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2Abstract
This thesis studies the development of bilateral relations in two pairs of states 
(dyads); Argentina-Brazil and Argentina-Chile. It takes on a moderate constructivist 
approach that incorporates into the analysis of international relations the role of 
identities, ideas and perceptions as well as of material forces, and understands that the 
former are affected and change during interaction. It also resorts to securitization theory 
to explain how issues come or cease to be considered security matters through social 
construction.
Using this framework, the thesis analyses how states within the dyads have 
gradually stopped viewing each other as threats to their security. For most of their 
history, they have defined their relationships in terms of rivalry, and have perceived one 
another accordingly. In turn, this has resulted in a situation of negative regional peace in 
the Southern Cone of Latin America. Since the late 1970s, however, mutual images 
have shifted, and the Southern Cone has evolved, alongside the dyads, toward a 
situation of positive peace.
The thesis argues that these bilateral rapprochement processes were set out by 
changes in domestic and international material situations, encouraging key actors in 
each state to reassess their interests and needs. These reassessed material considerations, 
coupled with particular ideologies and foreign policy traditions, reshaped the actors’ 
awareness of the scope of possible bilateral foreign policy actions. Thus, new political 
options came to be viewed as plausible, old ones were ruled out, or existing political 
trends were reinforced. Despite differences between the dyads, in time these processes 
led to the desecuritization of both bilateral relationships. Once the processes of 
desecuritization and rapprochement were set in motion in each dyad, they promoted 
changes in the perceptions of themselves, the other, and the relationship; a fact that has 
redounded to growth of mutual trust and the stabilisation of regional peace.
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9CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
During the twentieth century certain core regions of the world—most notably 
Western Europe, North America, and the North Atlantic area—have moved away from 
situations of balance of power and mere absence of war. Within these areas reasonable 
expectations of peace and peaceful change have become the norm, whilst the use of 
violence in bilateral as well as regional relationships has become simply inconceivable. 
In most instances the processes underpinning these changes began in the aftermaths of 
the Second World War, taking shape earlier or later depending on the region in 
question. By the end of the twentieth century, these areas can arguably be seen as zones 
of peace, and among those, some even have come to constitute zones of stable peace.
To many this conclusion may seem wishful thinking. In the present age of 
globalisation terrorism and international crime—and all the violence they involve— 
appear to reach, or at least to have the capacity to reach, every comer of the world. 
Peace and tranquillity cannot be guaranteed in any state any longer (if they ever could), 
regardless of how distant and remote that state may be from the centre of the 
international scene or how strong its defences may be. Recent events speak for 
themselves; there is no need to detail the many examples beyond 9/11 that confirm this 
trend.
Such argument is in tune with realist thinking in undermining any perception of 
stable regional peace. According to realists, states ultimately have to care for their own 
interests, even if at the expense of others, if they want to survive. In this self-help 
system, no one state should rely on another for its security, particularly in this era of 
non-state, transnational enemies. States may seek alliances and even multilateral action, 
yet “not out of goodwill or a rush to world government, but out of clear-eyed self- 
interest.”1
The existence of invasive terrorist activities and violence, and the persistence of 
realist mistrust do not denude, however, from the existence of geographic regions in 
which political dialogue and mutual trust have become the norm. The argument that the 
next chapters will develop and chart is how countries of the Southern Cone of Latin
1 The quote originally refers to the United States’ need to pursue a “hardheaded and legitimately 
multilateral and altruistic sensibility” in the aftermath of September 11th. M. J. Mazarr, 'Saved from 
Ourselves?,' Washington Quarterly vol. 25, no. 2 (2002), p. 225.
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America have followed a similar path, developing into a zone o f stable peace over the 
past twenty years. Nevertheless, in the one hundred and fifty years preceding the late 
1970s, relations between Argentina, Brazil and Chile were predominantly unstable and 
characterised by tension and mistrust, if not open hostility. The regional scenario was 
dominated by war plans, which made up a substantial part of their security doctrine, and 
were used as a justification for the expansion of defence budgets. By the early 1980s, 
however, the geopolitical environment had started to relax, and since then it has 
continued to improve.
1. What is the Southern Cone?
Before advancing into the argument, some of the geographical terms used in the 
chapters that follow must be clarified: partially to avoid confusion for readers not 
familiar with the terminology and, partially because some o f these terms are not at all 
unequivocal in their definition. Firstly, within this work, ‘the Americas’ are taken to 
mean one single continent, being constituted by the subregions of North, Central and 
South America, as well as the Caribbean. While this is how geography is conventionally 
taught from Mexico to the south, U.S. and Canadian literature usually hold that North 
and South America constitute two different continents. In the present study the terms 
‘the Americas,’ ‘Western Hemisphere,’ and ‘American continent’ will be all used as 
synonymous, and are understood according to the former definition.
Secondly, alongside the subdivision of the Americas into North, Central and South 
America, which is geographical, a secondary distinction can be made between Latin and 
Anglo-Saxon America, which refers to cultural and linguistic differences. The former 
geographic division is easily outlined: Canada, the U.S.A., and Mexico belong 
geographically to North America; Central America extends itself from Mexico’s 
southern border to the Isthmus of Panama; and South America, which begins to the 
south of the Isthmus of Panama, includes Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, 
French Guiana, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, and 
Argentina.
As well as the geographic division, however, it is important to define the cultural 
divide between Latin and Anglo-Saxon America. The latter provides an area covering 
Canada and the U.S.A., as well as the English speaking islands in the Caribbean. The 
former, meanwhile, incorporates all the Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries, 
including Mexico, regardless of whether they are geographically located in North,
11
Central, or South America.2 A further complication is introduced here by the fact that in 
Spanish, at least, it is also often talked of Spanish America (Hispanoamerica), stressing 
thus the difference between the former Spanish and Portuguese colonies.
With the exceptions of Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana, the whole of South 
America belongs to Latin America, although not all of Latin America is located in 
South America. Therefore, the terms Latin America and South America are not used 
here as exact synonyms. Some claims are going to be made about the whole of Latin 
America, whereas some others will just refer to South America, thereby excluding 
Central America and Mexico.
This seems sensible, given that despite Latin America sharing an important cultural 
heritage, many of the political, economic, social, and security questions differ 
immensely between its subregions. And this is true even within South America. For 
example, the Andean states are tied together by issues that combine guerrilla warfare 
and drug trading in a way that has so far had little impact on the Southern Cone. 
Similarly, the Amazon area has had its own regional dynamics regarding certain 
environmental problems, although sometimes these are further complicated by a 
spillover of the factors encountered in the Andean zone. Finally, the Southern Cone has 
its own distinct set of questions. As Selcher observes, “this region has been identified as 
particularly conflict prone, because it is the setting for numerous frontier disputes, 
resource conflicts, and the two major axes of historical interstate rivalry on the continent 
(Chile-Argentina and Argentina-Brazil).”3
Finally, the last term that needs some clarification is the one of ‘Southern Cone.’ 
Southern Cone refers to the shape on the map of the southernmost part of South 
America rather than to some strict and original affinity among the countries. But both 
history and vicinity have unquestionably left their mark on regional relationships. 
Unfortunately there is no unequivocal definition of the geographic limits of the 
Southern Cone. All authors agree that Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay are a 
part of it. However, many also include Brazil (or just its southern part) or Bolivia or 
both in their account of Southern Cone.
2 In addition to their cultural differences, in time the two Americas have also performed very 
differently regarding levels of economic, technological and industrial development achieved.
3 W. A. Selcher, 'Recent Strategic Developments in South America's Southern Cone,' in Heraldo 
Munoz and Joseph S. Tulchin (eds.), Latin American Nations in World Politics (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1984), p. 102.
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This study takes on the latter, broader approach, understanding that the Southern 
Cone encompasses all six states. It does so while acknowledging the difficulties 
involved in conceptually delimitating regions. As Andrew Hurrell points out,
contemporary debates remind us that there are no ‘natural’ regions, and
definitions of ‘region’ and indicators of ‘regionness’ vary according to the
particular problem or question under investigation. [...] Moreover it is how 
political actors perceive and interpret the idea of a region that is critical: all 
regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested.4
The Southern Cone is identified as a region, basing this claim more on the concept 
of Regional Security Complex (RSC) than on any positive process of regionalisation or 
regional integration.5 As will be discussed in chapter two, an RSC is distinguished by 
the interdependence of the security concerns and the security perceptions o f a set of 
units; in the present case these are states. These can be either positive or negative—that 
is, the RSC can be characterised by patterns of amity or enmity—although more
frequently the term has been used to describe the latter.
In the case of the Southern Cone, when the area originally grew into an RSC, it did 
so undoubtedly driven by patterns of enmity. The so-called A-B-C countries (Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile) have ever since been at its core. Rivalry and disagreements shaped the 
A-B-C into two pairs of states, or dyads, Argentina-Brazil and Argentina-Chile. They, 
in turn, have dragged the other, smaller states of Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay into the 
RSC. They did so in two ways that appear most distinctly in the case of Argentina and 
Brazil. First, the smaller neighbours were brought in by the larger states’ competition 
for influence, thereby functioning both as ‘prizes’ and as buffer states. Secondly, when 
the form of relationships eventually changed from negative to positive, when 
rapprochement started in the dyads, the smaller countries were attracted into the region, 
perceiving the higher costs of exclusion vis-a-vis the potential benefits of inclusion. The 
obvious and concrete example is the creation of Mercosur (or Mercosul, in Portuguese); 
an economic integration agreement of which Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
are at present fiill members, and Bolivia and Chile are associated members.6
4 A. Hurrell, 'Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,' Review o f International 
Studies vol. 21, no. 4 (1995), pp. 333-334.
5 For the concept of Regional Security Complex, see B. Buzan, People, State and Fear: An Agenda 
for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), chapter
5.
6 Mercosur stands for Common Market of the South (sometimes also translated as Southern Cone 
Common Market), and was created in 1991. Chapter seven deals with Mercosur in more detail.
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2. Research suiect
The main topic of the present research is the development of relationships within 
the dyads formed by Argentina and Chile, and Argentina and Brazil. In particular, the 
focus is on the positive transformation that they underwent over time. One of the central 
questions guiding this research is, thus, “why and how has the geopolitical agenda in the 
Southern Cone lost its prevalence over other issues?” Or, to put it another way, “why 
and how did desecuritization in the region develop?”
One could attempt to answer such questions on the basis of theories of 
interdependence and neoliberal institutionalism. These would argue that in an 
interdependent world—or rather, in the interdependent part of the world—the traditional 
realist distinction between high and low politics loses its relevance, and issues change 
their position in the agenda. However, the Southern Cone hardly conformed to the 
minimum requirements of interdependence in the 1970s and 1980s. This was a case of 
rapprochement followed by the construction of a regional integration project first, and 
growth of interdependence later. And even if it had not been so, the questions would 
still hold: why and how did it happen that countries in the Southern Cone increasingly 
ceased to behave according to realist premises, and started to observe the principles of 
interdependence? What made it possible for countries in this region to eventually rule 
out from their relationships geopolitical approaches, and instead start talking about co­
operation and integration? How can this transformation be explained?
A striking observation at the beginning of the research was the speed of the 
rapprochement that occurred between Argentina and Brazil, which allowed the 
relationship to move from open hostility to a comprehensive co-operation and 
integration project in a matter of some six years. It started initially in the sensitive field 
of nuclear technology, and resulted a few years later in Mercosur. How and why these 
states, still ruled by military regimes, managed to set in motion this process and 
favourably alter the perceptions of each other grew thus into a central research question.
A second focus of the research is on how and why improvements within the two 
dyads occurred at such different paces, despite a certain number of commonalities. For 
instance, both disputes escalated in the late 1970s, in both cases this happened after long 
histories of animosity, in neither case did war actually break out, and both 
rapprochement processes started when at least one of the states was still ruled by a
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military government.7 Yet besides these similarities, the processes were marked by 
several differences. Although the peaks of tension in the dyads were around the same 
period—in 1978 in the case of Argentina and Chile; throughout the 1970s in the case of 
Brazil and Argentina—the Argentine-Chilean rapprochement took considerably longer 
to take off. Once it started, its dynamic was completely different as well. Thus, another 
set of key questions informing this study refers to the reasons for such differences. What 
had precluded rapprochement in each case for so long? And what encouraged it to 
eventually occur? Why did these processes take such diverse paths, the Argentine- 
Brazilian rapprochement being much faster, more far-reaching and deeper than the 
rapprochement between Argentina and Chile?
Finally, after having observed these two dyads in a more systematic fashion, some 
other questions arise. Is desecuritization in the Southern Cone a regional trend? If it is, 
is it leading to a pluralistic security community? Is there room for formal security co­
operation, and eventually political integration, in the region?
In answering these questions, this study will first explore the particular domestic 
conditions of each of the three countries during the period that goes from the post 
Second World War until the 1980s, as well as the regional and hemispheric contexts. 
The focus will then shift to each of the two dyads, examining later the region in the 
1990s in order to discuss, in chapter seven, the transformations that followed the 
rapprochement processes. Throughout the study particular attention will be paid to the 
blend of security, economic and political aspects involved in these processes, as well as 
the security, economic, and political considerations of the actors.
This approach is thus different from those employed by the majority of previous 
studies. Apart from few exceptions that deal with rapprochement and integration in the 
Southern Cone in a more comprehensive manner,8 the region has been mostly studied
7 As just mentioned, when rapprochement started between Argentina and Brazil both countries were 
under military rule. In the case of Argentina and Chile, it started when General Pinochet was still in 
power while Argentina had already begun its democratic transition.
8 See A. Hurrell, 'Regionalism in the Americas,' in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), 
Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization and International Order (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995); A. Hurrell, 'An Emerging Security Community in South America?,' in Emanuel 
Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); 
I. Alcaniz, 'Slipping into Something More Comfortable: Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Integration and the 
Origins of the Mercosur,' in Georgi M. Derluguian and Scott L. Greer (eds.), Questioning Geopolitics: 
Political Projects in a Changing World-System (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000); F. Rojas Aravena (ed.), 
Argentina, Brasil y  Chile: Integracion y  Seguridad (Caracas, Venezuela: FLACSO-Chile and Editorial 
Nueva Sociedad, 1999); and A. M. Kacowicz, 'Stable Peace in South America: The ABC Triangle, 1979- 
1999,' in Arie M. Kacowicz, et al. (eds.), Stable Peace Among Nations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2000).
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either in economic terms—focusing on Mercosur9—or institutional terms—stressing the 
effect of regime change on the region.10 Additionally, research has focused either on 
Argentina and Brazil,11 or on Argentina and Chile,12 but rarely on the region as a whole 
or engaging in a comparative exercise of both dyads.
9 Among a vast literature, see for instance A. Arancibia, 'Comentario sobre Problemas y Perspectivas 
de Integracion Economica entre Chile y el MERCOSUR,' in Francisco Rojas Aravena and William C. 
Smith (eds.), El Cono Sur y  las Transformaciones Globales (Santiago de Chile: FLACSO/North South 
Center/Cladde, 1994); G. Arellano, 'La Integracion Economica y los Paradigmas en America Latina,' 
Revista Capitulos - Sistema Econdmico Latinoamericano (SELA), no. 49 (1997); R. Roett (ed.), 
Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1999); J. Cason, 'On the Road to Southern Cone Economic Integration,' Journal of Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs vol. 42, no. 1 (2000); P. R  D. Almeida, O MERCOSUL no Contexto Regional e 
Intemacional (Sao Paulo, Brazil: Edicoes Aduaneiras Ltda., 1993); M. I. Dugini de De Candido, 
Argentina, Chile, Mercosur: Cambios y  Continuidades (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Ciudad Argentina, 
1997); A. Ferrer, 'Mercosur: Trayectoria, Situation Actual y Perspectivas,' Desarrollo Econdmico Revista 
de Ciencias Sociales vol. 35, no. 140 (1996); E. Jelin et al., 'Mercosur: A Space for Interaction, a Space 
for Integration. A Research and Network Project,' produced by UNESCO/MOST, (1996) accessed: June 
2000, http://www.unesco.org/most/p80ext.htm; M. Rapoport (ed.), Argentina y  Brasil en el Mercosur: 
Politicos Comunes y  Alianzas Regionales (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1995); P. R. 
Schilling, Mercosul: Integracao ou Dominacao? (S.Paulo: CEDI, 1992); E. Rimoldi de Ladmann (ed.), 
Politico Exterior y  Tratados: Argentina, Chile, Mercosur (Buenos Aires: Ciudad Argentina, 1999); and I. 
M. Laredo, La Integracion Latinoamericano en el Actual Escenario Mundial: de la ALALC-ALADI al 
Mercosur (Rosario, Argentina: UNR Editora, 1992).
10 Again among a vast literature, see J. I. Dominguez (ed.), International Security and Democracy: 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1998); D. Fournier, The Alfonsin Administration and the Promotion of Democratic Values in the 
Southern Cone and the Andes,' Journal o f Latin American Studies vol. 31, no. 1 (1999); B. Galjart and P. 
Silva (eds.), Democratization and the State in the Southern Cone: Essays on South American Politics 
(Amsterdam: Center for Latin American Research and Documentation, 1989); M. Hirst, 'Security 
Policies, Democratization, and Regional Integration in the Southern Cone,' in Jorge I. Dominguez (ed.), 
International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era 
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998); M. Hirst and R. Russell, Democraciay Politico 
Exterior: los Casos de Argentina y  Brasil (Buenos Aires: FLACSO, 1987); J. Linz and A. Stepan, 
Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post- 
Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); G. O'donnell, 'The United States, 
Latin America, Democracy: Variations on a Very Old Theme,' in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico 
(eds.), The United States and Latin America in the1980s: Contending Perspectives on a Decade of Crisis 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986); K. L. Remmer, 'Does Democracy Promote Interstate 
Cooperation? Lessons from the Mercosur Region,' International Studies Quarterly vol. 42, no. 1 (1998); 
R. Russell, 'Democratization and its Qualitative Impact on Argentine Foreign Policy,' Documentos de 
Trabajo no. 27, (Buenos Aires: ISEN-Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Intemacional y 
Culto, December 1998); P. Silva, 'Democratization and Foreign Policy: The Cases of Argentina and 
Brazil,' in Benno Galjart and Patricio Silva (eds.), Democratization and the State in the Southern Cone: 
Essays on South American Politics (Amsterdam: Center for Latin American Research and 
Documentation, 1989); W. C. Smith, C. H. Acuna, and E. A. Gamarra (eds.), Democracy, Markets, and 
Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (Boulder, CO: 
University of Miami North-South Center Press, 1994); and C. H. Acuna and W. C. Smith, 'Politica y 
"Economia Militar" en el Cono Sur: Democracia, Production de Armamentos y Carrera Armamentista en 
Argentina, Brasil y Chile,' Desarrollo Econdmico vol. 34, no. 135 (1994).
11 For instance, R. Russell and J. G. Tokatlian, 'El Lugar de Brasil en la Politica Exterior Argentina: 
La Vision del Otro,' manuscript; M. A. Scenna, Argentina-Brasil: Cuatro Siglos de Rivalidad (Buenos 
Aires: Ediciones La Bastilla, 1975); M. Serrano, 'Brazil and Argentina,' in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. 
Litwak (eds.), Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994); M. Mena et al., 'Las Politicas Educativas y de Ciencia y Tecnica,' in Mario Rapoport (ed.), 
Argentina y  Brasil en el Mercosur: Politicos Comunes y  Alianzas Regionales (Buenos Aires: Grupo 
Editor Latinoamericano, 1995); H. J. Rosenbaum, 'Argentina-Brazilian Relations: A Critical Juncture,' 
World Today vol. 29 (1973); E. Solingen, Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining: 
Designing Nuclear Industries in Argentina and Brazil (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
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It is claimed here that economic co-operation and integration between the countries 
in the region have only been possible because major changes in these states’ 
relationships had taken place, and this, in turn, had an effect on the Southern Cone as a 
whole. The next few pages give a background to, and summarise, the nature of this 
shift, as it is understood in this work.
The 1980s and 1990s are seen in sharp contrast to the period between the 1940s and 
1970s. The 1980s were greeted in the Southern Cone with goodwill, rapprochement 
processes, a more viable economic co-operation project than those attempted in the 
1960s and 1970s, and improved relations between the new democracies. On the 
contrary, the period of the Second World War and the three subsequent decades was 
characterised by political dissent, foreign policy disagreements, competition for regional 
prestige and natural resources, and territorial disputes. In addition, the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s were marked by very hostile domestic political and economic conditions in most 
of Latin America.
In domestic politics, the 1960s and 1970s distinguished South America by its 
institutional instability and successive coups d’etat. Repeatedly, military regimes seized 
and stayed in power in Argentina (1962-1963, 1966-1973, and 1976-1983), Bolivia 
(1964-1966, 1969-1978, 1978-1979, and 1980-1982), Brazil (1964-1985), Chile (1973- 
1990), Ecuador (1963-1968 and 1972-1978), Paraguay (1954-1989), Peru (1962-1963, 
1968-1975, and 1975-1980), and Uruguay (1973-1985).
In the region, the Cold War took the form of violent clashes between left-wing 
guerrilla and terrorist movements on the one side, and military governments that carried
1996); J. R. Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson 
Center, 1995); J. H. Herrera Vega, 'Las Politicas Exteriores de la Argentina y del Brasil,' Documentos de 
Trabajo no. 10, (Buenos Aires: ISEN-Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Intemacional y 
Culto, September 1995); R. Diamint, 'Argentina y Brasil frente al Nuevo Orden Mundial,' Revista 
Seguridad Estrategica Regional vol. 6 (1994); J. C. Carasales, 'Los Ejemplares Acuerdos Argentina- 
Brasil sobre Transparencia y Cooperacion Nuclear,' Geopolltica vol. 20, no. 53 (1994); M. Olmos, La 
Cooperacion Argentina-Brasil: Nucleo Impulsor de la Integracion Latinoamericana (Buenos Aires: 
Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, 1986); and L. S. D. Aragao e Frota, Brasil -Argentina: Divergencias 
e Convergencias (Brasilia: Centro Grafico do Senado Federal, 1991).
12 For example, M. A. Scenna, Argentina-Chile: Una Frontera Caliente (Buenos Aires: Editorial de 
Belgrano, 1981); C. Fuentes, Chile - Argentina: el Proceso de Construir Confianza (Santiago de Chile: 
FLACSO-Chile, 1996); J. L. de Imaz and G. Lagos, 'Cooperacion y Conflicto entre Argentina y Chile: El 
Triunfo de la Paz,' in Ganar la Paz: Encuentro Universitario Argentino-Chileno (Buenos Aires: Editorial 
de Belgrano, 1984); T. S. Di Telia (ed.), Argentina-Chile: iDesarrollos Paralelos? (Buenos Aires: 
Nuevohacer/Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1997); J. G. Valdes Soublette, La Politica Exterior de Chile 
y  el Proceso de Integracion con Argentina (Buenos Aires: CARI, 1999); C. W. Pastor, 'Chile: La Guerra 
o la Paz. 1978-1981,' in Silvia Ruth Jalabe (ed.), La Politica Exterior Argentina y  sus Protagonistas. 
1880-1995 (Buenos Aires: CARI-Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1996); A. Amuchastegui Astrada, 
Argentina-Chile: Controversia y  Mediacion (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Ghersi, 1980); G. Lagos Carmona, 
Historia de las Fronteras de Chile: Los Tratados de Limites con Argentina (Santiago de Chile: Editorial 
Andres Bello, 1980); and F. Orrego Vicuna (ed.), Chile y  Argentina: Nuevos Enfoquespara una Relacion 
Constructiva (Santiago de Chile: Pehuen Editores, 1989).
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out fierce repression and state terrorism (i.e. the State employing terrorist techniques 
outside the law with the purpose o f fighting terrorism) on the other. The governments of 
the Southern Cone managed to set up a quite efficient co-operation scheme concerning 
their repressive activities—the Condor Plan—which has lately been the focus of 
thorough investigations. It constituted a system of trans-border exchange of intelligence 
information and illegally detained prisoners between the military governments of
1 'IArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Moreover, this enterprise counted on the blessing of the U.S. government of the time.14
In terms of international security, during this period members of nationalist factions 
often held key governmental offices. All too frequently, strategic and geopolitical 
perspectives, and regional war hypotheses dominated the foreign and defence policy 
agendas. The decade of the 1970s is paradigmatic of this regional disposition. In the 
Southern Cone the dispute between Argentina and Brazil involving water resources in 
the River Parana (part of the River Plate Basin) took hitherto unseen dimensions. In 
addition, in 1978 Argentina and Chile found themselves on the verge of war due to 
longstanding territorial disagreements. These cases were by no means isolated in the 
region. Throughout its history, South America has been far from a peaceful region, 
despite the relative absence of major wars. Historic animosities between states have 
been synthesised by Federico More already in 1918 as follows:
Brazil and Argentina, but foremost Argentina, have fallen into the sin o f  
believing that it is up to them to lead South America. [. . .] As it is known, when 
Brazil took sides with Yanquilandia [the United States] during the war against 
Germany, it asked in exchange to be Washington’s deputy in South America.
[...] Brazil is the most dangerous country in the continent [...]. Between Chile 
and Brazil there is something o f  an alliance [...] and together with Chile and 
Brazil there are Ecuador and Colombia. The friendship between Santiago and 
Rio has to do with their common rivalry with Argentina; the one o f  Quito and 
Bogota with Santiago has to do with their common rivalry with Peru.15
Most of these patterns survived throughout the twentieth century. Clearly, the 
absence of major armed conflicts did not prevent South American states from engaging 
in arms races, a practice that became more extended during the 1960s and 1970s. The
13 E. Gosman, 'El Desplume del Plan Condor,' Clarin Digital, (Buenos Aires: 28 May 2000), 
http: //www. clarin. com. ar/suplementos/zona/2000-05-28/i-00301 e.htm.
14 J. C. Alganaraz, 'Revelan Datos de la CIA sobre el Plan Condor,' Clarin Digital, (Buenos Aires: 23 
July 1999), http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/99-07-23/t-01201d.htm; D. Jean Schemo, 'Revelan un Apoyo 
Clave de EE.UU. al Plan Condor,' Clarin Digital, (Buenos Aires: 7 March 2001), 
http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2001-03-07/i-02815.htm; and especially A. Baron, 'La Alianza de 
Uruguay y los EE.UU. en el Plan Condor,' Clarin Digital, (Buenos Aires: 2 September 2001), 
http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2001-09-02/i-03001.htm.
15 Quoted in A. Benavides Correa, Habra Guerra Proximamenle en el Cono Sur? America Latina, 
Explosiva Caldera Geopolitica (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1974) p. 31, my translation.
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dispute over hydroelectric resources in the River Plate Basin fed military spending both 
in Argentina and Brazil, and served as a justification for some of the largest arms 
purchases in the history of the region. The dispute between Argentina and Chile over 
the Beagle Channel also encouraged a significant expansion of their military budgets. 
While those disputes brought Argentina’s adversaries closer together—which was 
reflected for instance in Brazil’s arms sales to Chile—, Argentina moved closer to 
Bolivia and Peru, exporting arms to these countries. Not surprisingly, Bolivia and Peru, 
in turn, have historically held territorial claims on Chile that come from the time of the 
Pacific War (1879-1884). Despite Chile being an arms importer itself, it also exported 
arms to Ecuador, a state in conflict with Peru over a region rich in natural and energy 
resources. This dispute dates back to the Peruvian occupation of Ecuadorian territory in 
1942.16 And this list could go on.
David Mares argues along these lines in his Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate 
Bargaining in Latin America, where the author points out that in spite of appearances 
“the use of violence across national boundaries has been a consistent trait of Latin 
America’s international politics.”17 Furthermore, Mares highlights the entangled and 
interconnected nature of the region’s conflicts by illustrating how “Central American 
balance of power dynamics, the Nicaragua-Colombia territorial dispute, and the 1995 
war between Ecuador and Peru provide more contemporary examples of the indirect 
links among distinct bilateral conflicts.”18
Throughout the period of the 1960s to 1980s, the economy of region saw different 
states implement successively import substitution and protectionist policies, inward- 
looking industrialisation programmes, socialism, and neoliberal and unilateral 
deregulation and privatisation schemes. Most of these projects resulted in, at best, short­
lived successes. More often, however, they simply failed to achieve their basic 
objectives, which typically comprised industrialisation, stabilisation of economic 
variables, reduction of inflation, and redistribution.
16 A. Varas, Militarization and the International Arms Race in Latin America (Boulder and London: 
Westview Press, 1985) pp. 54-56.
17 D. R  Mares, Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001) p. 28. See also his 'Regional Conflict Management in Latin America: 
Power Complemented by Diplomacy,' in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: 
Building Security in a New World (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); and 
D. M. Mares and S. A. Bernstein, 'The Use of Force in Latin American Interstate Relations,' in Jorge I. 
Dominguez (ed.), International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post- 
Cold War Era (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998).
18 Mares, Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America, pp. 29-30. Latin 
American conflicts are discussed again in more detail in chapter four of this thesis.
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However contradictory, those decades also witnessed attempts to set up economic 
co-operation schemes in Latin America. As chapter four discusses, all too frequently a 
rather wishful rhetoric would be at odds with the major states’ actual attitudes towards 
the region. In 1960 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay 
signed a treaty creating the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), to which 
later Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia also adhered. The goal o f this 
Association was to raise intra-Latin American trade through tariffs reduction. The 
programme did not prosper in the long run, and the same countries that took part in 
LAFTA tried to renew their commitment transforming it in 1980 into its successor 
LAIA, the Latin American Integration Association. However, also LAIA’s 
achievements fell short of its original targets, and once more, Latin America failed to 
accomplish the goal of achieving a sustained project of regional integration.
In the context of consecutive fruitless integration efforts and tense bilateral and 
regional relationships, the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement appears as a curious 
occurrence; an even more remarkable development as it started under two military 
governments. Equally extraordinary seems to be the bilateral economic co-operation 
scheme that unfolded soon after the first steps were taken; the 1986 PICE (Economic 
Integration and Co-operation Programme—Programa de Integracion y  Cooperacion 
Economica), which was in turn ensued by the creation of the Common Market of the 
Southern Cone, Mercosur. As Philip Kelly notes,
The Brazilian-Argentine rivalry for regional leadership has solidified the 
continental checkerboard, made shatterbelts more likely, kept frontier tensions 
high, and prevented regional integration. Yet, o f  late, because o f  the potential 
for profit through South American economic integration and diplomatic cooling 
between Brazil and the United States, conflict has changed to cooperation 
between the two states. This represents a monumental reversal o f  traditional 
geopolitics, and the two countries’ foreign policies and resources now seem to 
be melding into an integrative structure o f regional peace.19
Nevertheless, as already noted, the Argentine-Chilean relationship evolved quite 
differently. It advanced at an undeniably more cautious, and therefore clearly slower, 
pace. Having also had an extremely tense relationship in the 1970s—which almost 
resulted in a war in 1978, literally avoided in the last minute—co-operation and deeper 
rapprochement first came in the late 1990s. Only then the consideration of the bilateral 
use of force was completely and confidently ruled out. Reasons for this longer and 
slower process are of course various and complex ones. Among the most commonly
19 P. Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: the Geopolitics o f South America (Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, 1997) p. 2.
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alleged factors, the long Chilean military dictatorship and its much later transition 
towards democracy, as well as the fact that the pending disputes with Argentina were 
about territory, have certainly played a role.
Yet beyond the most frequent arguments that explain rapprochement in the 
Southern Cone, which usually rely on type and change of regime, it will be suggested 
here that further factors played a decisive role. These have to do with the self-perception 
and the perception of the other. That is, how a state—usually through its government, 
and more certainly so in the case o f military regimes, such as the Southern Cone’s ones 
in the 1970s—sees itself, perceives its needs, strengths and vulnerabilities, and ranks its 
priorities accordingly, and how it sees others; in this case bordering neighbours and the 
further region surrounding it, as well as the global context.
Such an approach is in line with the central ideas involved in constructivist 
perspectives, which in general claim,
[f]irst, that, in contrast to rationalist theories, we need to pay far more attention 
to the processes by which both interests and identities are created and evolve, to 
the ways in which self-images interact with changing material incentives, and to 
the language and discourse through which these understandings are expressed; 
second, that it matters how actors interpret the world and how their 
understandings o f ‘where they belong’ are formed; and third, that both interests 
and identities are shaped by particular histories and cultures, by domestic 
factors and by ongoing processes of interaction with other states.20
As chapter two discusses more closely, such an approach does not neglect material 
incentives and material forces. Nevertheless, the latter do not constitute the only or main 
factors explaining international behaviour. On the contrary, the ‘moderate’ 
constructivist perspective21 chosen here assumes that material incentives as well as 
“shared knowledge, learning, ideational forces, and normative and institutional 
structures,” and their inter-subjective constitution are key to understanding the way 
states behave and “the ways in which interests and identities change over time.”22 This 
comes somewhat closer to Alexander Wendt’s position, as opposed to more reflectivist, 
post-modern or discursive branches of constructivism:
brute material forces— the true ‘material base’— can still have independent 
effects [...]. These effects interact with interests and culture to dispose social 
action and systems in certain directions and not others. The term ‘interaction’ is
20 Hurrell, 'Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,' pp. 352-353.
21 For a collection of constructivist essays that are positioned in different points between the two 
extreme poles of rationalism and reflectivism, see T. Christiansen, K. E. Jorgensen, and A. Wiener (eds.), 
The Social Construction o f Europe (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, and New Delhi: SAGE, 2001), 
particularly their Introduction (pp. 1-19), where the differences between the several constructivist 
positions are spelt out.
22 Hurrell, 'Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,' p. 353.
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significant here, since it means that at some level material forces are constituted 
independent o f  society, and affect society in a causal way. Material forces are 
not constituted solely by social meanings, and social meanings are not immune 
to material effects. On the other hand, it is only because o f  their interaction with 
ideas that material forces have the effects that they do.23
Thus, the next chapters try to explain the process of change of perception of self and 
other that took place in the Southern Cone and that allowed rapprochement, or 
desecuritization, to advance. It will be claimed that the reassessment of one country’s 
own vulnerabilities and needs is crucial to the way a country perceives itself and others. 
In particular, it will be argued that the process of desecuritization between Argentina 
and Brazil can only be understood in the context of their perception of deterioration or 
failure of their individual economic projects, especially in the late 1970s. Hence the 
serious consideration given, for the first time in a serious manner, to economic co­
operation, which was the original goal of rapprochement. This was combined with a 
tradition both in Brazil and Argentina o f a high profile in regional affairs, given that 
they were both competing for regional leadership, which ruled out the option of 
isolationism from their range of alternatives.
Conversely, in the late 1970s Chile seemed to be improving its overall economic 
performance, even if later this proved to be a short-lived success. Therefore, its sense of 
economic vulnerability and need to co-operate did not seem so urgent as to encourage 
rapprochement with Argentina. Additionally, Chile had never pursued a policy of 
hegemony towards the region, although it had historically held a high profile in 
international affairs. The Pinochet administration openly put an end to this tradition, 
focusing mainly on international trade but dismissing other areas of international affairs. 
This government did not appear too worried about international political isolationism.
Argentina’s and Brazil’s transitions towards democracy would reinforce the vision 
that political and economic co-operation were fundamental for their purposes. There is 
little discussion about the fact that Mercosur was bom as a strategic ‘development 
alliance’ with clear political and economic goals: institutional (democratic) and 
economic stabilisation, economic growth, and increase o f political leverage in 
international affairs. Riordan Roett writes
in 1991, driven by a shared belief that economic integration and harmonization 
was the best way to push forward the process o f regional economic stabilization
23 A. Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
pp. 111-112.
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and ultimately to end the cycle o f hyperinflation and economic mismanagement, 
Mercosur came into existence with the Treaty o f Asuncion.24
Although I share with the author this conclusion, it will be argued here that the 
belief Roett talks about had been developed much earlier than he acknowledges.
In order to build up my argument, I have extensively reviewed secondary sources, 
including historical, as well as political, economic and social academic accounts. I have 
also relied on a number of chapters and volumes written by political leaders and state 
officials of the period under study. Newspapers and official documents have also been 
an important part of this research. The personal interviews with many of the 
protagonists of the events that I had so closely studied were highly stimulating. Mostly 
between March and April 2001,1 met with former ambassadors and former ministers o f 
government, as well as academic specialists, in Buenos Aires, Rio and Brasilia.
I have briefly introduced so far some important clarifications, the principal subject 
of this research, some of its core questions and assumptions, and its relevance. The 
remainder of this introduction outlines, chapter by chapter, the plan of the thesis.
3. Plan of the thesis
The thesis builds one cohesive argument, but covers different aspects of analysis 
through four parts, each of which consists of two chapters. Part I acts as a general 
introduction to, and theoretical framework for, the present research. It comprises 
chapters one and two, which are this introduction and the theoretical chapter, 
respectively.
Chapter two, “Theories of Regional Security and Peace,” proceeds in consecutive 
steps laying out the theoretical approach that this study adopts. It does so by first 
reviewing the concept of region, the difficulties defining regions, and the advantages o f 
taking a regional approach, focusing, in particular, on the notion of Regional Security 
Complex. It then examines the debate on international security as it has developed in the 
last two or three decades, concentrating next on the constructivist Securitization 
Approach. The relevance of this latter section rests on the fact that it presents the notion 
of ‘securitization,’ which will be then used throughout this research to study the 
processes of desecuritization of the Southern Cone. Through such processes states in the 
region progressively ceased to perceive one another as potential enemies, and began to 
allow the idea of potential partnership to grow. In addition, it is argued that along with
24 R. Roett, 'Introduction,1 in Riordan Roett (ed.), Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets 
(Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 1.
23
desecuritization a process of stabilisation and consolidation of peace took shape. 
Consequently, the concept of peace is discussed in some detail, peace hypotheses are 
reviewed, and a regional peace scale is constructed to differentiate between several 
types o f peace, including the category of Security Community as the deepest and most 
consolidated type of international peace in a region.
Part II addresses the ‘contexts’ surrounding the dyadic relationships, examining 
these from the domestic and regional perspectives. Chapter three, on “Domestic 
Conditions,” provides a discussion of the particular direction taken by Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile especially during the 1970s, the underpinning principles of their policies, and 
the consequences of such policies. Its primary focus is on the political and economic 
ideologies and performance of the different governments, and on how these affected 
their vision of the regional and global contexts, and their perception of strengths and 
weaknesses, of options and opportunities. The argument contends that in the case o f 
Argentina and Brazil, political and economic conjunctures and a tradition of high profile 
in regional affairs combined in such a way to allow the broadening o f the perceived 
range of policy options, and to favour rapprochement. It will be shown that in Chile’s 
case, its domestic situation and the government’s lack o f interest in regional or 
international politics resulted in the perception that there was no need to consider a 
broader range of policy alternatives.
Chapter four, “The Hemispheric Context,” looks at different aspects o f the broader 
regional background. It highlights the fact that the regional context was highly hostile to 
co-operation over many years, despite rhetoric to the contrary and several attempts to 
formalise co-operative projects. In so doing, this chapter reviews and discusses several 
hemispheric/continental regimes, pointing out the usually contradicting expectations 
held by the United States and the Latin American countries, and the generally 
detrimental effect that the presence of the superpower had on a continent of rather weak 
states. The chapter then examines the history of disputes in Latin America, showing that 
in spite of the relative absence of major wars, it is inappropriate to define Latin America 
as a region of stable peace. Finally, it discusses Latin America’s two major economic 
integration attempts prior to 1980, LAFTA and LAI A, explaining their poor outcomes 
in terms of the unreceptive regional context.
The Third Part shifts the focus to case studies of the two dyads, each in its own 
chapter. The objective of this part is to examine the peaks of tension in either dyad and 
the ensuing processes of rapprochement in the terms of the framework developed in 
chapter two, as well as taking into account the countries’ domestic circumstances,
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reviewed in chapter three. Both chapters have a similar structure in order to highlight 
differences and similarities between the cases.
The first of the pair, chapter five, entitled “Bilateral Relations between Argentina 
and Chile,” explores briefly the history of the relationship between the two, and 
discusses how the construction and adoption of negative mutual perceptions resulted in 
an oscillation between fragile and unstable peace. This was clearly reflected in the 
development of the Beagle Channel dispute, and of other territorial issues. As will be 
seen, attempts to solve such issues often resulted in very protracted negotiations, which 
in turn slowed down and delayed the desecuritization process and the improvement of 
the quality of bilateral peace.
The sixth chapter is on “Bilateral Relations between Argentina and Brazil.” As with 
chapter five, it pays particular attention to their historic construction of mutual rivalry as 
the dominant dyadic logic, and to the main ‘concrete’ dispute that these states had, one 
that came close to escalating, although it was kept within the limits of diplomacy. The 
issue at stake was the construction of dams on the River Parana for the exploitation of 
its hydroelectric resources at Itaipu and Corpus. In addition, the attempts by both 
countries to develop nuclear capabilities in the context of their longstanding competition 
also receives a thorough examination, not least because it was in this sensitive field that 
Argentina and Brazil made the first steps towards co-operation immediately after 
resolving the Itaipu-Corpus dispute. Those first steps were rapidly followed by 
increasing desecuritization and notable efforts on the part of the governments to 
improve the relationship and deepen integration.
Finally, Part IV returns to the Southern Cone region after the processes of 
rapprochement and desecuritization, and draws some final conclusions from the central 
arguments of the previous chapters. In chapter seven, “Regional Integration in the 
Southern Cone,” some implications of the integration initiative that resulted in Mercosur 
are considered. By looking at its original state-driven conception, its slow consolidation 
and expansion, its underpinning political principles, and the spillover of its success into 
the societies, I discuss whether Mercosur to some extent helped to develop a common 
‘identification’—a softer term than ‘identity.’ This chapter also addresses the more 
recent debate about whether integration should spill over into security by assessing the 
state of affairs in the military field and the timid emergence of a sense of community.
The concluding chapter summarises the main themes discussed in this dissertation, 
raises some questions about the current situation in a region that seems never to be fully 
‘at peace’ with itself, and, hopefully, opens the way for new discussions.
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORIES OF REGIONAL SECURITY AND PEACE
1. Introduction
The key focus of this thesis is, as already discussed, the processes of bilateral 
rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil, and Argentina and Chile. In trying to 
explain the causes of the rapid and far reaching development of the former dyad vis-a- 
vis the slower and less committed development of the latter dyad, I will study and 
compare domestic economic and political conditions in all three countries, their foreign 
policy orientations, and the evolution of their bilateral relations. The focus is mostly on 
the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, for it was then that both relationships reached their 
peak of tension to be followed by processes of rapprochement. The underlying 
assumption is that both domestic and international circumstances influenced the way in 
which political actors and elites perceived the needs of their countries, and the way they 
ranked their countries’ priorities. These perceptions were also influenced by existing 
foreign policy traditions or historical foreign policy orientations. The combination of 
perceptions and foreign policy tradition translated, consequently, into a particular set of 
policy attitudes towards their neighbours (see Figure 2.1).
International and domestic political 
and economic circumstances
Foreign policy traditions and historyPerception of priorities and needs
Foreign policy decisions/orientation
Figure 2.1: Basic process of formation of foreign policy orientation
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This chapter discusses the theoretical framework that informs my research, which, 
conceptually, deals with processes o f increasing and decreasing bilateral—and 
ultimately regional—tension. Moreover, as this chapter seeks to understand how 
geopolitical considerations may be subject to the influence of concerns originating in 
other areas of politics, it will need to examine broader approaches to security than what 
traditional strategic studies have to offer, since their focus is almost exclusively on 
military affairs.
This interest comes from the more empirical observation of the Argentine-Brazilian 
detente of the 1980s, as opposed to the longer-lasting Argentine-Chilean animosity. 
This thesis argues that in the late 1970s domestic and international concerns both in 
Argentina and Brazil became so unfavourable that the consideration that bilateral co­
operation could bring about benefits promoted the easing of tension between the two in 
spite of traditional geopolitical attitudes. Conversely, a relatively positive (even if short­
lived) political and economic outcome in Chile after the 1973 coup discouraged a 
rapprochement with its immediate neighbour, at a time when nationalism and doctrinal 
geopolitics were predominant on both sides of the Andes. The underlying claim is that 
non-military issues have had a major influence on the security agenda, advancing or 
hindering a change of vision of the neighbouring state, and consequently a change of 
attitude with regard to longstanding bilateral disputes. Therefore, the relationship 
between military and non-military issues needs to be explored more closely, as well as 
its relationship to the concept of security.
In this context, the notions of securitization and desecuritization are central to this 
research, as they conceptualise the increasing and easing of tension from a constructivist 
perspective. Social constructivism highlights that facts and evidence are as important in 
the making of policy as perceptions, attitudes and the presentation of those very facts by 
policymakers (or securitizing agents, as will be discussed shortly), as well as past 
history and traditions. In addition, a revision of the concept of peace seems appropriate 
in order to contextualize this research, given that in the cases studied here no actual war 
was fought.
Different IR theories explain the absence of war by different means. The argument 
that democracy has a powerful effect on the incidence of peaceful relations has become 
something of an accepted ‘natural law’ in the discipline. While not disputing this, the 
present dissertation deals with cases in which the process of stabilisation of peace began 
under at least one military regime. Therefore, an underlying claim is that under certain 
circumstances military governments may advance the stabilisation of peace as
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effectively as democracies. A stable and consolidated peace implies a certain quality of 
peace, substantially different from a more negative, unstable type. This becomes 
apparent when stable peace is contrasted with peace as the mere absence of war. As will 
be seen below, in the last decade or two numerous scholars have discussed the concepts 
of peace, stable peace and pluralistic security community, paying particular attention to 
the role of identities, perceptions, and trust; that is, taking on board constructivist 
notions. To be sure, in the same way as security studies have been approached by 
constructivism, similar considerations have permeated peace theories.
This thesis claims that the eventual improvement in the relationship o f each dyad 
has had a regional impact, improving in turn the quality of regional peace. Chapter one 
has highlighted the relevance of the chosen empirical cases. This chapter offers a 
theoretical basis to support the study of these dyads. It argues that they constitute two 
subsystems of a same regional security complex. Therefore, the regional security 
complex approach is the subject of the second section of this chapter. The third section 
turns to the debate on security studies and places it within IR theory. The securitization 
approach, developed by the so-called Copenhagen School, is identified as one of the 
attempts to redefine and set new boundaries to the field of security studies. While taking 
a critical view of some aspects of their approach, I borrow some of their concepts, and 
generally share with the Copenhagen School the belief that a constructivist approach 
can make important contributions to our understanding of international relations. 
Consequently, the fourth part discusses the concepts of securitization and 
desecuritization in more depth.
Section five turns to peace. It reviews first, fairly conventional peace hypotheses as 
put forward by different IR schools, and second, peace scales or gradations that refer to 
regional peace. Here I build up a typology that is helpful in understanding the 
developments in the Southern Cone. In its third part, this section introduces a 
constructivist model to understand the evolution of peace, centred on the concept of 
trust. Lastly, the concluding section integrates the ideas previously discussed, presenting 
some final thoughts on the theoretical approach informing this thesis.
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2. A Regional Approach
2.1. The region as a level of analysis
The classic distinction between the three images or levels of analysis drawn by 
Kenneth Waltz is widely known to IR scholars.1 According to his structural realism, 
there have been attempts to explain the international behaviour of states by focusing on 
personality and psychological features of statespersons, or by focusing on the features 
and characteristics of societies and states themselves. Waltz calls these levels of 
analyses the first and second images. However, both these approaches to international 
politics, according to Waltz, are reductionisms; they miss ‘the whole’ that rules 
international dynamics. The systemic level or third image, rather than the first and 
second images, is the key for building up a theory to account for international politics, 
since it is the international system that constrains the units’ international behaviour.
In Theory o f International Politics, Waltz is much more resolute in his assertions 
about the capital importance of the third image than in Man, the State and War, 
published some twenty years earlier. In the latter book, devoted to the cause of war, 
Waltz emphasises the importance of the third image while also stressing the need to 
look at the other two levels. Thus, he concludes,
The third image describes the framework o f world politics, but without the first 
and second images there can be no knowledge o f the forces that determine 
policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but 
without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict 
their results.2
An instance that seems to be absent from this analysis is the region, both as an 
analytical focus and as a discernible ‘image’ that may also condition the state’s external 
behaviour. However, I would argue that focusing on regions pushes us to take a more 
comprehensive perspective; more than if the focus is on other levels. When the analysis 
concentrates on a region, it becomes crucial a) to study the domestic circumstances of 
the states involved, given that their effect on regional dynamics is more immediate (and 
therefore more apparent) than the effect they are likely to exert on global dynamics, b) 
to examine the relationships between regional states, and c) to assess the influence on
1 K. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A theoretical analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1959); and K. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publisher Co., 
1979).
2 K. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A theoretical analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1959), p. 238.
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the region of extra-regional powers and of the international system as a whole. The 
same is true for the study of dyads.
The conception and development of the European Community conveniently 
highlights these points. A full appreciation of the formation of the European 
Community should not and cannot neglect the background of the Second World War, 
the historical rivalry between France and Germany, the context of the Cold War, and the 
role of the U.S. in Western Europe. Moreover, regional relations in Latin America 
during the 1960s and 1970s also illustrate the importance of comprehensive analyses. 
Domestic conditions dominated by the presence of guerrilla, terrorism, and chaos, the 
widespread reach of nationalist ideologies and high incidence of military regimes, and 
the spread of communist and socialist ideas in the region, combined with the role of the 
U.S. as the continental hegemon. All this shaped the Cold War in the region and 
accentuated the already contemptuous character of regional relations in Latin America.
The creation of Mercosur may serve as another example. Even when extra-regional 
powers did not seem to have played an obvious role, the constitution o f Mercosur is 
difficult to understand if global trends towards globalisation, regionalisation, and the 
building up of economic blocs are overlooked. But domestic circumstances of the 
demise of military governments, redemocratisation, and the need to be integrated into 
the world economy on the domestic side, and the overcoming of disputes and the 
consequent improvement of relations between Brazil and Argentina on the regional side, 
are also crucial factors in understanding the creation of Mercosur. Thus, pure inside-out 
or bottom-up analyses that explain regional outcomes by looking solely at the units 
appear rather incomplete, in the same way as pure top-down approaches do.
Indeed, the neorealist/systemic approach, as developed in Theory o f International 
Politics, fails to appreciate the effects that individual states may exert on regional 
dynamics. Not to recognise the role of domestic configurations in the shaping of 
regional relations seems to be missing (or at least underestimating) the ‘raw material’ on 
which the structure works. Regional analyses, more clearly than other types of analyses, 
demand attention to both systemic and unit factors in order to explain the functioning of 
regional dynamics.
In this sense, regional and dyadic approaches favour, and even force attention to all 
other three levels of analyses (personalities/bureaucracies, societies/state, global 
system). They emphasise the reciprocity of impact between the region and its external 
influences, on the one hand, and the region and its units, on the other. They highlight the 
interaction between all levels. Furthermore, regions should not be studied as isolated
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‘small global systems,’ even if they may resemble the system’s dynamics in many 
aspects. This is the way in which neorealists tend to analyse regions.3 In some respects, 
subsystems may reproduce a systemic logic, but precisely because they are open to the 
influence of the global system in which they are located—and the global system is not 
subject to any other higher influence!—they cannot be understood as mere minute 
reproductions of the global system.
At the same time, even if each region has its own set of patterns and features, its 
own internal dynamics, some general patterns identified in a particular region may 
result useful to understand others. Furthermore, some regions do share general patterns 
of behaviour. Broadly speaking, it is possible to sort regions into large categories in 
accordance with their most distinctive features. For instance, regions characterised by 
amity, ideological and cultural affinity, trade and interdependence can be sorted out 
from those distinguished by rivalry, conflict, and violence. The latter can surely be 
subdivided according to the level of violence and the type o f predominating conflict, be 
it territorial or border disputes, hegemonic competition or competition for regional 
prestige, ethnic struggles, ideological conflicts, and others.
A comparative analysis of regions with similar relational patterns can highlight 
commonalities and differences, thus facilitating the development of a more solid 
theoretical body for each category. The theory of complex interdependence, for 
instance, constitutes a study of the main features of a certain type of region in which 
commercial exchange and economic interdependence stand out. While studying almost 
the same region although aiming to explain a different outcome, Karl Deutsch’s, and 
later Adler and Barnett’s volumes on security communities are attempts to look 
systematically at regions in which a sense of community has arisen.4
In this sense, regions are neither mini-systems, whose characteristics can be 
universalised, nor totally unique phenomena in the international system. Some degree of 
generalisation is feasible, even if at the same time a great deal of attention must be paid 
to the internal dynamics distinctive of each region.5 Thus, a regional approach taking on 
a multilevel perspective is the approach endorsed here.
3 D. A. Lake and P. M. Morgan, 'New Regionalism in Security Affairs,1 in David A. Lake and Patrick 
M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 8.
4 R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1977); K. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light o f Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); E. 
Adler and M. N. Bamett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
5 Lake and Morgan, 'New Regionalism in Security Affairs,' pp. 8-11.
2.2. Regional Security Complexes and the boundaries of regions
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The choice of taking a regional approach raises other questions, such as the 
definition of the region’s boundaries. This problem comes up less frequently when the 
focus of analysis is on the state. Unless the discussion is on a state with highly contested 
borders, states are generally historically defined units with internationally recognised 
boundaries. If the focus is instead on the systemic level, then the problem of the 
boundaries does not apply, as the analysis encompasses the entire system Regions, 
instead, are territorial subsystems held together by a feature of the wider international 
system. The chosen feature may vary; for instance, it can be trade, common culture, or 
security/insecurity relationships. The key element in all o f them is the territorial 
proximity of the units.6
As the present thesis concentrates on the political and security relations of two 
dyads in the Southern Cone, the remainder of this section reviews the concept of 
Regional Security Complex (RSC), as developed by Barry Buzan in People, State and 
Fear: An Agenda fo r  International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, and 
revised later with a constructivist turn in Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis? 
What follows is not intended to be an exhaustive appraisal of Buzan’s theory, but rather 
seeks only to highlight some aspects of the RSC approach most relevant to this research. 
The main concern in this part is to back up conceptually the choice of states under 
study.
According to People, State and Fear, from a security perspective, “‘region’ means 
that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states 
whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.”8 
Such a geographical subsystem must show durable, significant and self-contained 
features of the security problem, where self-contained means not “totally free standing, 
but rather a security dynamic that would exist even if other actors [extra-regional 
powers, for instance] did not impinge on it.”9 Thus, an RSC is defined as a set of two or
6 Other types of grouping different from regions are possible, even if taking into consideration the 
same variables. For instance, the states of the Commonwealth of Nations claim cultural affinity. That may 
make them a subsystem. However, it does not make them a region, as they do not have territorial 
proximity.
7 See B. Buzan, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post- 
Cold War Era (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), chapter 5 Regional Security, pp. 186-229; and B. 
Buzan, O. Waever, and J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998).
8 Buzan, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War 
Era, p. 188.
9 Ibid., p. 187, brackets added.
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more states within a particular geographical area, whose primary security perceptions 
and concerns are interlinked so closely that their national security problems cannot be 
reasonably analysed apart from one another.10 That is, states in such a complex are 
engaged in a relationship of security interdependence. This, in turn, might be either 
negative or positive, as security complexes need not imply only enmity patterns.
The border of a regional security complex can thus be placed where 
interdependence becomes low, and security perceptions and concerns become 
characterised by relative indifference. In this manner, it is the distinctive pattern of 
security interdependence of an RSC that marks off the members of such a complex from 
other neighbouring states. Usually, regional security complexes will also include some 
smaller states less powerful than those constituting the core of the complex. Mostly, 
they will have little impact on the structure of the complex, but their alignment with one 
or the other major regional power can potentially become crucial. As will be discussed 
in chapter six, a great deal of the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry was dominated by their 
efforts to bring Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia into their spheres of influence. In a 
similar manner, historical territorial disputes between Chile and Argentina encouraged 
them to covertly assist whatever other state—regional or otherwise, as illustrated by 
Chile’s assistance to Great Britain during the Falklands War—held a cause against the 
other one.
A final feature of this theoretical approach that I find valuable is its emphasis on the 
historical context in which complexes develop, and the consequent importance given to 
processes of change, which could actually be defined as the general topic of this 
research. Certainly, RSC theory manages to avoid a frequent criticism to which 
structural realism is subject, and that is that of ahistoricism. Given that structural 
realism developed with the explicit goal of founding a systemic theory that could 
produce something similar to the general laws of natural sciences in order to be able to 
predict outcomes in international politics, it was often criticised for referring to system- 
level abstractions detached from their historical context.
Instead, security complexes are understood to be durable, rather than permanent 
features of the global system. They are subsystems in which structural changes may 
occur. According to Buzan, they may happen due to changes in a) the arrangements of 
the units (for instance, partitions or integration processes), b) the relational patterns 
(amity/enmity), and c) the distribution of power among the principal units. These three
10 See ibid., p. 190, and Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, p. 12.
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variables are defined as components o f the essential structure.n The changes may have 
either purely internal causes or may be fed by extra-regional intervention, as illustrated 
by the case of an extra-regional power arming up one state in the complex or otherwise 
actively supporting it.
In any case, changes in any of these components may bring about major 
redefinitions of the complex. Some of these transformations can be quite dramatic 
indeed. I would argue that in cases of major structural changes new complexes can 
come into existence, old complexes can dissolve, and the same complexes can stay, but 
suffering alterations in their relational patterns, i.e. they may shift away from a negative 
security dynamic towards a positive one, or vice versa.
a) RSC formation in Latin America
This can be nicely illustrated by a quick revision of interstate relations in Latin 
America. After decolonisation and independence, neither Latin America as a whole nor 
any of its subregions constituted a security complex. Mostly, territorial borders ran 
either through high mountains, dense jungles, or unpopulated deserts, and the newly 
independent states were more concerned with institutionally organising themselves than 
with demarcating every comer of their territory. But by the 1880s border disagreements 
started to arise, some of which have survived to this day. Thus, in the years that 
followed, South America grew into a security complex separated from the Central 
American one; one that could be analysed in its own right, as suggested in chapter one.
However, by the 1960s, and more clearly by the 1970s, the Southern Cone could be 
separated as a subcomplex of the South American complex, with its three main actors, 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and the smaller Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, playing 
balancing games, keeping revisionist claims alive, and staying very vigilant on strategic 
changes and extra-regional influences. The main disputes arising in the region involved 
Argentina with either Brazil or Chile. While these disputes can be relatively isolated 
from other security spirals taking place further north, they can hardly be considered 
totally isolated from one another. It need not be pointed out that Argentina was well 
aware of the fact that it could not afford to face major conflicts on two fronts
11 Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, pp. 13-15. In Buzan, 
People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 211- 
221, only two essential components are accounted for, a) the patterns of amity and enmity, and b) the 
distribution of power among the principal states.
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simultaneously; indeed a fact of which its neighbours were well aware, too! This, 
naturally, entered into the calculations of all o f them.12
Moreover, the Southern Cone can be seen as an autonomous security complex after 
the noteworthy transformations undergone in the 1980s and 1990s, when it shifted away 
from being a zone of unstable peace towards becoming a zone o f stable peace.13 Indeed, 
in the 1990s the Southern Cone could be set apart as a complex on its own characterised 
by amity patterns, as opposed to the northern part of South America, where some 
conflict-prone relational features persist.
b) Weaknesses o f the RSC approach
While the premises of the RSC approach appear valuable in defining the Southern 
Cone as a regional security complex, it seems equally pertinent to point out two 
important weaknesses of classical RSC approach as presented in 1991. These 
weaknesses stand out under the light of this particular research and its cases, and 
become more apparent the further the Cold War falls behind.14
Firstly, even though its second edition was published when the Cold War had 
already come to end, and explicitly trying to overcome a Europe-centred perspective, 
RSC theory still lays excessive weight on great power rivalry and on the way it 
impinges upon local security complexes, with the likely outcome of suppressing 
indigenous security dynamics. This effect is called overlay. The most conspicuous 
examples of overlay have been Europe and Northeast Asia, and earlier, the period of 
European colonialism in Africa and Asia. Buzan suggests, in addition, that great power 
penetration can also be unipolar, having then a similar effect to overlay and 
consequently suppressing local conflicts, and illustrates this with the American role in 
Latin America and the Soviet role in Eastern Europe. However, upon a closer look, the
12 Wayne A. Selcher also argues that the Southern Cone constitutes “a loose but active subsystem [...] 
identified as particularly conflict prone, because it is the setting for numerous frontier disputes, resource 
conflicts, and the two major axes of historical interstate rivalry on the continent (Chile-Argentina and 
Argentina-Brazil).” See W. A. Selcher, 'Recent Strategic Developments in South America's Southern 
Cone,' in Heraldo Munoz and Joseph S. Tulchin (eds.), Latin American Nations in World Politics 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 102-103.
13 See section 5.2 on peace scales.
14 For thorough revisions of RSC approach, see P. M. Morgan, 'Regional Security Complexes and 
Regional Orders,' in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in 
a New World (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 1997); D. A. Lake, 'Regional Security 
Complexes: A Systems Approach,' in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: 
Building Security in a New World (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Y. F. 
Khong, 'ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex,' in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan 
(eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1997), pp. 318-322.
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Latin American example, at least, turns out to be much more complex than that. In the 
Southern Cone superpower and ideological rivalry did not permeate interstate relations 
but rather domestically oriented military violence against revolutionary armed groups 
and civil movements. From an ideological point of view, the governments of the 
Southern Cone showed a fairly homogeneous nature during most of the 1970s. 
However, it is during this period that interstate tension escalated the most, contrary to 
what overlay would suggest. As will be discussed in chapter six, the United States as an 
extra-regional power had a significant impact on the Argentine-Brazilian relationship, 
having usually a double, contradictory effect. At times, foreign policy towards the U.S. 
helped to intensify mutual distrust in the local security complex. This happened when 
Brazil proclaimed alignment with the U.S., whereas Argentina conducted a foreign 
policy o f open opposition to the United States. At other times, in contrast, American 
policy towards the region helped to highlight both areas of coincidence between 
Argentina and Brazil and room for policy coordination to oppose the U.S.. This was 
particularly the effect of the United States’ non-proliferation and human rights policies.
The second deficiency probably originates in the fact that RSC theory is indeed 
heavily informed by structural realism, as well as in the already mentioned weighty role 
assigned to the overlay phenomenon. As a consequence, the influence of the global 
system or the higher-level complex on lower-level complexes is extensively elaborated 
upon at the expense of neglecting the effects of changes in the internal composition of 
states on local complexes. As just seen, a security complex may be redefined by major 
shifts in either the patterns of amity and enmity, or in the distribution of power among 
its main states. Changes in the distribution of power, it was noted, can have internal or 
external sources, but other than that, “the logic is the same as that for analysing the 
polarity of the system as a whole.”15 Instead, changes in amity/enmity patterns “occur 
either because an existing dispute has been resolved, or because new disputes have 
developed.”16 How those changes happen; what triggers them; why states may 
eventually be willing to resolve their disputes—all this seems to fall within the black 
box of the state, beyond the reach of the approach.
The regional shift from enmity to amity in the subcomplex o f the Southern Cone is 
the focus of the present research. In order to understand the process that took place in 
the region, domestic, bilateral, regional and global factors will be evaluated. The broad
15 Buzan, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War 
Era, p. 211.
16 Ibid., p. 213.
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principles of such an approach have indeed been advanced by RSC theory. Most 
importantly, however, RSC theory informed the delimitation of the selected region and 
the choice of the two dyads as the key regional components.
3. The Security Debate
3.1.Narrowers
Barry Buzan’s RSC theory, and, furthermore, his broader framework of security, 
which differentiates five major sectors of security,17 came to join an ongoing debate on 
security studies that had started in the 1980s. Indeed, in the last decades security has 
become a very contested concept. Its definition has been the object of multiple 
interpretations, while many scholars have elaborated new definitions. This was probably 
the result, at least partly, o f the development in military technology, particularly of 
nuclear arms, and the end of the Cold War; both of which have challenged traditional 
understandings of security and stimulated new thinking about it.
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the rise of a debate about security. Very 
schematically, two ‘sides’ could be identified: those who understand the concept of 
security ‘narrowly’ and those who understand it ‘widely.’18 The narrow definition of 
security has its grounds in the classical Strategic Studies, which were dominant during 
the Cold War. Traditionally, the meaning of security has involved any issue that has to 
do with the threat or use of force by an external aggressor against a state. Accordingly, 
even post-Cold War revised realist approaches to security refer primarily to the military 
agenda. They see national security in military terms and strongly reject attempts to 
broaden its content too widely. In this thinking, the nation-state plays a central role as 
the (almost exclusive) focus of security policy.19
17 The idea of the five sectors was first presented in Buzan, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for 
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, and then further developed in Buzan, Waever, 
and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis.
18 Krause and Williams differentiate between attempts to ‘broaden’ the security agenda—that is, to 
include a wider range of potential threats to the neorealist conception of security—and attempts to 
‘deepen’ it—that is, to move either down to the level of individuals or human security, or up to the level 
of international or global security, where regional and societal security would appear as possible 
intermediate levels. See K. Krause and M. C. Williams, 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: 
Politics and Methods,' Mershon International Studies Review vol. 40, no. 2 (1996).
19 See, for instance, the often-quoted renovated realist defence of a narrow security agenda by Stephen 
Walt, S. Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies,' International Studies Quarterly vol. 35, no. 2 
(1991); and the response by E. A. Kolodziej, 'Renaissance of Security Studies? Caveat Lector!,' 
International Studies Quarterly vol. 36, no. 4 (1992) See, also J. Mearsheimer, 'A Realist Response,' 
International Security vol. 20, no. 1 (1995); and J. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International 
Institutions,' International Security vol. 19, no. 3 (1994/1995).
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This traditional thinking is intellectually rooted in the realist school of International 
Relations (IR). Founded on a Hobbesian approach to IR, it regards the international 
system as a ‘state of nature,’ an anarchic, self-help scenario, where nation-states 
struggle for survival, and the way they do it is through the accumulation of military 
power. For classical realist/neorealist authors, such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth 
Waltz, it is military power that ensures the state, through deterrence, its security.20 This 
overwhelming preoccupation with national security led them to make military issues a 
top priority in policy agendas and IR academic research. In the context of the Cold War, 
and with the pre-eminence of American schools in political science and IR, this was 
indeed what happened. As a consequence, issues on the agenda came to be divided into 
‘high politics’ and ‘low politics,’ where high politics had to do with military security 
and security through diplomatic means, nuclear weapons policy, national security, and 
conventional warfare. Meanwhile, economy, trade, social policy, ecology, and all other 
issues belonged to the realm of low politics.
However, as Krause and Williams note, it is not just that contemporary 
realists/neorealists advocate for a narrow perspective and a specific ontology based on 
an implicit Hobbesian heritage. In addition, they ground the study of security, as well as 
IR in general, in a particular understanding of evolutionary and scientific knowledge; 
one which claims to represent objective, cumulative, necessary, useful and practical 
knowledge. This seems to confer them authority to define the limits of the very debate 
about security; to determine what is security and what is not, what can be discussed in 
the field of security studies and what cannot.21 Contrary to their claim to knowledge, 
especially after the end of the Cold War (but also before) realists/neorealists’ 
foundations appear to be challenged both from an epistemological point of view and for 
their limited capacity to explain new international conditions.
An alternative tradition in IR—although sharing with neorealist theories important 
underlying premises, such as a pessimistic conception of the human condition in the 
state of nature, and a methodological individualist assumption, both of which allow 
them to view the international system as anarchic, the state as a unitary actor, and its 
behaviour as rational22—is neoliberalism, with its variants liberal-institutionalism and
20 See H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r Power and Peace (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1993); and Waltz, Theory o f International Politics.
21 K. Krause and M. C. Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security 
Studies,' in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
22 This is further explored in Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical 
Security Studies.'
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complex interdependence. This school stresses the potential for co-operation and order 
in the international system, rather than its inclination toward conflict, and point at entire 
regions ruled by such logic as opposed to the logic of geopolitics. These are regions that 
tend to grant higher value to the benefits of trade, exchange, and industrial development, 
than territorial gains and military balance games.
However, these authors recognise, even in such regions where liberal democracy 
and economic interdependence shape interstate relations not all is harmonious. Tension 
and disagreements may arise, although related to commercial and economic matters 
rather than to territorial, ideological, ethnic, or religious issues. But given the prospects 
of absolute gains that interdependence highlights, the role o f regional institutions, and 
the costs and unpopularity of wars, disputes tend to be settled without recourse to 
military threats, hence not constituting military security problems. In this sense, 
neoliberals underline the role of international institutions, multilateralism, integration, 
non-state actors, and trade in inducing states to conduct peaceful relations.23
As hinted, these principles apply to the analysis of only certain intraregional 
relations. History shows that democracy, economic development, and interdependence 
may exert a positive influence on the relationship between like-minded countries, but 
not necessarily between democratic and developed countries, on the one side, and 
countries ruled by other types of regimes and/or in other stages of industrial 
development, on the other. Thus, wars between Western and non-Western states, or 
developed and Third World states have been rather frequent lately.
3.2. Wideners
In the last two decades or so, critical voices of the realist perspective have called 
into question the very basic principles of realism in a way that neoliberalism had not; a 
fact explained by their profound epistemological coincidences. With regard to security, 
in particular, they claimed that new analyses and definitions were needed in order to 
reflect the end of bipolarity and other global changes, as well as the security realities of 
non-Westem, non-superpower, and even non-state actors. Their argument for a broader 
approach to security studies provoked, as expected, a heated debate in the field. These
23 See, for instance, R. O. Keohane and L. L. Martin, 'The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,' 
International Security vol. 20, no. 1 (1995); R. O. Keohane, 'Institutionalist Theory and the Realist 
Challenge after the Cold War,' in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); R. N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the 
Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modem World (New York: Basic Books, 1986); and R. 
Axelrod and R. O. Keohane, 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,' in 
Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
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voices have been raised from different sources, amounting to an eclectic choir rather 
than a consonant theory.24 Where they are all in agreement is that “in a highly 
interdependent world facing multiple security threats [...] [a] state-centric analysis, 
which focuses exclusively on the political/military dimensions of security, is no longer 
adequate.”25
Critical scholars have emphasised the existence of non-military dimensions of 
security that encompass issues such as failure to provide basic needs (food, health, 
housing, money), environmental degradation, natural disasters, crime, drug trafficking, 
and demography, among others. The nature of these ‘new threats’ also denounces their 
critical view of the traditional exclusivity of the state as referent object and provider of 
security. They stress, conversely, that an adequate analysis of security demands 
consideration of the individual level as well, arguing that the security of the individual 
is often not reducible to the security of the state. Krause and Williams identify three 
overlapping arguments that reorientate the debate, exposing the ways in which 
individual security may conflict with claims of state security.26 The first regards 
individuals as right-bearing persons. Therefore, it understands that
protection o f individuals within a community is not equated with support for 
states, and this leads to a focus on individual human rights and the promotion o f  
the rule o f law, which protects persons from each other and from predatory state 
institutions.
The second focus is on individuals as citizens or members o f a society, and thus it 
highlights the fact that “the most direct threats to individuals can come not from the 
anarchic world of international relations and the citizens of other states, but from the 
institutions of organized violence of their own state.” Finally, the third argument 
understands individuals as being members of a transcendent global community 
(humanity), which brings to light a great deal of common global concerns, such as 
environmental threats. Here, the state as a sufficient security provider is called into
24 A. Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics,' International Security vol. 20, no. 1 (1995), p. 71. 
For broader approaches to security see the Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and 
Security Issues, Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament (London: Pan Books, 1982); G. 
Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (St. Leonards, N.S.W.: 
Allen and Unwin, 1993); J. Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining Security,' Foreign Affairs vol. 68, no. 2 
(1989); M. Serrano, 'Latin America,' in Paul Stares (ed.), The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey 
(Tokio/New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998); R. Ullman, 'Redefining Security,' 
International Security vol. 8, no. 1 (1983); and others quoted below. In general, it can be said that critical 
theory is a family of theories that includes postmodernists, constructivists, neo-Marxists, feminists, and 
others.
25 J. A. Tickner, 'Re-Visioning Security,' in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations 
Theory Today (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), p. 178.
26 The quotes that follow are all from Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations 
of Critical Security Studies,' pp. 44-45.
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question, as, for instance, many of these common global threats can be met by no one 
state alone.
In this manner, rather than the national security of the state, critical scholars call for 
a comprehensive understanding of security that deals with both the global and 
individual dimensions of security. As feminist authors often highlight, “the unitary state 
actor model favoured by realists conceals the extent to which individuals’ insecurities 
are dependent on race, class and gender, categories that also cross state and regional 
boundaries.”27
A broader perspective of security should “look at the ways in which the objects to 
be secured, the perceptions of threats to them, and the available means of securing them 
(both intellectual and material) have shifted over time.”28 However, as critical authors 
acknowledge, “the alternative ways of studying security [...] possess their difficulties, 
and they also all present considerable epistemological challenges.” They have been 
“conspicuously vague or even silent” about how conditions o f stability and security can 
be achieved, and often understate “the importance of the ideas, institutions, and 
instruments of organized physical violence” in its direct and brutal form.29
The focus of these alternative approaches to security is often perceived as a variety 
of diffuse societal challenges to individual and collective well-being posed by a wide 
range of different threats, not exclusively embodied by states. The room for national 
security policy, and for international security as a field of study, becomes as a result too 
complex, broad and vague. In fact, the very boundary between security and public 
policy, and security and social policy, becomes rather blurred. Security understood in 
this broad sense expands its reach to the detriment of its capacity to offer a defined 
meaning that would serve both the development of a theoretical body, and the 
understanding of current events and subsequent policy making. Trying to highlight these 
difficulties, Ronnie Lipschutz asks himself,
What, in the final analysis, is being secured? If ozone holes are a threat, is the 
enemy us? If immigrants are a threat, do police become soldiers? If the 
economic competitiveness o f our allies is a threat, is corporate America to be 
protected against leveraged buyouts by foreign capital or against those who 
have been fired during self-protective downsizing? If one social group threatens 
the mores o f another, are there front lines in the “culture wars?”30
27 Tickner, 'Re-Visioning Security,' p. 192.
28 Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,' p. 49.
29 All quotes are from Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical 
Security Studies,' pp. 51-52.
30 R. Lipschutz, 'On Security,' in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed.), On Security (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995), pp. 14-15.
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While such critical approaches have enriched the debate, posed new and important 
questions, and vigorously challenged traditional accounts—all facts that in themselves 
should be welcomed, as they encourage more and better creative thinking—their 
perspective often appears to be too broad. In other words, they stretch the meaning of 
security so much that finally everything—and thus nothing in particular—may end up 
being a security problem. Security runs the risk of losing its focus, as it may refer to a 
general question of social order encompassing all possible sources of threats posed to a 
large variety of objects of security (individuals, social groups, states, mankind, etc.).
However, it also seems reasonable to question the narrow definition of security. As 
defined by traditional Strategic Studies it proves to be too narrow a concept to analyse 
current security concerns of states, regions and even the global system, not to mention 
the security concerns of non-state actors, such as nations. Since the mid-1980s it has 
become apparent that there are non-military threats to security that are left untouched by 
the traditional approach dominant during the Cold War. As expressed by Simon Dalby, 
critical approaches to security have raised
the crucial issue o f whether the discursive practices o f  Cold War security 
policy, premised on the necessity o f ensuring military preparedness, 
maintaining secrecy, and working out strategies for using nuclear weapons in 
international conflict, really offer a useful policy approach or scholarly 
framework for dealing with political problems o f  economic dislocation, political 
violence, the growing numbers o f refugees, environmental degradation, and the 
failure to think or act seriously concerning questions o f sustainable livelihoods 
around the globe.31
The works of the so-called Copenhagen School, which emerged from the 
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) with Barry Buzan and Ole Waever 
among its most prolific members, constituted an attempt in the direction of bridging this 
gap. Building upon the scholars’ previous developments, such as Buzan’s RSC and 
sectors of security, and Waever’s securitization/desecuritization, they envisaged an 
approach that tried to reflect the new reality o f not exclusively military security while 
retaining a specific meaning of security that would allow the differentiation between
31 S. Dalby, 'Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security 
Discourses,' in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and 
Cases (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 4.
32 See, for instance, O. Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization,' in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed.), On 
Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), and O. Waever, 'Insecurity, Security, and 
Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community,' in Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett (eds.), 
Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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security policy and non-security policy.33 After a route focusing on European security, 
this rather theoretical project materialised in their 1998 book Security, a New 
Framework fo r Analysis
The next section draws upon their treatment of the processes of securitization and 
desecuritization, and explains the relevance to the present research. Rather than revising 
the Copenhagen School’s whole agenda, which is unquestionably much larger than what 
this research intends to cover, it just focuses on some elements of the securitization 
approach.35 In the end, it suggests amending the slightly neglected definition of 
emergency measures, a key element in securitization. And it does so by arguing that if 
the component of violence—or rather, the consideration of violence—is brought back 
in, it would help to differentiate more clearly between security and non-security.36 In 
addition, the presence of the consideration of use of force, even if eventually not used, 
helps highlight the existence of different qualities of peace, which is the topic of section 
four.
4. Securitization Approach
Given the room left between narrowers and wideners to develop a theory that 
envisages a broader, yet coherent and discernible, definition of security, the 
Copenhagen School sought to find coherence by “exploring the logic of security itself to 
find out what differentiates security and the process o f securitization from that which is 
merely political.”37 This project entailed not yet a new list o f threats to account for a
33 J. Huysmans, 'Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security Studies 
Agenda in Europe,' European Journal o f International Relations vol. 4, no. 4 (1998), p. 487. See this 
essay also for a review of how the Copenhagen School developed the ideas of security sectors, the 
meaning of security, and regional security dynamics.
34 Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. For their previous works, 
see E. Jahn, P. Lemaitre, and O. Waever, Copenhagen Papers 1. European Security - Problems of 
Research on Non-Military Aspects (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1987); O. 
Waever, P. Lemaitre, and E. Tromer (eds.), European Polyphony: Perspectives beyond East-West 
Confrontation (London: Macmillan, 1989); B. Buzan et al., The European Security Order Recast: 
Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (London: Pinter, 1990); and O. Waever et al. (eds.), Identity, 
Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993).
35 For more thorough revisions of and other critiques to their works, see for instance B. McSweeney, 
'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,' Review o f International Studies vol. 22, no. 1 
(1996); Huysmans, 'Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security Studies 
Agenda in Europe;’ J. Eriksson, 'Observers or Advocates? On the Political Role of Security Analysts,' 
Cooperation and Conflict vol. 34, no. 3 (1999); and L. Hansen, 'The Little Mermaid's Silent Security 
Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School,' Millennium: Journal o f International 
Studies vol. 29, no. 2 (2000).
36 For a critique similar to the one presented below, although calling back for a much narrower 
understanding of security, see O. F. Knudsen, 'Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing 
Securitization,' Security Dialogue vol. 32, no. 3 (2001).
37 Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, p. 5.
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new definition of security, but rather a search for the logic that drives the securitization 
process; that is, the process by which issues come to be seen as security matters.38
The answer, in Waever’s words, lies in the specificity of security, which “is to be 
found in the field  and in certain typical operations within the field (speech acts— 
‘security’—and modalities—threat-defense sequences), not in a clearly definable 
objective (‘security’) or a specific state of affairs (‘security’).”39 Building upon 
language theory, Waever argues that ‘security’ can be regarded as a speech act: the mere 
invocation of something using the word ‘security’ declares its threatening nature, 
“invokes the image of what would happen if it [security] did not work,”40 thereby 
justifying the use of extraordinary measures to counter it.
Security, hence, is the realm where emergency measures beyond ordinary political 
procedures become allowed. When an issue makes it into the sphere of security because 
it has been successfully presented as a threat, then it has been securitized. In other 
words, securitization is the process by which a securitizing actor succeeds in presenting 
a threat or vulnerability as an existential threat to a referent object, thereby attaining 
endorsement for emergency measures. These measures would otherwise not have been 
legitimised by the audience.
Several elements need to be disaggregated from this basic definition in order to 
understand its implications and be able to make a substantial criticism of the approach. 
The remaining part of this section concentrates on the process of securitization, 
discusses what I find to be an important drawback of the theory, and suggests an 
amendment for the approach to regain coherence.
In the process of securitization five components play a key role; referent object, 
securitizing actors, threats, securitizing audience, and emergency measures. As it is 
argued below, the approach loses consistency because the nature of the emergency 
measures that are to be legitimised is left ill-defined, which results in the securitization 
approach, suffering from similar weaknesses as other wide approaches to security. But 
let us start revising the elements of the securitization process.
First, the referent object refers to what is being declared as existentially threatened 
and as having a legitimate claim to survival. Traditionally, this has been the state. When
38 Also Jef Huysmans argues that “although the debate on expanding the security agenda to non­
military sectors and non-state referent objects launched an interesting discussion about the security 
(studies) agenda, it has not really dealt with the meaning of security.” J. Huysmans, 'Security! What Do 
You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier,' European Journal o f International Relations vol. 4, no. 2 
(1998), p. 226.
39 Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization,' p. 51.
40 Ole Wasver, “Security the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word,” quoted in Waever, 
'Securitization and Desecuritization,' p. 61.
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the state’s territory, for instance, is seen as threatened, it can be argued that the state’s 
survival is at risk. Another recurrent referent object has been the nation. In this case, the 
survival of its collective identity is claimed to be at risk (societal sector of security).41 
But if one accepts that securitization is a modality of operation rather than a closed list 
of threats, then “a much more open spectrum of possibilities has to be allowed. In 
principle, securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object.” 
However, as the authors of Security: A New Framework fo r Analysis acknowledge, 
certain types of referent objects are more likely to be successfully securitized, and this 
tends to be the case when the “security action is [...] taken on behalf of, and with 
reference to, a collectivity.”42 In this sense, it can be said that security is, even today, a 
state-dominated field, “in which the state is still generally privileged as the actor 
historically endowed with security tasks and most adequately structured for the
5)43purpose.
Besides the military sector (with the state as its referent object) and the societal 
sector (with collective identity at its heart), the securitization approach differentiates 
another three sectors of security. Traditionally, the political sector has also enjoyed pre­
eminence. Political security deals with non-military threats to sovereignty both o f states 
and other political units. Threats can “typically be made to either the external pillar of 
stability—recognition—or the internal pillar of stability—legitimacy.”44 Furthermore, 
there are also the environmental and economic sectors, where referent objects can vary 
widely, and are sometimes difficult to pin down.
The division into five different sectors of security is analytical rather than empirical. 
In reality, security issues tend to interconnect and cut across different sectors, mutually 
affecting one another. For instance, economic policy has major impacts on the political 
and societal sectors, and links to military security in complex ways as well. Conversely, 
military policy has powerful long-term effects on economic standing. The societal 
sector may have a parochial dimension or a cosmopolitan one, depending on the feeling 
of threat to identity or culture by migrations or general foreign influence. From a 
parochial point of view, the mobilisation of public opinion behind a ‘societal threat’ 
leads to a power-security dilemma through its impact on political perception and 
military behaviour. The cosmopolitan element in the societal sector, reflected in the idea
41 Societal security is centred on collective identity. It is important to differentiate it from social 
security, which is about individuals and is largely economic.
42 Both quotes are from Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, p.
36.
43 Ibid., p. 37.
44 Ibid., p. 145.
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of an international society, in contrast, facilitates both the pursuit o f joint gains, and the 
avoidance of joint loss in many areas of military, political, economic and environmental 
policy.45
The second element in the security action is the securitizing actor. Securitizing 
actors are different from their referent objects. They speak on behalf of them, they 
declare referent objects as existentially threatened, thus performing the security speech 
act. Securitizing actors can be state officials, governments, bureaucracies, leaders of 
political, national or religious parties, the armed forces, environmental groups, 
lobbyists, and pressure groups, among many others.
Thirdly, there are the threats, which have to be presented as existentially 
endangering a referent object in order to have a chance of successful securitization. The 
threats need to be seen as putting at risk the very survival o f the referent object. 
According to the proposed wider agenda, in the same way as referent objects vary 
across the different sectors of security, so varies the nature of threats.
It is important to note, however, that the question is not so much about the presence 
of a real existential threat, but rather about the fact that it be presented and perceived as 
such. This relates to the constructivist (rather than objectivist) perspective of 
securitization, which conceives security as a specific form of social praxis. In the words 
of the authors,
Security issues are made security by acts o f securitization. We do not try to 
peek behind this to decide whether it is really a threat (which would reduce the 
entire securitization approach to a theory o f  perceptions and misperception).
Security is a quality actors inject into issues by securitizing them, which means 
to stage them on the political arena [...] and then to have them accepted by a 
sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defensive moves.46
In a similar vein, Jef Huysmans implicitly understands security as a speech act, and 
argues that security in a thick signifier approach “becomes self-referential. It does not 
refer to an external, objective reality but establishes a security situation by itself. It is 
the enunciation of the signifier which constitutes an (insecurity condition.”47
The definition of security as socially constructed implies that it is not simply a 
subjective perception of threats; it is not a matter that individuals decide alone, but has 
instead an intersubjective character. Consequently, the actual content of the concept of 
security is built up by the securitizing actor in a delicate bargaining process with the
45 See Buzan, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
War Era, chapter 10 “Concluding thoughts on international security studies.”
46 Words are in italics in the original. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for  
Analysis, p. 204.
47 Huysmans, 'Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier,' p. 232.
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legitimising audience on the grounds of actual facts. Once those facts are extensively 
perceived as existentially endangering something and make it into the security agenda, 
they translate into security policy. The process of securitization is then mostly a political 
choice. It is the combination of both facts and the successful spread of perceptions of 
threat that makes up security and becomes security policy.
Hence, the fourth element capital to securitization: the audience. The audience is 
who, in a more active or more passive way, accepts (or not) the discourse of 
securitization and renders possible the adoption of emergency measures, as it legitimises 
the breach of rules. Often the audience is ‘public opinion.’ However, and partly 
depending on the type of society or type of regime, a relevant audience can be made up 
of pressure groups, or political, military, intellectual and other elites. The audience is 
crucial in the process, as “the security act is negotiated between securitizer and 
audience—that is, internally within the unit.” Thus, “successful securitization is not 
decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech act.” 48
The fifth  component, finally, is the emergency measures that become legitimised, 
regardless of whether in the end they are implemented or not. Unfortunately, the authors 
leave this component, which I find to be key, rather loose and ill-defined. The most that 
is said about these emergency measures is that they break ordinary rules, they become 
absolute priorities, and they are actions outside the normal bound of political procedure.
However, emergency measures are the key to understanding why, when the authors 
explore one by one each security sector at the different levels (local, regional, global), 
they find the economic and environmental sectors to be, but for few occasions, rather 
difficult to securitize.49 I suggest that while referent objects, threats, actors and 
audiences may be specific to, and different in, each sector of security, the emergency 
measures that become legitimised have one commonality across the board. They have to 
refer in some way to the threat or use of force, or to its avoidance, even if it means to 
argue that “if this [the emergency measure] is not done, the situation may become 
violent/may require the use of violence.” It is this that will make an issue a security 
matter. In other words, the type of legitimated emergency measure is key to 
differentiating a process of securitization from one of politicisation. Whilst 
politicisation may also imply policy priority, mobilisation of resources, urgency and
48 Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, p. 26 and p. 31.
49 This is not to say that these issues cannot be successfully securitized. Below are some examples of 
such securitization. Also, see T. F. Homer-Dixon, 'On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes 
of Acute Conflict,' International Security vol. 16, no. 2 (1991); and T. F. Homer-Dixon and M. A. Levy, 
'Environment and Security (In Correspondence),' International Security vol. 20, no. 3 (1995).
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gravity, it is the reference to a measure that can ultimately involve violence (or seeks its 
avoidance) that characterises securitization.
Thus, a last condition can be added to the definition of securitization: it takes place 
when a) a security actor presents an issue as existentially threatening a referent object,
b) his/her discourse is accepted by the relevant audience, and c) thereby emergency 
measures that make reference to the use o f force or its avoidance become legitimised. 
As mentioned earlier, legitimisation of such measures need not equate to the actual 
recourse to violence. It only means that its consideration has been rendered legitimate.
This new conceptualisation of security still allows for a wide range of threats, 
referent objects and actors. For instance, as will be discussed in chapter six, the River 
Parana’s water resources became a security issue between Argentina and Brazil, 
because at a certain point on both sides the violent option was contemplated in order to 
solve the issue. The concrete and explicit dispute was not about borders, arms balances, 
identities or ideologies, but rather about how much water the Brazilian dam, which was 
being built upstream, would have capacity for, and whether or not that would affect 
Argentina’s projected dam to be built downstream.50 In the eyes of Argentine 
geopoliticians, the potential consequences would range from floods to droughts to the 
spread of diseases. In the eyes of Brazilian geopoliticians, Argentines just wanted to 
slow down the speed of their industrial and economic growth.
If this issue were to be located in a security sector, it would be either the 
environmental (as it was about natural resources) or the economic sector (as the dams 
were for the production of hydroelectric energy needed for industrial development). 
What made it a security matter—regardless of in which security sector—was that 
securitizing actors presented the issue as so dangerous and important that they received 
endorsement by the audience (political and military elites in this case, since both states 
were ruled by authoritarian regimes that left little space for public opinion) to resort to 
violence, if necessary.51
Another example that shows the need for a reference to force in order to securitize 
an issue is given by the treatment of the Amazonia issue from the 1960s through the 
early 1990s on the part of successive Brazilian governments. The issue o f the 
exploitation of natural resources in Amazonia and the international debate that it
50 As chapter six discusses, there were naturally many more issues at stake, such as a historic rivalry 
for regional hegemony and a race to achieve nuclear capacity. The ‘official’ dispute, however, was about 
hydroelectric resources.
51 This happened more obviously so in Argentina. However, as it became apparent through the 
interviews, also Brazil had prepared contingency plans for the eventuality of escalation.
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generated was picked up by the Brazilian military, in addition to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The military institution made Amazonia a top priority of their agenda gaining 
influence on the Executive power both during the authoritarian government and the first 
years of the democratic rule, which signals that it had become a security issue. The 
question, certainly, was not only about the environment, but also about sovereignty, 
potential foreign intervention, and economy.52
This different conceptualisation of the security act, binding it back to issues of 
force, surely strengthens the realist element of the perspective. Nonetheless, it does so— 
it is hoped—without compromising its constructivist component, which will allow the 
approach to potentially remain fairly broad. At this point, with this understanding of 
securitization, also the process of desecuritization can become clearer. Desecuritization, 
in principle, involves “the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal 
bargaining processes of the political sphere.”53 Yet more can be said; it implies that 
issues, for which the potential use of force had been legitimised before, now start to 
retrace their steps taking the opposite direction, whereby violence ceases to be a 
legitimate option. The same or other actors that had previously securitized an issue may 
now encourage the process of desecuritization by negotiating again appropriate 
responses with relevant audiences.
Under this lens it becomes apparent that security and insecurity are not necessarily 
opposites, but rather different ends on the same continuum, as both refer to the existence 
of a security problem and the presence or absence of measures to deal with it. The 
actual opposite situation is one in which an issue transcends the security language and 
moves away from such terms, becoming, instead, desecuritized, and thereby ‘only’ 
politicised.54 Desecuritization, in other words, implies the de-escalation from the 
security sphere back into the political realm.
What encourages both this move and its reversal? As expected, it will be a 
combination of many different factors that need detailed study in each empirical case. 
They can range from changes in the constitution of domestic governments, changes in 
domestic preferences, pressure from interest groups in one direction or another, 
emergence or decline of other concerns that make actors re-rank priorities, and regional 
and global transformations, among many others.
52 See S. Feitelberg Jakobsen, 'The Determinants of the National Position of Brazil on Climate 
Change: Empirical Reflections,' CDR Working Paper no. 97.1, (Copenhagen: Centre for Development 
Research, May 1997), http://www.cdr.dk/working_papers/wp-97-l.htm.
53 Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, p. 4.
54 Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization,' p. 56.
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In any case, it is important to note that even when issues have been securitized, it 
does not necessarily mean that we are in the presence o f a situation of violence. As 
already observed, it only means that a response involving violence has been considered 
legitimate. Therefore, in the context of a regional security complex, it is quite possible 
to find regional relationships conducted in a peaceful manner even when certain issues 
in those relationships are securitized. That is, a relationship can be securitized, or have 
securitized issues, and yet be peaceful. If this may be so, then the existence of different 
types of peace, or different ‘qualities’ of peace should become apparent. The presence 
or absence of securitized issues between members of an RSC will have a critical 
influence on the quality of the resulting regional peace. We can expect peace to be more 
stable and consolidated in the absence o f mutual security concerns or when issues have 
been effectively desecuritized. As will be seen next, the factor of ‘trust’ plays a crucial 
role in the move from security to politics, and in the actual quality of peace achieved. In 
order to explore this, peace hypotheses and types of peace, including peace scales are 
the subject of the next section.
5. Peace
5.1. Peace Hypotheses
a) Realism
Peace and war, needless to say, have traditionally been at the centre of the field of 
international relations. A key concern of scholars has been how to account for the 
occurrence of international war, and in doing so they have also reflected on the 
occurrence of peace in an anarchic system. Realism and neorealism have offered strong 
arguments to explain the absence of war; a phenomenon that, in their view, amounts to 
peace—even if only to a certain type of peace, as will be discussed below.
According to (neo)reahsts, in an anarchic system, actors (states) seek to survive, 
and the safest way to ensure survival is through the accumulation of power, which is 
measured in capabilities. As all states do the same, more important than the absolute 
amount of accumulated power is the state of one’s own capabilities vis-a-vis the 
capabilities of others. Thus, all states seek to gain relative advantages, taking note not 
only of how much they have got, but also how much the others possess.
States preoccupation with relative gains soon results in a security dilemma. States 
arm themselves for their own security, and seeking to maintain and increase their 
relative advantage over others. These, in turn, may (mis)interpret this as an offensive
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rather than a defensive strategy, and as a consequence may feel compelled to increase 
their own arsenals too, thus leading to arms races. For realists, this is indeed a very 
effective mechanism by which wars are prevented: through arms balances and 
deterrence.55 Explicitly enough, John Mearsheimer contends, “[p]eace is mainly a 
function of the geometry of power in the international system, and certain 
configurations may be very peaceful while others are more prone to war.”56 Other 
factors that according to realists may prevent regional armed conflicts are the presence 
of a regional hegemon,57 the strong influence of an extra-regional power,58 or the 
existence of a common external threat that may encourage alliance formation.59 Other 
than these, if states in a region do not engage in war it is probably because of 
impotence, geographical isolation, or sheer strategic irrelevance.60
Moreover, realism, with its emphasis on rational models and strategic alliances, can 
also explain rapprochement and desecuritization. Indeed, bilateral or multilateral 
rapprochement can be seen as the outcome of power, interests and capabilities 
calculations, according to which strategic co-operation is evaluated as more efficient for 
the accomplishment of certain goals than alternative means, such as war. For instance, 
the easing of tension between Argentina and Brazil in the late 1970s could be 
interpreted as power balancing strategies and rational calculations on the part of both 
states. On the side of Argentina, it was facing a critical period. The Videla government 
had recognised Brazil’s strategic superiority; internal politics were in a state of havoc; 
and relationships with Chile were deteriorating in a rapid and unfavourable manner. 
Confrontation with Brazil could result more destabilising, while a rapprochement could 
bring about some material advantages, and could help balancing Santiago.
On the part of Brazil, its ‘special relationship’ with the United States had come to 
an end in 1967, when Brasilia refused to join the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
55 See, classically, Waltz, Theory of International Politics, See as well S. Walt, 'Alliance Formation 
and the Balance of World Power,' International Security vol. 9, no. 4 (1985); and J. Mearsheimer, 'Back 
to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,' International Security vol. 15, no. 1 (1990). Also 
Hedley Bull, from the English School tradition, has advanced arguments in favour of the balance of 
power. See H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1995), particularly chapter five “The Balance of Power and International Order” pp. 97-121.
56 J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European Security 
(Correspondence),' International Security vol. 15, no. 3 (1991-1992), p. 220.
57 R  Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Doubleday, 1966).
58 As mentioned earlier, Buzan calls this effect ‘overlay.’ See Buzan, People, State and Fear: An 
Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 219-221.
59 B. L. Job, 'Matters of Multilateralism: Implications for Regional Conflict Management,' in David A. 
Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park, 
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 171.
60 Arie Kacowicz discusses realist hypotheses on the maintenance of regional peace in A. M. 
Kacowicz, Zones o f Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative 
Perspective (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 34-39.
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Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). In the second half 
of the 1970s it had only worsened as a consequence of Jimmy Carter’s human rights and 
nuclear proliferation policies, which were actually punishing Argentina as well. This 
common opposition to the U.S., combined with Brazil’s recognition of the superiority of 
Argentina’s nuclear programme, encouraged Brasilia to reorient its foreign policy and 
ease the tension with Buenos Aires.
Even though realism may explain rapprochement, its account tends to imply a rather 
contingent type of peace based on circumstantial calculations rather than on some 
deeper commitment, and as a consequence, it might not be durable.61 At most, realism 
explains the absence of conflict, a situation that amounts to just one type of peace: 
negative peace.
Halfway between realist and liberal theories, which will be discussed below, Arie 
Kacowicz identifies the hypothesis o f ‘peace by satisfaction,’ according to which peace 
is more likely to be maintained when states are satisfied with their territorial status 
quo.62 This situation, he contends, is more likely to be found at the regional than at the 
global level. Thus, territorial satisfaction becomes a sufficient condition for the 
maintenance of regional negative peace, understood strictly as the absence of war. As 
Kacowicz notes, “a very large proportion of international wars, though by no means all 
of them, have been a product of dissatisfaction with existing boundaries, and attempts to 
forcefully change them.”63 Indeed, it seems that, other things being equal, territorial 
disputes escalate more easily into war than other types of disputes; which, of course, is 
not to say that all territorial disputes escalate into war. Instead, absence of territorial 
claims, i.e. satisfaction with the territorial status quo, works as one positive factor 
easing the achievement and maintenance of peace.
b) Liberalism
Theories o f interdependence and institutionalism take on a liberal stance. These 
liberal theories argue that states—or at least economically developed and prosperous 
states—are inclined to avoid to war because they hold absolute gains higher than 
relative gains, regard negatively the costs of going to war and positively the benefits of 
trade and commercial exchange, and recognise the importance of a peaceful context for 
the achievement of the latter. Such states consider favourable trade and commerce
61 Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions.’
62 Kacowicz, Zones o f Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative 
Perspective, pp. 47-59.
62 Ibid., p. 48.
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results to be of higher value—as well as to contribute more to the accumulation of 
wealth—than territorial conquest.64 Neoliberal institutionalists emphasise the role that 
international institutions play in achieving common goals and overcoming the obstacles 
created by interdependence.65 In other words, co-operation, for liberals, can take place 
even in the context of anarchy mainly because the actors see more instrumental 
advantages in peace and co-operation than otherwise.66 Under this lens, peace is more 
convenient than war, and is therefore preferred by actors.
In addition to these approaches, another variant of liberal theory, democratic peace, 
turns to domestic political regimes to account for the external behaviour of states. 
Democratic peace theory was bom of Immanuel Kant’s proposition o f peace within a 
federation of republics,67 and has almost become a social scientific law in International 
Relations. Its basic assertion is based on an empirical observation: consolidated liberal 
democracies have tended not to wage war on one another. Explanations for this outcome 
are diverse, but all of them resort to the presence of democracy as the type of domestic 
political regime to account for the non-occurrence of war.68
Bruce Russett offers two possible arguments to account for the causal link in this 
statistical coincidence.69 The first is normative, and contends that the internal 
organisation principle—liberal democracy—is reflected externally, and thus its 
domestic values influence the state’s international behaviour. For instance, in 
democracies certain norms and procedures have been institutionalised, such as 
representation, respect for human rights, individual freedoms, and constitutional 
principles. Among these, the use of force is not considered a legitimate means to resolve 
disputes. On the contrary, democracies share the commitment to peaceful conflict
64 See, among many others, Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in 
the Modem World; and R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, Transational Relations and World Politics 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
65 R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
66 Hurrell, 'An Emerging Security Community in South America?,' in Emanuel Adler and Michael 
Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 228-229.
67 I. Kant, Kant's Principle o f Politics, Including His Essay on Perpetual Peace: a Contribution to 
Political Science (Edinburgh: T. Clark, 1891).
68 The literature discussing democratic peace is vast and growing. See, among others, M. W. Doyle, 
'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I,' Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 12, no. 3 (1983); 
M. W. Doyle, Ways o f War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: Norton, 1997); 
B. M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1993); J. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,' International 
Security vol. 19, no. 2 (1994); and T. Barkawi and M. Laffey (eds.), Democracy, Liberalism, and War: 
Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).
69 Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, pp. 31-39.
53
resolution. Leaders of non-democracies, on the other hand, resort more frequently to the 
use or threat of violence, a fact that is likely to spill over internationally.70
The second argument stresses structural-institutional factors. It claims that 
democracies have an institutional structure involving representative systems and broad 
political freedoms that function as an instance of control on the use of force 
(accountability), be it domestic or international. And as wars have generally become 
unpopular incidents with public opinion, and politicians need public support to succeed 
politically in democratic societies, they will try to avoid taking decisions that would 
diminish their own popularity. Autocratic elites, instead, are not subject to these checks, 
and usually find themselves in a much more insulated position vis-a-vis the interests of 
the people. As a result, these elites are more prone to follow their own narrow interests, 
even if these imply the initiation of international violence.71
In a similar vein, it could be claimed that it is risky to include new or fragile 
democracies into the democratic peace provision. The argument in this case would 
suggest that leaders of young and/or unstable democracies may find it tempting to try to 
broaden their political support by resorting to nationalist and populist discourses, which 
easily result in revisionist claims at the expense of regional peace.
In any case, the explanations presented so far do not necessarily argue about peace 
among democracies, but rather about the inclination of democratic states to avoid war 
with any other state, regardless of its political regime. Aware of the fact that this is not 
empirically true, and complementing those hypotheses, authors have most often added 
yet a further proposition, whereby democratic states recognise each other as such; that 
is, they recognise in one another the same institutional constrains o f accountability 
and/or their adherence to the same values, norms and principles. As a result, they 
perceive each other as being more predictable and less prone to resolving international 
disputes by violent means, and thus tend to conduct peaceful relations among 
themselves.72
70 C. Brown, Understanding International Relations (Basingstoke, Hamshire: Palgrave, 2001), p. 228.
71 See M. Ericson, 'Birds of a feather? On the Intersection of Stable Peace and Democratic Research 
Programs,' in Arie M. Kacowicz, et al. (eds.), Stable Peace Among Nations (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2000), pp. 136-137; and Brown, Understanding International Relations, pp. 228- 
229.
72 Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, pp. 35-42; and 
Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I,' pp. 228-230.
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c) Constructivism
Moving beyond this commitment to rationalism shared by both liberals and realists, 
constructivist and critical theorists have sought to understand the processes of identity 
construction and mutual recognition that rationalist accounts take for granted. Basically, 
they have raised the question of how it is that liberal democracies recognise each other; 
or what it is that they see as having in common. By doing this, they refuse to accept so 
unproblematically “the process of objective recognition of essentially ‘liberal’ 
structures, or consensual mutual recognition on the basis of common norms.”73 
Moreover, they have also critically appraised the absence of the notion of power in 
traditional understandings of both democracy and the construction of identity.74
While enormously stimulating, this particular discussion, as well as the more 
general one of democratic peace, is beyond the scope of this dissertation. As mentioned 
earlier, the main concern here involves the development of two processes of bilateral 
rapprochement or desecuritization that began when at least one state in the dyad was 
ruled by a military regime. Obviously, democratic peace theory can hardly be applied to 
explain the absence of war and the stabilization of peace in these cases.
As will be seen, I will acknowledge that in the cases covered by this study both 
liberal and realist peace hypotheses bear some explanatory force to account for the 
absence of war even during the most tense periods, and for the initial steps towards 
rapprochement. However, a factor that they tend to neglect, which constructivists tend 
to highlight, is the role and the development of trust as a central element in 
understanding a more positive type of peace, one that is qualitatively different from the 
mere absence of war.75 By redefining their mutual negative perceptions into gradually 
growing positive perceptions of one another, states—whether democratic or not—can
73 M. C. Williams, 'The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: Kant, Liberalism and the Social 
Construction of Security Communities,' European Journal o f International Relations vol. 7, no. 4 (2001), 
p. 530. For the question of self-identity and mutual recognition, see also Owen, 'How Liberalism 
Produces Democratic Peace;’ T. Risse-Kappen, 'Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies? A Social 
Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument,' European Journal of International Relations vol. 
1, no. 4 (1995); and H. Muppidi, 'State Identity and Interstate Practices: The Limits to Democratic Peace 
in South Asia,' in Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey (eds.), Democracy, Liberalism, and War: Rethinking 
the Democratic Peace Debate (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).
74 Muppidi, 'State Identity and Interstate Practices: The Limits to Democratic Peace in South Asia,' pp. 
45-51. Also, Williams, 'The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: Kant, Liberalism and the Social 
Construction of Security Communities.'
75 The question of trust is extensively discussed in the different chapters of Adler and Barnett (eds.), 
Security Communities. See also R. Bengtsson, 'The Cognitive Dimension of Stable Peace,' in Arie M. 
Kacowicz, et al. (eds.), Stable Peace Among Nations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000); 
and R. Vayrynen, 'Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps towards Theory-Building,' in Arie 
M. Kacowicz, et al. (eds.), Stable Peace Among Nations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2000).
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potentially open a space for the development of mutual confidence and trust. In this 
way, they will be much more inclined to avoid the use or threat of force in their 
relationships.
This latter argument involving trust and confidence is not necessarily related to 
democracies, but rather to the transformation of negative zones of peace into positive 
ones, and of zones of stable peace into security communities. As is further discussed 
below, although democracy is not a sine qua non for the stabilisation of peace and the 
development of trust, it seems to favour to a great extent the consolidation both of peace 
and of security communities. The next section elaborates on different types of peace and 
proposes a peace scale, while the following one focuses more closely on the role of 
trust.
5.2. Types of regional peace
From the previous discussion about peace and peace hypotheses, a few thoughts can 
be provisionally drawn. Firstly, no particular type of domestic political regime is 
indispensable for the maintenance of a zone of peace. Stable democracies seem to 
favour it, but other types of regimes have been capable, too, of conducting peaceful 
relationships and avoiding war. Secondly, peace at the international level refers to the 
type of relationship that two or more states maintain. When the talk is about peace, 
rather than about a pacific foreign policy, clearly more than one state has to be involved. 
It can thus be said that peace is a relational concept. It is necessary that two or more 
states conduct some sort of relationship or interaction to be able to say that it is 
peaceful. Therefore, the mere absence of war may be pointing to the lack of relationship 
rather than to meaningful peace. In a regional context, however, it is very rare to find 
neighbouring states with no relationships at all.76
A further element that I would add to this understanding of peace is that it is a 
process, and as such, dynamic. To be maintained, peace demands permanent attention 
and dedication. There is nothing in even the most stable type of international peace that 
makes it irreversible. On the contrary, it is an inherently fragile process, much easier to 
reverse than build. However, if successfully built, peace may reinforce itself, resulting 
in an increasingly stable and consolidated type of peace.
The differentiation between types or levels of peace has already been noted by 
several scholars, who have constructed scales or typologies of peace that typically cover
76 From now on, references to peace will imply interstate regional peace, unless otherwise stated.
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all the range from a very fragile and unstable peace to situations of consolidated and 
stable peace. A possible further step that some authors consider in these gradations is 
the establishment of a pluralistic security community, alluding to the situation in which 
war has become unthinkable due to the emergence of a sense of community among 
elites and societies of the states involved.
The remainder of this section reviews categorisations of peace by several authors. It 
is interesting to note that the typologies are not essentially divergent. In fact, they all 
point, with slight differences in emphasis, to similar stages of the same process of 
peace. The differences between them relate to the aspects that each scholar prefers to 
highlight as a consequence of his or her own research interests, rather than to 
fundamental conceptual disagreements.
Thus, for instance, Kalevi Holsti introduces a threefold scale including no-war 
zones, zones of peace, and pluralistic security communities. In no-war zones military 
capabilities are targeted toward specified enemies (usually neighbours), and alliances 
and arms races are prominent features of the diplomatic and strategic landscape. 
Although militarised clashes are frequent, war does not result from them. In zones of 
peace, however, capabilities are not targeted at fellow members of the zone and 
operational war plans do not include ‘conflict hypotheses’ with them. Militarised 
disputes may break out from time to time (e.g., the Anglo-Iceland cod wars in 1972 and 
1975), but war has literally become unthinkable in mutual relations. Finally, pluralistic 
security communities are characterised similarly, except for the fact that militarised 
conflicts of any type have become unthinkable. In addition, “a zone of peace has a 
foundation in the relations of states; a pluralistic security community rests on the social 
foundations of community between individuals and societies.”77
Similarly, Arie Kacowicz composes a gradation o f increasing quality and 
endurance of regional peace. Beyond the situation of war, he identifies three other 
categories in this scale: negative peace, defined as the mere absence of war; stable 
peace, which precludes the expectation o f violence among states; and a pluralistic 
security community of nation-states “with stable expectations of peaceful change, in 
which the member states share common norms, values, and political institutions, sustain
78an identifiable common identity and are deeply interdependent.”
77 K. Holsti, The State, War, and the State o f War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 
148.
78 Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative 
Perspective, pp. 9-11.
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Kenneth Boulding reviews relational patterns taking into account space and time. 
This allows him to distinguish on a map four different types o f areas; those at war, 
where war is virtually incessant; those of unstable war; those o f unstable peace, where 
the periods of peace are longer than those of war; and those areas of stable peace, where 
“the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of 
any of the people involved.”79
Alexander George, in turn, suggests the distinction between precarious, 
conditional, and stable peace. Precarious peace amounts to little more than the 
temporary absence of war. Conditional peace is less acute, but general deterrence is still 
predominant. In a zone of stable peace, however, neither the threat nor the use of 
military force is thinkable.80 Benjamin Miller also uses a triple categorisation that 
covers cold, normal, and warm peace. Cold peace describes the situation in zones where 
there has been war until recently, and disputes have not yet been resolved. 
Consequently, the use of force is still a strategic option that the parties consider. Normal 
peace refers to a situation in which all conflicts have been resolved, although the threat 
and use of force have not been ruled out. Finally, in warm peace, as in stable peace, war 
has become unthinkable, even when some disputes may survive.81 As Kacowicz and 
Bar-Siman-Tov note, Miller’s normal peace lies somewhere between George’s 
conditional and stable peace.82
Slightly differently, Ole Waever puts together a 4-stage spectrum of relational 
possibilities sorted by the degree of amity and enmity that define security 
interdependence. These range from chaos, where all relations are defined by enmity, to 
security community, in which members do not fear or prepare for violence among 
themselves. Between these extremes, Waever identifies ‘regional conflict formations’ 
that are characterised by tension although amity seems possible; and security regimes, 
where an explicit effort is made to avoid war and to peacefully resolve disputes, 
promote confidence and overcome the security dilemma.83
79 K. E. Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin & London: University of Texas Press, 1978), pp. 12-13.
80 A. George, 'Foreword,' in Arie M. Kacowicz, et al. (eds.), Stable Peace Among Nations (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000).
81 B. Miller, 'The International, Regional, and Domestic Sources of Regional Peace,' in Arie M. 
Kacowicz, et al. (eds.), Stable Peace Among Nations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000).
82 A. M. Kacowicz and Y. Bar-Siman-Tov, 'Stable Peace: a Conceptual Framework,' in Arie M. 
Kacowicz, et al. (eds.), Stable Peace Among Nations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000),
p. 21.
83 Taken from Buzan, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era, pp. 218-219. According to Buzan, the concept of ‘regional conflict formation’ was 
coined by Raimo Vayrynen, ‘security regime’ by Robert Jervis, and ‘security community’ by Karl 
Deutsch.
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Finally, Patrick Morgan presents a typology, which discerns categories depending 
on the dominant patterns of security management within Regional Security Complexes. 
Morgan calls these patterns ‘regional orders.’ Although in this case it is not a 
continuum, one could assume an increasing order of stability and predictability in the 
relationships of states taking part in these arrangements. The first regional order, based 
on ‘power to restrain power,’ implies the principle of traditional international politics, 
the balance of power. The second, ‘great-power concert,’ is defined as the mechanism 
by which the major powers of a region co-operate to deal with security issues and to 
manage their conflicts. Thirdly, ‘collective security’ points to the presence of regional 
organisations and regimes where management is exercised collectively and 
multilaterally. Fourthly, ‘pluralistic security community’ applies when states, while 
retaining their national autonomy, have fully renounced the possibility o f using force 
against each other. Finally, ‘integration’—in its early stages and when security is the 
primary objective—involves transnational institutions to manage the members’ 
interactions.84
Based on these peace scales and categorisations, I have tried to develop yet another 
arrangement in order to better understand the path undergone by the dyads under study 
here. Thus, I have found it useful to distinguish first between two broad categories of 
peace, negative and positive.85 Negative peace refers to the situation where the absence 
of threat or use of force is not necessarily expected. Under negative peace there is no 
war, but there are preparations and contingency plans for war. Depending on how often, 
and how far back violent clashes last occurred, this category can be subdivided into 
fragile, unstable, and cold peace.
I understand fragile peace to characterise the relationship in which there are yet 
pending disputes, the armed forces work on regional conflict hypotheses, and the states 
prepare for war. Peace is occasionally interrupted by military clashes, but they are kept 
below the level of international war. For instance, Argentina and Chile had a 
relationship of just fragile peace for most of the twentieth century, with many territorial 
disputes pending, preparing themselves to go to war against one another, playing 
balancing games and displaying power, and occasionally exchanging fire in border
84 Morgan, 'Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders,1 pp. 31-38.
85 Kenneth Boulding made first the argument that peace could be either positive or negative, the 
former involving “good management, orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature 
relationships, gentleness, and love,” and the latter implying “the absence of something—the absence of  
turmoil, tension, conflict, and war.” See Boulding, Stable Peace, p. 3.
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zones. Until some time ago, also the Middle East could be said to be in fragile peace, 
although unfortunately this has not been the case lately.
Under unstable peace, preparation and contingency plans for war are also present, 
but without any armed confrontations having occurred, or only in the distant past. 
However, confrontations, and even war, have not only not been ruled out, but also 
deterrence and threats continue to play a critical role in this type of relationship. The 
Argentine-Brazilian relationship can be analysed this way at the time o f the escalation 
of tension due to the Itaipu-Corpus dispute. Clearly, U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations during the 
Cold War would fit into this category.
Finally, cold or conditional peace is a less extreme type of non-war. Relationships 
are still characterised by the absence of war, rather than by the presence of confidence, 
but war and confrontation do not appear to be such a realistic eventuality. In other 
words, although the use of violence has not been discarded, it does not seem to be as 
likely an outcome as in fragile and unstable peace. Display of force can be used as a 
means to apply pressure during negotiations, and parties have no reason not to expect 
this. Argentina and Brazil have had such a relationship for most of their history as 
independent states. This is also the sort of relationship conducted by Argentina and 
Britain in the years that followed the Malvinas/Falkland Islands War of 1982.
If negative peace and its three subcategories (fragile, unstable, and cold peace) are 
defined by the absence of war, then positive peace is defined by the presence of 
confidence and trust. States in a relationship of positive peace do not prepare for war, 
nor do they expect other states in the zone to do so. This does not necessarily mean that 
all disputes have been resolved. Issues and disagreements may persist, but no party 
conceives of force to sort them out. Zones of positive peace can be subdivided into 
zones of stable peace and pluralistic security communities. In both, members of such 
zones have ruled out the possibility of war among themselves, and are confident that 
their fellow members have done so too. All are certain that any potential changes in the 
status quo will be peaceful and agreed.
A pluralistic security community stands out because it appears as a more 
‘participatory’ kind of stable peace in that not only has war become unthinkable, but 
also the societies have developed links, mutual sympathies, and some sort of common 
identification86 that makes them perceive each other as members of one same
86 I prefer the use of the term ‘identification’ rather than ‘identity’ in this context, implying a looser 
understanding of the concept. The difference between the two is explained in some more detail in chapter 
seven, footnote 1 on page 197 of this thesis.
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community. In addition, states may be bound by common political institutions, similar 
political systems, and considerable economic interdependence. To be sure, all pluralistic 
security communities are zones of stable peace. However, not all zones o f stable peace 
are pluralistic security communities.87 Examples of stable peace are the current 
Argentine-Chilean relationship, and relations among members of the Association of the 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since the late 1970s. On the other hand, members of 
the European Union, and Canada and the United States are clear examples of pluralistic 
security communities, whereas Argentina and Brazil can be said to be part of an 
incipient security community.
This peace categorisation can be summarised as follows:
Table 2.1: Peace categories
Negative peace
Fragile peace
Unstable peace
Cold or conditional peace
Positive peace
Stable peace
Pluralistic security community
5.3. Trust as the key for the evolution of regional peace
The categorisation presented above implies the consideration o f mainly two 
variables, the stability of peace, temporally determined by the length of the absence of 
military confrontation, and the solidity of peace, signalled by the presence or absence, 
and degree, of trust in the relationship. Of the two, I consider the solidity of peace to be 
the crucial element to distinguish between the different types of peace.
The factor of time plays a weightier role in situations of negative peace, where 
aggressive behaviour may have occurred in a not too distant past. Collective memory of 
past aggression influences the degree of trust between states and peoples. While it holds 
true that recent armed conflicts make the development of trust more difficult, the 
opposite is not necessarily the case. Even relationships with a long record of absence of 
actual military conflict may be dominated by mistrust. Therefore, time, while important
87 Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov, 'Stable Peace: a Conceptual Framework,' p. 22.
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(especially if there have been recent confrontations), tends to have only an indirect 
effect on the type of peace, mostly by affecting the level of trust.
The development of mutual confidence, consequently, is key to understanding the 
process of desecuritization implied in the transformation o f negative into positive peace, 
and in the stabilisation and later consolidation o f peace. The level o f confidence shows 
the solidity of the peace that the relationship rests upon. In other words, the higher the 
degree of mutual confidence, the more solid the peaceful relationship. And also, the 
harder it will be that the process be reversed (although not impossible). Conversely, the 
higher the degree of distrust—and therefore the less solid the basis for peace—the easier 
it will be that even a small misunderstanding or misinterpretation develop into military 
violence, and possibly war.
Although stability can be measured in years of absence o f conflict, I am reluctant to 
set a fixed amount of years that indicate whether peace has become unstable, cold, or 
stable. Rather, I understand it to be a delicate blend of stability (time) and solidity (trust) 
that points to one type of peace or another. However, one might possibly say, in 
accordance to Kacowicz, that a zone of peace, whether negative or positive, is one in 
which
a group o f  states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves for a 
period o f  at least thirty years— a generation span— though civil wars, domestic 
unrest, and violence might still occur within their borders, as well as 
international conflicts and crises between them.88
For its part, a quantitative measurement of trust is indeed difficult. Instead, one has 
to rely on the interpretation of the presence or absence of certain indicators. For 
instance, the deployment of two states’ troops along a common border is most probably 
a sign of fragile or unstable peace. The presence of a system of mutual accountability 
through confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) is likely to be indicative of 
cold or stable peace. Common institutions, high level of interdependence, compatible 
domestic regimes, withdrawal or absence of troops on common borders, among others, 
point to the existence of trust, and thus to a situation of stable peace, or even to a 
pluralistic security community.
The existence of pending disputes in itself should not be an indication of distrust. 
There may be pending issues along with a firm commitment to find agreed solutions. 
Conversely, distrust can define a relationship even when no apparent conflict exists. 
While by no means an exhaustive list, I suggest that the presence or absence of the
88 Kacowicz, Zones o f Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative 
Perspective, p. 9.
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following should be taken into account when the solidity of regional peace is to be 
assessed:
■ recent war, repeated exchanges of cross-border fire, deployment of troops in 
border areas, arms races, existence of contingency plans for war, few and distant (in 
time) diplomatic visits, mistrust and antipathy between societies, obstacles for the 
mobility of persons;
■ diplomatic visits and public speeches pointing at the easing o f tension, CSBMs, 
problem-solving mechanisms;
■ fluid communication channels, common projects that involve joint expected 
benefits (a common market, for example), common institutions, high degree of 
interdependence and exchange, compatible self-images, free or easy mobility of 
people.
The first set of indicators points at a situation of either fragile or unstable peace, 
depending mainly on whether force was used in the recent past or not. In any case, they 
reveal a high degree of distrust and suspicion, and the rather ease with which peace can 
be reverted. The second set of indicators manifests a clear intention to try to handle 
potential misperceptions, implicitly acknowledging that they can indeed occur. Mutual 
confidence is not high, but parties have developed common mechanisms to try to make 
their behaviour more predictable and transparent. These mechanisms actually represent 
the basis for whichever degree of mutual confidence there exists. States in such a 
situation have a relationship of cold or conditional peace. If  one of these mechanisms 
fails, peace can revert into unstable or fragile, and war can even break out. Conversely, 
they may make explicit efforts to improve the degree of mutual confidence and trust, 
and thus achieve stable peace. Nevertheless, states might also choose to stay in 
conditional peace, being careful not to make it unstable, but without pursuing closer 
links either. Even in this case, I argue, peace is a dynamic process, in that it will require 
an active effort on the part of governments to be kept this way.
The last set of signs indicates a high level of mutual trust, which can point at a 
relationship of stable peace, or even at the existence of a pluralistic security community 
if a sense of we-feeling and community among states and societies has developed as 
well. As already mentioned, the most important feature of such a high level of mutual 
confidence is that the use or threat of force has become unthinkable to resolve disputes 
and disagreements, and indeed all parties perceive it in this manner. States in a situation
63
of stable peace or in a security community neither expect this situation to change, nor 
are prepared to wage war on one another.
The last question to be addressed here refers to the mechanisms o f expanding the 
solidity of peace. How does the qualitative transformation occur that expands trust and 
confidence, and rules out interstate violence between certain states to the point of 
making it unthinkable? This, as suggested earlier, involves a complex learning process 
that
requires a redefinition or reevaluation o f the parties’ national interests, so that 
each party will perceive a mutual interest in establishing and maintaining the 
peace between them as the most important factor in assuring each other’s
» i  * 89security and even existence.
The resort to constructivist theory helps to better understand the process at work
here.
Key concepts in explaining the development of mutual trust are those of social 
learning and cognitive structure, the latter being understood as a set of shared beliefs, 
meanings and understandings that can be modified by social learning. Specifically, 
transactions and social exchanges trigger processes of social learning that imply a re­
assessment of the actors’ meanings, beliefs and understandings.90 These form their 
cognitive structure, influencing the way they perceive others and themselves, which in 
turn constitutes and constrains (or broadens the range of) their actions. When this is a 
positive process, it redounds to the expansion of trust, which is in turn reflected in 
policy decisions, such as, say, withdrawal of troops from common border areas, 
expansion of co-operation, and so on.
Thus, the development towards a more consolidated peace involves “an active 
process of redefinition or reinterpretation of reality—what people consider real, possible 
and desirable—on the basis of new causal and normative knowledge,” where social 
actors “manage and even transform reality by changing their beliefs of the material and 
social world and their identities.”91 Crucial actors in this process are policy-makers and 
other political, economic, and intellectual elites, who will try to transmit to the public 
(audience) their re-interpreted perception of reality—that is, their modified cognitive 
structure—with the aim of producing concrete policy, broadly legitimised.
89 Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov, 'Stable Peace: a Conceptual Framework,' pp. 24-25.
90 E. Adler and M. N. Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,' in Emanuel 
Adler and Michael N. Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998).
91 Ibid, pp. 43-44.
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6. Final remarks
The pieces introduced throughout this chapter can now be put together again to 
present the conceptual framework informing this research. Regional security complexes, 
zones of peace and security communities are analytical devices to which the present 
research resorts extensively. Rather than being alliances or any kind of formal political 
arrangement, they are empirical developments embedded and rooted in the historical 
and geopolitical context of a certain region. Security and peace are understood broadly 
enough as to overcome realists’ narrow focus on geopolitics and the absence of war, but 
remain closely related to the use of violence and the possibility o f developing trust, 
respectively.
The thesis deals with processes of rapprochement in the Southern Cone of South 
America. It argues that the Southern Cone constitutes a regional security complex with 
two main dyads, Brazil and Argentina, and Chile and Argentina. This RSC, however, 
has constituted a zone of (negative) peace for most of the twentieth century. In the 
period between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, relationships in both dyads were 
significantly transformed, to the point that their relational patterns changed from enmity 
to amity, and the quality of their peace moved from negative to positive.
This doctoral thesis studies these changes by focusing on the two dyadic 
relationships. This choice presents two advantages. First, to focus on a dyad directs 
attention to domestic, bilateral, regional, as well as extra-regional factors, thus allowing 
a comprehensive exploration. And second, the contrast between the two cases will 
hopefully contribute to illuminating the causes of their differences. In other words, by 
means of studying these dyads individually, and comparing them, I expect to find out 
why Argentina and Brazil were able to desecuritize their military relationship so rapidly 
and shift in only some six years from an unstable to a stable peace, and even started 
developing an incipient security community, while Argentina and Chile took much 
longer to begin the process of rapprochement that brought them from a fragile to an 
unstable peace, which only recently developed into a stable peace.
Desecuritization explains the domestic changes by which rapprochement becomes 
possible, that is, accepted and legitimised by the relevant domestic audiences. The 
advantage of taking a rather constructivist perspective to explain the changes in mutual 
and self-perceptions is that such an approach also considers how changes in concrete 
circumstances affect learning processes, and thus cognitive structures. And while peace 
and co-operation cannot be understood in merely rational cost-benefit terms, a
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constructivist approach can incorporate the element of rational calculations into the 
social learning process. In this way, a constructivist perspective need not preclude 
interest-based factors. Some element of calculation and self-interest must be present in 
the construction of any peace zone and security community, and it should be identified 
in the analysis.
The initial diagram on page 25 (Figure 2.1) could be completed as follows (Figure
2.2, from the perspective of the state and its representatives/policy makers):
International and domestic political 
and economic circumstances
social learning
Cognitive structures
(shaping perception of 
priorities and needs)
Foreign policy traditions and history
Bargaining with relevant audience
Foreign policy decisions/orientation 
(for instance increased interaction/exchange)
Figure 2.2: Complex process of formation of foreign policy orientation
(De)securitizing actors—in the case of this research the political and economic 
elites—are faced with certain domestic, regional and global circumstances. Their 
exposure to these circumstances makes them re-assess their set of shared beliefs, 
meanings and understandings, which is also influenced by traditions and history. This 
leads them to try to pursue a certain course of action, probably different from a previous 
one, for which they need legitimisation by a relevant audience. Once there is political 
room for manoeuvre, it translates into new policy decisions, which in turn modify the
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domestic and regional context, feeding back into the process. One can imagine this as a 
positive circuit where trust develops and grows, turning peace into a more stable and 
consolidated condition, or one can imagine it as a deteriorating circuit. Nevertheless, 
this does not imply a determined and fixed flow, but, on the contrary, the path can be 
broken and the tendency can change. If the above graph represents one state, it is not 
difficult to imagine two or more states aggregated, each one affecting the regional 
environment where they interact, and thus feeding into one anothers’ complex learning 
process.
Hopefully, it is clearer now why it was said earlier that a relationship of peace is a 
dynamic development in constant ‘movement,’ under a continuous process of social 
learning, even if it stays for long periods in the same category of peace (fragile, 
unstable, cold, or stable peace, or security community). It is incessantly redefined by 
changes in the cognitive structures of the actors. These changes, brought about by the 
interpretation of new ‘informationV‘reality,’ contribute towards the maintaining, 
strengthening or deterioration of trust, thus directly affecting and redefining the quality 
of the peace achieved.
In the case of the formation of a security community, in addition to trust building 
among elites, the process spills over bringing about trust and eventually some kind of 
shared identity among the societies involved. As the role of societies is crucial in the 
definition of security communities, it seems reasonable to argue that states which are 
members of a security community have regimes that allow a great deal of participation 
and involvement of their civil societies in all aspects of political and social life. That is, 
states with high levels individual and political freedoms. Usually, such states are 
democratic.
Finally, it seems relevant to recall a last argument before moving on to the 
empirical studies. The existence, or lack, of border disagreements is not by itself a 
determining factor for the development or hindering of trust. As observed earlier, states 
may have disputed borders as well as a strong commitment to resolving the issue 
peacefully. Conversely, other states may not have any territorial disagreement and still 
present very low degrees of mutual trust. However, when border disputes exist and 
levels of mutual confidence are low, the cycle of increasing distrust seems more likely 
to perpetuate itself to the point of escalation into war, probably because territorial 
claims encourage governments to deploy troops in the disputed areas. The proximity of 
distrustful armed forces increases the chances of fire exchanges, which in turn feeds in 
the process described above.
67
PART II
DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL CONTEXTS
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CHAPTER 3 
DOMESTIC CONDITIONS
1. Introduction
This chapter explores the domestic conjunctures of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, 
focusing especially on the decade of the 1970s. The relevance of studying the beliefs 
and principles guiding policy design, as well as its implementation, lies in the 
importance given here to domestic factors in the development of an image of self, that 
is, of how a state gets to see itself. As discussed in chapter two, a government’s 
perception of the success, failure, strength, weakness, vulnerability, and so on, of its 
own state’s performance will affect its perceived range of available policy options. In 
other words, how a government assesses its own and its country’s performance may 
expand or restrict the scope of foreign policy choices that it visualises as possible, and 
thereby, alternatives not envisaged before may become apparent, or, similarly, 
alternatives seen as possible before are later ruled out.
This chapter argues that the particular direction taken by Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile during the 1970s, the underpinning principles of their policies, and the 
consequences of such policies led to a specific political configuration in each country by 
the second half the decade. In turn, those different individual conjunctures led to 
divergent perceptions and assessments of their own political choices; a fact that 
persuaded policy makers in Argentina and Brazil in the late 1970s to revise their mutual 
attitudes, whilst, conversely, it led Pinochet’s highly centralised regime to become even 
more intransigent. In the same way as previous experiences had shaped the nature of the 
state and the political developments of the 1970s in each country, the 1970s themselves 
and their backdrop shaped the character that bilateral politics took in each dyad.
The next three sections set out the historical backgrounds of Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile for the analysis of their domestic, economic, foreign and foreign trade policies 
and developments in the second half of the 1970s. Attention is centred on these policy 
areas given that they were of key concern to governments and people during the period 
studied. Coups d’etat, guerrilla, and political and economic instability were common 
features of Latin America from the aftermath of the Second World War up until the late 
1980s. Neither the 1970s nor the countries of the Southern Cone were an exception.
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2. Argentina
2.1. Between Peron and Peron: fault-lines in Argentine politics
“Argentina’s efforts to stop high inflation are almost permanent,” wrote Roque 
Fernandez in 1991, who a few years later became minister of the economy, “and the last 
decades are full of attempts to stabilize prices. Attempts were made by populists, 
liberals, and conservative governments, by military dictatorships and democratic 
governments.”1 Indeed, inflation and economic instability have been at the core of 
Argentine collective preoccupations for a long time. Not longer, however, than political 
instability. Between 1930 and 1983, democracy was only an intermittent institution. The 
recurrence of military coups d ’etat every few years was not only expected, but often 
widely supported as well. Of the forty years between 1943 and 1983, the armed forces 
were in power for twenty-one, and carried out five successful coups.
According to Adolfo Canitrot, during those years the state could be seen as an 
instrument of power or as the prize of permanent political struggles.2 The main 
contenders were the armed forces and Peronism, whose bases of support lay at opposite 
ends of the social spectrum. Whereas Peronism was backed by working and lower- 
middle classes, the armed forces found most allies in the entrepreneurial sector and 
right-wing upper class liberals and conservatives. Despite their differences, both shared 
a nationalistic and Roman Catholic ideology, as well as strong anti-Marxist convictions.
A related struggle was that of the two traditional interest groups in the Argentine 
business sector, the agriculturalists (agro-exporters) and the (import-substitution) 
industrialists, who competed to gain influence over the state’s economic policies. After 
having been ‘the breadbasket of the world,’ in the post-Second World War era 
Argentina saw many of its export markets close and the international terms of trade for 
its traditional primary goods exports worsened. This fact, in addition to weakening the 
country’s position in the world economy, forced almost every government from the 
1940s to the 1970s to try to pursue inward-looking growth, thus favouring industrialists, 
but funding industrialisation with primary agricultural export revenues. The memory of 
the wealthy and promising 1920s and 1930s was to survive in the minds of politicians
1 R. B. Fernandez, 'What Have Populists Learned from Hyperinflation?,' in Rudiger Dombusch and 
Sebastian Edwards (eds.), The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 121.
2 A. Canitrot, 'Crisis and Transformation of the Argentine State (1978-1992),' in William C. Smith, 
Carlos H. Acuna, and Eduardo A. Gamarra (eds.), Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin 
America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (Boulder, CO: University of Miami North-South 
Center Press, 1994), p. 75.
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and military, and the pursuit of the ‘destiny of greatness’ became the goal o f every 
nationalist or industrialist administration.
The post-war period coincided with Peron’s first and second governments (1946- 
1955), during which a strong, pervasive, nationalist and populist state was built. While 
the active participation of the working classes in the political system is an undeniable 
legacy of this period, the Peronist era left Argentina with an institutionally weak and 
intrinsically incoherent state apparatus, which lay on only very fragile legitimacy. What 
followed the Peron administrations were a series of brief civilian governments that 
indefectibly ended in military coups, the proscription of Peronism, only lifted in 1973, 
and a deep political fault-line dividing the country between Peronists and anti-Peronists.
The ‘Liberating Revolution’3 (1955-1958) of General Pedro E. Aramburu and 
Admiral Isaac Rojas unsuccessfully tried to bring back the past by attempting to 
reimpose the old model based on agricultural exports and to de-Peronise society. The 
desarrollista (developmentalist) government of Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962), which had 
won the elections with Peronist support, gradually lost this key support as it imposed a 
stabilisation plan in line with the indications of the International Monetary Fund. 
Caught between Peronist unions and the anti-Peronist military, the desarrollista 
programme was left unfinished. Also Arturo Illia, during his brief and weak 
administration (1963-1966), tried to carry out a limited developmentalist plan, although 
more influenced by Yrigoyen’s traditional nationalism. The lack o f support either from 
Peronist forces, the military, or the industrial or agricultural bourgeoisie marked the 
demise of the government. The ‘Argentine Revolution’ (1966-1973) of Generals 
Ongania and Lanusse was the next attempt to overcome the profound division left by 
Peron, and to set in motion the reconstruction o f that ‘destiny of greatness’ promised in 
the 1940s. However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the country had grown 
politically polarised and economically uncertain.
Fed by a balance of payments crisis and increasing inflation and unemployment 
rates, it soon became clear that the ‘Argentine Revolution’ would not fulfil its self- 
proclaimed mission o f “[constructing] a new political economy free o f the vices o f both 
liberalism and populism.”4 In 1972 inflation was almost twice as high as in any previous
3 Military governments have been inclined to give themselves names. Thus, the ‘Revolution 
Libertadora’ ruled between 1955 and 1958, the ‘Revolution Argentina’ between 1966 and 1973, and the 
‘Proceso de Reorganizacion NacionaV between 1976 and 1983.
4 W. C. Smith, 'Reflections on the Political Economy of Authoritarian Rule and Capitalism 
Reorganization in Contemporary Argentina,1 in Philip O'brien and Paul Cammack (eds.), Generals in 
Retreat: The Crisis of Military Rule in Latin America (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 
p. 41.
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year of Argentine history (except for the 1959 inflationary peak), reaching 64.2 
percent,5 and was perceived as “a process apparently out of control.”6 In addition, those 
years witnessed the emergence of the first guerrilla movements, the FAP (Peronist 
Armed Forces), the Guevarist FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces), the Marxist ERP 
(Popular Revolutionary Army), and the Peronist Montoneros,7 which led Ongama to 
adhere to the ‘ideological borders’ thesis and to campaign for anti-subversive co­
operation with the neighbouring dictatorships.
Amidst economic turmoil, and as social and political violence proliferated in the 
form of strikes and popular demonstrations and revolts at the same pace as the forces of 
Peronism grew stronger, General Lanusse decided to call for elections allowing the 
Peronist party to run, although not Peron himself. The result was a confusing 1973, 
during which Argentines underwent two electoral processes—the second one with 
Peron as the main candidate—and had three presidents, in addition to outgoing Lanusse. 
Hector Campora, who ran instead of Peron and belonged to the more progressive wing 
of the party, was forced to resign after some 50 days in office. Following the procedure 
indicated by the constitution, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Raul Lastiri, 
was appointed temporary president, in what clearly implied an advance of the right- 
wing faction.
Finally, after the September elections, Juan Domingo Peron assumed the presidency 
in October 1973 under the slogan ‘Argentina Potential having obtained over 61 
percent of the votes. Despite this massive popular support, polarisation between left and 
right-wing Peronism had already become extreme and violent in a highly politicised and 
ideologically charged climate.8 Each of the different groups supporting Peron expected 
him to materialise their national project. For instance, some sectors within the military 
viewed him as the one who would restore the rules of the political process and 
neutralise the action of the guerrilla, thus achieving ‘national unity,’ whereas the more
5 Indec - Institute) Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, 'Serie Historica del Indice de Precios al 
Consumidor (IPC) en el Gran Buenos Aires,' produced by INDEC, (2003) accessed: 14 May 2003, 
http://www.indec.gov.ar/nuevaweb/cuadros/10/ipc-var-ddel943.xls.
6 Clarin, 5 January 1973, quoted in F. A. Sturzenegger, 'Description of a Populist Experience: 
Argentina 1973-1976,' in Rudiger Dombusch and Sebastian Edwards (eds.), The Macroeconomics of 
Populism in Latin America (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 87.
7 C. J. Moneta, 'La Politica Exterior del Peronismo, 1973-1976,' in Ruben M. Perina and Roberto 
Russell (eds.), Argentina en el Mundo (1973-1987) (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1988), 
pp. 53-54.
8 This is well shown by the events that took place upon Peron’s return to Argentina after his 17-year 
exile. What was supposed to be a welcoming festivity of 2 million people at the airport quickly turned 
into armed violence between the left-wing and right-wing extremes of the party, leaving 200 people dead.
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radicalised sectors expected the Peronist government to carry out a process of national 
revolution and liberation, or even a socialist revolution.9
The division within the party soon translated into virulent struggles to exert 
influence on the leader and his government. Yet Peron was old, had moved further to 
the centre, and his right-wing Social Welfare Minister Jose Lopez Rega was the most 
influential around him. Lopez Rega was to gain yet more power when Vice President 
Isabel Peron took over after her husband’s death on 1 July 1974. As the right-wing 
faction of the party tightened its grip on the government, open opposition by trade 
unions and youth sectors, as well as guerrilla actions, intensified. The official reaction 
came soon; under the co-ordination of Minister Lopez Rega, the Argentine 
Anticommunist Alliance, or ‘Triple A,’ was founded: a paramilitary group responsible 
for the counter-assassination and kidnapping of Marxists and left-wing Peronists. The 
organisation continued its activities after the military coup of 1976, this time under the 
direct command of the armed forces, in what became sheer and systematic state 
terrorism.
The political transformation of the successive Peronist administrations, moving 
away from more progressive and combative postures advanced by Campora, towards the 
extreme right policies of Isabel/Lopez Rega was also reflected in their foreign 
policies.10 During his brief administration, Hector Campora followed a more radical 
version of Peron’s traditional foreign policy principles. Thus, the ‘Third Position’ 
between capitalism and Marxism, and the adherence to the Third World and Latin 
America, translated into anti-American speeches at the Organisation of American States 
(OAS) and a call for Latin American unity to defy external domination.
Instead, both Lastiri and Peron moderated their confrontation with the United 
States. Feeling surrounded by military governments in Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil and 
Chile, they thought that Argentina was not in a strong position to promote an 
autonomist shift in the region. Alternatively, under both governments Argentina sought 
to strengthen ties with Western and Eastern Europe, China, Third World countries, and 
Latin America. In the context of the latter, keeping and improving the country’s position 
in the balance of power with Brazil was central. To that end, Peron actively sought to 
remove all potential causes of tension and advance co-operation with Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Bolivia.
9 See Moneta, 'La Politica Exterior del Peronismo, 1973-1976,' p. 54.
10 See Juan Carlos Moneta’s excellent study on the subject, Moneta, 'La Politica Exterior del 
Peronismo, 1973-1976.'
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After Peron’s death the shift was rather abrupt. The government’s desperate need 
for international credits led to “a profound change regarding the position to be adopted 
vis-a-vis the hegemonic power.”11 In addition, while it distanced itself from traditionally 
friendly states, such as Peru and Mexico, the government sought allies in the 
dictatorships of Chile and Uruguay. The Isabel administration abandoned, gradually or 
abruptly, depending on the case, most of the autonomist goals once announced by 
Peron.
Domestically, the Rodrigrazo of 1975, as the major economic adjustment 
programme implemented by Minister Celestino Rodrigo came to be known, contributed 
to exacerbate the chaos.12 When in March 1976 the military led the coup d’etat that 
ousted the Isabel administration, a sense of eventual relief was felt by a society appalled 
by terrorism and turmoil, a bourgeoisie whose sympathies had never lain with Peronism, 
and a working class that had lost all empathy for the government a long time ago. 
Indeed, “the triumphant Peronism of May 1973 underwent the unprecedented internal 
crisis which led to its virtual dismemberment as a political force and to the self- 
destruction of its project for ‘Reconstruction National'.”13 The incoming authoritarian 
administration, despite giving itself the name o f ‘Process of National Reorganisation,’ 
proved to fall short of its aims too.
2.2. Military dictatorship and economic neoliberalism: an unholy alliance
By the time of the 1976 coup, the armed forces had had vast experience of being in 
power. Nonetheless, and in spite of economic reorganisation being one of their central 
aims, the military did not have their own economists nor a clear economic programme. 
Their stand was mainly based on their aversion to the prominence of trade unions, 
(intellectual) middle-class groups, and national entrepreneurial sectors, most of which 
had flourished under the protection of Peronism. According to the military, these were 
the sources of all Argentine problems, and the rapid disempowerment of such groups—
11 Ibid., p. 92, my translation.
12 During his fifty days in office, Rodrigo implemented a 100 percent devaluation of the financial 
exchange rate, 80 percent of the tourist rate and 160 percent of the commercial rate; and increased prices 
of oil, gas, electricity, transportations and other public services between 40 and 181 percent. Wages, 
instead, were in principle subject to a maximum (officially approved) increase of 38 percent, which three 
days later became 45 percent, and seventeen days later, 80 percent. Workers and firms signed collective 
bargaining arrangements on wage increases of between 45 percent (construction union) and 203 percent 
(workers of leather). Just in the month of July 1975, inflation reached 34.9 percent. See Sturzenegger, 
'Description of a Populist Experience: Argentina 1973-1976,' p. 86 and p. 105.
13 Smith, 'Reflections on the Political Economy of Authoritarian Rule and Capitalism Reorganization 
in Contemporary Argentina,' p. 45.
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penetrated by international communism, they argued—was set to be the new 
government’s main goal.
This view was also shared by the so-called ‘new hegemonic coalition’: exporters, 
importers, and the upper strata of the national and international bourgeoisie, led by the 
financial sector.14 Furthermore, both the military and the new hegemonic coalition saw 
in Marxism the greatest danger; a “looming threat to the continuity of the social 
relations of class domination, i.e., the sensation that the survival of the state and 
capitalist society itself face[d] immediate peril.”15 Anti-Marxism became the key word 
of a highly ideological regime, which made of the ‘National Security Doctrine’ and the 
‘annihilation of the internal enemy’ its absolute political priority. The frequent reference 
to terms such as ‘national security,’ ‘internal security,’ ‘subversion,’ and to the ‘need to 
suspend all political, parliamentary and trade union activities’ in early speeches and the 
junta’s Acts makes this clear.16
In meetings held prior to the coup this new hegemonic coalition had given the 
military the diagnosis they wanted to hear: the dominant economic order since the 
1940s—protectionist and inward-looking industrialism heavily reliant on state 
intervention—had resulted in chronic inflation, over-dimension of the state, an 
oligopolistic industrial sector, disincentives to export, crises of the balance of payments, 
and low growth rates. The political model underpinning these economic distortions had 
created and reinforced a corporatist structure that gave excessive power to pressure 
groups, such as trade unions, political parties, and industrial sectors in the face of a 
weak state. Clearly, neoliberal elites blamed populist practices conducted mainly, but 
not only, by the Peronist governments. The prescribed remedy entailed, therefore, a 
complete reversal of the old model, in economic as well as in political terms.
Attracted to each other by these shared dislikes and fears, military and neoliberals 
formed a close alliance with the aim of politically and economically transforming the 
country. A representative of the Argentine oligarchy was appointed minister of 
economy. As Joseph S. Tulchin explains in rather graphic words, the armed forces
14 See R. Russell, 'Argentina: Ten Years of Foreign Policy toward the Southern Cone,' in Philip Kelly 
and Jack Child (eds.), Geopolitics o f the Southern Cone and Antarctica (Boulder & London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1988).
15 Smith, 'Reflections on the Political Economy of Authoritarian Rule and Capitalism Reorganization 
in Contemporary Argentina,' p. 48.
16 See, for instance, J. R. Videla, E. E. Massera, and O. R. Agosti, 'Proclama del 24 de Marzo de
1976,' 1976), http://www.nuncamas.org/document/document.htm; 'La Asuncion de Videla - 30 de Marzo.
Su Discurso,' 1976), http://www.historiadelpais.com.ar/dictadural.htm; 'Discurso de Jorge R. Videla - 25
de Mayo de 1976,' 1976), http://www.nuncamas.org/document/militar/discvide.htm; and Orden Parcial
Nro 405/76, 'Reestructuracion de Jurisdicciones para Intensificar las Operaciones contra la Subversi6n,'
21 May 1976, http://www.nuncamas.org/document/militar/40576.htm.
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“handpicked Jose (‘Joe’) Martinez de Hoz as their economic czar to purge the economy 
in the same way that they were prepared to purge the society of its antinational, Marxist, 
subversive cancer with a powerful diuretic, at whatever cost to the body politic.”17
Yet beyond these few coincidences, there were profound incompatibilities between 
the ffee-market economy a la Milton Friedman of Martinez de Hoz—even if conceived 
of in rather loose terms—, and the geostrategic and national security objectives of the 
junta. After all, the armed forces’ key missions—“the reorganisation of the nation, a 
task undertaken with a true spirit of service,”18 and preventing the advance of 
international Marxist subversion in the region (not just in the country), in order to 
“recapture the historic destiny of Argentina in Latin America”19—allowed for no budget 
constraints.
The economic model was based on several ffee-market principles, including the 
liberalisation of prices, which had been state-regulated under previous governments; the 
non-interference of the state in the economy, which implied the end of subsidies and the 
privatisation of public enterprises; and the opening of the economy to international
90markets. The aim was to encourage foreign competition in domestic markets in order 
to achieve a price structure more in line with that of international markets, thus focusing 
on improving efficiency in those areas where Argentina had comparative advantages. 
According to the designers of the programme themselves,
the opening o f  the economy allows not only greater competition, but also a 
higher and more efficient specialisation, as well as taking advantage o f the 
modern international labour division, through which production and exchange 
of industrial goods are achieved between different states in accordance to their 
comparative advantages derived both from their natural resources and from 
economies o f  scale.21
The new model, in opposition to previous ones, was one of outward-looking 
development.
However, not long after implementing the tariffs reductions and announcing a 
system of further gradual reduction and unification of tariffs during the following five
17 J. S. Tulchin, 'Authoritarian Regimes and Foreign Policy: The Case of Argentina,' in Heraldo 
Munoz and Joseph S. Tulchin (eds.), Latin American Nations in World Politics (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1984), p. 192.
18 J. R. Videla, 'A Time for Fundamental Reorganization of the Nation: Speech by General Jorge 
Rafael Videla, 1976,' in Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr. (eds.), The Politics o f Antipolitics: 
The Military in Latin America (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), p. 178.
19 C. M. Lewis, Argentina: A Short History (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002), p. 68.
20 What follows is based on Ministerio de Economia, Memoria 29-3-1976 /  29-3-1981, Tomo I 
(Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Economia, Secretaria de Estado Programacion y Coordination Economica, 
1981).
21 Ibid., p. 72, my translation.
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years, it was also announced that the government would be entitled to accelerate such 
reductions at its own discretion as a means of fighting inflation. The resulting loss of 
credibility, and, foremost, of predictability of the government’s actions, had an 
unsurprisingly negative effect on potential investors, as it became clear that ultimately 
the whole system was subject to the government’s arbitrariness. Furthermore, the 
decision o f rapidly reducing the tariff on capital goods had very high social costs, 
adding to the low credibility of the plan.
Deregulation also reached the financial system, where a preannounced schedule of 
mini-devaluations of the exchange rate (widely known as ‘la tablita’) was put into 
effect. Very convenient interest rates vis-a-vis both the inflation and devaluation rates 
attracted large amounts of short-term speculative capital from abroad that inundated the 
domestic market and left soon after cashing the interest.22 Hence the larger amount of 
capital leaving Argentina than the amount of currency entering. In turn, the low 
exchange rate was financed with foreign debt, which grew between 1976 and 1980 from 
$9.2 billion to $27.1 billion.23
It was not long before many small companies that had taken out loans found 
themselves in default due to the elevated interest rates, taking out new loans to repay old 
ones; a strategy that mostly backfired. First, smaller financial institutions, but soon 
banks as well, were forced to declare themselves insolvent. By 1980, the Argentine 
financial system had collapsed.
The failure of the model is partially explained by the high level of corruption, which 
was not effectively dealt with, and partially by reference to the model’s inherent 
contradictions and mismanagement. Martinez de Hoz was a pragmatic liberal rather 
than a dogmatic monetarist. This differentiated the Argentine and the Chilean economic 
teams, as will be seen below. The greater orthodoxy of the latter, much more closely 
associated with the Chicago School, helps to explain the higher degree of consistency of
22 Liicke and Pascual Spada highlight that the difference between the interest rate and the announced 
devaluation rate allowed a speculative benefit in dollars of up to 50 percent annually, and that while the 
most common fix-term accounts were only 30-days deposists, in many cases they even were 7-day 
deposists. See A. Liicke and T. Pascual Spada, La Interdependencia del Orden Economico y  Politico: Dos 
Experiencias Latinoamericanas, Argentina (1976-81) y  Chile (1973-83) (Buenos Aires: Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung-CIEDLA, 1986), p. 41.
23 Data from 'Development Statistics: Latin America,' produced by The United States Agency for 
International Development - USAID, accessed: 22 May 2003, http://qesdb.cdie.org/cgi-
bin/broker.exe?_program=lacprogs.econ_l.sas&_service=rrbsas.
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the Chilean programme. Conversely, Argentina’s was marked by contradictions, flaws, 
and incoherencies.24
The concepts of ‘private property’ and ‘market economy’ were presented as ‘ethical 
imperatives’:
The proposed industrial policy tends to deepen the application o f the rules o f the 
game o f a system o f private property and market economy, with the aim o f  
revitalising it and strengthening its philosophical basis, thus fulfilling its ethical 
imperative.25
Yet the armed forces soon found that indiscriminately applying the ‘ethical 
imperative’ of the free market to all fields was against the principles o f national 
security. The chemical, oil, steel, iron, aluminium and paper industries, electric and 
nuclear energy, and communications and other public services, all constituted ‘strategic’ 
areas to be exempt from the ‘ethical imperative.’ Not only did they escape privatisation, 
but in turn some previously private enterprises, such as the electricity company Italo or 
the airline Austral, were nationalised. ‘Strategic industries’ were put under the direct 
management of military officials, thus being out of reach for the Ministry of Economy. 
The result was an expanding ensemble of huge state companies that very soon turned 
into heavy bureaucratic corporations.
Additionally, the armed forces engaged in expensive arms purchases, costly military 
campaigns, and the organisation of colossal events, such as the 1978 Football World 
Cup.27 Faced with these decisions, Martinez de Hoz chose not to defy the military and 
to ignore the resulting incoherencies. In the end, the model paid the consequences of 
retaining and expanding both public expenditure and the size of the state despite its 
neoliberal discourse.
The ‘natural’ inclination of the armed forces towards interventionism and statism 
did little to help a programme doomed to fail. Yet most other aspects of the liberal plan 
fell short of its objectives. The financial liberalisation ended up in capital flight abroad. 
The level of corruption was extraordinary, and foreign debt grew 179 percent between 
1976 and 1980, at which point it represented 37.3 percent of the GDP.28 In addition,
24 For a thorough comparison of both programmes and policies, see Liicke and Pascual Spada, La 
Interdependencia del Orden Economico y  Politico: Dos Experiencias Latinoamericanas, Argentina 
(1976-81) y  Chile (1973-83).
25 Ministerio de Economia, Memoria 29-3-1976/29-3-1981, p. 68, my translation.
26 J. J. Sebreli, Critica de las Ideas Politicos Argentinas: Los Origenes de la Crisis (Buenos Aires: 
Sudamericana, 2002), p. 333.
27 Ibid.
28 See A. Cisneros and C. Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica 
Argentina (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 2000), Volume XI, Chapter 55, 
http://www.argentina-rree.eom/l 1/1 l-087.htm.
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high interest rates and the “shock opening of the economy in 1976”29 destroyed large 
parts of local industry that had been used to protectionism and suddenly found itself 
unable to adjust to the new situation. Finally, until 1979 inflation had failed to be 
contained, oscillating between 139.7 (1979) and 169.8 percent (1978), after having 
reached 347.5 percent in 1976.30
By the end of the 1970s, experts’ confidence in the economic programme and in the 
military government was eroding rapidly. The armed forces had become an 
unpredictable and risky actor, both for the business community and the public in 
general. This feeling would intensify a few years later with the Malvinas/Falklands 
defeat. In addition, the methods first introduced by the ‘Triple A ’ were perfected and 
systematised when the armed forces took over. Whilst the regime’s planned terror had 
practically achieved its goal of “annihilating the operation of subversive elements”31 by 
1979, its campaign against Marxism had hit far larger sectors of society in the name of 
‘National Security.’32
If the political plan of the authoritarian government was plagued with excesses and 
the economic programme with inconsistencies, its external behaviour was not entirely 
different. Although the regime seemed to reintroduce the 1960s concept o f ‘ideological 
borders’33 for the design of its foreign policy—illustrated by its participation both in the 
Condor Plan (exchange of prisoners and intelligence information about subversive 
activities with neighbouring dictatorships), and in the Bolivian coup d’etat of 1980—, 
national borders and territorial integrity had not at all become irrelevant. The rather 
sharp division within the regime between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ explains many of its 
contradicting decisions. For instance, the ‘Operation Sovereignty’ in the Beagle
29 Lewis, Argentina: A Short History, p. 82.
30 Indec - Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, 'Serie Historica del Indice de Precios al 
Consumidor (IPC) en el Gran Buenos Aires.'
31 Decreto 2772/75, 'Fuerzas Armadas - Ejecucion de las Operaciones Militares y de Seguridad 
Necesarias para eliminar la Subversion,' 6 October 1975, 
http://www.nuncamas.org/document/document.htm.
32 According to Argentina: Nunca Mas; The Report o f the Argentine National Commission on the 
Disappeared (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1986), 8,960 cases of ‘disappearance’ were 
denounced to the National Commission on the Disappeared. Alfred Stepan, in Rethinking Military 
Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), highlights that 
this equals to 32 disappearances per 100,000 people; while for every person who disappeared or died in 
official custody in Brazil during the bureaucratic authoritarian regime, over three hundred died in 
Argentina. Human rights organisations generally estimate that the figure of ‘disappearances’ could reach 
30,000.
33 The concept o f ‘ideological border’ as opposed to ‘territorial border’ was popular in the second half 
of the 1960s among Argentine and Brazilian anti-Marxist nationalists. See Cisneros and Escude, Historia 
General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, Volume XIV, Chapter 66, 
http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-001.htm.
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Channel and the invasion of the Malvinas/Falkland clearly show the ascendancy of the 
orthodox nationalist ‘hawks,’ represented mainly by Generals Suarez Mason and 
Menendez, and Admiral Massera, who were also strongly opposed to Martinez de Hoz’s 
economic liberalism. In contrast, the ‘doves,’ such as President Videla, General Roberto 
Viola and Minister Martinez de Hoz, were more inclined to search negotiated solutions 
on pending disputes with neighbours, as shown by the outcome of the disputes with 
Chile and Brazil.
However, they were all in agreement on the method to be used to counter domestic 
subversion; a matter that strained relations with the United States when Democrat 
Jimmy Carter took office in early 1977. Indeed, whereas the Republican Ford 
administration received the new authoritarian government’s proclamation of alignment 
with the Western and Christian world—a world threatened by (internal and external) 
communism—with eagerness, after 1977 friction increased to the point that bilateral 
dialogue was interrupted in 1980 until the election of Ronald Reagan.
Human rights turned into a sore issue as the Carter administration denounced 
Argentina and other Latin American countries at international fora, reduced military 
help by half in 1977 and then cancelled it in 1978, and pressured the OAS into sending a 
delegation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to Buenos Aires.34 Yet 
the military—hawks and doves equally—felt that they were being misinterpreted and 
their efforts to defend capitalism and Christianity were not being appreciated. They saw 
themselves “locked in a virtual crusade as the lonely and misunderstood guardians of 
one of the most vulnerable outposts of ‘Western Civilization’.”35
Argentine governments had traditionally maintained a rather distant, at best 
ambivalent, attitude towards the hemispheric power, which was accentuated by the 
historic U.S.-Brazilian special relationship, as will be discussed in chapter six. Buenos 
Aires’ decision to stay within the Non-Aligned Movement, which it had joined during 
the previous Peronist government, or its systematic refusal to join nuclear non­
proliferation regimes since the late 1960s were of increasing concern to the U.S.. 
Equally, the armed forces’ support in terms of arms, funds, intelligence and logistic for 
the Bolivian coup caused deep resentment in the Carter administration, which was
34 See Lewis, Argentina: A Short History, pp. 68-70; Cisneros and Escudo, Historia General de las 
Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, Volume XIV, Chapter 68, http://www.argentina- 
rree.com/14/14-043.htm: and M. Rapoport, Historia Economica, Politico y  Social de la Argentina (1880- 
2000) (Buenos Aires, Bogota, Caracas y Mexico DF: Ediciones Macchi, 2000), pp. 769-776.
Smith, 'Reflections on the Political Economy of Authoritarian Rule and Capitalism Reorganization 
in Contemporary Argentina,' p. 49. See also R. Russell, 'Sistemas de Creencias y Politica Exterior 
Argentina: 1976-1989,' Serie de Documentos e Informes de Investigation (Buenos Aires: Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales-FLACSO, Julio 1996).
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trying to promote democracy across the region. Perhaps even more suspicions were 
raised by the ties the country had developed with states on the other side of the iron 
curtain, whose corollary would be Argentina’s refusal to adhere to the cereal embargo 
stipulated by the United States against the Soviet Union in 1980. While it is true that 
Buenos Aires used its relationship with the Soviet Union to counterbalance U.S. and 
Western European pressure on human rights issues, many analysts explain the rejection 
of the embargo in terms of the pragmatism that had characterised the ‘economic 
diplomacy’: the country was in desperate need for export markets for its agricultural 
products, and the Soviet Union had become its main importer.
Also, the eventual rapprochement with Brazil can be interpreted as the acceptance 
of a pragmatic vision among government members at the expense of a nationalist 
position. As just seen, by the second half of the 1970s the government had surrounded 
itself with a larger, rather hostile and potentially unstable context, both in domestic and 
external terms. Against this background, the acceptance of the existing gap between a 
stagnant Argentina and an ‘economic miracle’ Brazil made some members of the 
government aware of the potential benefits of co-operation in economic matters. 
According to Martinez de Hoz, the Foreign Trade Department of the Ministry of 
Economy was the first to insist on the need to reach a deeper understanding with Brazil. 
The minister and his team, as well as President Videla, were convinced of the 
importance of developing good trade relations with the Brazilian industrial sector, 
whose success they admired and hoped to emulate. Accordingly, they worked under the 
slogan “Argentina and Brazil are not rivals but partners.” As Martinez de Hoz put it 
clearly, “there was indeed a shift of ‘political intention.’ Such shift originated in the 
Ministry of Economy and encouraged changes in other areas of government.”
36 Rapoport, Historia Economica, Politico y  Social de la Argentina (1880-2000), p. 772. Roberto 
Russell highlights that intervention in Bolivia responded to ideological as much as to power political 
reasons, in that the Argentine Army felt compelled to occupy a regional space that otherwise would have 
been won by Brazil. See also Russell, 'Sistemas de Creencias y Politica Exterior Argentina: 1976-1989,' 
p. 19-23.
37 Mario Rapoport gives a thorough account of Argentine-Soviet relations throughout history. For the 
particular period of the authoritarian regime, see his chapter seven in Rapoport, Historia Economica, 
Politica y  Social de la Argentina (1880-2000), as well as A. Varas, 'The Soviet Union in the Foreign 
Relations of the Southern Cone,' in Heraldo Mufioz and Joseph S. Tulchin (eds.), Latin American Nations 
in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). For Argentina and the cereal embargo against the 
Soviet Union, see R. Russell, 'El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones en la Politica Exterior Argentina (1976- 
1989),' in Roberto Russell (ed.), Politica Exterior y  Toma de Decisiones en America Latina (Buenos 
Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1990).
38 Telephone interview with Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, Argentine Minister of Economy between 
1976 and 1981. Buenos Aires, 17 April 2001.
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The ‘economic diplomacy’ of Martinez de Hoz managed to influence the hawks’ 
typical ‘military diplomacy’39 as the government acknowledged its military and 
geopolitical inferiority vis-a-vis the most powerful state in the region. In the words of 
geopolitical thinker General Juan Guglialmelli, “Brasilia consolidated [...] its several 
proposals of hegemony based on parameters among which the spatial factor and the 
economic development carry a definitive weight.”40
As the relationship with Brazil was considered for the first time in pragmatic terms, 
both the integrationist discourse of the Peronism years and the geopolitical disposition 
of the 1960s and 1970s were played down, and instead a less ideological and more 
opportunity-seeking view was promoted.
In 1979, Martinez de Hoz met twice with Antonio Delfim Netto, then the Brazilian 
Minister of Agriculture, to discuss agreements of economic complementarity, and once 
with Karlos Rischbieter, Minister of Finance of Brazil, to propose the joint construction 
of a gas pipeline going from the North of Argentina, through Uruguay, to the South of 
Brazil.41 Although internal opposition and domestic instabilities delayed these projects, 
the old geopolitical stance regarding the larger neighbour had been reassessed; a fact 
reflected in the nuclear agreements that soon followed the resolution of the Itaipu- 
Corpus dispute. After many decades of tension, one thing had become apparent: there 
eventually was room for a different relationship with Brazil. A non-hostile relationship 
was finally perceived as possible.
3. Brazil
3.1. Getulio Vargas and his legacy
Like Argentina, Brazil has also experienced populism. Between 1930 and 1945 the 
country was ruled by populist leader Getulio Vargas, who in 1937 led an auto-coup 
closing the Congress, banning political parties, and imposing himself as president of the 
newly promulgated Estado Novo, or New State. Vargas initiated a programme of 
nationalisation that included mines, energy sources, banks, insurance companies, and 
basic and essential industries; promoted redistribution, and encouraged the formation of
39 For the differentiation between the ‘economic and military diplomacies’ of the military regime, see 
R. Russell, 'Argentina y la Politica Exterior del Regimen Autoritario (1976-1983): una Evaluation 
Preliminar,' in Ruben M. Perina and Roberto Russell (eds.), Argentina en el Mundo (1973-1987) (Buenos 
Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1988).
40 J. E. Guglialmelli, 'Geopolitica en la Argentina,' Estrategia vol. May-June/July-August, no. 46/47 
(1977), p. 8.
41 Telephone interview with Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz.
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loyal workers’ unions.42 He laid down the basis for a large, entrepreneurial state that 
retained its centrality in the country’s economy during much of the following decades.
The formula of state interventionism backed by populism inherited from the Vargas 
years was reproduced by almost every government, albeit with differences in styles and 
accents, until the coup d’etat of 1964. Among these administrations, that of Juscelino 
Kubitschek (1956-1961) stands out. After promising ‘Fifty Years of Progress in Five’ 
through his ‘Targets Programme,’ Kubitschek promoted the development of basic 
sectors, such as metallurgy, cement, chemicals, heavy mechanics, shipbuilding, and the 
automobile industry; emphasised the areas of energy, transportation, and food supply; 
and provided investment incentives to foreign companies investing in Brazil. It was also 
this government that built a whole new capital city in the middle of a tropical savannah 
within four years. Brasilia symbolises to this day, as originally intended, Kubitschek’s 
enterprising administration, during which Brazil’s GDP expanded at an average rate of 
8 percent yearly as a result of an active policy of industrialisation, protection of the local 
industry, and heavy public investments.
Although 1964 marked the first time that the Brazilian armed forces retained and 
directly exercised power since their 1889-1894 rule following the overthrow of the 
emperor, they were in fact used to taking part in politics. For a long time, civilian 
politicians—mainly from the anti-populist, anti-Varguist National Democratic Union— 
turned to the armed forces when confronted with undesired elections results, assigning 
them the role of final arbiters in the political system.43 Prior to 1964, their interventions 
in the political process had always been followed by rapid restorations of civilian 
governments.
Ambassador Marcos Henrique C. Cortes explains the relatively low degree of 
disruption o f the democratic rule by the Brazilian military—low, when compared to the 
armed forces’ interventions in Argentina—by referring to its middle class extraction: 
“The military in Brazil had natural contacts with the common people, nothing 
programmed or especially planned. As a matter of fact, the first time the military 
intervened in politics was to favour the Republic against the monarchy.”44 This, 
according to the diplomat, marks a striking difference with the Argentine armed forces,
42 In particular, see 'Constitui?ao da Republica dos Estados Unidos do Brasil,' (1934) accessed: 20 
May 2003, http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/Brazil/brazil34.html, Title IV On The 
Economic and Social Order.
43 C. Menendez and M. Kerz, Autocracia y  Democracia: Brasil, un Camino al Mercosur (Buenos 
Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1993), pp. 18-21.
44 Interview with Ambassador Marcos Henrique C. Cortes in Rio de Janeiro, 4 April 2001. 
Ambassador Cortes was Minister Counsellor at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires between 1974 and 
1978, and is currently professor at the Brazilian War College (Escola Superior de Guerra).
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whose members had traditionally belonged to the vernacular aristocracy, and therefore 
felt part of the national political elite with a right to intervene in politics.
Vargas gave the military a prominent role during his first administrations and the 
Estado Novo, of which they became a key supporter. When in 1945 Vargas threatened 
to not call for open elections, the military organised a discrete overthrow that ended in 
the appointment—by civilian politicians—of General Eurico Dutra, Vargas’ minister of 
war, with the intention of maintaining political stability. Since then, and up until the 
1964 coup, at least one member of the armed forces ran as candidate in every 
presidential election. Yet, in addition to having their own candidates, at times the 
military’s political participation was more resolute (and coercive) than that. In 1954, 
they led a coup d’etat to remove, again, President Vargas from power, a situation that 
resulted in his suicide; in 1955, there was an attempted coup to prevent Juscelino 
Kubitschek from taking office; and finally, in 1961, another coup failed to stop Vice 
President Joao Goulart from succeeding Janio Quadros after his resignation.45
Goulart was seen as the heir of Vargas, as a symbol of the communist penetration of 
the Brazilian political system. The manifesto issued by the military ministers on 29 
August 1961 as part of their attempted coup shows the uneasiness felt by a faction of the 
armed forces in relation to Goulart’s appointment:
Being at the presidency o f the Republic in a regime that grants vast personal 
authority and power to the chief o f government, Mr Joao Goulart will 
undoubtedly become the most evident incentive for all those who wish to see 
the country plunged into chaos, anarchy, civil war.46
While this attempt was unsuccessful, by 1964 the loss of control over the economy 
and the increasingly radicalised initiatives of the government led to the consolidation of 
consensus among the armed forces and set the scene for a new coup d’etat. This time 
the military remained in office.
3.2. The developmentalist military
The arrival to power of General Humberto Castello Branco (1964-1967) and 
Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969) initiated an era o f decisive influence of 
the Brazilian War College (Escola Superior de Guerra) and its geopoliticians on the
45 For the historical role of the armed forces in Brazilian politics, see T. Skidmore, The Politics o f  
Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); R. Roett, 
Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1999), particularly 
chapter four; and Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone.
46 'Manifesto dos ministros militares a Nafao, em 29 de agosto de 1961,' (1961) accessed: 21 May 
2003, http://www.etapa.net/download/gabarito/fuvest2002_fasel2/fuv2002h.pdf, my translation.
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political developments in the country. In particular, it meant the practical 
implementation of the National Security Doctrine, taught at the War College since 
1954,47 which translated internationally into understanding the region and the world as 
divided by ‘ideological borders,’48 and domestically, into a process of centralisation of 
power and decline of civilian influence, which was put into practice through several 
Institutional Acts.
Whereas at the beginning of the military rule the regime could be defined as semi­
constitutional in that, for instance, some electoral processes were allowed and the 
Congress continued to function—albeit with seriously curtailed faculties—, its character 
soon changed, particularly after the issue of the Institutional Act nr. 5 (1968). By then, 
however, the 1946 Constitution had already been severely modified, some former 
politicians and public servants had been declared ineligible to hold public office, 
electoral laws had been rewritten to provide for the indirect elections of state governors, 
a new official political party had been founded (National Renovating Alliance- 
ARENA) whilst only one opposition party (Brazilian Democratic Movement-MDB) 
was allowed, thus replacing the previous 13-party system; and political and 
administrative power had been further centralised in the hands o f the military 
president49 The Fifth Institutional Act, in turn, opened the door for shutting down 
Congress, suspending political rights and habeas corpus, and imposing press 
censorship.50
National security, anticommunism, internal enemies, and membership of the 
Western and Christian world were all key concepts underpinning the policy choices of 
the first three governments of the military regime. Indeed, not only were the 
administrations of Castello Branco and Costa e Silva driven by strong ideological 
principles both in domestic and in international politics, but the years of General Emilio 
Garrastazu Medici (1969-1974) also witnessed an increase of authoritarian tendencies. 
Several guerrilla and terrorist groups had emerged, and for some time posed a serious 
threat to the stability of the regime, as the case of the kidnapping of the U.S. 
ambassador in 1969 illustrates. However, rather than weakening the regime, this served 
to justify a stronger and more repressive turn, which was legitimised and supported by
47 Menendez and Kerz, Autocraciay Democracia: Brasil, un Camino al Mercosur, p. 42.
48 As part of the ‘ideological borders’ principle, Brazil participated in the invasion of Dominican 
Republic in order to prevent the installation of a second Cuba in the continent.
49 Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society, pp. 114-119.
50 'Ato Institucional n° 5,' 13 December 1968, http://www.nethistoria.com/docs/100/docs05.shtml.
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middle and upper-class sectors. Unquestionably, Medici was the most repressive, but 
also the most popular of all military presidents.
Simultaneously, other objectives became increasingly central to the War College, 
and thus, by extension, to the regime. These were the principle of self-determination, 
understood as synonymous with national sovereignty; national integration, including 
territorial, economic, political and social integration; and prosperity and international 
prestige and power, to be achieved through economic development and growth.51 In this 
sense, General Meira Matos, a geopolitical thinker of the War College, stated that there 
was a ‘mutual causality’ between economic strength and security, although “economic 
growth in itself already represents security [...].’
State interventionism saw its height during the Medici years. In this period, Brazil’s 
industrial growth achieved most extraordinary results. Minister Delfun Netto introduced 
‘crawling peg’ devaluations, managing to neutralise the exchange rate deadlock. This 
allowed Brazil to significantly increase its exports o f industrial goods at a time when 
world trade was also expanding, while continuing to enlarge its own domestic market. 
The productive activities of the public sector also expanded significantly during these 
years, which clearly contributed to the impressive growth of the economy. The share of 
industry in GDP reached 30 percent in 1972, after having remained constant at 26 
percent between 1960 and 1967. Since then, Delfim Netto’s name has been associated 
with Brazil’s ‘economic miracle,’ fully under way between 1968 and 1973 when the 
GDP attained growth rates of an average of over 10 percent annually, as table 3.1 
shows.
Table 3.1: Annual GDP growth rate in Brazil, 1968-1973
Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
GDP
Growth 9.8% 9.5% 10.4% 11.4% 11.9% 13.9%
Source: Abreu, Marcelo de P., Alfonso S. Bevilaqua, and Demosthenes M. Pinho, 'Import 
Substitution and Growth in Brazil, 1890-1970s,1 produced by Department o f Economics, 
Catholic University o f Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, (1997) accessed: 21 May 2003, 
http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/mpabreu/pdfytd366.pdf.
When General Ernesto Geisel took office in early 1974, the first oil crisis had 
already broken out. As Brazil’s industry was heavily dependent on oil—80 percent of 
which was imported—the new president centred his ambitious investment programme
51 Men&idez and Kerz, Autocraciay Democracia: Brasil, un Camino al Mercosur, pp. 37-68.
52 C. Meira Matos, 'Estrategia Militar Brasilena,' Estrategia vol. 49-50, no. November- 
December/January-February (1977-1978), p. 34.
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upon the generation of energy; the construction of power plants, oil mining, and the 
production of alcohol as an alternative to fuel. This explains the determination with 
which the project of the hydroelectric plant at Itaipu was set in motion, in spite of 
endless Argentine complaints and the intensification of the bilateral dispute over the 
water resources of the River Parana, a matter explored in more detail in chapter six.
Resources to fund such grand plans and the needed oil imports came mainly from 
dramatically increasing state debt, both domestic and foreign, and from drawing on 
foreign exchange reserves. Only in 1974, Brazil increased its net external debt from 
$6.2 billion to $11.9 billion, and by 1978 it had reached already $31.6 billion.53 Imports 
shot up by 104 percent, thus more than doubling 1973 imports and causing a trade 
deficit of $4.7 billion. The government’s deficit as a percentage of GDP grew from 1.4 
percent in 1974 to 13.1 percent in 1979. At the same time, inflation rose from 15 
percent in 1973 to 34.5 percent in 1974, reaching 46.3 percent in 1979, revealing the 
fact that the average yearly inflation for the 1974-1978 period (37.9 percent) had been 
almost twice as high as the average inflation rate for the period between 1968 and 1973 
(19.3 percent).54
These figures were the cause of deep concern, which increased when it became 
clear that what had kept inflation under control thus far had indeed been the policy of 
indexation and mini-devaluations. According to Thomas Skidmore, although Geisel was 
able to maintain a respectable economic growth in 1974 (as shown in table 3.2), the 
economic record for that year already “indicated what was in store for the Brazilian 
economy in the second half of the 1970s. [...] In 1974 Brazil had survived the initial 
impact of OPEC’s economic blackmail. But how long could the ad hoc response 
succeed?”55
53 F. D. H. Barbosa and M. Sanchez De La Cal, 'Brazilian Experience with External Debt and 
Prospects for Growth,' produced by Escola de P6s-Gradua?ao em Economia, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, 
(1987) accessed: 21 May 2003, http://www.fgv.br/epge/home/PisDownload/104.pdf.
54 For the figures quoted in this paragraph, see P. R. D. Castro and M. Ronci, 'Sixty Years of Populism 
in Brazil,' in Rudiger Dombusch and Sebastian Edwards (eds.), The Macroeconomics o f Populism in 
Latin America (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 163; and Skidmore, The 
Politics o f Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985, pp. 178-180.
55 Ibid., p. 180.
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Table 3.2: Annual GDP growth rate in Brazil, 1974-1979
Year 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
GDP
Growth 8.2% 5.1% 10.2% 4.9% 4.9% 6.8%
Source: Abreu, Marcelo de P., Alfonso S. Bevilaqua, and Demosthenes M. Pinho, 'Import 
Substitution and Growth in Brazil, 1890-1970s,' produced by Department o f Economics, 
Catholic University o f Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, (1997) accessed: 21 May 2003, 
http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/mpabreu/pdiytd366.pdf.
As the economic miracle died out and the international context changed, the old 
conceptual body of the National Security Doctrine began to be revised. General Geisel 
started the route towards re-democratisation through a long and slow process of 
abertura, or political liberalisation, that was only completed when General Joao 
Figueiredo (1979-1985) called for direct municipal, state, and national offices elections 
in 1982, and indirect presidential elections in 1985. Among other measures, Geisel 
eased censorship, restored habeas corpus, allowed the first massive strike (1978) since 
1964, and abolished the repressive Fifth Institutional Act.
The Geisel administration overlapped with Jimmy Carter’s presidency in the United 
States, and Brazil, like Argentina, was the object of strong criticism by the new 
Democrat administration for its human rights record. Although Brazil deplored a report 
published by the U.S. State Department on human rights as constituting an intolerable 
interference in its internal affairs, Geisel made the respect of human rights a priority of 
his government. By 1978, Geisel had taken a series o f decisions by which the issue of 
human rights violations had been practically overcome.
1979 not only marked the beginning of the Figueiredo administration, the last 
government of the authoritarian regime, but was also the year of the second oil shock 
and rising interest rates. This posed an especially serious challenge given that the new 
government inherited an external debt whose servicing took up 67 percent of export 
revenues. As Roett points out, “[t]here was a sense of both crisis and expectation 
surrounding the presidential inauguration” as President Figueiredo “had to address the 
challenges of an overheating economy and rising social expectations.”56
The government had to carry out urgent measures to deal with the rampant crisis, 
which forced Delfim Netto—now in the Planning Ministry—to scrap “the pre-fixing of 
devaluation and indexation adjustment, and unceremoniously [dump] the high-growth
56 Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society, p. 152.
strategy” by 1980.57 Instead of the expected results, the plan ended in yet higher 
inflation, rising from 77 percent in 1979 to 110 percent in 1980, and in 1981 Brazil’s 
GDP not only failed to grow for the first time since 1942, but it declined by 1.6 percent.
Thus, by the start of the second half of the 1970s, the Brazilian economy showed 
the signs of what was about to come. Soon, the domestic front was at the centre of the 
concerns of political and economic elites, who became aware of the need for changes. 
Similarly, the external scenario had been deteriorating in the previous decade, especially 
in what refers to relations with the United States and with Argentina.
U.S.-Brazilian relations had seen years of oscillation between ‘special relationship’ 
and open antagonism: close ties in the aftermaths of the Second World War, distance in 
the early 1960s with Quadros’ and Goulart’s ‘autonomous’ foreign policy, favourite 
partnership again in the beginning of the military regime, and nationalist shift in the late 
1960s as Brazil’s national interest was redefined. By then, the ‘economic miracle’ was 
taking off, and, as mentioned before, goals such as national self-determination, national 
integration and the accumulation of power were gaining weight on the agenda at the 
expense of ideological borders and alignment with the U.S.. In Brasilia, it was felt that 
the country’s economic strength could translate into a more prominent role 
internationally, or, in the words of Riordan Roett, that Brazil “would take second place 
to no one.”58
As the country pursued an autonomous foreign policy and defined its own profile in 
the international scene, the United States became less of a supporter—let alone a 
partner—and more of an antagonist. Antagonism became overt in 1967 and 1968, when 
Brazil refused to join the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and the Treaty of Non-proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); and was exacerbated in 1975 when Brazil recognised the 
new, independent government of Angola despite U.S. opposition, and signed a nuclear 
agreement with West Germany, also despite vigorous American objections. The 
situation further deteriorated in the second half of the 1970s, when Jimmy Carter’s 
human rights foreign policy pointed the finger directly at Brazil. At this point, Brasilia 
unilaterally cancelled its military agreements with the United States.59
57 Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985, p. 230.
58 Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society, p. 190.
59 A. D. S. C. Barros, 'The Formulation and Implementation of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Itamaraty 
and the New Actors,' in Heraldo Munoz and Joseph S. Tulchin (eds.), Latin American Nations in World 
Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 35.
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Against this background, Geisel and his foreign affairs minister, Antonio Francisco 
Azeredo da Silveira—who had left his position as Brazilian Ambassador in Buenos 
Aires to take up this new post—began the shift that placed Latin America at the centre 
of Brazil’s “pragmatic, ecumenical and responsible foreign policy.”60 When then 
Figueiredo took over, the specific instruction that his foreign affairs minister, 
Ambassador Saraiva Guerreiro, received was to carry on in this direction, deepening 
relations with the Latin American neighbours even further and promoting regional 
economic integration.61
During this period, personal ideology and preferences played an important role in 
the relationship with Argentina and the region.62 The deepening of links with Latin 
America and above all the resolution of the dispute with Argentina were, to a great 
extent, promoted by Minister Saraiva Guerreiro and President Figueiredo. In his youth, 
Joao Figueiredo had spent some years in exile in Buenos Aires as his father had to flee 
Vargas’ dictatorship. Those years had had an important influence on him. He felt a 
personal attachment to the country, which may have contributed to his decision to 
resolve all outstanding disputes with Argentina and begin a process of rapprochement 
and co-operation, a matter considered in greater detail in chapter six. In any case, 
Figueiredo openly showed a “special interest in overcoming the longstanding problem 
with Argentina” with more celerity than his predecessor, who had begun intricate and 
protracted talks with its neighbour.63
Similarly, Figueiredo was determined to continue and speed up the process of 
political liberalisation started by Geisel. Here, too, his personal experience exerted a 
significant influence. Figueiredo’s father, General Euclydes Figueiredo, had been a firm 
opponent of the Vargas regime. Upon his return from exile in Argentina, he was jailed 
by the Estado Novo in 1937. Most probably, his father’s democratic convictions 
persuaded him to accelerate and complete the abertura under way. Figueiredo removed 
the ban on the creation of new political parties, granted amnesty to political exiles, re­
established direct elections for governors, and restored some powers to the Congress, all 
of which was firmly in place by the end of 1982.
60 Menendez and Kerz, Autocraciay Democracia: Brasil, un Camino al Mercosur, p. 58.
61 Interview with Ambassador Ramiro Elysio Saraiva Guerreiro, Foreign Affairs Minister 1979-1985 
during the government of Figueiredo, Rio de Janeiro, 6 April 2001.
62 See Russell, 'Sistemas de Creencias y Politica Exterior Argentina: 1976-1989,' where the author 
shows that personal beliefs, motivations and ideologies constitute important domestic sources to 
understand and analyse foreign policy decisions and behaviour.
63 Interview with Ambassador Ramiro Elysio Saraiva Guerreiro.
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Thus, it was a distinct blend of factors, encompassing domestic and international 
circumstances, as well as personal experiences and preferences, that encouraged 
Brazilian foreign policy makers to reassess their range of options, and consider a wider 
spectrum. The signs of exhaustion of Brazil’s developmentalist model and the end of its 
‘economic miracle’—palpable already after the first oil crisis—, the erosion of domestic 
support for the regime, the increasing opposition to and from the United States, and the 
crucial role played by Figueiredo and his foreign affairs minister, all contributed to 
make rapprochement with Argentina desirable; an option that, until not long before, had 
appeared inconceivable.
4. Chile
4.1. A case of democracy and distribution
Until the coup d’etat of 1973, Chile had enjoyed a stable and consolidated 
democratic history that constituted a hallmark in Latin America. Since the 1930s 
governments had been uninterruptedly appointed by democratic elections. After the 
1950s the country grew ideologically divided into three rather equally influential 
groupings: the National Party; the Christian Democratic Party; and socialists and 
communists, who later converged with other left-wing groups in the Popular Union 
(UP).
Post-war Chile had faced chronic high inflation, moderate growth, and frequent 
balance o f payments crises. For instance, President Jorge Alessandri’s (1958-1964) 
main goal was to stabilise inflation. It was then argued that growth and distribution 
would come later, once the anti-inflationary programme had proven effective. Christian 
Democrat President Eduardo Frei (1964-1970), instead, made redistribution one of his 
priorities. He introduced gradual and slow structural changes, such as the beginning of a 
process of land reform seeking to “change the skewed pattern of land tenure and to 
incorporate peasants to the political and economic structure,”64 and the participation of 
the Chilean state in the ownership of large copper mines, which had until then belonged 
to American companies. As part of this same project, the government increased 
expenditures in social areas and increased wages. In line with the U.S.-sponsored
64 F. Larrain and P. Meller, 'The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience, 1970-1973,' in Rudiger 
Dombusch and Sebastian Edwards (eds.), The Macroeconomics o f Populism in Latin America (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 177.
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Alliance for Progress, the Frei administration—under the slogan ‘Revolution in 
freedom’—intended to generate a capitalist programme with a ‘human face.’
The sharp economic slowdown during the second half o f Frei’s government, and the 
imbalance between increased political and social participation of the lower classes and 
unfavourable economic outcomes resulted in a loss of support in the 1970 elections. The 
coalition Unidad Popular (UP) of left and centre-left parties led by Salvador Allende 
obtained around 36 percent of the votes, only slightly over 1 percent more (less than 
40,000 votes) than right-wing candidate Alessandri, who finished in second place. The 
vote in Congress of the Christian Democrats in favour of the UP became crucial for 
Allende’s nomination, in accordance to the constitutional provision for the eventuality 
that no candidate obtained the absolute majority.
4.2. The socialist interlude
The general direction set by Frei’s programme laid the foundations o f the three-year 
socialist experience of Salvador Allende’s Popular Union (1970-1973). However, whilst 
Frei sought to improve the distribution of wealth through a gradual process of land 
reform and ‘Chileanisation’ o f the mining industry, and improving social services and 
salaries, Allende’s far more ambitious goal was to democratically ‘overcome 
capitalism’ carrying out a socialist-Marxist restructuring of the state. Ultimately, this 
proved to be very difficult. Society became deeply polarised in ideological terms, and 
politics became the arena o f virulent conflicts. As the government did not have a 
majority in Congress, every negotiation became very arduous, and increasingly resulted 
in sheer confrontation.
According to the socialist government, structural reform was needed in four main 
areas in order to alter the monopolistic, externally dependent, and oligarchic structure of 
the Chilean economy. They envisaged the total nationalisation of the mining industry, 
socialisation of the industrial sector, completion of the agrarian reform, and 
nationalisation of the banking and financial system.65 Once in office, the UP moved fast 
to achieve these goals. However, only the reform of the mining sector raised general 
consensus, being in fact the only one to obtain congressional approval. In order to 
complete the remaining three parts of the programme the government had to either 
resort to old and obscure legislation, to extralegal means, or it had to purchase
65 The summaries of the reforms in all four sectors are based on Larrain and Meller, 'The Socialist- 
Populist Chilean Experience, 1970-1973,'pp. 184-189.
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properties directly. In spite of difficulties, political opposition, and lack of a legislative 
majority, by 1973 the state controlled 100 percent of utilities, 85 percent of the banking 
system and mining industry, 70 percent of transportation and telecommunications, and 
40 percent of industry.66
The dramatic growth of the state and the public sector was accompanied by 
impressive macroeconomic results in UP’s first year in office. In 1971, GDP grew by 8 
percent, more than doubling the previous year’s growth rate; inflation decreased to 
reach only 22.1 percent, a good outcome against the background of Chile’s record in the 
1960s; and unemployment was reduced to 3.8 percent, the lowest rate hitherto registered 
in Chilean statistics. These outcomes were the successful consequence of policies 
aiming to increase aggregate demand.67
Yet after this initial success, the years 1972 and 1973 were of fast decline, and 
ultimately represented the collapse of the socialist experience. Signs of disequilibria of 
numerous indicators—such as increases of budget and fiscal deficits, sharp reduction of 
international reserves, negative trade balances, large increases of money supply, an 
increase in consumption accompanied by a drop in investment, and the appearance of 
shortages, black markets and rationing—had been ignored since the beginning of the UP 
administration. In time, and since the government pursued no corrective policies, this 
led to the destabilisation and failure of the model, carrying with it high levels of 
inflation, recession, public deficit, and the deterioration of real wages. Further factors 
seriously damaged the Chilean economy: the severe drop in the international price of 
copper in 1971, the suspension of external funds by Chile’s traditional credit providers, 
and the so-called ‘invisible blockade’ and destabilisation campaign by the United 
States. As a result of this situation, in November 1971, Chile suspended the payment 
of its external debt service.
Against this background, social unrest and political opposition to the government 
were growing fast. Unsatisfactory macroeconomic outcomes were only part of the
66 S. Teitel, 'The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience, 1970-1973. Comment,' in Rudiger Dombusch 
and Sebastian Edwards (eds.), The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America (Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 218.
67 Larrain and Meller, 'The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience, 1970-1973,' pp. 196-198.
68 The United States resorted to countless means to weaken Allende’s government. Abraham 
Lowenthal indicates that between 1970 and 1973, the United States spent around $8 million financing 
political activities among many different civic groups, stimulating ‘news’ stories and editorials in the 
Chilean press, and promoting articles on Chile by CLA-subsidised ‘journalists’ from other countries. In 
addition, it worked to “cut off Chile’s access to international loans and credits and by encouraging local 
capital flight. [...] The Allende government faced a great deal of domestic opposition, to be sure, but U.S. 
efforts were significant in preparing the way for the 1973 coup.” A. F. Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: 
The United States and Latin America in the 1990s (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1990), p. 34.
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problem. Additionally, from the start the UP had been an intrinsically weak 
administration, having come to power with only a—literally—tiny advantage over the 
right-wing party. Moreover, early government decisions generated the opposition of 
important sectors of the public that might otherwise have stood by Allende. For 
instance, the process of land reform targeted originally only farms of over 80 hectares. 
Yet soon also farms of under 80 hectares were occupied by peasants while the 
government turned a blind eye. As a result, even small landowners felt threatened by the 
UP and withdrew their initial support. Similarly, in the beginning, expropriation and 
pressure to sell companies were aimed exclusively at owners of large firms, but then 
expanded to also include medium and small-sized companies, who could have otherwise 
constituted some basis of support. Instead, they soon became a source of strong 
opposition, resorting to judicial means and lockouts to prevent expropriation. Finally, 
on 27 August 1973 the Chamber of Deputies, dominated by opposition parties, declared 
illegal all actions taken by President Allende.
As pointed out by Manuel Antonio Garreton, the radicalisation of the programme 
had the effect of mobilising moderate actors who would normally have stayed on the 
sidelines, pushing them to take authoritarian positions. Thus, “in an increasingly 
polarized and de-institutionalized climate, the traumatized middle classes and the 
military put an end to reforms they believed threatened their survival.”69 On 11 
September 1973, a military coup d’etat led by General Augusto Pinochet brought 
President Allende’s socialist experience to an end.
4.3. Pinochet, geopolitics, and the stabilisation of the accounts
The last period of the Allende government resembled to some extent the collapse of 
the Peronist administration in 1976, except for the latter’s daily manifestations of open 
violence and terrorism. In Chile, the polarisation of social and political forces, and the 
acute distributive impact of economic disequilibria made socio-political confrontations 
virtually intolerable.70 Joseph Ramos observes that both the frustration with the 
economic performance and the severity of the immediate socio-political and economic
69 M. A. Garreton, The Political Dimension of the Processes of Transformation in Chile,' in William 
C. Smith, Carlos H. Acuna, and Eduardo A. Gamarra (eds.), Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform 
in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (Boulder, CO: University of Miami 
North-South Center Press, 1994), p. 219.
70 For instance, in 1972 there were 3,300 strikes, being declared illegal 96 percent of them. See W. 
Sanchez G., 'Las Tendencias Sobresalientes de la Politica Exterior Chilena,' in Walter Sanchez G. and 
Teresa Pereira L. (eds.), 150 Ahos de Politica Exterior Chilena (Santiago de Chile: Editorial 
Universitaria, 1977), pp. 396-397.
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crisis made the public receptive to the drastic measures proposed by the neoconservative 
forces.71
This Chilean neoconservative faction, composed of conservative military and 
neo liberal economists, shared some common aspects with its Argentine counterpart. 
They, too, saw the crisis as the result of the economic and political order dominant since 
the 1930s, of which the UP was just the radicalisation of an already present tendency. 
The obvious recipe to rescue the country from such a distorted economic order—and 
from the political model that had underpinned it—was the pursuit of its complete 
reversal, both in economic and political terms. In the words of Philip O’Brien,
Backed by leading sectors o f  the Chilean capitalist class, and international 
capitalist agencies and U.S. business interests, [the economic team] argued the 
need for a revolutionary overhaul o f Chilean economy and society: an overhaul 
that would depoliticize the dangerous Chilean working class with their stubborn 
adherence to Marxist ideology. Their technocratic, authoritarian approach to 
economic problems appealed to certain sectors o f the military [ ...] .72
The re-privatisation of nationalised properties, the opening of the economy, the 
liberalisation of markets, and a ffee-market price and resource allocation became nearly 
dogmatic principles for the Chilean economic policy-makers. The state saw its size and 
role transformed accordingly. Following neoliberal premises, it turned into a ‘subsidiary 
state’ that only carried out those activities that the private sector could not or did not 
want to perform, and a ‘neutral state’ which interfered in the economy only to establish 
general rules that applied equally to all.73 Distribution—a fundamental assignment of 
the state according to previous administrations—was no longer seen as a state 
responsibility.
The eradication of communism and the de-politicisation of society became key 
political objectives. As in Argentina, the new government took drastic measures to fulfil 
these goals, including shutting down Congress, dissolving all political parties, detaining 
or forcing into exile former officials, political activists and sympathisers, and 
suspending trade unions, the right to strike, and any union-related activity. Any attempt 
by workers’ movements to influence and participate in politics was severely repressed.
Curiously, the economic team saw no contradiction between the need for economic 
liberty and the lack of political freedom. This was one of the few differences between
71 J. Ramos, Neoconservative Economics in the Southern Cone o f Latin America, 1973-1983 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
72 P. O'Brien, 'Authoritarianism and the New Orthodoxy: the Political Economy of the Chilean 
Regime, 1973-1983,' in Philip O'Brien and Paul Cammack (eds.), Generals in Retreat: The Crisis of 
Military Rule in Latin America (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p. 151.
73 Liicke and Pascual Spada, La Interdependent del Orden Economico y  Politico: Dos Experiencias 
Latinoamericanas, Argentina (1976-81) y  Chile (1973-83), p. 25.
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the Chilean ‘Chicago boys’74 and their American teachers: American neoliberals based 
their theory on the preservation of individual freedom. According to Pinochet himself, 
in Chile, instead, “we can point out that in the inter-relationship between the economic 
and the social and political orders, economic freedom is a necessary requisite for the 
existence of a truly free political system”75—a belief shared by Argentine economists 
and military.
Despite a few similarities, Chile constituted a ‘purer’ case of neoliberalism than 
Argentina in that economists applied the recipes of the Chicago School rather strictly. 
Additionally, in comparison to Argentina, it turned out to be easier to implement the 
programme in Chile given its economic, political and social constitution. The country 
had achieved lower levels of industrial and agricultural development and auto­
sufficiency, and was therefore more inclined to an open economy. Its middle class and 
intermediate organisations were less sophisticated and organised, and thus less capable 
of representing a serious obstacle to a policy of structural reform that did not take them 
into account.76 Chile’s ‘purer’ model was also the product of the prevalent consistency 
in the country’s economic thought; a fact that permitted the continuity of a sustained 
programme between 1975 and 1982, even if under different economic teams.
Finally, the Chilean military constituted a more homogeneous and vertical body 
than its Argentine counterpart. Although Chile’s armed forces were also inclined to 
developmentalism—and consequently statism—particularly in those areas of the 
economy that were perceived as strategic, they did not have a definite stand with regard 
to the general economy, partly because they had not participated in politics or in the 
government recently. This, again, made the implementation of the new economic 
programme significantly easier, diminishing any potential opposition within the very 
military government.77
As noted earlier, the cases of Argentina, and more strikingly of Brazil, were very 
different. In Brazil, the military openly assumed an active developmentalist economic 
policy, whilst in Argentina they took on Martinez de Hoz’s neoliberal programme, but 
then widened the definition of ‘strategic areas of the economy’ with which the super- 
Minister was not allowed to interfere. Oil and energy, transport, communications and
74 Most of the members of the economic team had attained degrees from the University of Chicago.
75 Quoted in J. R. Whelan, Out of the Ashes: Life, Death and Transfiguration o f Democracy in Chile, 
1833-1988 (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1988), p. 918.
76 Liicke and Pascual Spada, La Interdependent del Orden Economico y  Politico: Dos Experiencias 
Latinoamericanas, Argentina (1976-81) y  Chile (1973-83); and T. E. Skidmore and P. H. Smith, Modem 
Latin America (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 137.
77 Liicke and Pascual Spada, La Interdependent del Orden Economico y  Politico: Dos Experiencias 
Latinoamericanas, Argentina (1976-81) y  Chile (1973-83), pp. 31-33.
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other public services were as ‘strategic’ as the arms and nuclear industries and therefore 
not subjected to privatisation or to budget constraints. In Chile, the only area where 
privatisation was strongly objected was the copper industry. While the economic team 
claimed the need to privatise it with the same celerity and political determination that 
had characterised the privatisation of expropriated, intervened and public enterprises, 
the armed forces refused to sell its companies in the copper industry.
The first few years of the military regime did not translate into immediate economic 
recovery. The sudden liberalisation of prices meant that the (relatively) repressed 
inflation that had built up during the UP years shot up. While already at over 160 
percent in 1972, and 150.5 percent for the first three quarters of 1973, inflation 
exploded after the coup, reaching between 143.7 and 302.4 percent during the last 
quarter, depending on the calculation method. Hence, the accumulated annual inflation 
of 1973 reached 508.1 or 908.1 percent.78
Milton Friedman, a professor from the University of Chicago whose model was 
being followed, took a personal interest in Chilean politics, and during a visit to the 
country in 1975 suggested the implementation of a stabilisation shock treatment. Not 
long after Friedman’s conference in Santiago, the Minister of the Economy Cauas was 
given special powers to abandon gradualism and carry out an anti-inflationary shock 
treatment, the ‘Plan of Economic Recovery.’
Through a sharp cutback of civil servants, a dramatic cut by around 50 percent of 
the real salary of the remaining ones, and the elimination of subsidies, the new 
economic policy managed to reduce the deficit and bring inflation down to a two-digit 
rate by 1977.79 Despite the high costs in terms of distribution o f wealth, it was 
reassuring for a country with hyperinflationary experience to see inflation ‘under 
control,’ even when that meant at a rate of around 30 or 40 percent.
Additionally, during 1974 and 1975 the financial sector was again privatised and 
expanded, and the financial market deregulated, freeing interest rates for deposits and 
loans.80 Although the system almost collapsed in 1982 and the Central Bank had to 
intervene in several banks and financial firms and guarantee the repayment of deposits, 
in the second half of the 1970s the Chilean economy seemed successful to government
78 On the different methods utilised to calculate Chilean inflation with political ends and corrected 
results, see M. Riesco Larrain and C. Paiva, 'Chile: Correction Indice de Precios a Consumidor (IPC) e 
Indice de Remuneraciones Reales 1960-2000,' (Santiago de Chile: Centro de Estudios Nacionales de 
Desarrollo Altemativo-CENDA, December 2000),
http://cqj.cl/Cenda/Cen_Documentos/IPC_IGSS_Corregidos/IPC_Cenda_1960_00.pdf.
79 Liicke and Pascual Spada, La Interdependencia del Orden Economico y  Politico: Dos Experiencias 
Latinoamericanas, Argentina (1976-81) y  Chile (1973-83), pp. 60-62.
80 Ibid, pp. 47-50.
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and economists. After the sharp contraction of 1975, the country was indeed performing 
better than the Latin American average (see table 3.3). According to a World Bank 
country study of 1980, “under extraordinarily unfavorable circumstances the Chilean 
authorities have engineered an economic turnaround without precedent in the history of 
Chile.”81
Table 3.3: Average Annual GDP growth rates in Chile and in Latin America, 1976-1980
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Chile 3.5% 9.9% 8.2% 8.3% 7.5%
Latin
America 5.4% 4.8% 5.1% 6.5% 5.9%
Source: Whelan, James R., Out o f the Ashes: Life, Death and Transfiguration o f  Democracy in 
Chile, 1833-1988 (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1988), p. 921.
Finally, the expansion of foreign trade was central to the Pinochet administration. 
Exports were soon favoured by a series of mini-devaluations carried out for much of the 
period between 1974 and 1978, by the elimination of complicated administrative 
procedures and by the creation of ProChile, a division within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs whose aim was (and still is) the promotion o f Chilean exports. This way, Chile 
went from being “an economy which, until 1974, had generated no more than 10-13 
percent of its gross national product from exports, [to] reaching a 30 percent-plus 
figure.”82
The government of Pinochet thus broke with several traditions of Chilean politics. 
First of all, the longstanding tradition of democracy. The second break was with the 
policy of redistribution of wealth, which had started very timidly with Alessandri, had 
been deepened by Frei, and had seen its height during the Allende period. The third 
fracture was in the realm of foreign policy.83 President Frei had universalised diplomatic 
relations, normalising political and diplomatic links with the Soviet Union and countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Also, he had endorsed processes of Latin American 
integration—an enterprise supported even more firmly by Allende—which was 
reflected in the creation of the Andean Pact, the backing of the Latin American
81 Quoted in Whelan, Out o f the Ashes: Life, Death and Transfiguration of Democracy in Chile, 1833- 
1988, p. 916.
82 Ibid., p. 936.
83 For Chile’s foreign policy, see F. Rojas Aravena, 'Chile: Cambio Politico e Insercion Intemacional, 
1964-1997,' Estudios Intemacionales vol. XXX, no. 119-120 (1997).
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Economic Commission (ECLA), and the foundation of CIPEC, an association of copper 
producing countries.
Allende’s foreign policy followed the basic lines of the previous governments. As 
Frei’s, his administration emphasised its universalistic orientation, pragmatically 
defending the principles of non-intervention and self-determination regardless of the 
ideological and political position of the other states. Contrary to expectations, socialist 
Chile did not receive strong support from the Soviet Union.84 Instead, Santiago sought 
to counterbalance U.S. opposition and its ‘invisible blockade’ by relying on Latin 
American solidarity and deepening relations with Western and Eastern Europe. A good 
example of this is that in spite of political and ideological differences with the 
government of General Lanusse, the relationship with Argentina improved considerably 
during this period. The administrations were able to agree on Her Britannic Majesty 
formally assuming the role of arbiter in the Beagle Channel controversy, and on a new 
General Treaty on Judicial Solution of Controversies to replace the 1902 one. 
Additionally, bilateral trade was increased significantly.85
After the coup, Chile’s foreign policy did a U-turn, becoming praetorian and 
ideologically driven, in strong opposition to the civil-pragmatic foreign policy that had 
hitherto prevailed. In effect, a central element that guided most of the regime’s foreign 
policy was its deep anticommunism. Accordingly, diplomatic relations were broken 
with the Soviet Union and the Soviet block, and relations with social-democratic 
Western Europe and populist Latin America cooled down drastically, to the extent that 
some European states withdrew their ambassadors from Santiago.
As Manfred Wilhelmy observes, there were only two partial exceptions to this 
principle; “the relations with neighboring border countries—where the traditional logic 
of power politics dominates—and international economic relations.”86 Regarding the 
latter exception, the prominence given to integration into the world economy allowed 
Chile to maintain uninterrupted, and often growing, trade relations with states with 
which diplomatic relations had severely deteriorated, or even been broken. Such were 
the cases of Mexico, the UK, West Germany, Spain, France, and Italy.87 International 
isolationism in political terms was tolerated as long as it did not translate into trade
84 Varas, 'The Soviet Union in the Foreign Relations of the Southern Cone.'
85 H. Mufioz, 'The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile,' in 
Heraldo Munoz and Joseph S. Tulchin (eds.), Latin American Nations in World Politics (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1984), pp. 160-161.
86 M. Wilhelmy, 'Politics, Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy in Chile,' in Heraldo Munoz and Joseph S. 
Tulchin (eds.), Latin American Nations in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 51.
87 Whelan, Out o f the Ashes: Life, Death and Transfiguration o f Democracy in Chile, 1833-1988, pp. 
692-696.
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constraints. An eloquent example of this is Chile’s withdrawal from the Andean Pact in
1976, which simultaneously points to its preference for autonomous integration into the 
world economy and its disregard for regional politics.
Regarding the former exception, foreign policy towards neighbouring countries was 
characterised by its nationalism and territorialism, guided primarily by Pinochet’s 
geopolitical thought. It is interesting to note that whilst in other countries geopolitics 
may have influenced the government to a greater or lesser extent, in Chile the very 
president of the nation was a former geographer, professor of geopolitics at the Army’s 
War Academy, and author of the book Geopolitica (1974). A key idea in Geopolitica is 
that states resemble living organisms. Thus, “the man needs space for its development, 
and the same happens with the State; when it is growing, it needs to extend itself over 
larger spaces,”88 which explains why, according to Pinochet, all relations between states 
are power relations. As will be seen in chapters four and five, this conception guided a 
great deal of Pinochet’s foreign policy towards its immediate neighbours.
Finally, by the second half of the 1970s the bilateral relationship with the United 
States began to deteriorate quickly. In 1976 a bomb exploded in Washington under the 
car of a former Chilean minister of Foreign Relations, Orlando Letelier, killing him and 
his secretary. This political assassination, carried out by agents of Chile’s secret police, 
brought bilateral relations to a critical point, particularly as “Chile contemptuously 
rebuffed the Carter government’s attempt to extradite the accused members of the 
Chilean military.”89 Moreover, the emphasis of the Carter administration on human 
rights and the consequent sanctions against the Southern Cone regimes translated into a 
further deterioration of relations between both states. In this context, Pinochet chose to 
defy criticisms and pursue political autonomy as a geopolitical objective. Two instances 
illustrate this attitude. Firstly, in a public speech in 1977 Pinochet declared that he had 
“recently provided that we resign the application for a foreign credit, whose granting 
[they] tried to publicly make conditional upon the examination by a foreign Government 
on the evolution of our situation in terms of human rights.”90 And secondly, also in
1977, following the fourth consecutive United Nations condemnation of Chile for 
human rights violations, Pinochet called for a national ‘consultation,’ so that
88 Quoted in F. Diaz Loza, 'Geopolitica de Chile,' Estrategia vol. September October, no. 48 (1977), p. 
58, my translation.
89 Skidmore and Smith, Modem Latin America, pp. 138-139.
90 A. Pinochet, 'Discurso del General Augusto Pinochet en Cerro Chacarillas con Ocasion del Dia de 
la Juventud, el 9 de Julio de 1977,' produced by Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, (1977) accessed: 21 
April 2003, http://www.bicentenariochile.cl/fondo_bibliografico/fondo_datos/documentos/periodos/l 973- 
1981/Chacarillasl977.pdf, my translation.
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every man, every woman, and every youth in this country will have to decide, in 
the secrecy o f his conscience, whether he supports the president in his defense 
o f the dignity o f Chile and reaffirms the legitimacy o f  the government o f  the 
Republic [.. .] or whether, in contrast, he supports the resolution o f the United 
Nations and its pretension to impose our future destiny on us from abroad
Not even the Reagan period proved much friendlier toward the Pinochet regime. By 
then, re-democratisation was gradually gaining position in the American agenda 
towards the region. Yet Chile showed no signs of considering a democratic transition 
until the late 1980s.
By the mid-1970s, the political and economic context had changed so dramatically 
that the set of foreign policy options that the Pinochet regime saw as necessary, 
possible, and desirable was fundamentally different from what previous governments 
had envisaged. The regime’s main concerns lay with the maintenance of the satisfactory 
macroeconomic performance that it had achieved after 1975, the increase of foreign 
trade as part of its aim of integration into the world economy, and the emphasis on its 
absolute national sovereignty.
5. Final remarks
In the same manner as strongly ideological and nationalist policies at home appear 
to be less tolerant of internal dissent, less prone to dialogue, and less inclined to 
compromise than other type of policies, ideological and/or nationalist-territorialist 
policies in international affairs have a similar effect on bilateral and regional relations. 
Ideological, nationalist and territorialist foreign policy can be characterised as dogmatic 
and rather inflexible, in contrast to a pragmatic foreign policy, better disposed to revise 
and accommodate its orientation to changing circumstances.
A self-image of success coupled with a dogmatic foreign policy appears to preclude 
the search for policy alternatives. On the contrary, it seems to lead to the toughening of 
dogmatic postures. Such was the case of Brazil in the height of its ‘economic miracle,’ 
when it pursued a distinct profile and an autonomous posture in international politics, 
distancing itself from the U.S., and even defying it. Similarly, once authoritarian Chile 
appeared to have overcome the economic and political crisis of the first half of the 
1970s, and signals were pointing at success (relative to the goals of military regime), the
91 Quoted in Whelan, Out o f the Ashes: Life, Death and Transfiguration o f Democracy in Chile, 1833- 
1988, p. 786.
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country toughened its international political attitudes giving main priority to its foreign 
trade performance.
The appearance or continuation of failures appears to have the opposite effect of 
widening the horizon of envisaged choices, hence allowing the consideration of more 
pragmatic policies—in this case, rapprochement-seeking policies with former 
adversaries. The cases of Argentina and Brazil in the late 1970s can be analysed in this 
way. Amidst an unfavourable context both domestically (perhaps with the sole 
exception of the ‘successful’ annihilation of subversion, although only completed 
around 1979) and internationally, Argentine hard-liners within the government 
reluctantly agreed to revise their attitude towards Brazil, which amounted to starting 
revising their vision of Brazil. Similarly, facing the exhaustion o f its ‘economic 
miracle,’ beginning the process of domestic abertura, and confronted with the 
opposition of its former ally (the United States), the Brazilian government gave serious 
consideration to straightening out the bilateral dispute and longstanding competition 
with Argentina.
Furthermore, the fact that both Argentina and Brazil had traditionally held high 
profiles in the region as part of their aspirations to prestige and regional leadership, and 
of their mutual competition, precluded them to take on an isolationist posture. In 
contrast, Santiago’s goals were rather limited to improving its trade relations and 
maintaining or improving its achieved geopolitical condition, much less concerned than 
its neighbours about international prestige. Therefore, the choice o f political 
isolationism was not seen as a terrible loss, as long as foreign trade continued to expand.
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Table 3.4: Summary of policy orientation in Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the second half 
of the 1970s
Argentina Brazil Chile
Domestic
policy
• National 
Security 
Doctrine
• Ideological
• Anticommunism
• Abertura (slow 
political 
liberalisation)
• Ideological
• National 
Security 
Doctrine
• Ideological
• Anticommunism
Domestic
economic
policy
• Neoliberal
• Although 
inconsistent 
with
underpinning
principles
• De­
industrialising
• Falling short of 
own goals
• Interventionist
• Industrialist
• Consistent with 
underpinning 
principles
• Exhaustion of 
‘economic 
miracle’
• Neoliberal and 
monetarist
• More consistent 
with
underpinning
principles
• Export-oriented
Foreign
policy
• Nationalist
• Territorialist
• Autonomist
• (Pragmatic turn 
regarding Brazil 
by the late 
1970s)
• Searching 
autonomy from 
U.S.
• Oriented 
towards Latin 
America
• Professional
• Ideological/anti- 
Soviet
• Guided by 
Pinochet’s 
geopolitical 
principles: 
nationalism and 
territorialism
Foreign
economic
policy
• Pragmatic
• Export-oriented 
(primary goods)
• Inward-looking
• Export of 
industrial 
goods
• Pragmatic
• Aggressive
• Dynamic
In these circum stances, the constitution o f  a certain dom estic configuration, and o f  
an according im age o f  self, facilitated or hindered a shift in external behaviour. This 
w as the first step in a m uch longer developm ent, one in w h ich  the internalisation o f  
changes— and thus the transformation o f  identities and interests— occurred as part o f  the 
process itself. A s A lexander W endt explains, identities and interests are a continuing  
outcom e o f  interaction, alw ays in process, not an exogen ou s input.92 In transforming 
and internalising the v ision  o f  the other, Argentina and Brazil, first, and later also  
Argentina and Chile, w ere able to  advance rapprochement and desecuritize bilateral 
relations to  the point o f  ruling vio lence out o f  the equation. B y  doing so , they m anaged  
to transform the quality o f  regional peace.
92 A. Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
p. 316.
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Before engaging in the study of the two dyads, the next chapter explores the Latin 
American and hemispheric backgrounds, aiming to show the unfavourable nature of the 
regional context for desecuritization.
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CHAPTER 4 
HEMISPHERIC CONTEXT
1. Introduction
After having discussed domestic conditions in the three countries studied in this 
thesis before and during the period in question, this chapter explores broader 
hemispheric and regional issues. The main purpose is to give a background that will 
help understand why, despite numerous attempts, most regional projects to coordinate 
policy in political, defence and trade matters failed or had only very limited success. It 
will be suggested that beyond specific explanations provided for each individual 
attempt, there are two fundamental and more general reasons underpinning these 
outcomes.
The first has to do with the role played by the United States in the Western 
Hemisphere during the period following the Second War, and the existence of divergent 
expectations between the U.S. and the Latin American states. Hemispheric undertakings 
have usually responded to American initiatives, and consequently to U.S. political and 
ideological interests, which were strongly shaped by the Cold War. Frequently, Latin 
American governments failed to recognise this, leading them to hold high expectations 
for economic and military co-operation and assistance, which, more often than not, went 
unfulfilled. This, in turn, tended to lead to a perverse effect in which regional elites 
would develop a mistrust of the U.S., while competing with other Latin American 
countries for U.S. favouritism. Simultaneously, these elites would develop suspicions o f 
any other countries deemed to be viewed favourably by the U.S..
The second factor helps to explain the failure of both hemispheric and purely Latin 
American co-operation programmes, and refers to the background of regional conflicts. 
Given the extended history of regional disputes and conflicts—most of them over 
territorial and border issues—trust has usually been low among Latin American states, 
despite a longstanding discourse of Latin American solidarity and fraternity. To an 
important extent, it was this background that prevented co-operation projects from 
advancing.
In both cases—those involving hemispheric co-operation and those of just Latin 
American partnership—the rhetoric used and the prospective goals set were much more
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ambitious than what was achievable. This has probably made their failure even more 
resounding and the ensuing disappointments even deeper.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts. The second section reviews 
the development of hemispheric institutions and co-operation processes. The third part 
focuses on intra-Latin American disputes and conflicts, latent and active, that lingered 
on to some extent into the 1960s and 1970s. This will serve as the background of the 
next section, section four, in which two specific Latin American economic integration 
attempts will be discussed, the 1960 Latin American Free Trade Agreement (LAFTA) 
and the 1980 Latin American Integration Agreement (LAIA). The last section draws 
some conclusions from these arguments.
2. Hemispheric regimes and U.S. influence
Early proposals for the creation of a Western Hemisphere institution date back to 
the 1889 First International Conference of American States in Washington, which was 
convoked at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of State James G. Blaine. But the resulting 
Pan American Union was only reluctantly accepted by Latin American nations, which 
“viewed with great skepticism the presence of an autonomous inter-American 
Secretariat in Washington, D.C., and consistently refused to delegate any operational 
responsibilities to the director of the Pan American Union.”1 In 1915 Woodrow Wilson 
proposed the agreement on a comprehensive Pan American Pact with the aim of 
protecting the republican form of government in the continent, guaranteeing territorial 
integrity, and controlling the manufacture and sale of armaments. The First World War, 
and the priority given to universal schemes such as the League of Nations, nevertheless, 
eventually prevented the pursuit of the project.
In 1933 President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced his Good Neighbour Policy, 
accepting Latin America’s long-sought principles of juridical equality and non­
intervention, which after the Second World War finally culminated in the Inter- 
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Organisation of American States. 
These two, together with the Inter-American Treaty for the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes (Pact of Bogota), first made up what became known as the inter-American 
system.2
1 L. R. Scheman, The Inter-American Dilemma: The Search for Inter-American Cooperation at the 
Centennial o f the Inter-American System (New York: Praeger, 1988), p. 39.
2 Ibid., pp. 2-19, and p. 21.
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The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as Rio Treaty, was the 
result of the 1947 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace 
and Security, which was held in Rio de Janeiro. Its main provisions stipulated that the 
signatory parties committed themselves to resolving peacefully all disputes that could 
arise between them (Article 2), and that any attack on a state in the Americas would be 
considered an attack on all countries in the Americas, and therefore would be repelled 
collectively (Article 3). More importantly, it also stipulated that any aggression different 
from an armed attack, or any extra-continental or intra-continental conflict that 
endangered hemispheric peace and security would prompt the Consultation Committee 
to meet immediately. The Committee would determine the measures to be taken in 
support of the aggressed, or, in general, those measures aiming to achieve a common 
defence and the maintenance of peace and security in the continent (Article 6).
In fact, this treaty was based on very unequal expectations of benefits to be derived 
from U.S.-Latin American military relations. Whereas the Latin American military had 
been looking for professionalisation and military assistance, and ultimately the 
development of hemispheric institutional relations in the field of security, the United 
States was looking for allies to defend the Western Hemisphere from a potential Soviet 
attack. When it became clear that Latin American armies could offer only very limited 
support in the case of an East-West confrontation, the United States started to promote 
bilateral co-operation schemes aimed to strengthen the domestic policing roles of the 
Latin American military. These schemes took the form of bilateral Military Assistance 
Programmes (MAPs), signed by all Latin American governments and the United States 
between 1951 and 195 8.4
Again with the wrong idea, Latin American governments expected these 
programmes to bring modernisation to their armed forces and economic development, 
since equipment was to be provided together with factories of ammunitions and 
installations for their maintenance and repair. However, this expectation did not 
materialise, and the most they got was “a modest transfer of secondhand weapons used 
during World War II.”5 For David Mares, the MAPs functioned as the United States’
3 Inter-American Treaty o f Reciprocal Assistance signed at the Inter-American Conference for the 
Maintenance o f Continental Peace and Security, Rio de Janeiro, August 15-September 2, 1947 
(Washington: Organization of American States, 1961).
4 A. Varas, 'Hemispheric Relations and Security Regimes in Latin America,' in Augusto Varas (ed.), 
Hemispheric Security and U.S. Policy in Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 47-48.
5 Ibid, p. 49.
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unilateral arms control mechanism in the region.6 In the 1960s the focus of pan- 
American military relations turned instead progressively to the ideological 
indoctrination of military personnel, training them to carry out internal political security 
tasks aimed at domestic security threats. In other, more explicit words, the objective was 
that they could deal with, and stop, growing anti-U.S. movements and the spread of left- 
wing guerrillas in the region.
While Latin America grew in political-ideological importance in the eyes of the 
United States, strategically it was becoming increasingly irrelevant. For Augusto Varas, 
“the crisis of the so-called ‘panamerican military system’ at the beginning of the 70s 
was a result, therefore, of the politicization and ideologization o f the relations between 
South American and U.S. armed forces.”7
U.S. political influence on the continent was further enforced by the creation of the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) in 1948. According to Abraham Lowenthal, the 
OAS “was headquartered in Washington primarily to facilitate regional political 
leadership by the United States.”8 This became apparent in the years that followed its 
establishment, as evidenced by Jerome Slater’s assertion in 1969 that “the United States 
increasingly sought to use the OAS as an anticommunist alliance to mobilize the 
hemispheric states on behalf of its cold war policies.”9 And indeed, many Latin 
American governments soon adopted U.S. Cold War concerns as their own, a fact 
which, more often than not, undermined the ability of the inter-American system to 
constrain the United States’ increasing unilateralism
However, until the 1970s the OAS also played a prominent role in preserving peace 
in Central America. Jorge Dominguez notes that its intervention was key to put an end 
to the Honduras-El Salvador war in 1969, and served as a useful background to their 
bilateral negotiations during the following decade.10 Nonetheless, as OAS Secretary 
General Alejandro Orfilia declared in his resignation speech on 14 November 1983, 
since the mid-1970s
the OAS has been estranged from, or at best only partially committed to, many 
o f the fundamental issues that affect the present and determine the future o f  the
6 D. R. Mares, 'Regional Conflict Management in Latin America: Power Complemented by 
Diplomacy,' in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a 
New World (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 212.
7 A. Varas, 'Controlling Conflict in South America: National Approaches,' in Michael Morris and 
Victor Millan (eds.), Controlling Latin American Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. 80.
8 A. F. Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s (Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 29.
9 J. Slater, 'The Decline of the OAS,' International Journal vol. 24, no. 3 (1969), p. 499.
10 J. I. Dominguez, 'Los Conflictos Intemacionales en America Latina y la Amenaza de Guerra,' Foro 
Intemacional vol. 24, no. 1 (1984).
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Americas. In some cases, it has been conspicuous by its absence; in other, even 
worse, it has been completely ignored.11
The most obvious and blatant case was the 1983 U.S. invasion o f Grenada, when 
the Organisation was not consulted at all. Neither before nor after the incident.
The OAS, as well as the Rio Treaty, paid the price o f declining legitimacy and 
efficiency due to the contradictory expectations of its members. Here too, it was a case 
of wanting to reconcile two mutually exclusive goals:
from the Latin American viewpoint, the OAS should have served as an 
instrument o f cooperation to further the economic development o f  the whole 
region. For the United States, the OAS served as an instrument o f  power to be 
used to secure political stability in the region and thus its own hegemonic 
position.12
Although the United States seemed to have an interest in Latin America in the 
1950s, its concern did not stretch much beyond signing the bilateral MAPs and making 
sure that its own agenda and initiatives were also priorities of its southern neighbours. 
This latter goal was fulfilled with great success, as very soon U.S. Cold War concerns 
had also permeated Latin American domestic and foreign policy-making. For instance, 
international communism was barred from the Hemisphere through an OAS resolution 
in 1954, and many states even broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
Reciprocity, however, was out of the question. During this decade, Latin American 
leaders put forward proposals outlining their own pleas for expanding aid and 
promoting economic development. In 1954, at a meeting of the Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council of the OAS, Raul Prebisch, director of the U.N. 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), suggested the creation of an Inter- 
American Development Bank to increase and facilitate credit and aid, and advance 
commodity price stabilisation and industrial development. In 1958 the president of 
Brazil, Juscelino Kubitschek, submitted a proposal for a hemispheric development 
programme, Operagao Panamericana or Pan-American Operation. Latin Americans 
were seeking the promotion of some sort of Marshall Plan directed at them. Both
1 3instances, however, were summarily dismissed by the United States.
Augusto Varas makes the following diagnosis regarding the United States’ attitude 
towards Latin America: “the United States, following an autistic approach to this issue, 
often used the [Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance] and the OAS as
11 My translation, ibid., p. 8.
12 W. Grabendorff, 'Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America,' 
Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs vol. 24, no. 3 (1982), p. 278.
13 Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s, p. 30.
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mediums to implement its own interest in the Latin American region.”14 American 
hegemony in the region after the Second World War, the non-reciprocal nature of the 
U.S.-Latin American relationship, and the increasingly apparent reality o f divergent 
interests eventually resulted in growing negative reactions towards the United States 
that translated into strong anti-American sentiments among intellectuals and politicians 
first, and very soon among wider circles of Latin American public opinion.
This became clearer than ever with the 1959 Cuban revolution. After a failed 
attempt by Washington to reverse Cuba’s course, it decided to try, at least, to prevent 
this tendency from expanding throughout the Western Hemisphere. Thus, renewed 
attention and involvement in the region were to follow. In 1960 the United States finally 
agreed to the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank, and in 1961 the newly 
elected President Kennedy announced an ambitious multibillion-dollar programme, the 
‘Alliance for Progress,’ that included political, economic, and security measures to 
assist Latin American development. The unilaterally proclaimed Alliance reflected 
Kennedy’s determination to re-establish U.S. dominance in the Americas.
As Lowenthal points out,
the architects o f the Alliance recognized the revolutionary potential o f  extreme 
poverty and inequality. Accordingly, the United States undertook to promote 
economic development and social reform in Latin America as an antidote to 
revolution.15
They did so by focusing on the expansion of middle-class sectors, social reform, 
and democratic politics, all designed to prevent Latin Americans from preferring leftist 
alternatives. U.S. economic assistance, however, came along with “military aid and 
training programs [that] would be expanded and reoriented toward 
counterinsurgency. ”16
Being the provider of numerous grants and loans whose importance was quite 
significant in the context of the modest size of the Latin American economies, very 
soon Washington was in the position of determining by itself what military equipment 
Latin American countries were to acquire, which economic choices they were to make, 
and which social, economic, and even cultural reforms they were to pursue.
Yet despite the ambitious original plan,
14 Varas, 'Hemispheric Relations and Security Regimes in Latin America,' pp. 51-52. A similar 
argument is made by H. L. Cargnelutti, Seguridad Interamericana: fUn Subsistema del Sistema 
Interamericano? (Buenos Aires: Cfrculo Militar, 1993), pp. 55-72.
15 Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s, p. 32.
16 Ibid.
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the Kennedy administration backed away from many o f  its early commitments.
Security assistance was unstintingly provided, even when it conflicted with the 
aim o f curbing military intervention in politics, but other aspects o f  the Alliance 
atrophied. Economic assistance fell short o f original projections. Much o f the 
aid that was provided turned out to be mainly a device to secure immediate 
advantages for a variety o f U.S. private interests. The Kennedy administration’s 
commitment to constitutional democracy also proved to be short-lived; by the 
time President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, the objective had been 
shelved in the wake o f the Honduran and Dominican coups.17
With the appointment of Lyndon B. Johnson and the beginning of the Vietnam War, 
U.S. attention to Latin America became at best sporadic and short-term. The Alliance 
for Progress abandoned its originally proclaimed intent o f favouring democracy and 
constitutionalism, as the United States ceased to transfer public resources to Latin 
American countries. Instead, it began to promote private investment in the region, and 
to intervene on behalf of its private investors’ interests. In addition, it adopted a ‘mature 
partnership,’ implying that it would take a neutral stand on domestic affairs and accept
1 Xthe existing regimes as they were.
Despite this change of policy, successive U.S. administrations would still dedicate a 
great deal of effort and energy to maintaining control over the Hemisphere’s ideological 
and political developments, putting more emphasis on anti-communism than on 
democracy. Thus, many authors argue that the early rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress 
was in the end counterproductive and void, or at least fruitless, for it did nothing to 
prevent the wave of antidemocratic coups and anti-American reactions in the early and 
mid-1960.19 Probably 1973 marks a watershed for Latin American-U.S. relations. While 
that year many Latin American countries took more determined and co-ordinated action 
to defend their autonomy vis-a-vis the United States, between 1973 and 1976 a series of 
political and economic changes would start to affect the outlook of the region, such as 
the coups or ‘self-coups’ in Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Argentina.20
17 Ibid., p. 40.
18 Ibid., pp. 40-43.
19 See, for instance, H. J. Wiarda, 'Can Democracy be Exported? The Quest for Democracy in U.S.- 
Latin American Policy,' in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico (eds.), The United States and Latin 
America in thel980s: Contending Perspectives on a Decade o f Crisis (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1986); and G. O'donnell, 'The United States, Latin America, Democracy: Variations on 
a Very Old Theme,' in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico (eds.), The United States and Latin 
America in thel980s: Contending Perspectives on a Decade o f Crisis (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1986).
20 In 1973 Peru and Ecuador seized American fishing boats within the 200 miles of their zones of 
territorial waters; Panama claimed the devolution of the Canal before the U.N. Security Council; Mexico 
actively promoted the defence of the rights of developing countries through the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States; and within the OAS, resolutions were adopted recognising the existence of 
‘ideological pluralism’ and promoting Cuba’s readmission. See C. J. Moneta, 'La Politica Exterior del 
Peronismo, 1973-1976,' in Ruben M. Perina and Roberto Russell (eds.), Argentina en el Mundo (1973-
1987) (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1988), p. 55. As for the changes, Pinochet led a
I l l
The Carter administration once again took up a policy of rapprochement toward 
Latin America trying to respond to changing continental realities, but fell short of 
translating this into concrete actions. Moreover, not only was foreign aid to support 
economic growth in the region not expanded, but also certain decisions on tariffs, taxes 
and other matters directly harmed individual Latin American states. Latin American 
claims for improved access to markets, capital, and technology of advanced industrial 
states; increased aid to less developed countries; more stable and favourable commodity 
trade arrangements; and more responsiveness by multinational corporations vis-a-vis the 
host countries, all remained unattended.
Relations with many Latin American governments were strained even further due to 
Carter’s human rights policy, which ranged from condemnation of regimes that violated 
human rights to withdrawal of military and economic aid. Carter’s policy “caused 
Guatemala and Brazil to reject U.S. aid in 1977 and caused the United States to 
discontinue military aid to Chile and Uruguay in 1976, and to Argentina, Nicaragua, and 
El Salvador in 1978.”21 Soon, the U.S. government was accused by many in Latin 
America of interfering in their domestic affairs, if not of totally misinterpreting the duty 
of Latin American armed forces to defend the Western Hemisphere from the (internal) 
communist cancer.
The main achievement of the Carter administration in this regard was that it 
managed to weaken the widely spread image of U.S. official support for—and even 
identification with—authoritarian military dictatorships. And while Carter’s human 
rights policy promoted U.S. dissociation from repressive and illegitimate governments, 
and thereby helped increase domestic and international support for American foreign 
policy, it seems neither to have made Latin American armed forces more respectful of 
human rights and democracy, nor to have lasted long enough as to become a state 
policy. Ronald Reagan’s government, which interpreted Carter’s commitment to human 
rights as a sign of declining U.S. power abroad, returned to the old policy of strong 
support to anticommunist regimes, regardless of their human rights record.22 However, 
as Andrew Hurrell points out, much of Reagan’s
successful military coup in Chile in 1973, Banzer announced an exclusively military government in 
Bolivia in 1974, Morales Bermudez replaced Velasco Alvarado through an internal coup in Peru in 1975, 
a Supreme Council of Government ousted General Rodriguez Lara in Ecuador in 1976, and the military 
‘Process of National Reorganisation’ was initiated in Argentina in 1976.
21 Grabendorff, 'Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America,' pp. 
276-277.
22 M. E. Crahan, 'Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Realism Versus Stereotypes,' in Kevin J. 
Middlebrook and Carlos Rico (eds.), The United States and Latin America in thel980s: Contending 
Perspectives on a Decade of Crisis (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986).
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‘reassertion o f hegemony’ remained on the level o f  rhetoric [. . .] but its impact 
was not entirely absent further south and was most notable in the increasingly 
forceful trend in U.S. trade policy and, negatively, in the United States’ 
unwillingness to make concessions on debt management.23
Thus, the main attempts at hemispheric co-operation had only meagre results, 
especially if seen from the perspective of Latin American expectations. While the 
United States was successful in spreading their Cold War ideological-political agenda 
across the region, Latin American states and armed forces failed to at least receive the 
collateral benefits of such an adoption in terms of modernisation, professionalisation, 
and economic support.
Partly as an outcome of the region’s disappointment, and partly because of the U.S. 
increasing capacity to interfere in the region, Latin American countries became 
gradually more wary and suspicious of the United States. This happened, however, at a 
time when confidence among themselves was also in decline. The next section explores 
the regional background of past disputes, some dormant and some active, in order to 
highlight the enormous hurdle they represented to any co-operation proposal.
3. Disputes within Latin America
Projects of integration of different kinds have always been present in Latin 
America. While still under Spanish rule, in the days of independence wars, Latin 
American liberators Jose de San Martin and Simon Bolivar viewed the various 
declarations o f independence of Latin American countries as a step towards a broader 
goal, the establishment of a large Confederation of South American States. This view 
encompassed a desire for the newly independent states to gain political leverage and 
international recognition, as well as to counter Spain’s potential attempts to restore the 
monarchic domination. Security and defence were part of the rationale underpinning 
this initiative, although it was indeed about a much wider political enterprise. However, 
this early nineteenth century scheme would not prosper.
Within the field of security, further unsuccessful undertakings were pursued in the 
years following. In 1915, the ABC Pact between Argentina, Brazil and Chile 
materialised, establishing a permanent and automatic mechanism of conflict resolution. 
It was intended to serve as the basis for an alliance. Yet this initiative encountered both 
internal and external opposition. Domestically, neither the congresses o f Argentina or
23 A. Hurrell, 'Latin America in the New World Order: A Regional Bloc of the Americas?,' 
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs) vol. 68, no. 1 (1992), p. 125.
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Chile acted to ratify this initiative. And although it was ratified by the Brazilian 
Congress, shortly afterwards Rio opted to give priority to its relationship with the 
United States, by offering its support and declaring war on Germany in 1917. This was 
in contrast to Argentina, Chile, and most other Latin American countries, which 
preferred to maintain their neutrality during the First World War.
Externally, the ABC Pact was not greeted warmly by any other South American 
country, nor was it particularly welcomed by the United States. The former were wary 
of a pact between the three most powerful states of the region, which would increase 
their regional hegemonic power, while the latter perceived it to be in competition with 
Woodrow Wilson’s Pan-American Pact.24 As was evident by these early international 
hemispheric tensions, and as became even more strikingly apparent in the developments 
that took place in 1960s and 1970s, a notable lack of trust among states in the region 
dominated their relations with one another, despite rhetoric to the contrary. To a large 
extent, it is argued here, this was a natural consequence, shaped by a history of 
longstanding—as well as contemporary—regional conflicts.
Although more precise economic explanations of why particular integration 
programmes failed are, indeed, very helpful—and some are reviewed in section four of 
this chapter—they tend to overlook the possibility o f non-economic causes behind the 
failure of such regional co-operative enterprises. In the case o f Latin America, I suggest 
that an important part of the explanation rests on the fact that the governments of the 
region were not ready to trust each other given the proliferation of regional disputes and 
conflicts. A minimum degree of trust is a key element for successful co-operation, a fact 
that sounds almost commonsensical, but appears to be often ignored in practice. In other 
words, although there has been sustained discourse about Latin American (or inter- 
American) co-operation, even to the extent of encompassing the notion of ‘brotherhood’ 
within such discourse, the history of the region has not provided a favourable backdrop 
for governments to realistically envisage and implement co-operation and trust.
Augusto Varas also notes this gap between proposals—and even formal 
agreements—on the one hand, and measures actually taken on the other, and illustrates 
it with the case of disarmament and arms limitation policies. In Latin America, not only 
declared intentions and actual measures do not seem to match, but also “the relative 
failure to implement disarmament and arms limitation measure contrasts with the
24 See volume VII, chapter 36 in A. Cisneros and C. Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones 
Exteriores de la Republica Argentina (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 2000), 
http://www.argentina-rree.eom/7/7-040.htm.
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‘success’ of the regional arms race, which has pushed military expenditures to more 
than six billion dollars in 1981.”25
Historically, most disputes in Latin America have involved borders and territory. 
Very often, these have had a symbolic meaning as much as a strategic or economic one, 
as Peter Calvert rightly points out. “Given the widespread practice in Latin America of 
military intervention in politics, all governments, military and civilian, have a high 
degree of sensitivity to questions of national dignity,” he argued in the early 1980s, 
adding that “the government that incurs the odium of giving up even a square metre of 
the historic soil of the fatherland, may find its term of office abruptly curtailed.”26
Regardless of whether these disputes be strategic, economic, or symbolic, Philip 
Kelly points to a typical geopolitical checkerboard pattern forming in South America 
throughout the twentieth century, where “neighboring states became opponents, and 
neighbors of neighbors became confederates.”27 Thus, in almost every bilateral dispute 
third states have become involved in some way. Therefore, assertions such as the 
following should be read with care:
It is not necessarily disparaging to observe that Latin American militaries have 
dressed better than they have fought because, happily, they have fought (each 
other) so seldom. Nor is it disparaging to note that these militaries have been 
more likely to be preoccupied with governing than with responding to external 
threats.28
While there is some degree of truth in this claim,29 unfortunately, Latin American 
militaries have also devoted large amounts of money, energy and time to draw war and 
defence plans targeting their own neighbours. Geopolitics informed indeed a great deal 
of Latin American strategic thinking, and for a long time it was a major component of 
military and political decision-making. As pointed out by Jack Child, geopolitical 
thought was used largely as a basis to justify competition, prominently so in the 
Southern Cone. While Child concludes that regional peace and co-operation would 
require democratic institutions powerful enough to counter the influence of
25 Varas, 'Controlling Conflict in South America: National Approaches,' p. 74.
26 P. Calvert, Boundary Disputes in Latin America (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1983),
p. 6.
27 P. Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: the Geopolitics o f South America (Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, 1997), p. 1.
28 G. F. Treverton, 'Interstate Conflict in Latin America,' in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico 
(eds.), The United States and Latin America in the 1980s (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1986), p. 566.
29 Also David Mares points out that even “during the heyday of ABC geopolitics, roughly the forty 
years between 1945 and 1985, the only war that occurred was the Malvinas/Falkland war in 1982.” D. R. 
Mares, 'Foreign Policy in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: The Burden of the Past, the Hope for the Future,' 
Latin American Research Review vol. 29, no. 1 (1994).
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geopoliticians, for many years such institutions did not benefit from a high status in the 
region, nor did they enjoy the necessary strength to withstand non-democratic forces.30
What follows is a brief summary of the most salient disputes in Latin America and 
their resolution, or not. Starting from south to north rather than keeping to a 
chronological order, the first conflict is the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War between 
Argentina and the United Kingdom. Although it involved an extra-regional power, that 
war clearly generated the checkerboard logic described by Kelly, thereby contributing to 
the deepening of regional patterns of distrust and jealousy. Whereas Peru and Venezuela 
sided with Argentina, and Brazil took an ambivalent position, eventually offering timid 
support to its neighbour, Chile was generous to the British forces, letting them use its 
facilities against the Argentines.
This surely caused little surprise among observers. In 1978, not long before the 
Malvinas/Falklands conflict, the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Brazil 
escalated literally to the verge of war. In fact, that was not the first time, since also in 
1899 and 1902 they had been on the brink of war over the same issue. As this is 
analysed in chapter five in more detail, suffice it to say here that the dispute derived 
from historically poorly demarcated borders, and that it was only one among many 
clashing claims. With the 1977 pronouncement of the Arbitral Court coming down 
heavily on the side of Chile, the Argentine military felt the decision “to be a further 
tightening of the Chilean-Brazilian encirclement of Argentina; [a] fear [that] has
-i i
traditionally colored the republic’s geopolitics.”
Argentina had long been very sensitive to this ‘Chilean-Brazilian encirclement,’ 
given its traditional animosity towards both its neighbours. In particular, Argentina and 
Brazil have been engaged during most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in a 
rather implicit competition for regional hegemony. Only in exceptional occasions did 
this take the form of concrete disputes. In the 1970s the Itaipu Corpus controversy over 
the hydroelectric resources of the River Plate Basin threatened to become a dispute of 
critical proportions. Its resolution in 1979 marked a watershed for bilateral relations. 
Chapter six of this thesis, which is entirely devoted to the Argentine-Brazilian 
relationship, discusses both this and their nuclear competition in more detail.
The River Plate Basin, of which the River Parana is part, had already been the 
source of another dispute, as well as the ‘source’ of its resolution. By the 100th
30 J. Child, Antarctica and South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum (New York: Praeger,
1988).
31 Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: the Geopolitics of South America, p. 146.
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anniversary of the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870)—a war seen by Paraguayans 
as the ‘martyrdom of a race’ (see below)—relations between Brazil and Paraguay had 
again become very tense due to a border dispute involving waterfalls o f the River 
Parana with hydroelectric power potential, which were located at Salto de Sete 
Quedas/Salto de Guaira (Seven Falls/Guaira Falls, according to its name on the 
Brazilian or Paraguayan side). Brazilian military forces had occupied the area in 1965 
despite Paraguayan claims over the Guaira Falls. The issue only made it to the 
negotiating table in 1966, when Brazil offered Paraguay to build Itaipu, the largest dam 
in South America. Part of the plan was to flood the disputed region, and turn the new 
Lake Itaipu into a shared territory. In the words of the then Brazilian ambassador in 
Asuncion, Mario Gibson Barboza, “in this manner, we managed to ‘submerge’ the 
problem.”32
An old dispute still affecting regional relations to the present day is the War of the 
Pacific, which involved Chile, Bolivia and Peru. In 1879 Chilean workers and 
businessmen expanded the exploitation of nitrates into Bolivian and Peruvian territories. 
When Bolivia protested, Chilean troops occupied the Bolivian port o f Antofagasta. 
However, Bolivia and Peru had secretly formed a military alliance in 1873, and when 
this incident occurred, both declared war on Chile. The allied defeat was so sound that 
very soon Chile had occupied the Peruvian towns of Tarapaca, Arica, and Tacna, and 
even the Peruvian capital, Lima. For Bolivia, instead, it meant the loss of Antofagasta, 
cutting off its only access to the Pacific.
In 1904 Bolivia and Chile signed a treaty formally ending war, by which Bolivia 
recognised Chile’s possession of Antofagasta in exchange of the construction by Chile 
of a railway linking La Paz with the seaport of Arica. With the Treaty o f Ancon of 1929 
Chile and Peru also eventually reached an agreement. Chile retained Arica, but accorded 
Peru port facilities at its harbour, while Peru recovered Tacna. Bolivia stayed thus as the 
big looser, being left without any access to the sea.
The issue has remained obstinately present in Bolivian politics and collective 
memory ever since. Eventually, in 1975, as the 100th anniversary of the War of the 
Pacific was approaching, the President of Bolivia, General Hugo Banzer, submitted a 
proposal to his Chilean counterpart, General Augusto Pinochet, for the re-establishment 
of negotiations on the dispute. Despite optimism, the process encountered at least two
32 Interview with Ambassador Mario Gibson Barboza in Rio de Janeiro, 5 April 2001. Ambassador 
Gibson Barboza was, among many other appointments, ambassador in Paraguay between 1966 and 1967, 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1969 and 1974.
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obstacles that complicated its resolution, and eventually condemned it to failure. First, 
the conditions demanded by Pinochet as compensation for the cession of a coastal 
corridor were so high that they became unacceptable for the Bolivian government and 
public opinion. Second, Peru, as by the 1929 Treaty, had veto power in the matter. 
Using this prerogative, Lima submitted a counterproposal suggesting the tripartite 
administration of the port of Arica and surrounding territory that Pinochet refused to 
even consider.33 Since this incident in 1978, Bolivia and Chile have not re-established 
diplomatic relationships.
Bolivia was engaged in yet another war, this time on its southeastern border with 
Paraguay. The Chaco War (1932-1935) was, as Eduardo Galeano dramatically words it, 
a war between the two poorest countries in South America, the countries with no sea, 
the most defeated, the most stripped; a war for some possible oil on a hostile and 
deserted piece of map.34 The result was a bloody three-year confrontation, in which 
Paraguay secretly received help from Argentina in the form of ammunitions and fuel, in 
this way prompting Brazil and Chile, although much more timidly, to side with Bolivia
1 C
in an attempt to balance power.
In the end, a cease-fire was agreed in 1935, although peace was not signed until 
1938, after the mediation of other Latin American countries. Paraguay was awarded 
possession of the greater part of the Chaco region, while Bolivia was guaranteed rights 
of navigation of the River Paraguay, having thus secure access to the Atlantic route. 
After the war Bolivia found itself with the least favourable frontier since 1879.36 In any 
case, oil, which seems to have been the main motive for this conflict, was never found 
in Chaco.
If the Chaco War carried terrible costs for both Bolivia and Paraguay, the earlier 
War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870), between Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay on one 
side, and Paraguay on the other, carried the most dramatic consequences for the latter in 
terms of loss of human life and territory; destruction of industrial infrastructure, cities, 
agriculture, and livestock; and the imposition of an onerous war compensation. 
Although historians do not agree on the actual causes of the war, it seems clear that
33 See J. Gumucio Granier, Estados Unidosy el Mar Boliviano: Testimonios para la Historia (La Paz: 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, 1988).
34 E. Galeano, Memoria del Fuego 3: El Siglo del Viento (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1986).
35 See V. E. Baruja R., R. G. Pinto Sch., and J. Perez Paiva, 'Una Historia del Paraguay,' (January 
2000) accessed: July 2002, http://galeon.hispavista.com/swiss/paraguay/, especially chapter 12 .
36 Calvert, Boundary Disputes in Latin America, p. 15.
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territory was not the issue.37 Rather, it was a political war; a war motivated by the 
balance of power in the River Plate, competition for political influence, interference in 
the Uruguayan civil war, and the intervention of British diplomacy.
W. B. Gallie compares the War of the Triple Alliance to Clausewitz’s concept of 
‘absolute war’:
But he might have been expected to consider the abstract possibility that war, 
when escalated to the limit o f the resources— physical and moral— o f  any 
people or civilizations, might result in its total dissolution: as the Paraguayan 
war o f the 1860s was said almost to have done, leaving that helpless country 
destitute o f all but infants and old men and women.38
Indeed, the Paraguayan people had been fanatically committed to their leader 
Solano Lopez and to the war effort, fighting, as a result, to the point of dissolution. 
Despite having been before a rather developed country for Latin American standards of 
the day, Paraguay has not been able to recover from such destruction, and was left 
utterly prostrate still to the present.
Ecuador and Peru, too, have a history permeated with conflict. The River Maranon 
area has been in dispute since the late nineteenth century, and numerous attempts to 
mediate failed in 1887, 1936 and 1938. In 1941, after repeated border incidents, full 
scale fighting broke out. In highlighting again the checkerboard logic of this short war, 
Kelly points out that Argentina backed up Peru, while Chile and Colombia sided with 
Ecuador. In 1942 Ecuador and Peru signed the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, by which 
Ecuador, under pressure to make “a gesture towards inter-American solidarity at a time 
of grave crisis”39 (as was the Second World War), ceded a large part of the disputed 
territory. The United States, Brazil, Argentina and Chile were guarantors of the 
settlement.
Since 1960, when the Ecuadorian government tried to declare the Protocol null and 
void—a decision rejected by the guarantors—, Quito has officially refused to recognise 
its validity. For Ecuador, what was at stake at the Cordillera Condor was its status as an 
Amazonian state. In the following years, several armed clashes occurred that threatened 
to escalate into war. In 1981 and 1995, they became armed crises of importance, where 
combats registered casualties and, in the latter, the loss o f military airplanes. It was only 
in 1998 that the dispute was resolved.
37 Cisneros and Escudo, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, 
volume VI, especially chapter 29 on the different historiographic approaches on its causes.
38 W. B. Gallie, Understanding War (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 62.
39 Calvert, Boundary Disputes in Latin America, p. 16. See also Kelly, Checkerboards and 
Shatterbelts: the Geopolitics o f South America, p. 142.
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Colombia, in turn, has had border problems with Venezuela at the mouth of the 
Gulf of Venezuela, and with Nicaragua on rival sovereignty claims to two islands, San 
Andres and Providencia. Although the governments of Venezuela and Colombia have 
committed themselves to find a peaceful solution, the dispute, which involves rights to a 
maritime zone where oil resources have been discovered, has survived since 1941.
Yet another surviving issue is the one between Venezuela and Guyana on the 
Essequibo basin. It dates back to the late nineteenth century, when Venezuela and 
Britain were in dispute over the River Orinoco. Arbitrators decided largely in favour of 
Britain, awarding however the mouth of the river to Venezuela. After Guyana’s 
independence in 1966, Venezuela claimed that Britain had exerted unfair influence on 
the arbitration by bribing the Russian chairman, and Caracas could therefore no longer 
accept its result. The area demanded by Venezuela comprised some two-thirds of 
Guyana’s national territory. Through the Protocol o f Port of Spain (1970) the parties 
agreed to ‘freeze’ the issue for twelve years. Thereafter, however, no other arrangement 
has been reached, nor the agreement renewed, and the discrepancy remains unresolved. 
Soon after Venezuela’s refusal to renew the Protocol, Brazil reached an agreement with 
Guyana committing itself to construct a road through, and promote industrial 
development in, the disputed area. As Calvert points out, this worked both as a check on 
the possibility of Venezuelan expansion to the east, as well as a signal of Brazilian 
influence northwards.40
In Central America several disputes and conflicts have taken place, such as early 
unresolved boundary disagreements between El Salvador and Honduras, and their later 
Football War in 1969; a border conflict in 1957 between Honduras and Nicaragua; and 
Nicaragua’s long history of frontier disputes with Costa Rica, which survived until the 
fall of Somoza in 1979, who was ousted by revolutionary forces that benefited from 
some Costa Rican support41
All the issues reviewed here had survived in some way or another into the 1960s 
and 1970s, and still retain weight in Latin American politics. As a matter of fact, they 
constituted the background against which the lack of trust among states in the region 
would persist. Most of these disputes have remained unresolved, badly resolved, or have 
otherwise left deep scars in the collective memory of the countries, thus leaving room 
for their potential reactivation. Furthermore, they have been a key element in defining
40 Calvert, Boundary Disputes in Latin America, pp. 19-20. See as well Kelly, Checkerboards and 
Shatterbelts: the Geopolitics o f South America, p. 148.
41 Calvert, Boundary Disputes in Latin America, p. 22.
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the traditional isolation between regional neighbours, their mutual distrust, and their 
inclinations to arms races. As Dominguez notices, the fact that between 1960 and 1980 
the GDP of Latin America grew 211% made it possible for many governments to 
significantly raise their military expenditures without raising the military share of 
national resources. This ‘militarisation without pain’ was most visible in Brazil, 
Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela, although countries with slower economic growth 
also engaged in the expansion of their arsenals and war industries, as was the case with 
Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Argentina.42
4. LAFTA and LAIA: Two Latin American integration attempts
It was, thus, in this rather unromising context that Latin American countries pursued 
their two major regional integration efforts. Not surprisingly, these attempts fell short of 
their original goals, even though the Latin American Integration Association still exists. 
There were sound economic reasons that account for their failure that will be discussed 
next. However, the political background of Latin American relations, as just discussed, 
was not conducive to reinforcing the sense o f commitment needed for such joint 
projects. A central claim of this thesis is that trust and confidence are key elements to 
the success of a co-operative programme, such as an economic integration process. As 
will be examined in chapter seven, the fact that Mercosur endured as a project even 
when interdependence was very low, and eventually grew into an imperfect customs 
union is partly explained by the strong political will o f the time, and the positive 
development of mutual trust and confidence between the major partners. Instead, trust 
and confidence were missing factors in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
remainder of this section focuses on the two economic integration associations, the 
Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Latin America Integration 
Association (LAIA), and their main economic features.43
LAFTA was created in 1960 by the Treaty of Montevideo, partly inspired by the 
treaties establishing the European Economic Community. Its goal was the formation of 
a free trade zone and the gradual elimination of trade restrictions within the following 
12 years. It was envisaged as a partial and flexible mechanism that would take into 
consideration the uneven development levels of the member states and their difficulties
42 Dominguez, 'Los Conflictos Intemacionales en America Latina y la Amenaza de Guerra,' pp. 4-5.
43 For an exhaustive study of both associations, see J. M. Vacchino, Integration Latinoamericana: de 
laALALC a laALADI (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Depalma, 1983).
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to reduce restrictive trade policies. Thus, trade liberalisation would advance 
progressively starting with products where intraregional competition was lower.
Its planning dates from 1956, when a Trade Committee was established under the 
direction of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) to study the 
mechanics of setting up a Latin American Common Market. By 1959 Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay began the process of establishing a free trade zone in the Southern 
Cone. However, ECLA persuaded them to extend this trade zone to Bolivia, Paraguay, 
Peru, Mexico and Venezuela. In 1960 the Montevideo Treaty was signed by Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, and later joined by Ecuador, 
Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia.
There was a sound case for the establishment of a common market, since both the 
size of domestic markets and the access to foreign markets was very limited. A regional 
market would allow fuller and more efficient utilisation of existing productive capacity 
to supply regional needs. In addition, it would lead to regional specialisation, thus 
reducing costs and expanding output; and, finally, it would attract new investment as a 
result of the appeal regional market areas hold.44
At that time, the work of Argentine economist Raul Prebisch was very influential in 
Latin America and ECLA. Prebisch argued strongly that the law of comparative 
advantage worked against underdeveloped countries preventing their industrialisation 
and thus perpetuating the status quo. The solution for those countries, then, lay in 
industrialisation via import substitution or, as Prebisch argued later, export-creating 
industries. Either type of industrialisation would benefit from an expanded and 
integrated common market for previously imported goods, protecting its infant 
industries with a common external tariff.
Despite a large number of products negotiated in the first few years, and an 
important increase of intraregional trade, LAFTA’s initial dynamism did not last. By 
1968 the Association attempted to instrument an automatic tariffs reduction to inject 
new vigour into the arrangement. However, the outcome was rather a generalised failure 
to comply with the commitment. The ambitions of LAFTA’s project had stretched 
perhaps too far, and, in addition, it had to confront several material obstacles. The 
diversity of the countries involved, the fact that they were just beginning the process of 
industrialisation, and their different levels of development turned out to be greater 
impediments than originally thought. Rampant inflationary processes in Argentina,
44 F. J. Mathis, Economic Integration in Latin America: The Progress and Problems o f Lafta (Austin, 
Texas: University of Texas, 1969).
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Brazil, Chile and Bolivia—although ascribed to different causes—were also highly 
detrimental ingredients.
Furthermore, because Latin American countries produced and traded similar goods, 
they had built up substantial trade barriers between each other. This presented them with 
the dual challenge of reorienting the existing national industries toward the regional 
market, and improving the efficiency of these national industries so that they could 
compete regionally. And the problems went on. There was an absence of channels of 
trade and financing, commercial contacts, clearing and payment mechanisms, sources of 
supply, and market outlets, in addition to poor transportation and communication 
systems not only between countries, but oftentimes within countries as well.45 
Eventually, the Latin American countries were not able to live up to the challenge. 
National governments continued to think along near-autarkic lines, withholding their 
support for integration.
Diana Tussie points yet to other factors to explain LAFTA’s demise. While 
highlighting “its -partial- achievements,”46 Tussie emphasises the decline in influence 
of the structuralist school associated with ECLA and its stress on import substitution 
and protected markets at the hands of the supporters of the neoclassic tradition 
favouring free markets. This new policy orientation translated by the late 1970s into 
drastic tariffs reductions in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and to a lesser extent in Peru, 
hence eroding the margin of preference that covered trade among LAFTA members. 
Tussie observes that
As these countries reduced or withdrew regional preferences, the remaining 
members o f the Association were inclined to reciprocate treatment in self- 
defence. [...] Thus (and even though the goal o f a common external tariff had 
never been in sight) the carefully negotiated LAFTA tariff structure, where all 
members applied matching high import duties to outsiders lay on shaky 
ground.47
In 1980, the members of a dying LAFTA tried to save the advances attained by it, 
and negotiated a new treaty signed again in Montevideo, the Latin American Integration 
Association. LAIA was based on what they called ‘LAFTA’s historic heritage,’ and 
came to replace it, taking on more flexible conditions and less ambitious objectives. 
LAIA, too, aimed to achieve a Latin American Common Market in the long run, but 
instead of starting up by constituting a free trade zone as LAFTA had, LAIA formed a
45 Ibid. See also A. Methol Ferre, 'Una Bipolaridad Cultural: Mercosur-Nafta,' in Gregorio Recondo 
(ed.), Mercosur: La Dimension Cultural de la Integracion (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Ciccus, 1997).
46 D. Tussie, 'Latin American Integration: From LAFTA to LAIA,' Journal of World Trade Law vol. 
16, no. 5(1982), p. 411.
47 Ibid.
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preferential trade area consisting of three mechanisms: regional tariff preference vis-a- 
vis third countries, regional agreements with the participation of all member countries, 
and so called ‘partially binding agreements’ between two or more member countries but 
not all. According to this last rule LAIA members were no longer obliged to grant each 
other most-favoured-nation treatment, but instead it allowed interested parties to 
negotiate bilateral agreements covering exclusively the trade between them. In this way, 
it left the door open to sub-groups of countries to pursue closer economic ties, which 
was eventually the path chosen by Argentina and Brazil first, with Uruguay and 
Paraguay later, thus founding Mercosur.
In August 1982 Mexico announced a unilateral default on the payment of its 
external debt services, which provoked the rise of interest rates in the international 
markets. The 1982 debt crisis marked the beginning of Latin America’s ‘lost decade,’ as 
the 1980s came to be known in the region. Most domestic economies experimented 
major instability when their external financial obligations rose at the same time as the 
developed countries cancelled all credits to the region. Their exports stagnated as the 
price o f oil and other commodities fell, leaving them with few choices but to reduce 
imports and follow, once again, protectionist economic policies. Thus, intraregional 
trade fell back considerably, reducing LAIA to little more than a symbolic arrangement 
serving as an umbrella for bilateral preferential agreements.48
Some argue that LAFTA/LAIA represented the artificial creation o f a juridical 
infrastructure where there was no real market infrastructure in existence. In the words of 
Felipe Salazar Santos, “in spite of rhetorical declarations on Latin American solidarity, 
it did not exist except on paper.”49 Also Francisco Orrego Vicuna points to the disparity 
between the “solemn and declarative treaties” and the “basic realities of the participant 
countries.”50 Felix Pena similarly observes that the experiences of LAFTA and LAIA 
resulted in
an imbalance between the broad geographic territory and the objectives o f
deepening, which translated into an enormous distance between the rhetoric and
48 G. E. Reyes, 'Cuatro Decadas en la Historia Economica de America Latina,' Revista Capitulos - 
Sistema Economico Latinoamericano (SELA), no. 60 (2000); and P. Schaal, 'La Integration Economica 
Latinoamericana. Desarrollo y Perspectivas,' in Ciedla-Centro Interdisciplinario De Estudios Sobre El 
Desarrollo Latinoamericano (ed.), Contribuciones para el Debate (Buenos Aires: Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, 1991).
49 Quoted in M. I. Dugini de De Candido, Argentina, Chile, Mercosur: Cambios y  Continuidades 
(Buenos Aires: Ediciones Ciudad Argentina, 1997) p. 21, my translation.
50 F. Orrego Vicuna, 'Las Nuevas Bases del Entendimiento entre Argentina y Chile: La Proyeccion 
hacia el Futuro,' in Francisco Orrego Vicuna (ed.), Chile y  Argentina: Nuevos Enfoques para una 
Relacion Constructiva (Santiago de Chile: Pehuen Editores, 1989), p. 106. See also Methol Ferre, 'Una 
Bipolaridad Cultural: Mercosur-Nafta,' p. 45.
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formal commitments and their actual impact on trade flows and investors’ 
expectations.51
5. Final remarks
The economic and structural obstacles that a successful Latin American integration 
programme would have had to overcome were indeed substantial, and that fact seemed 
not to have been recognised by the parties concerned. It was not fully acknowledged 
that Latin America actually found itself very far from fulfilling some minimum, 
commonsensical requirements to be able to pursue effective regional co-operation. 
Employing the concepts of the peace scale introduced in chapter two, it is important to 
bear in mind that except for the 1969 Football War between Honduras and El Salvador 
no other war broke out in the region during the 1960s and 1970s. In that sense, one 
might be tempted to say that Latin America constituted a zone of peace. But if so, what 
kind of peace was it? Certainly, negative peace; the kind of peace that simply highlights 
the absence of war.
As discussed in chapter two, negative peace can be divided into three subcategories: 
fragile, unstable, and cold or conditional peace. Depending on the type, war may seem 
more, or less, imminent, but never impossible. In none of them has the threat or use of 
force been ruled out as a means to put pressure on others during a negotiation, or to 
achieve one’s own goals. This explains why states in a zone of negative peace are wary 
and cautious, and their relationships are dominated by mistrust and suspicion.
The existence of a situation of positive peace, instead, is characterised by the 
presence of confidence. The sole idea of resorting to violence to resolve disagreements 
or to exert pressure on fellow members in the zone of positive peace has been discarded. 
It is the passage from cold or conditional peace to stable peace that will increase the 
chances for a co-operation arrangement to work out. As long as suspicions survive to 
the point where one government believes that some other state may be preparing its 
forces for the eventuality of war, and consequently prepares itself for war too, it is 
highly unlikely that economic co-operation projects, or any other kind of co-operation 
project where confidence is key, may succeed.
Confidence was a missing element in Latin America, and was equally absent from 
Latin American-U.S. relationships. The latter proved to be too imbalanced a 
relationship. The motives encouraging Latin American states to hemispheric co­
51 F. Pefia, 'Broadening and Deepening: Striking the Right Balance,' in Riordan Roett (ed.), Mercosur: 
Regional Integration, World Markets (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 52.
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operation have been different to those behind U.S. rationale. Being the case that 
common institutions were ultimately dominated by the United States, it was eventually 
American, rather than Latin American, interest that prevailed. This fact often resulted in 
Latin American dissatisfaction and frustration with the hemispheric superpower.
Regarding the relationships between Latin American states, this chapter has shown 
that they were dominated by dormant disputes, some of them dating back to the early 
days of Latin American independence; active claims; and dissatisfaction with the status 
quo. Almost every country had had a border dispute with a neighbour, or had 
intervened, more openly or more covertly, in its neighbours’ internal affairs or 
international conflicts. Other than that—that is, other than relations mediated by 
antagonism and intervention—what characterised Latin America was the isolation 
existing between states. Gerardo Arellano calls this the ‘neighbour syndrome,’ present 
even in the midst of integration programmes. According to this syndrome it resulted less 
costly in political terms to develop closer ties with trans-Atlantic states and extra- 
regional powers than with immediate neighbours, to whom it was easier, instead, to 
maintain a conflict-prone attitude.52
Thus, in addition to this tendency towards isolationism fed by geographical 
obstacles and lack of infrastructure, as well as by an adverse foreign policy preference, 
there was a general sense of animosity, which Mathis detected in 1969:
The movement toward a Latin American Common Market is faced with a broad 
spectrum o f economies with extreme physical diversity and problem disparity.
These disparities are further widened by national jealousies and military 
accusations and fears.53
The next two chapters deal with the bilateral relations between Argentina and Chile, 
and Argentina and Brazil. During the 1960s and 1970s, hostility was the main feature in 
both relationships. This is not surprising given the broader context just discussed, and 
the particular history of these dyads, as will be seen next. What instead results striking 
is the development, after 1979, of the Argentine-Brazilian relationship, and their 
construction of a new regional integration arrangement, Mercosur. This, in turn, will be 
explored in chapter seven.
52 G. Arellano, 'La Integration Economica y los Paradigmas en America Latina,' Revista Capitulos - 
Sistema Econdmico Latinoamericano (SELA), no. 49 (1997).
53 Mathis, Economic Integration in Latin America: The Progress and Problems of Lafta, p. 16.
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CHAPTER 5 
BILATERAL RELATIONS 
BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE
1. Introduction
Historically, political relations between Chile and Argentina have not been any 
easier than those characterising the relations between other nations of Latin America. It 
was in the mid-1800’s—many years since independence from old colonial powers and 
once the civil wars scaled down enough to allow political leaders to focus on their 
external borders—that the first disputes arose between Argentina and Chile. Many of 
those disputes persisted over long periods of time and were not completely resolved 
until the 1990s. Throughout this time, their mutual perception was that of sure 
adversaries and potential enemies. This feeling of animosity gradually grew on both 
sides and resulted in the use of aggressive language and mutual displays o f power.
One author described Argentina’s bilateral relations in these terms:
[i]f Brazil’s rivalry with our country [Argentina] [...] is almost metaphysical,
Chile’s rivalry, instead, is biological. Chile feels us— not only thinks o f us— as 
enemies, as that what they have to eliminate in order to be again a grand nation, 
at least in South America.1
Interestingly, this has been the way Argentina and Chile have regarded one another, 
and the way each has thought it was perceived by the other. The fact is that relations 
between Argentina and Chile deteriorated to a much greater extent than relations 
between Argentina and Brazil. Despite never having waged war on one another, 
Argentina and Chile dangerously approached the brink of war on more than one 
occasion. Most recently in 1978 when the situation escalated to such a degree that both 
countries’ militaries were mobilised on land and sea into the Beagle Channel zone, and 
even declarations of war were drafted. It was only through a last minute Papal 
intercession, in December 1978, that the armed confrontation was averted.
Whilst Argentine-Brazilian antagonism rested on political perceptions and 
competition for regional leadership, Argentine-Chilean disputes were more a
1 R. A. Paz, El Conjlicto Pendiente: Fronteras con Chile (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de 
Buenos Aires, 1980), pp. 198-199, my translation.
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consequence of geographical facts. Faced by the third longest border of the world (over 
5,300 km, around 3,300 miles), the two states attempted to establish general criteria to 
determine their borders and resolve disputes, enshrining these in the 1881 Borders 
Treaty. Notwithstanding this treaty, the protocols were inadequate and unable to 
successfully resolve subsequent disputes, which were mostly confined to territory along 
the Andes, and to the Beagle Channel and three islands located therein, south of Tierra 
del Fuego. These disputes, although present since the nineteenth century, were felt once 
again in the middle of the twentieth century.
As the next sections discuss, two factors have been the underlying causes for 
delaying successful rapprochement between these two countries. The first was the 
prevalence of geopolitical, territorialist and nationalist doctrines in both countries that 
viewed concessions on territorial issues purely in terms of a zero-sum game, and felt 
them as Tosses’ and ‘dismemberment.’ And second was the importance attached to the 
difference of political regimes, which was crystallised once Argentina initiated its 
democratic transition.
This chapter analyses the evolution of the bilateral relation between Argentina and 
Chile in four stages that correspond to different categories of regional peace, in 
accordance with the classifications which were introduced in chapter two. Section two, 
reviews the history of the bilateral relationship until 1977, and explores how the 
construction and adoption of negative mutual perceptions resulted in an oscillation 
between fragile and unstable peace. Section three focuses on the escalation of the 
Beagle Channel dispute in 1977 and 1978 in order to draw attention to the nature and 
dimension that it achieved. It also discusses the peaceful resolution of the dispute in 
1984, after democracy had been restored in Argentina, although not in Chile. The Treaty 
of Peace and Friendship signed that year marked the end of potential hostilities, 
although not yet the beginning of a friendship, which is the subject of the fourth section. 
Section five examines the final resolution of the remaining border disagreements, and 
the ensuing co-operation, which characterised the 1990s. By then, not only were both 
states ruled by democratic regimes, but they also had implemented neoliberal economic 
reforms. These two facts facilitated rapprochement, the transition to a positive peace, 
and the advance of bilateral co-operation. The last section concludes the chapter by 
reflecting on key points raised.
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2. Between fragile and unstable peace
In the days of the Spanish Empire, the General Captaincy of Chile and the 
Viceroyalty of the River Plate constituted two separate administrative dependencies. 
After 1810, the Republic of Chile and the United Provinces o f the River Plate declared 
independence on the territories of those former imperial dependencies, respectively. The 
years that followed were devoted to imposing their sovereignty claims on the Spanish 
Crown through wars of independence—a process only completed in 1816 by Argentina 
and in 1826 by Chile—and to consolidating their inner territory and domestic 
institutions. As in the rest of Latin America, the principle guiding the establishment of 
the external borders was the uti possidetis, according to which newly independent states 
inherit the territory formerly ruled by an individual colonial administration.
For many years neither the question of accurate territorial demarcation nor that of 
competing national identities appeared problematic in Spanish-speaking America. 
Distinguished names responsible for establishing the first national institutions in the 
newly independent countries were often natives of other South American territories. 
Such was the case of Andres Bello, whose name is associated with the foundation o f the 
University of Chile and with the design of Santiago’s first stable foreign policy, but who 
in fact was bom in Venezuela and for some time represented the independent 
Venezuelan government in London. Similarly, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, who 
would later become president of Argentina, his country, was for over a decade a 
prominent journalist and devoted civil servant of Chile. And the founder of the Bolivian 
Military College, Bartolome Mitre, was another Argentinean, who also was to become 
president of that country.
It took South American political elites many years to become aware of the fact that 
the demarcation of their frontiers was not at all clear. Along with that realisation came a 
growing sense of actual or potential territorial dispossession at the hands of 
neighbouring states. Whilst the harmful effects of this on regional relations lingered on 
during much of the twentieth century—and in some cases can still be seen to this day—, 
the construction of the notion of one’s neighbour as an aggressive ‘other’ turned out to 
be an integral part in building distinct nations and national identities in countries with 
people with many more commonalities than differences.
2 G. Lagos Carmona, Historia de las Fronteras de Chile: Los Tratados de Limites con Argentina 
(Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andres Bello, 1980).
3 A. Cisneros and C. Escudo, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina 
(Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 2000), Volume I, Introduction, http://www.argentina- 
rree.com/1/1-004.htm.
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Professor Carlos Escude demonstrated through extensive research how South 
American states created inaccurate historical accounts of their territorial evolution and 
losses that in time allowed them to feed on nationalistic and revisionist theses.4 Most 
often, these accounts were also reproduced in history textbooks, whereby new 
generations of students were educated with biased and distorted visions of their own as 
well as of the neighbouring states’ histories.5 Daniel Prieto Vial indicates that Bolivian 
and Peruvian primary schools teach anti-Chilean history, in the same way as Chilean 
children learn that Argentina ‘stole’ Patagonia from them, and Argentineans are taught 
that Chile stripped them o f the Magellan Strait, half o f Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego 
and the Western Patagonia.6
Two agreements signed by the governments of Argentina and Chile in the 1930s 
confirm that negative images of one another were widespread; probably a consequence 
of the biased education that Prieto Vial observed. On 2 July 1935 “the two Governments 
agree[d] to ban [...] in their territories the screening of cinematographic films that refer 
to the other country in ways that the Government of the latter may consider offensive.”7 
And on 4 May 1938 both ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed on
the revision o f  the teaching of, and textbooks on, national and American history 
and geography. The Revising Committees that the Governments will appoint 
[...] will proceed to cleanse texts o f words that are offensive to the dignity o f  
the States, and with documented truths and censuses they w ill save historic 
omissions and statistical and geographic errors.8
When in 1847 Argentina and Chile started to discuss historic rights to Patagonia 
and the Magellan Strait, the issue proved to be particularly difficult to settle. As the 
Spaniards had never occupied the lands o f Patagonia, it had belonged to neither colonial 
administrative authority, being thus the rule of uti possidetis very difficult to 
demonstrate. Negotiations turned out to be protracted and complex, and were fruitless 
for more than thirty years. The defence o f their mutually contradictory claims both in 
juridical and moral terms became so passionate—as well as plagued with fallacies, lies
4 Interview with Carlos Escude in Buenos Aires on 18 April 2001.
5 See R. Pellet Lastra, 'Nueva Historia Argentino-Chilena,' La Nation Line, (Buenos Aires: 15 
December 1996), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/96/12/15/G02.htm.
6 D. Prieto Vial, 'Coordination Militar Sudamericana. Primer Paso hacia los Estados Unidos de 
America del Sur,' in Augusto Varas (ed.), Hacia el Siglo XXI: La Proyeccion Estrategica de Chile 
(Santiago de Chile: FLACSO, 1989), pp. 260-261.
7 Convenio relativo a la Exhibition de Peliculas Cinematograficas de Caracter Ofensivo - Republica 
Argentina y  Republica de Chile, signed in Buenos Aires, 2 July 1935, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department, my translation.
8 Declaration de Chile sobre Acercamiento Intelectual, signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile, in Santiago, 4 May 1938, in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department, my translation.
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and adulterations9—that when the issue was finally resolved in 1881, no party could 
admit to see the compromise as an achievement. The Treaty on Borders did not manage 
to diminish either the sense of territorial loss or of danger of further losses at the hands 
of the other.
This first dispute embodied the start of the construction of negative, antagonistic 
images of one another. Moreover, it represented the establishment of a relational pattern 
that would survive during most of the next hundred years. As will be discussed below, 
this relational dynamic did not remain fixed throughout history. During favourable 
periods it improved with negotiation and exchange, and during others it worsened with 
nationalistic and intransigent claims. Overall, however, until the 1980s bilateral 
relations underwent a gradual but steady process that reinforced negative mutual visions 
and consolidated a culture of antagonism.
Even if the 1881 Treaty on Borders could have served as a tool to overcome 
divergences and to smooth negative images out by solving old disagreements and 
allowing the subsequent construction of a different type of relationship, this did not 
happen. The Treaty stipulated that the border should run through the highest peaks of 
the Andes that divide rivers to the Pacific and the Atlantic, except in three parts. North 
of the Magellan Strait the Treaty drew a line from west to east granting the territory to 
the north to Argentina, thus confirming its sovereignty in Patagonia; the Magellan Strait
thitself was granted to Chile; and finally Tierra del Fuego was divided along the 68 34’ 
meridian (see map 5.1).10
However, the Treaty left undefined the exact course of the Beagle Channel, which 
was established as the southern boundary of Tierra del Fuego; an issue that took the 
neighbours to the brink of war almost a century later. Yet neither the clause of ‘the 
highest peaks that divide rivers’ was very clear. When in 1892 experts appointed by 
both parties met to start drawing up the boundaries, they failed to come to a unified 
interpretation of the clause. The Argentines understood that the line should run through 
the highest peaks of the Andes, whereas the Chileans sustained the divortium aquarum 
principle, according to which the demarcation should follow the line separating the 
rivers that flow into the Atlantic from those that flow into the Pacific. The problem 
arose south of the 40th parallel, where geography becomes complex and the two
9 Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, 
Volume I, Chapter 3, http://www.argentina-rree.eom/l/l-025.htm.
10 Tratado de Limites entre la Republica de Chile y  la Republica Argentina, signed by Francisco De 
B. Echeverria and Bernardo De Irigoyen, in Buenos Aires, 23 July 1881, in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.
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principles are incompatible. As a matter o f  fact, the orographic thesis defended by  
Argentina would have given it an access to the Pacific Ocean in Puerto Natales, whereas 
the hydrographic line suggested by Chile would have m oved the border a considerable 
stretch to the east.11
Map 5.1: Tierra del Fuego, including areas of the Magellan Strait and Beagle Channel 
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In the years that followed, and as the demarcation com m ittee tried to solve 
discrepancies, Argentina and Chile started to devote important resources to renew their 
military arsenals, focusing primarily on their naval fleets. Chile had inflicted a massive 
defeat on Peru and Bolivia in the War o f  the Pacific, which on the one hand inflamed 
nationalist ambitions in Santiago and gave its leaders military self-confidence, whilst on 
the other reinforced in Argentina the vision o f  Chile as expansionist, aggressive and not 
trustworthy.12 In 1898 the demarcation com m ittee stopped m eeting given the lack o f  
progress in its mission. It had been able to place provisional boundary stones along just
11 Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, 
Volume VI, Chapter 34, http://www.argentina-rree.eom/6/6-090.htm.
12 Ibid., Volume VII, Chapter 36, http://www.argentina-rree.eom/7/7-001.htm.
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2,560 km (around 1,600 miles), that is, less than half of the total length of the border. 
By then, both states were calling up their reservists.
Against this backdrop, and in an attempt to avoid an armed confrontation, the 
governments agreed to submit the issue to British arbitration, as established by the 1896 
protocol.13 There were other instances in which Argentina and Chile tried to favour a 
political solution over a military conflict. In 1899, for example, the U.S. plenipotentiary 
minister in Buenos Aires, William Buchanan, was asked to intervene to find a solution 
to the issue o f Puna de Atacama. In 1902 the governments signed the so-called May 
Pacts, spelling out the extended prerogatives of the British arbitrator, and establishing 
limitations to the acquisition of naval weaponry as well as a reduction in naval 
squadrons in order to stop the arms race under way and reach a balance between the two 
powers.14
In 1915 they even tried to create a tripartite entente together with Brazil, known as 
the ABC Pact. It established a permanent commission for the resolution of controversies 
that could not be resolved by means of previously agreed mechanisms. However, in a 
similar way as border treaties failed once and again when the parties tried to advance on 
the border demarcation, the ABC Pact too failed to take effect due to domestic and 
international obstacles, as commented in chapter four. Further attempts to revive the 
Pact in the 1920s were also unsuccessful.
1952 appeared to inaugurate a new period of convergence and mutual 
understanding. Between 1952 and 1955 General Carlos Ibanez and General Juan 
Domingo Peron coincided in power in Chile and Argentina respectively, sharing a good 
friendship and ideological affinity,15 as well as similar styles and backgrounds. The two 
had spent their careers in the army, both had become popular—and populist—caudillos, 
and both had been elected president with resounding victories over their opponents, thus 
enjoying a fairly strong political mandate. Peron won in 1946 with 52.5 percent of the 
votes, and was re-elected in 1951 with 62.5 percent. Ibanez, who years before his 
election had spent a long time in exile in Argentina, obtained 47 percent of the popular
13 The text of the Award pronounced by His Majesty King Edward VII on 20 November 1902 is 
reproduced in M. I. Dugini de De Candido, Argentina, Chile, Mercosur: Cambios y  Continuidades 
(Buenos Aires: Ediciones Ciudad Argentina, 1997), pp. 63-72.
14 The May Pacts may have been the first and most advanced treaty of its sort for many decades to 
come. See M. A. Scenna, Argentina-Chile: Una Frontera Caliente (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 
1981), pp. 124-129; and F. Ghisolfo Araya, Origen y  Desarrollo del Diferendo Limitrofe Austral 
(Santiago: Instituto de Investigaciones del Patrimonio Territorial de Chile, Universidad de Santiago, 
1983), p. 18.
15 See Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, 
Volume XIII, Chapter 61, http://www.argentina-rree.com/13/13-010.htm.
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votes in the Chilean presidential elections of 1952. Unlike Peron, who was ousted from 
office by a coup in 1955, Ibanez completed his six-year mandate.16
This period may have witnessed the most important rapprochement in over a 
century and a half of bilateral relations, only surpassed in the 1990s. Bilateral talks did 
not just involve political issues but sketched a project of harmonisation of the 
economies aiming at economic integration, which in 1953 became the Chilean- 
Argentine Common Market and Economic Union through the Act of Santiago and the 
Treaty of Buenos Aires.
However, as Miguel Angel Scenna observes, “the honeymoon was brief.”17 After 
the 1955 coup relations deteriorated again, resulting in the 1958 crisis o f the islet of 
Snipe. Whereas Peron and Ibanez had managed to set aside or at least play down the 
prominence of territorial issues, after 1958 political attention turned back to them. 
Although the Snipe dispute was rapidly solved, most bilateral documents, declarations 
and agreements of the following years made reference to borders, arbitration, 
demarcation, and limits.18
Despite ideological differences, a final apparent period of goodwill took place 
during the socialist government of Salvador Allende and the military administration of 
Alejandro Agustin Lanusse, after a mutually acceptable compromise on the terms of 
arbitration was reached on 22 July 1971. The Queen of England would be restricted to 
accepting or rejecting as a whole the pronouncement of an Arbitral Court composed of 
five members of the International Court of Justice. The appointment of an impartial 
panel resulted from Argentina’s long objection to the neutrality o f Great Britain in the 
light of the renewed Malvinas/Falkland Islands controversy. The leaders’ optimism was 
palpable in a joint declaration they made two days later: “the Argentine-Chilean 
friendship and co-operation are irreplaceable factors for the preservation and 
consolidation of peace in America in a context of justice and economic and social 
progress.” Equally optimistically, they congratulated themselves on the growth of
16 Rosendo Fraga gives a thorough account of coincidences and divergences of the governments in 
Chile and Argentina between 1946 and 1996. See R. M. Fraga, 'Fuerzas de Centro-Derecha en Chile y 
Argentina (1946-1996),' in Torcuato S. Di Telia (ed.), Argentina-Chile: iDesarrolios Paralelos? (Buenos 
Aires: Nuevohacer/Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1997).
17 Scenna, Argentina-Chile: Una Frontera Caliente, p. 170.
18 See, for instance, the Presidential Declaration of Santiago on 2 February 1959; Joint Presidential 
Declaration of Santiago on 22 March 1960; Protocol on Borders in the Beagle Channel, Buenos Aires on 
12 June 1960; Additional Act modifying the Treaty of 16 April 1941 on revision, reposition and 
densification of boundary stones, Buenos Aires on 12 June 1960; Agreement, by exchanges of notes, on 
boundary stones, Buenos Aires on 24 August 1960; Presidential Declaration of Vina del Mar on 11 
September 1961; Agreement, by exchanges of notes, on the modification of the Additional Act to the 
Protocol of April 1941 cm Borders, Buenos Aires on 8 September 1961.
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bilateral trade, which in 1970 had reached “the highest level in its history,” and 
celebrated the rising interdependence, which allowed “the development of new common 
interests.”19
Again, Miguel Angel Scenna points out that this rapprochement had more to do 
with domestic problems and weaknesses in each country than with a real change in the 
political attitude.20 The arbitral agreement and the more general convergences between 
the two governments rose strong opposition and suspicions among nationalistic sectors 
in both countries, which ultimately had a fatal effect on the initial enthusiasm21 And 
while the Argentine 1976 coup d’etat brought the Videla and the Pinochet regime 
closer—a fact crystallised into joint declarations and the signing o f 16 agreements 
raging from economic and physical integration, to financial matters and nuclear co­
operation, all in November 1976—the announcement of the arbitral decision a few 
months later suddenly brought back the nationalist-territorialist language to the dyad, as 
the next section examines.
The fact that repeated agreements and good intentions were soon reversed by the 
recurrence of disputes is indicative of the type o f bilateral relationship that 
predominated between Argentina and Chile. While such initiatives may have 
temporarily cooled down animosities, their spirit failed to solidify; it failed to alter the 
relational dynamic or, following Alexander Wendt, the predominant culture of anarchy, 
which remained a Lockean one. According to Wendt, the Lockean culture is based on 
the logic of rivalry, one in which
rivals expect each other to act as if  they recongize their sovereignty, their ‘life 
and liberty,’ as a right, and therefore not to try to conquer or dominate them.
[.. .] Unlike friends, however, the recognition among rivals does not extend to 
the right to be free from violence in disputes.22
The Beagle Channel and its three islands Picton, Nueva and Lennox, the issue of the 
escalation of the 1970s, moved to the centre of attention for the first time in 1904. The 
‘Almirante Brown,’ a warship of the Argentine Navy, claimed to have demonstrated 
that the course of the Beagle Channel, which constituted the agreed border, ran south of
19 Declaration Presidential Conjunta - Presidente Tte. Gral. Alejandro Augusto Lanusse y  Presidente 
Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, signed in Salta, 24 July 1971, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.
20 Scenna, Argentina-Chile: Una Frontera Caliente, p. 216.
21 Cisneros and Escude give a thorough account of the difficulties that the rapprochement of 1971 
encountered. See Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica 
Argentina, Volume XIV, Chapter 66, http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-014.htm.
22 Italics in the original. A. Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), p. 279.
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the islands. As a consequence, those three islands under Chilean jurisdiction since 1881 
were now claimed as Argentine.23 Negotiations, protests, exchanges of diplomatic notes, 
proposals and counter-proposals, as well as draft agreements of arbitration were 
produced in 1904-1905, 1915, 1938, and again in 1948. Unilateral requests for 
arbitrations were made in 1964 and 1967. Yet failure of the governments to reach an 
agreement (1905, 1948, 1964 and 1967), and of the congresses to ratify the agreements 
(1915 and 1938) left the issue unresolved and contested.
Except for one border incident in 1965 that left one Chilean carabinero (military 
police officer) dead, the period that goes from the beginning of the disputes to the mid- 
1970s did not involve actual violence. Nevertheless, tension, display of power, arms 
races, and the possibility of that fragile peace being broken were present during most of 
the period. Whereas until the mid-1970s the relationship oscillated between fragile and 
unstable peace (as these categories were defined in chapter two), in the second half of 
the decade it definitely moved towards the former. The main feature of the dyad until 
the escalation was that, despite sporadic attempts and frequent rhetoric, the states failed 
to start trusting each other.
3. Further fragilisation of peace in the 1970s
3.1. The escalation
As discussed above, the Beagle Channel became the focus of dispute in 1904 
resulting from the 1881 Treaty’s declaration that the Channel was a boundary line 
whilst failing to stipulate its exact course between a number of islands. The issue of 
contention in this dispute was whether three small and barren islands in the eastern 
entrance to the Beagle Channel—Picton, Nueva, and Lennox—were located south or 
north of the Channel itself. While the islands became the centre of the controversy, the 
cause resulted from a far broader and more geopolitically sensitive issue: maritime 
jurisdiction surrounding the Beagle Channel itself. The Channel, lying as it does south 
of Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego and separating it from a series of lesser islands, links 
the Atlantic with the Pacific Oceans above the Cape Horn. Hence, it was of vast 
geopolitical importance to both Chile and Argentina.
The controversy escalated in 1977 after a panel of five members of the International 
Court of Justice, with the concurrence of the British Crown, awarded the disputed
23 Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, 
Volume VII, Chapter 36, http://www.argentina-rree.eom/7/7-037.htm.
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territory to Chile. The possession of the islands granted Chile projection into the South 
Atlantic, a prerogative that violated a tradition very dear to both states, namely the 
bioceanic principle. According to this principle access to the Magellan Strait from the 
South Atlantic was Argentina’s domain, while access from the Pacific was controlled by 
Chile; and, by extension, ‘Argentina on the Atlantic, Chile on the Pacific.’ In spite of 
this principle, Chile has historically accused Argentina of trying to gain a Pacific 
coastline, and by the same token Argentina has long complained about Chile’s 
perseverance in trying to gain an Atlantic exit.24 For instance, Ricardo Alberto Paz 
asserts, “today as yesterday, [Chile] covets the Patagonia, ports on the Atlantic, naval 
and ground bases from where to look down as a lord on Argentina Similarly,
the Chilean counterargument contends,
the aggressive geopolitics o f Buenos Aires has since last century 
uninterruptedly sought [...] to reach, at any price, the coasts o f the Pacific 
Ocean. For that end they use the trick o f stating that the sea south o f  Tierra del 
Fuego, Isla de los Estados and the archipelago south o f  the Beagle Channel are 
all part o f the Atlantic Ocean.26
Thus, a critical question in the bioceanic principle, and in this particular dispute, 
was where to set the limit between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. As Child explains, 
“giving the Chileans sovereignty of the three Beagle Channel Islands [pushed] the 
oceanic limit too far east to be acceptable to Argentina.”27 There were also other reasons 
that made the decision unacceptable to Buenos Aires. Firstly, Argentina’s port and naval 
base at Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego, located on the Channel and west of the disputed 
islands, was left inaccessible through Argentina’s own waters. The thesis of the ‘dry 
shore’ for Argentina had long been demanded by some nationalistic sectors in Santiago, 
which understood that according to the 1881 Treaty “the Argentine sovereignty, in strict 
reality, goes only as far as to touch the Beagle Channel but not beyond; the Channel, its
9 o
waters and its islands are Chilean in all their extensiveness.”
24 See A. Magnet, 'Las Condicionantes Politicas Nacionales de la Relacion entre Chile y Argentina,' in 
Francisco Orrego (ed.), Chile y  Argentina: Nuevos Enfoques para una Relacion Constructiva (Santiago 
de Chile: Pehuen Editores, 1989); and O. Munoz Miranda, 'Una Vision Historico-Juridica de las 
Relaciones Chileno-Argentinas: Experiencias de una Politica Territorial,' in Francisco Orrego (ed.), Chile 
y  Argentina: Nuevos Enfoques para una Relacion Constructiva (Santiago de Chile: Pehuen Editores, 
1989).
25 The expression used by the author is “desde donde sehorear sobre la Argentina” R. A. Paz, El 
Conflicto Pendiente: Fronteras con Chile (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1980), 
p. 199, my translation.
26 H. Santis Arenas, Chile y  su Desarrollo Territorial (Santiago: Instituto de Investigaciones del 
Patrimonio Territorial de Chile, Universidad de Santiago, 1984), p. 25, my translation.
27 J. Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels among Neighbors (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1985), p. 45.
28 Ghisolfo Araya, Origen y  Desarrollo del Diferendo Limitrofe Austral, p. 23.
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Secondly, awarding the islands to Chile endangered the validity of Argentine claims 
to a sector of the Antarctica, thus jeopardising the concept of tricontinental Argentina— 
mainland, insular, and Antarctic Argentina—, or even more extreme, of “peninsular 
Argentina; [...] continental, bi-maritime and Antarctic.”29 Not surprisingly, 
geopoliticians in Santiago developed a similar concept of tricontinental Chile. Also in 
Santiago there was a strong sense that geographic continuity between all three parts had 
to be defended in order to protect the Antarctic claim. Moreover, Chilean geopoliticians 
placed a significant emphasis on their geographic proximity to Antarctica so as to give 
their tricontinental concept priority over Argentina’s, as well as on the fact that their 
Antarctic claim was older.
The controversy was fed by a great deal of nationalistic literature. Argentine 
Admiral Isaac Rojas, a prolific nationalist geopolitician and founder of the Movement 
for the Affirmation of the Sovereignty, warned in his writings about a series of 
geopolitical ‘mutilations’ that Argentina had suffered at the hands of Chile, arguing that 
acceptance of the ruling of the British Crown would mean another dismemberment of 
Argentine sovereignty.31 On both sides of the Andes the phrasing chosen to refer to one 
another was rather similar; ‘aspirations of territorial expansion,’ ‘policy of conquest and 
imposition,’ ‘obstructionism,’ ‘spurious arguments,’ ‘attempts at dismemberment.’ 
Hardliners on both sides were gaining increasing influence on their governments with a 
discourse of territoriality and sovereignty.
When in April 1977 the ruling came down heavily on the side of Chile, and 
Santiago was granted jurisdiction over the three main islands, together with 200 miles of 
the Atlantic coastline, the award was immediately accepted by the Chilean government. 
In Argentina, it was received with surprise and consternation. The government 
expressed officially its disquiet, delayed the time o f declaring the arbitral decision 
null—a delay partly due to the junta’s internal dissension—, and sought to open a
29 J. E. Guglialmelli, 'Geopolitica en la Argentina,' Estrategia vol. May-June/July-August, no. 46/47 
(1977), p. 10.
30 For the concepts of tricontinental Argentina and tricontinental Chile, and their relationship to the 
Beagle Channel, see J. Child, Antarctica and South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum (New 
York: Praeger, 1988), especially Part II, chapters 4 and 5.
31 I. Rojas, La Argentina en el Beagle y  Atlantico Sur (Buenos Aires: Codex, 1978). For further 
nationalist writings in Argentina see R. C. Rey Balmaceda, '^Otra Cuestion de Lfmites con Chile?,' 
Estrategia, no. 69 (1981); J. A. Fraga, 'Beagle - Hablar con Claridad al Sumo Pontffice,' Estrategia, no. 
69 (1981); Scenna, Argentina-Chile: Una Frontera Caliente; M. A. Basail, Temas de Geopolitica 
Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Clio, 1983); and L. H. Destefani, Lo que Debe Saberse sobre el 
Beagle: Slntesis del Conjlicto de Limites Austral entre Argentina y  Chile (Buenos Aires: Platero, 1984). 
For Chilean nationalist writings see R. Santibanez Escobar, Los Derechos de Chile en el Beagle (Santiago 
de Chile: Editorial Andres Bello, 1969); A. Pinochet, Geopolitica (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andres 
Bello, 1974); and Ghisolfo Araya, Origen y  Desarrollo del Diferendo Limitrofe Austral.
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process of bilateral negotiation. Two rounds of negotiations took place in July 1977 in 
Buenos Aires, and in October 1977 in Santiago. By the end of these Chile had rejected 
Argentine proposals to modify the terms of the arbitral decision, and both parties had 
hardened their positions.32
In spite of further attempts at bilateral negotiation, the enchantment of 1976, when 
Videla and Pinochet and their Foreign Affairs ministers jointly repudiated international 
terrorism and subversion, and asked for the international community’s understanding 
instead of condemnation, had been definitely broken.33 Once more, what dominated the 
bilateral relation was distrust, geopolitical calculation, and hard language hinting at war. 
And the expected war, according to Pinochet himself, “would have been a total war.”34
In the midst of intensifying political statements and mutual demonstrations of 
military power, on 25 January 1978 Buenos Aires rejected the award as irreversibly null 
and void,
on the grounds (among others) that it contained ‘gross errors,’ ‘violations o f  
essential juridical rules,’ and that it ‘exceeded its authority,’ since the award 
arrived at conclusions affecting geographic regions beyond the area it was 
supposed to consider.35
The military presidents of Argentina, Jorge Rafael Videla, and Chile, Augusto 
Pinochet, held summits just before—in Mendoza in January 1978—and just after—in 
Puerto Montt in February 1978—the nullity declaration. Whilst during the former both 
leaders stated their determination of not going to war and of creating a bilateral
32 On the succession of events during the Beagle crisis, Roberto Russell elaborates an excellent and 
detailed analysis on the process of decision making in Argentina during the escalation. See R. Russell, 'El 
Proceso de Toma de Decisiones en la Politica Exterior Argentina (1976-1989),' in Roberto Russell (ed.), 
Politico Exterior y  Toma de Decisiones en America Latina (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor 
Latinoamericano, 1990). The Foreign Affairs minister of the time offers his own account in C. W. Pastor, 
'Chile: La Guerra o la Paz. 1978-1981,' in Silvia Ruth Jalabe (ed.), La Politico Exterior Argentina y  sus 
Protagonistas. 1880-1995 (Buenos Aires: CARI-Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1996). For other 
examinations on the crisis of the Beagle Channel, see M. Wilhelmy, 'Las Decisiones de Politica Exterior 
en Chile,' in Roberto Russell (ed.), Politica Exterior y  Toma de Decisiones en America Latina (Buenos 
Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1990); J. A. Lanus, De Chapultepec al Beagle: Politica Exterior 
Argentina: 1945-1980 (Buenos Aires: Emece Editores, 1984); A. L. Corbacho, 'Predicting the Probability 
of War during Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas,’ MA Thesis, Deparment of Political 
Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1993; and C. A. Fiona and C. A. Garcia Belsunce, 
Historia Politica de la Argentina Contemporanea (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1988).
33 See Declaracion Conjunta de Presidentes, General Videla y  General Pinochet, signed in Santiago, 
13 November 1976, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine 
Republic, Treaties Department. See also Cisneros and Escudd, Historia General de las Relaciones 
Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, Volume XIV, Chapter 68, n. 1-4, http://www.argentina- 
rree.com/14/14-057.htm.
34 Quoted in E. Gallardo, 'Pinochet: "No nos habrla ido tan mal en una guerra con la Argentina",' La 
Nacion Line, (Buenos Aires: 25 November 1999), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/99/l l/25/x04.htm.
35 R. Russell, 'Argentina: Ten Years of Foreign Policy toward the Southern Cone,' in Philip Kelly and 
Jack Child (eds.), Geopolitics o f the Southern Cone and Antarctica (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1988), p. 71.
140
committee to avoid its occurrence,36 during the latter language and attitudes had 
hardened considerably. Pinochet read a speech in which he warned that “the arbitral 
judgement is not under discussion, and any agreement that may be reached will not 
affect any of the rights awarded to Chile by the judgement.”37 Videla, surprised and 
more inclined to compromise, gave a lukewarm answer that infuriated hardliners in his 
government:
Argentines and Chileans are faced with the prospect of strengthening our ties, of 
perfecting our integration, and of better defining our common interests in key 
areas, such as the Antarctica. What is discussed today between Argentina and 
Chile constitutes a vital interest for both states. It transcends the moment 
coming from the past, and is key for the harmonic definition of what is to come.
Today, as in other circumstances of our history, we try the road of negotiation.38
The Argentine junta’s hawks, instead, produced their own answer, targeted at both 
Videla and Pinochet in the same speech, when Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera 
asserted,
The whole country is looking towards the South, confident that the government 
of the Armed Forces will not exchange the Argentines’ honour and goods for 
the decorative praise of those who mask their weakness or interests behind 
fallacious appeals to peace. [...] As well as the Army’s and Air Force’s units, 
all components of the naval power too are ready to fulfil the mandate of a 
people who admit no more distortions, conscious that our war power will never 
be at the service of aggression but of reason [...]. No one should forget: the time 
of words is running out.39
In any case, at Puerto Montt the leaders decided to create mixed commissions 
(COMIX 1 and COMIX 2) as part of a bilateral negotiation scheme aiming to find a 
solution within a period of six months. Except those openly favouring war, it was in the 
interest of both sides to maintain an open line of communication. The possibility of an 
Argentine-Bolivian-Peruvian alliance against Chile had always been seen as an 
unwanted possibility by military strategists in Santiago, who were aware that they had 
to simultaneously keep a strong military presence in both the north and the south. For 
Argentina, war also had risks. It would imply invading and fighting in a foreign
36 See Russell, 'El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones en la Politica Exterior Argentina (1976-1989),' p.
40.
37 Augusto Pinochet quoted in Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de 
la Republica Argentina, Volume XIV, Chapter 68, http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-057.htm, my 
translation.
38 'Mensaje del Excelentisimo Senor Presidente de la Nation del 23 de Febrero de 1978 dirigido a todo 
el pais,' reproduced in Ricardo Luis Quellet (ed.), El Canal del Beagle (Buenos Aires: Escuela de 
Comando y Estado Mayor de la Fuerza Aerea Argentina, 1978), p. 120.
39 Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera, member of junta, quoted in Scenna, Argentina-Chile: Una 
Frontera Caliente, pp. 288-289.
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territory, and facing a well-prepared army. In this context, nothing ensured a low-cost 
victory against Chile.40
However, after six months of the creation o f COMIX 1 and 2 no significant 
progress had been made, and tension had only increased as both countries appeared to 
enter a new arms race. Augusto Varas highlights that Argentina’s rejection of the British 
arbitration produced an action/reaction effect, which explains the simultaneous 
increases in 1977 through 1979 of Argentine and Chilean military expenditures41 
Simultaneously ‘hawks’ on either side of the mountains advanced war proposals and 
were openly making militaristic declarations.
In the face of the failure of COMIX 2, an incessant exchange of notes and military 
contacts, both official and unofficial, was initiated. The Argentine military secretaries of 
the three branches of the Armed Forces met secretly with Pinochet in late October in an 
attempt to soften Chile’s rigid opposition to carry on bilateral talks. In that meeting the 
Chilean president agreed to consider the possibility of a Papal mediation for the first 
time. A few days later, however, at the final meeting of COMIX 2, Pinochet 
demonstrated that he had changed his mind, the Chilean delegation having been 
instructed to refuse any kind of mediation 42
As it became clear that Santiago was not willing to reach a compromise, the more 
conciliatory position of President Videla and his Foreign Affairs minister, Carlos 
Washington Pastor, weakened within a divided junta, in which the hawks grew 
increasingly strong. During the months of November and December, the military 
machines of both countries prepared for war, and mobilisation orders were issued 43 By 
mid-December there was a further proposal for mediation, but as the ministers of both 
countries were not able to agree on the scope of the mediation, the hardliners in 
Argentina gained prevalence and forced the Foreign Affairs minister to end 
communications. As discussions were halted an operation plan was finalised. Receiving 
the code name of Operation Soberania (Operation Sovereignty), the plan was to be
40 See chapter six, “Military Leadership and the Use of Force: Illustrations from the Beagle Channel 
Dispute,” in D. R. Mares, Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001).
41 A. Varas, Militarization and the International Arms Race in Latin America (Boulder and London: 
Westview Press, 1985), p. 86. See also W. A. Selcher, 'Recent Strategic Developments in South 
America's Southern Cone,' in Heraldo Munoz and Joseph S. Tulchin (eds.), Latin American Nations in 
World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), particularly the section on ‘National-Security 
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Military Capabilities: An Arms Race in the Southern Cone.’
42 See Russell, 'El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones en la Politica Exterior Argentina (1976-1989).'
43 See R. Castelli, 'Una Historia Oficial Trasandina,' La Nation Line, (Buenos Aires: 21 December 
1998), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/98/12/21/p07.htm; and J. Camarasa, 'La Guerra que se evito Cuatro 
Horas antes del Ataque,' La Nation Line, (Buenos Aires: 21 December 1998),
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/98/12/21/p06.htm.
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launched on 21 or 22 December, and involved the military occupation of two islands, 
Nueva and Homos. Once the islands were secured the Argentineans intended to await 
Chile’s reaction, and only afterwards would they respond.
Videla and Pastor, representing the more pragmatic and conciliatory wing of the 
government, needed Chile to adopt a more flexible and compromise-inclined position if 
they were to avoid open war. Indeed, the bilateral relationship had reached a level of 
securitization where the use of force seemed imminent. Videla and Pastor needed to 
demonstrate that they had in Pinochet an interlocutor if they were to have the chance to 
improve their internal position and advance desecuritization. Using the 
securitization/desecuritization sequence presented in chapter two, it can be seen here 
that one faction of the Argentine military and junta (hawks) was the securitizing actor, 
whereas the other (doves) was the desecuritizing actor, mid in their competition, they 
constituted each other’s bargaining audiences.
Yet Chile’s rigidity was leaving Argentine desecuritizers with no room for 
manoeuvre vis-a-vis the belligerent faction within the very government. As a last resort, 
Videla sent secret missions to the Vatican, Washington, and Moscow in the hope that, 
by informing the papacy and the external governments of the development of events and 
the prospect of war, they might place political pressure on Chile.44 If they managed to 
make Pinochet’s position more flexible, they might manage to soften hawks as well.
At the same time, U.S. ambassadors in Buenos Aires and Santiago, Raul Castro and 
George Landau, and the Papal Nuncio in Buenos Aires, Pio Laghi, played key roles, 
exerting pressure on the military of both countries by having meetings with politicians 
and high ranking military officials, as well as urging the Vatican to intervene 
diplomatically. Finally, on 21 December 1978 a high official of the Vatican very close 
to Pope John Paul II, Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, called the Chilean and Argentine 
ambassadors to the Vatican for separate meetings, and conveyed to them the Pope’s 
intention to send a special delegate, Cardinal Antonio Samore, to mediate in the crisis. 
Chile’s conformity was immediate, whereas in Buenos Aires the junta’s internal 
disagreements delayed the positive response some 24 hours 45 Only six hours away from
44 See J. Camarasa, 'Moncayo convencio al Vaticano para que mediara en el Conflicto,' La Nacion 
Line, (Buenos Aires: 22 December 1998), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/98/12/22/pl3.htm; and Russell, 'El 
Proceso de Toma de Decisiones en la Politica Exterior Argentina (1976-1989),' p. 51.
45 Jose Claudio Escribano notes, in that respect, “each chapter that Samore negotiated with the 
members of the official commission was then being reinterpreted by the spokespersons of each of the 
Armed Forces.” See J. C. Escribano, 'Afios de Enajenacion y Dolor,' La Nacion Line, (Buenos Aires: 23 
October 1999), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/99/10/23/p34.htm.
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the deadline set for the beginning of armed hostilities, the Argentine Executive called 
off the operation. As the whole war machinery had been set in motion already,
it was a miracle— in part thanks to the severe weather conditions in the Austral 
Sea area where the islands to be occupied are, and in part thanks to the 
efficiency o f  communications— that the offensive action could be stopped in 
time.46
3.2. The slow resolution
Christmas o f 1978 found Cardinal Samore flying back and forth between Santiago 
and Buenos Aires, and organising an exhausting series o f meetings until he finally 
obtained both parties’ commitment to accept Papal mediation and a pact of non­
aggression, which they signed on 8 January 1979 in Montevideo. The moral authority of 
the Pope exerted the necessary weight on both military governments, which had a strong 
catholic discourse and identity. Nonetheless, it would still take several years until 
rapprochement began.
On 12 December 1980, the Pope submitted his Peace Proposal based on a 
compromise. As had been the case in the 1977 arbitration award, the three islands in 
question and all the other islands located south of Cape Horn were awarded to Chile,
drawing an enclosing line that covers all the lines in dispute. Using this line as a 
starting point, Chile has a strip o f  territorial waters o f  six miles, and a second 
strip o f  exclusive economic zone o f  another six miles. The remainder, out to 
200 miles, will be devoted to common or joint activities (Sea o f Peace), with 
Argentine sovereignty, but at perpetual service o f Chile 47
Thus, Chile would limit its projection into the South Atlantic, dissipating Argentine 
fears of Chilean penetration into that sensitive region and protecting the bioceanic 
principle. But the Argentine government was again not entirely satisfied with this 
outcome and the proposal failed to break the deadlock. Whereas Chile accepted the 
ruling on 8 January 1981, the Argentine junta, immersed once more in internal disputes, 
objected to it on 25 March. Argentine Minister Carlos Washington Pastor wrote in his 
letter to the Pope: “The positive attitude of the Argentine Government has not been able 
to dissuade you from the conclusion that the renunciations that your proposal suggests 
are grave.
Throughout 1981 several border incidents took place, violating the Montevideo 
Agreement, which anyway had been signed with little enthusiasm. Argentina went as far
46 Pastor, 'Chile: La Guerra o la Paz. 1978-1981,' p. 265, my translation.
47 Russell, 'Argentina: Ten Years of Foreign Policy toward the Southern Cone,' p. 81, n. 8.
48 Pastor, 'Chile: La Guerra o la Paz. 1978-1981,' p. 270, my translation.
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as to close its borders with Chile. Soon afterwards, the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War 
contributed to augment suspicions on both sides. Pinochet’s attitude during the war did 
little to dissipate Argentine doubts about Chile’s sincerity in insisting to reach a 
common solution, and the war itself did little to dissipate Chilean doubts about 
Argentina’s potential behaviour. As Jimmy Bums summarises,
throughout the war [Chile] offered constant logistical and military support to the 
Task Force, putting its own navy and troops on standby near the Argentine- 
Chilean border. Chile had no doubt that the Argentine invasion o f the Falklands 
formed part o f the junta’s territorial ambitions, and from the outset o f the 
conflict worked on the assumption (based on its own intelligence assessments) 
that an Argentine victory over the British would be quickly followed up by an 
occupation o f the Chilean-owned islands in the Beagle Channel— historically 
disputed by Argentina.49
After the war, events succeeded each other at a dizzy pace in Argentina. The demise 
of Galtieri’s government, the transitory military government that followed, the 
elections, and the democratic transition, all delayed any attention being focused on the 
Beagle Channel issue, and ultimately left the matter on hold until 1984. When the new 
government took office the solution of the dispute became a key priority. Eventually, 
five years after signing the Montevideo Agreement, the governments of Chile and 
Argentina got together again at the Vatican to sign a Joint Declaration of Peace and 
Friendship (23 January 1984), which led later to the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (29 
November 1984).
When President Alfonsin was sworn in on 10 December 1983, his government 
planned a change in foreign policy, alongside changes in many other areas. The military 
regime, in spite of other notorious inconsistencies, had strongly adhered to the East- 
West model, claiming its membership to, and its active participation in the defence of, 
the Western world and values. Also, it had showed a certain disregard for Latin 
America, except for issues relating to stopping the advance of Marxism in the region 
and its competition with Brazil for gaining influence over neighbouring states.
Alfonsin’s foreign policy maintained the existing cultural adherence to the West, 
whilst simultaneously opposing the merely strategic components of the East-West 
conflict, returning thus to the Non-Aligned Movement. In addition, the government 
gave priority to relationships with the developing world in general, and with Latin 
America in particular, reflecting thus their importance to Argentina. For instance, the 
Alfonsin administration supported various schemes of selective co-operation and
49 J. Bums, The Land That Lost its Heroes: Argentina, The Falklands and Alfonsin (London: 
Bloomsbury, 1987), p. 54.
145
integration, especially in Latin America. Democratic Argentina worked actively for the 
creation of the Contadora Support Group, which backed up the efforts of the Contadora 
Group to solve the crisis in Central America, trying to prevent yet more direct U.S. 
intervention. It was also actively involved in the Cartagena Consensus (June 1984), by 
which the countries of Latin America claimed for a political treatment of the external 
debt issue, as well as in the Rio Group (December 1986), which sought to systematise 
political coordination among some Latin American states to face common problems.50 
Integration with Brazil became a political priority, as will be discussed in chapter seven.
The administration of Alfonsin marked an important break with the policies of the 
military regime towards the region. It is in this context that the urgency to overcome and 
resolve the problems with Chile has to be understood. The newly found determination 
was clearly stated by Dante Caputo, minister of Foreign Affairs of the government of 
Alfonsin:
Our priority was peace, to become a state that would use its resources to 
develop and live in a civilised manner, not to wage war [...] to have ruled out 
the possibility o f war with Chile constitutes one o f  our most important 
achievements, both at the personal level and as government action.51
Nevertheless, the negotiation of peace with Chile turned out to be a far from easy 
process for Raul Alfonsin, not least because of the intense domestic opposition of some 
sectors. As Roberto Russell indicates,
using a systematic propaganda action, accompanied by various mechanisms for 
self-censorship (which had been in operation from the beginning o f the 
Process), the military regime was able to spread its geopolitical schemes—  
unfortunately, with considerable success— over a large sector o f  the population, 
and awoke in it strong anti-Chilean and bellicose feelings.52
Such feelings remained among sectors of the political elite and public opinion for 
some time after the dictatorship was over.
President Alfonsin’s political party did not have a sufficient majority in the Senate 
to guarantee the ratification of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed with Chile, 
and an important element of the Peronist opposition repeatedly warned that they would 
not pass the agreement easily. Alfonsin and Caputo realised that the government would 
need a strong public endorsement if it was to exert pressure on the opposition and have 
the Treaty approved. Hence, the strategy they envisaged was to call for a voluntary and 
non-binding plebiscite:
50 Russell, 'Argentina: Ten Years of Foreign Policy toward the Southern Cone.'
51 'Entrevista al Ex-Canciller Dante Caputo, Julio 1989,' America Latina/Intemacional vol. 6, no. 21 
(1989), p. 262, my translation.
52 Russell, 'Argentina: Ten Years of Foreign Policy toward the Southern Cone,' p. 81 n. 6.
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We want Argentineans, all Argentineans, to participate by taking a position 
regarding whether it is convenient or not to find a rapid and peaceful solution to 
a problem that has constituted an element o f tension with Chile for the last 
century. [.. .] Solving the Beagle dispute would not only constitute the end o f  an 
old litigation but also, and foremost, it would be an essential factor for the 
construction o f a future that is quickly approaching.53
The plebiscite, it was thought, would have several benefits, in addition to the 
immediate purpose of showing the public’s preference for peace with Chile. Firstly, it 
would serve to strengthen democratic institutions. Secondly, it would expose the 
profound differences with the military government’s policy making. And thirdly, it 
would shift, at least symbolically, the location of the desecuritization process’s 
legitimising audience away from Congress, where ratification was not secured, onto the 
citizenry, where the government expected to find more responsiveness.
The plebiscite took place on 25 November 1984, and the voluntary participation 
exceeded 70 percent. Of this number, over 81 percent voted in favour of signing the 
peace agreement, 17 percent voted against it, and around 1 percent returned a blank 
voting paper. In addition to this resounding outcome, Alfonsin sent the Treaty to 
Congress for its approval making a forceful appeal:
The Treaty, submitted to the consideration o f the Honourable Congress, has an 
important political and strategic significance for Argentina’s external interests, 
establishes a transactional solution for a dispute that has persisted for decades, 
and interprets the will o f the majority o f our people. [.. .] We thus collect a 
lesson from history. Argentine prosperity has only been possible in times o f  
fraternal relationships with our neighbours.54
Despite the resounding outcome of the plebiscite and the president’s request, the 
Senate hosted an intense and protracted debate, after which 23 senators voted for the 
ratification, 22 voted against, and one abstained.55
As Ramon Huidobro points out, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and 
Argentina’s later agreements with Brazil substantially modified the state of affairs in 
regional geopolitics.56 The Treaty had a far-reaching political relevance, offering the 
possibility to Argentina and Chile of relating to each other in a completely new way. It
53 Speech of President Raul Alfonsin announcing the call for a plebiscite, on 25 July 1984, reproduced 
in M. L. Rossi De Flory, Argentina y  Chile en la Zona del Beagle (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de 
Education y Justicia, 1984), p. 46, my translation.
54 Mensaje 3849 y Proyecto de Ley del Poder Ejectuvo: Expediente Diputados 058-PE-84, 'El Poder 
Ejecutivo somete a consideration del Congreso el proyecto de ley por el que se propone aprobar el 
Tratado de Paz y Amistad del Vaticano del 29 de Noviembre de 1984,' 11 December 1984, my 
translation.
55 Russell, 'El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones en la Politica Exterior Argentina (1976-1989),' p. 58.
56 R. Huidobro, 'Las Altemativas de una Concertacion Diplomatica entre Chile y Argentina,' in 
Francisco Orrego (ed.), Chile y  Argentina: Nuevos Enfoques para una Relacion Constructiva (Santiago 
de Chile: Pehuen Editores, 1989), pp. 18-19.
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allowed bilateral integration policies to be envisaged and then promoted, such as the 
establishment in October 1985 of the Binational Commission for Economic Co­
operation and Physical Integration. The resolution o f the Beagle Channel issue 
facilitated rapprochement and allowed the resolution of the other pending disputes, 
although this only happened in the 1990s. The period immediately following the Treaty, 
however, failed to install a deeper sense of mutual confidence. The possibility of war 
had been driven away, but co-operation was not in place yet, let alone the perception of 
some kind of common identification.
4. Cold peace -  1980s
As just discussed, the resolution of the dispute and the stabilisation of relations with 
Chile were of great importance to democratic Argentina. Equally, the regime of 
Pinochet was interested in closing an issue that had proved to have the potential for 
instability, particularly since it had seen in the previous years some sources of 
debilitation, such as the 1982 financial collapse and a series of demonstrations against 
Pinochet between 1983 and 1985. However, as Mark Laudy argues, “[t]he domestic 
political situation in Argentina was clearly one of the most significant factors driving 
the [Papal] mediation process, and changes in that situation were quite arguably the 
primary impetus for the settlement ultimately achieved.”57
If change of regime in Buenos Aires proved to be key to easing tensions and 
removing the obstacles to the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty, the fact that 
the regime changed only in Argentina, but not in Chile, was the main reason hindering a 
more rapid rapprochement. According to Jorge Lavopa, “[Alfonsin*s Foreign Affairs 
Minister] Dante Caputo set an ideological frontier with Chile. Formally, there was a
ro
rapprochement, but the relationship still remained very cold and distant.” The 
Alfonsin administration was not only deeply committed to democracy at home, but also 
to supporting democracy throughout the region. An eloquent indication of this is the fact 
that during 1988 and 1989 the Concertacion de Partidos por la Democracia—the
57 M. Laudy, 'The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum 
Building,' in Melanie C. Greenburg, John H. Barton, and Margaret E. Mcguinness (eds.), Words Over 
War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2000), p. 315.
58 Interview with Dr Jorge Lavopa, Director of the Committee for the Study of Latin American Affairs 
at the Argentine Council for International Relations (CAR!) in Buenos Aires, 30 March 2001.
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coalition that would later win the elections in Chile—held its meetings at the Argentine 
Embassy in Santiago when planning its political campaign.59
It is in this light that the government’s apprehension about a deeper rapprochement 
with Chile’s military dictatorship has to be seen. And Alfonsin and his administration 
manifested their apprehension in several other political attitudes. For instance, in 
Washington in 1985, during a visit of the Argentine president to his American 
colleague, Alfonsin insisted on the need of a democratic restoration in Chile; an issue 
that the Chilean regime took as a violation of the principle of non-intervention in other 
states’ internal affairs. In March 1987, at the meeting o f the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee, the Argentine delegation voted in favour of the condemnation of the 
Chilean dictatorship. Later that year, on 11 September, the Argentine ambassador in 
Santiago repudiated the celebration of the coup’s new anniversary, while the Argentine 
Foreign Affairs Ministry gave its support to Bolivia’s territorial claim. Each of these 
decisions provoked Chilean responses, which ranged from repudiation, to accusing 
Argentina of allowing Chilean subversive activities in its territory, to the country’s 
refusal to take part in a joint ceremony to commemorate the Montevideo Act.60 % 
In addition, some 24 border disagreements still survived from the time that the 1941 
Mixed Commission was set up to demarcate the frontier line. Although the pending 
issues did not appear to pose a threat of escalating into political or military conflict, they 
remained unresolved until the 1990s. In this sense, Oscar Camilion seems to be right 
when he argues that whereas states can coexist peacefully with problems, they cannot 
with bad, inadequate or premature solutions. If the dynamics of the bilateral 
relationship—the ‘philosophy of the relationship,’ in Camilion’s own words—are 
clearly defined, then two states can coexist with a pending border issue until they find a 
satisfactory solution. If, instead, a solution is pushed or imposed upon them—by force 
or otherwise—but is not underpinned by a genuinely defined ‘philosophy of the 
relationship,’ then dissatisfaction will eventually arouse revisionist claims.61
In the Argentine-Chilean dyad, after the agreement of 1984 a new relational pattern 
evolved that allowed the two states to coexist with their disagreements for a number of 
years. The improvement of the quality of peace only came about after the resolution of
59 Telephone interview with Minister Gustavo Bobrik, Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cult 
in Buenos Aires, 26 March 2001. This was also confirmed by Minister Marcelo Giusto, current Chief of 
Cabinet of the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, who worked at the Argentine Embassy in 
Santiago de Chile between 1984 and 1989, and 1992-1998.
60 See Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, 
Volume XIV, Chapter 69, http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-082.htm.
61 'Entrevista al Senor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores Doctor Oscar Camilion. Argentina 1981: Su 
Politica Exterior,' Estrategia, no. 69 (1981), p. 46.
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the Beagle Channel dispute. In this sense, the second half of the 1980s opened a period 
in which the escalation into war seemed highly unlikely, in spite of persisting mutual 
claims, opposing political ideologies (and regimes), and lack o f mutual trust. During 
this phase, Argentina and Chile maintained a cold peace; a step that seemed necessary 
after so many decades of tense, territory-centred unstable and fragile peace.
It was only when Chile restored democratic rule and in Argentina the second 
democratically elected government took office that all territorial issues could be 
finalised, and more decisive and concrete schemes of co-operation, both bilateral and 
regional, could be implemented. This was also coincidental with the beginning of 
Argentina’s economic liberalisation programme, which permitted large sums of Chilean 
investment to flow into the country.
5. Stabilisation of peace -  1990s
Indeed, as President Patricio Aylwin took over from General Pinochet in early 
1990, he established as a primary goal of his foreign policy the reinsertion of Chile into 
the international community after over a decade and a half o f deteriorating relationships 
and isolationism That the regional environment had improved and that neighbours 
welcomed Aylwin’s initiative was reflected in the fact that both the presidents of 
Argentina and Peru—countries with which Chile had had very tense relations—attended 
the inauguration ceremony.
Five months later, in August 1990, Presidents Carlos Menem (Argentina) and 
Patricio Aylwin (Chile) had signed a protocol committing their governments to 
complete the task of border demarcation entrusted to the old Mixed Commission of 
1941. As a result, within one year 22 out of the 24 pending border issues were resolved 
by technical teams, and in August 1991 Menem and Aylwin met again to sign the 
agreement confirming these resolutions.
Indicative of the predominant optimism was the fact that this was done on the 
occasion of the official visit to Buenos Aires of the Chilean president, who was joined 
by an important delegation that included seven ministers. Aylwin was received and 
honoured by the mayor of Buenos Aires, the Argentine Congress, the president of the 
supreme court of justice, and several governors, in addition to President Menem 
himself. In addition, at the same meeting where the border agreement and an important 
number of declarations and treaties were signed, the leaders also signed the significant
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Agreement on Economic Complementation, known as ACE 16, under the umbrella of 
LAIA/ALADI, as is discussed below.
The remaining two border disagreements proved to be rather difficult to settle. 
Nonetheless, the development of negotiations, even if dense and protracted, showed the 
striking transformation of the dyadic relationship. The first pending issue, Laguna del 
Desierto, was only resolved in 1994 through the arbitration of a Latin American 
commission, whose decision favoured the Argentine thesis. Prompt acceptance by both 
governments undoubtedly eased the situation, and permitted the relationship to advance 
further with some co-operation schemes being initiated despite the last boundary 
disagreement pending resolution.
The last dispute centred on an area of perennial snows that constitutes the third 
largest surface of ice cap in the world—22,000 square km (13,750 square miles)— 
which Chileans call Campos de Hielo Sur, and Argentineans Hielos Continentales. 
The already controversial border principle o f ‘highest peaks that divide waters’ was 
technically even more difficult to apply here. The first attempt by the governments to 
resolve the dispute in 1991 resulted in an accord based on a polygonal line, representing 
a political solution rather than one based on the geography or the history of the region. 
The issue generated an extended debate, not just within political and policy-making 
spheres, but also among the general public. Although the need to provide a final 
solution to all the territory discrepancies between the two countries was pressing, the 
polygonal line was not an acceptable option to any party.
The bitter and prolonged debates that ‘the Polygonal,’ as it came to be known, 
generated in both countries were reflected in a special issue of the journal Archivos del 
Presente in 1996, which collected articles by the vice-minister of Foreign Affairs and a 
representative of the Chamber of Deputies of Argentina, a Chilean senator, and 
academics and other informed actors.63 After seven years of discussions, the congresses 
on both sides of the Andes finally refused to grant the polygonal line ratification. 
Instead, in 1998 a new arrangement was agreed upon by members of the two congresses 
in reserved meetings. The resulting proposal was later transformed into a treaty signed 
by Presidents Carlos Menem and Eduardo Frei, and finally it was simultaneously 
approved by both legislatives on 2 June 1999. As well as putting an end to the 
controversy, the treaty envisaged measures to protect the environment, the promotion of
62 A very thorough overview of the history of Campos de Hielo/Hielos Continentales is offered by 
Carlos Macchi in http://www.todoiure.com.ar/monografias/publico/hielos continentales.htm.
63 See Archivos del Presente 2.6 (1996).
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joint research activities, and the adoption of common strategies in the case of natural 
disasters in the region.64
The manner in which this last territorial disagreement was resolved symbolised the 
strong political will existing in both states to find a mutually satisfactory, and thereby 
durable, solution. Such solution was in the end found by members of the congresses, 
after a debate that involved society at large and the media. Also interesting to note is 
that during the whole period of bilateral negotiations co-operation and physical 
integration between Argentina and Chile continued to advance in the framework of 
ACE 16, signed in 1991.
As will be seen in chapter seven, the Agreement on Economic Complementation 
was much less ambitious than the Argentine-Brazilian Treaty on Integration, Co­
operation and Development of 1988, which expressed the aim of constituting a common 
market. ACE 16, instead, referred only to the expansion of commercial exchange and 
reciprocal investment, as well as to the furtherance of physical integration.65 This last 
point faced a significant challenge since it sought to facilitate the transit of people and 
trade, both bilaterally and to third markets through a long and mountainous frontier that 
had only one paved border crossing.
Of particular importance are the Agreement’s protocols on gas interconnection and 
natural gas supply, co-operation and integration of the mining industry, and terrestrial, 
maritime and air transport. These protocols certainly opened the door to further 
agreements, such as those on co-operation and complementation of the mining industry 
(1 July 1996, 29 December 1997, and 20 August 1999), electric energy interconnection 
and electric energy supply (29 December 1997), and those on the construction of oil and 
gas pipelines (20 August 1999). The political and economic importance of these treaties 
has been highlighted in several interviews.66 Through these agreements, Argentina and 
Chile were launching interdependence in areas that not long before had been labelled as 
strategic.
Another critical factor in the process of political rapprochement between Argentina 
and Chile was Chile’s association with Mercosur. As chapter seven discusses in greater
64 Interview with Marcelo Stubrin, president of the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine 
Chamber of Deputies, in Buenos Aires, 17 August 2000. Mr Stubrin took part in the reserved meetings 
with Chilean representatives. See also the Argentine newspaper Clarin, 
http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/99-06-02/t-00301 d.htm. and the Chilean El Mercurio, 2 June 1999.
65 Acuerdo de Complementation Economica entre la Republica Argentina y  la Republica de Chile, 
signed in Buenos Aires, 2 August 1991, in the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult 
of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.
66 These were the interviews with Juan Alemann, former Treasury Secretary between 1976 and 1981; 
Dr Jorge Lavopa, and Gustavo Bobrik.
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depth, in 1996 Chile became an associated member of Mercosur. The importance of this 
association has to be read in the context of the broader process of rapprochement, since 
it added flesh and substance to a process that had for many decades only reflected half­
hearted intentions. It was only the backdrop of other factors that allowed rhetoric to lead 
to concrete results.
Some suggest that the key to understanding the shift was the simultaneous change 
of regime in Chile—by which it became a democracy, like Argentina—and a change of 
economic programme in Argentina—by which it became neoliberal, like Chile’s.67 In 
fact, Chile became the Latin American leader in economic growth and modernization in 
the 1980s when it was still ruled by Pinochet. Jorge Castro points out that Chile has 
become a capital exporter since the mid-1990s, with Argentina becoming the main 
destination for this wealth. According to Castro, this fact has played a key role in the 
new co-operative relationship. Chile has indeed envisaged an extraordinary internal 
savings capacity due to a high level of capitalisation of its private pension system. 
Argentina, in contrast, had been involved throughout the 1990s in a major campaign to 
attract direct foreign investment. These factors combined to result in Chile becoming 
the second largest foreign investor in Argentina, and Argentina the destination of 63 
percent of Chile’s investment abroad. When the Argentine government began to sell off 
its debt-ridden state concerns in 1990, Chilean firms moved in. The author argues that 
the process of interdependence that began in the 1990s between the two countries has 
become deep and irreversible.68 This has become a two-way dependency, as Chile 
depends largely on Argentina for its energy supply, of both oil and gas. In the words of 
Joaquin Fermandois,
in the same way as prejudice against [foreign] investment in sensitive sectors—  
such as electric supply— has been overcome in Argentina, so have Chileans 
accepted, for their own economic convenience, to be strongly dependent upon 
Argentine gas, in spite o f some people seeing it as a ‘strategic dependency.’69
67 On the effect of the neoliberal economic programme in Argentina on the relationship with Chile, 
see, among others, R. Barros Charlin, 'Liberation Comercial y Cooperation Economica Chileno- 
Argentina,' in Francisco Orrego (ed.), Chile y  Argentina: Nuevos Enfoques para una Relacion 
Constructiva (Santiago de Chile: Pehuen Editores, 1989); J. Castro, 'Hielos Continentales: de Problema 
Limitrofe a la Alianza con Chile,' in Torcuato S. Di Telia (ed.), Argentina-Chile: iDesarrollos Paralelos? 
(Buenos Aires: Nuevohacer/Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1997); and H. Groth, 'Chilean Firms are 
Investing Billions in Argentina,' Latin American Report vol. 12, no. 2 (1996).
68 Castro, 'Hielos Continentales: de Problema Limitrofe a la Alianza con Chile.' See also Secretaria de 
Relaciones Economicas Intemacionales, 'Analisis del Impacto del Acuerdo Mercosur-Chile. Un Factor 
Favorable para las Inversiones,' accessed: 2001, http://www.santafe.gov.ar/magic/comext/chile/tit3.htm.
69 J. Fermandois, 'Una Decada de Transformaciones: Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, 1988-1998,' in 
Eve Rimoldi De Ladmann (ed.), Politica Exterior y  Tratados: Argentina, Chile, Mercosur (Buenos Aires: 
Ciudad Argentina, 1999), p. 64, my translation.
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Developments in the area of military security are also indicative o f greater policy 
convergence, showing that the basis for further rapprochement was not only economic. 
The government of Chile published the Book on National Defence (Libro de la Defensa 
Nacionaf) in 1997 based on reports prepared by the Ministry of Defence, which had 
been in turn the result of many meetings of a group of specialists, both military and 
civilians, composed of academics, diplomats, parliamentarians, and other politicians.70 
The document, which constitutes Chile’s defence strategy, reflects the stands of a broad 
range of the country’s political spectrum.
The establishment of the Book on National Defence is o f interest for several 
reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates the changes that the political system has undergone in 
the country, despite the transition being very gradual and the military retaining a great 
number of prerogatives. And secondly, it shows that Chile has begun to make its 
defence planning and concerns regarding the region more transparent. For instance, it 
indicates that Chile considers that all its borders have been delimited by international 
agreements, and therefore discards any expansionist claims by Chile itself or by any 
other bordering country. It is to be noticed that the book was published before the 
dispute of Campos de Hielo/Hielos Continentales had been solved, demonstrating an 
underlying belief that this last disagreement would find a rapid and peaceful solution. 
Additionally, the document replaced the old concept of ‘bordering country’ as one 
which sets a border, a limit, with a new concept of ‘neighbouring country,’ giving the 
idea of members of the same neighbourhood.71
In April 1999 President Menem presented the Argentine White Book on National 
Defence, showing that a similar process had occurred in Argentina. The book highlights 
that the area of Mercosur ‘broadly defined’—that is with its full members, Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and its two associated members, Bolivia and Chile—has 
been declared a ‘zone of peace,’ and that the country has peacefully resolved all its 
border disagreements, making here special reference to Chile and the issue of the Hielos 
Continentales/Campos de Hielo, then still awaiting ratification by the congresses.72
70 Libro de la Defensa Nacional (Santafe (Chile): Imprenta de la Armada, 1997).
71 G. Gaspar, 'La Politica de Defensa de Chile,' in Francisco Rojas Aravena (ed.), Argentina, Brasil y  
Chile: Integracion y  Seguridad (Caracas, Venezuela: FLACSO-Chile and Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 
1999), p. 195. Gaspar’s chapter offers a good analysis of the contribution of the Book on National 
Defence towards Chile’s defence strategy.
72 See Libro Blanco de la Defensa Nacional (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Defensa de la Republica 
Argentina, 1999), Part I, Chapter 2 “The Continental Dimension,” and Chapter 3 “The Nation.”
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Another coincidence in the field of military affairs between the governments of 
Argentina and Chile has been their active participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. 
Argentina has kept a very high profile in the United Nations since 1991, taking the lead 
in Latin America in the number of personnel contributed towards U.N. missions. In 
addition, in 1995 the Argentine Peacekeeping Academy (CAECOPAZ) was created, 
offering peacekeeping courses and training for both its own national troops and those of 
foreign countries. Although not as prominent in its involvement as Argentina, Chile has 
committed its participation in peacekeeping operations as well. In its Book on National 
Defence peacekeeping is listed as a new type of mission for the Chilean armed forces; a 
new responsibility along with the defence of the country’s sovereignty.
The decision to publish White Papers, as well as much of their content, points to a 
convergent orientation of their defence and security policies. This is indicative of an 
important shift in the strategic planning of both countries. As they have ceased to 
perceive threats in their immediate region, they have begun to consider participation in 
international missions a vital task of the armed forces. Furthermore—and of a more 
immediate regional impact—they have been able to transform their perceptions of one 
another and their mutual understanding.
Finally, in 1995 Argentina and Chile signed a Memorandum of Understanding for 
the Strengthening of Co-operation in Security Matters, creating a Permanent Security 
Committee. In 1998 military forces from both countries carried out joint exercises and 
combined practices that included the deployment of troops and equipment. This, 
however, generated certain uneasiness among some sectors of the armed forces. 
Nonetheless, in August 1998 both navies performed a joint mock search, localisation 
and rescue operation in the zone of the Drake Passage and Beagle Channel. Later that 
year the air forces carried out a series of joint exercises in the Andes.73 The symbolic 
importance of these practices should be highlighted, not least because they were carried 
out in zones which, not too long ago, both parties were ready to fight a war over.
More recent events have given the bilateral relationship a final confidence boost. 
Argentina openly supported Chile’s claim in the case o f General Pinochet’s detention in 
London when, at the 1999 Mercosur summit in Rio de Janeiro, Menem called the 
presidents of the member and associated states to publicly manifest their solidarity with
73 M. F. Sain, 'Seguridad Regional, Defensa Nacional y Relaciones Civico-Militares en Argentina,' in 
Francisco Rojas Aravena (ed.), Argentina, Brasil y  Chile: Integracion y  Seguridad (Caracas, Venezuela: 
FLACSO-Chile and Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1999).
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Chile.74 The result was a document signed by all and which defended the principle of 
territoriality, which was the argument advanced by President Frei in order to have 
Pinochet taken to court in Santiago rather than in Madrid. Chile’s gratitude to Menem’s 
initiative came soon afterwards, when Frei pressed for the prohibition o f flights between 
Chile and the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.
6. Final remarks
During most of their history as independent states, both Argentina and Chile have 
considered territory to be of vital national interest. This fact, coupled with the various 
border disputes which have arisen over the years, has led to a relationship based on 
negative mutual perceptions and mistrust. These permeated not just the military, but 
also political elites, media, and public opinion. Indeed, even during military regimes, 
where it enjoyed only limited political participation, public opinion on either side of the
7SAndes was successfully mobilised in support of their governments.
As long as territorial sovereignty remained at the centre o f dyadic concerns, it 
became very difficult for Argentina and Chile to escape the Lockean dynamics of 
adversaries. In the absence of military confrontations, peace oscillated between 
instability and fragility. The escalation of the dispute in 1977 and 1978 situated it 
definitely on the side of fragile peace, seriously threatening to give in to war by the end 
of that period. With the return to democracy in Buenos Aires, the new government 
worked hard to break the domestic deadlock that obstructed the peace treaty. Thus, in 
1984 Minister Caputo declared,
not all foreign policy can be reduced to territorial issues. [ ...]  The main 
objective is to recover credibility and predictability before the international 
community, because it is that way that national sovereignty is defended.76
Argentine democratisation did not dramatically transform mutual perceptions, but it 
at least reduced the possibility o f armed confrontation. The eventual process of easing 
tensions, shifting mutual perceptions and desecuritizing the relationship between these 
two countries resulted in a very gradual and slow evolution. It still took them a few 
more years to start more substantive co-operation projects. The pace of the process was
74 Interview with Rut Diamint in Buenos Aires on 17 August 2000.
75 See Wilhelmy, 'Las Decisiones de Politica Exterior en Chile,' and Russell, 'Argentina: Ten Years of 
Foreign Policy toward the Southern Cone.'
76 Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs Dante Caputo, quoted in Cisneros and Escude, Historia 
General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, Volume XIV, Chapter 69, 
http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-082.htm. my translation.
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marked by the transitions to democracy. While the relationship moved towards a cold 
peace after the change of regime in Argentina, it was only after the return to democracy 
in Chile that rapprochement became deeper and more genuine, and that mutual trust 
began to emerge.
However, the shift in mutual perceptions was not the sole result of change of 
regime, as past experiences in the same dyad demonstrated. Following the model 
presented in chapter two (see figure 2.2), transformations in both the international and 
domestic circumstances of the two states as well as the recovery o f certain foreign 
policy traditions contributed to the reassessment of the terms o f the bilateral 
relationship.
The Alfonsin administration aimed to improve the international image of Argentina, 
re-orientate its foreign policy towards Latin America in order to unite forces, and 
promote democracy in the region. These goals needed to explicitly rule out all 
possibilities of regional conflict. At the same time, the policy of maintaining a high 
profile in the defence of human rights and democracy obstructed the possibility of a 
deeper transformation in the image the government in Buenos Aires had of the 
government in Chile. Hence the importance of ruling out the possibility of war, while 
also not engaging in too close and amicable relationships with Pinochet’s dictatorship. 
Argentina’s support for Chile’s democratic transition paved the way for the important 
improvements of the 1990s. With the election of Carlos Menem, pragmatism and 
economic liberalisation came to predominate. This coincided, as noted earlier, with 
Chile’s restoration of the democratic rule, and the availability of capital to be invested 
in Argentine privatised enterprises.
Chile’s strategic shift was as much a response to domestic changes as to the changes 
which occurred in the region. The restoration of democracy in Chile implied a return to 
its traditional foreign policy orientation towards the region after 17 years of political 
isolation that the authoritarian regime had entailed. As was seen in chapter three, the 
effects of the abandonment of a tradition of international involvement, and the resulting 
political isolationism, were compensated for by Chile’s entry into the world economy. 
Chile opened its markets internationally, reduced tariffs unilaterally, engaged in a 
process of massive privatisation, and offered substantial benefits to foreign investors. 
Economic liberalisation became a priority of the military regime.77
77 A. Van Klaveren, 'Chile: La Politica Exterior de la Transition,' America Latina/Intemacional vol. 1, 
no. 2 Otono-Inviemo (1994).
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Alfonsin’s support for the Chilean transition made the new democratic government 
favour a rapprochement with its neighbour. In addition, the whole Southern Cone was 
changing its outlook, and Chile sought to adapt to the new reality as well. In the words 
of the Juan Gabriel Valdes Soublette, then Chile’s Foreign Affairs minister,
From a strategic perspective, Chile’s insertion in South America has to be 
understood as Chile’s response to the great shift in the Argentine-Brazilian 
relationship. [ ...]  The fact that two brother-countries that are so relevant to 
Chile have been able to transform their relationship formerly marked by rivalry 
into a true economic and strategic alliance, this has represented a shift that could 
not and should not be ignored by our foreign and defence policy.78
In sum, the outcome of the very long process o f rapprochement was a qualitative 
change in the strategic relational pattern of these two states. This involved a shift of 
priorities, as well as a necessary transformation of the mutual perceptions. In the 1960s, 
1970s and part of the 1980s, territory, oil, gas, and the ability to produce electricity had 
been considered strategic assets of a state, and required self-sufficiency in order to 
ensure freedom of action. Also the control of communications, from telephones to mass 
media, had been considered of vital strategic importance. The whole idea o f delegating 
such control to the private sector, let along to foreign companies, together with the 
exploitation or production of them, would have been thought of in terms of vulnerability 
and thus contrary to one’s own national security. The fact that some of Argentina’s 
privatised plants for the production of electricity now belong to Chilean capital, and that 
Chile is dependent on Argentina’s oil and gas provision, certainly reflects that extent of 
the rapprochement.
The next chapter turns to the Argentine-Brazilian relationship. As between 
Argentina and Chile, the history of the Argentine-Brazilian dyad is mostly characterised 
by distrust and competition, and, only fairly recently has an ability to reassess mutual 
perceptions and to transform rivalry into partnership been possible. Nevertheless, as will 
be discussed below, there were also a number of differences that made rapprochement 
between Brasilia and Buenos Aires easier.
78 J. G. Valdes Soublette, La Politico Exterior de Chile y  el Proceso de Integration con Argentina 
(Buenos Aires: CARI, 1999), p. 24, my translation.
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CHAPTER 6 
BILATERAL RELATIONS 
BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
1. Introduction
Still in the early 1980s, notwithstanding declamatory pronouncements by 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela in favour of general and complete 
disarmament, these countries were the main forces behind the regional arms race. For 
decades “Argentina’s active participation in disarmament and arms limitation proposals 
[was] in strong contradiction with its policy toward actual agreements.”1 But Argentina 
was not the only country with an ambiguous discourse. Until the mid-1990s neither 
Argentina nor Brazil nor Chile had signed and ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty 
(PTBT) or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nor had the Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of 
Tlatelolco) fully entered into force in those countries. One of the explanations for this 
ambiguity was that no state in the Southern Cone was willing to be the first to sign an 
agreement that would bind it while not binding its neighbours. Rivalry and competition 
have been a constant in the relational pattern of the region.
In contrast with the Argentine-Chilean relationship, in which the state of their 
border issues was the main indication of the state of their peace, the rivalry between 
Argentina and Brazil was for regional prestige and leadership, and therefore less 
concrete and tangible. Ultimately, it crystallised into two matters that strained bilateral 
affairs during the 1960s and 1970s. The first was the dispute for hydroelectric resources 
of the River Parana. Although it threatened to escalate, the controversy came to a 
peaceful end with the 1979 Agreement of Itaipu-Corpus. The second issue was the 
covert nuclear race. Claiming that they were in the search o f nuclear energy with 
peaceful ends, both states refused to adhere to multilateral non-proliferation regimes. By 
doing this, they manifestly kept open the possibility of developing warlike nuclear 
technology. Although external pressure played an important role in the evolution and 
resolution of the nuclear competition, domestic political will was a crucial factor in the 
development of both the nuclear and the hydroelectric issues.
1 A. Varas, 'Controlling Conflict in South America: National Approaches,' in Michael Morris and 
Victor Millan (eds.), Controlling Latin American Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. 72.
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This chapter explores the Argentine-Brazilian relationship focusing first on how the 
historic origins of the antagonism moulded predominant visions of one another, and 
then how, through the successful resolution of the hydroelectric and the nuclear matters, 
those visions developed into an increasingly positive mutual attitude in the 1980s and 
1990s. It is thought here that the manner in which these two issues were resolved 
represented a cornerstone in, as well as a reflection of, the shift from open hostility to 
open friendship.
What appears as both puzzling and striking about the Argentine-Brazilian case is 
the fact that efforts to ease tensions began under the rule of military governments in 
both states. It is generally thought that military regimes hold a geopolitical vision of the 
region they live in, if not the world. And as the previous chapters have shown, that was 
mostly the case in the Southern Cone.
Given the centrality of the evolution of the hydroelectric and nuclear competitions 
in this dyad, this chapter is structured as follows. Section two discusses the historic 
Argentine-Brazilian rivalry, from the times of the colony until the late 1970s. It aims to 
trace the origins of the construction of the relationship in terms of rivalry and competing 
mutual images. Section three focuses on the River Parana dispute, involving their 
hydroelectric power projects; an issue that connects with their competition for industrial 
development and regional hegemony. It was its resolution that cleared the way for a 
different type of relationship. This fact was reflected in the nuclear rapprochement of 
the 1980s and co-operation of the 1990s after some 30 years of nuclear distrust. This is 
the subject of section four. It examines the parallel nuclear developments in Argentina 
and Brazil as well as their domestic relevance in terms of the search for international 
prestige and autonomy; the global context of non-proliferation regimes surrounding 
these developments; and the different phases of their nuclear relationship. Finally, 
section five draws some conclusions from the previous discussion, and links the post- 
1979 rapprochement to the later bilateral economic co-operation.
2. The historic construction of cold peace
Authors dealing with the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry date its origin back to the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, when their fatherlands, the Spanish and Portuguese 
empires, competed to assert their control of the River Plate. Since Portugal founded the 
town of Co Ionia del Sacramento in 1680 in an effort to establish itself on the east bank 
of the River Plate, it was constantly faced with Spanish opposition. The Spaniards, in
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turn, tried to assert their dominance on both banks of the river. The later foundation of 
Montevideo (1729) was part of this campaign.2
The competition continued after independence, and eventually in 1825 war broke 
out between the Argentine Confederation and the Brazilian Empire. After protracted 
negotiations and the intervention of a British mediator, the Peace Treaty of 1828 created 
the Oriental Republic of Uruguay as an independent, buffer state. The war o f 1825 has 
been the only armed conflict between Brazil and Argentina. Four decades later they 
engaged in war again; this time, however, in coalition with Uruguay to fight the 
devastating War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay (1865-1870). Nonetheless, the 
alliance was not without problems, and relationships between Argentina and Brazil 
strained again, as the development of the war and of the ensuing peace shows.3
By the end of the nineteenth century Argentina and Brazil were engaging in 
different strategies to pursue economic development. Argentina, on the one hand, 
sought its consolidation and growth in close association with Great Britain. Between 
1860 and 1930 it had achieved such rapid modernisation that it was considered ‘a small 
Europe’ in the Americas. Brazil, on the other hand, under the Baron of Rio Branco (the 
notorious minister of Foreign Affairs between 1902-1912) prioritised relations with the 
United States, anticipating the weight that the latter would have on the continent’s 
affairs. After the First World War, and even more so after the Second, as Europe started 
to withdraw its influence from the new continent, the U.S.-Brazilian alliance grew 
stronger.
With the beginning of the twentieth century, “[increasingly, each country viewed 
the other as a competitor, as an opponent in many areas, and even as a possible 
enemy.”4 The divergent development paths chosen by Argentina and Brazil reinforced a 
relationship characterised by mutual suspicions of expansionist strategies and 
perceptions of hegemonic attitudes. Indeed, the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry was mainly 
driven by threat perceptions rather than by concrete disputes.
Argentina would see in Itamaraty, Brazil’s Foreign Ministry, the source of Brazil’s 
imperial ambitions pursuing “the expansion and westward movement (‘la marcha hacia 
el oeste') o f the Portuguese-speaking world,” while Brazilian geopoliticians would
2 M. Olmos, La Cooperation Argentina-Brasil: Nucleo lmpulsor de la Integration Latinoamericana 
(Buenos Aires: Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, 1986), pp. 71-72.
3 See J. H. P. Araujo, 'O Segundo Reinado: O Tratado da Triplice Alianfa,' produced by Ministerio 
das R edoes Exteriores, Republica Federativa do Brasil, accessed: 15 June 2003, 
http://www.mre.gov.br/acs/diplomacia/portg/h_diplom/lcO 18.htm.
4 P. L. De La Fuente, 'Confidence-Building Measures in the Southern Cone: A Model for Regional 
Stability,' Naval College War Review vol. Winter (1997), p. 37.
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express concern “over the Argentine dream of restoring the viceroyalty of the Rio de la 
Plata [River Plate], a restoration that would be partially at Brazil’s expense and would 
tend to polarize the South Cone.”5 Furthermore, Stanley E. Hilton claims that the 
“enduring image of Argentina as an aggressive, expansionist state lies at the core of the 
sense of threat that has pervaded Brazilian strategic circles for generations.”6 As most 
authors acknowledge, “the relative absence o f war did not amount to a peaceful, 
cooperative region.”7
The perception of irreconcilable and competing destinies would only intensify 
throughout the twentieth century, fostered by divergent foreign policies. For instance, 
they maintained different positions during World War I, when Brazil joined the Allies 
while Argentina remained neutral; supported opposing sides during the bloody Chaco 
War (1932-1935) that erupted between Paraguay and Bolivia, when Argentina backed 
Paraguay, and Brazil and Chile sided with Bolivia; and clashed again during the Second 
World War, when Argentina took a neutralist and ultimately pro-Axis position 
throughout the conflict, declaring war on the Axis only in the last minute, whereas 
Brazil had increasing participation in the Allied cause. Indeed, after extensive talks 
between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Getulio Vargas, Allied air bases patrolled the 
South Atlantic from Brazilian shores, and the Brazilian Expeditionary Force was 
deployed to Italy, where it was attached to the U.S. Fifth Army as a division.
According to Andres Cisneros and Carlos Escude, the Brazilian foreign minister 
declared during the Second World War to be more concerned about a potential 
Argentine attack on its southern border than about a Nazi threat in the northeast. In 
addition, the regime established in Argentina after the 1943 coup only helped to 
increase those suspicions, given that the new government campaigned openly for the 
establishment of a “bloc of nations with similar ideas to isolate Brazil and fight the 
influence of the United States.”8
The 1946 election of Juan Domingo Peron in Argentina did little to pacify Brazilian 
fears. The Peronist administration was a populist nationalist regime that maintained an 
unusually high level of expenditures on the armed forces, while promoting closer
5 J. Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels among Neighbors (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1985), pp. 98-99.
6 S. E. Hilton, The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy,' 
Political Science Quarterly vol. 100, no. 1 (1985), p. 28.
7 E. Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand 
Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 132.
8 A. Cisneros and C. Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina 
(Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 2000), Volume XIII, Chapter 60, http://www.argentina- 
rree.com/13/13-007.htm. my translation.
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commercial, financial, and cultural ties with its Spanish-speaking neighbours. Yet 
Peron’s overthrow in 1955 would not improve the situation. Brazilians geopoliticians 
remained extremely suspicious, and Argentina continued to be a main focus of their 
national strategy.9
At the same time, Argentina saw with concern the U.S.-Brazilian special 
relationship; a concern that would be exacerbated by the openness with which Brazil 
acknowledged this partnership, and “by the large amounts of U.S. economic and 
military aid that flowed to Brazil during World War II and shortly thereafter.”10 Another 
factor that had preoccupied Argentines from the early 1920s was the emphasis of 
Brazilian geopolitical thinking on its ‘inevitable path to grandeza ’ (greatness); “the 
code word for the moment when (and never if) Brazil will become the first superpower 
to emerge from the Southern Hemisphere.”11 To this end, Brazil counted on U.S. 
support. Statements like the following were promptly picked up by Argentine 
geopoliticians, and fed into their perception of Brazil: “Brazil has to seek its own 
authenticity and universalism in order to be able, one day, to abrasileirar
19[‘brazilianize’] America, and abrasileirar the world.”
The United States played a major role in the relationship between Argentina and 
Brazil. For most of the twentieth century and until the mid-1970s, Brazil saw in the U.S. 
a major ally with whom to align its foreign policy, expecting in return its support for 
subregional leadership. Argentina, instead, systematically opposed the United States 
since 1889, when the First Pan-American Conference took place in Washington. 
Regardless of the ideological orientation of the government—from the conservatives of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, democratic governments such as those 
of Presidents Irigoyen and Alvear, to the military that seized power in 1930, or again 
conservatives and military that alternately took office until the rise of Peron—none of 
them saw U.S. hegemony with good eyes, and all regarded Brazil’s alignment as 
suspicious, and even looked at it with disdain.13
9 See Hilton, The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy,' pp. 31-
35.
10 Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels among Neighbors, p. 101.
11 Ibid., p. 34.
12 FundafSo Nacional de Material Escolar, Atlas Historico e Geografico Brasileiro, Ministerio de 
EducafSo e Cultura, 1967, p. 4, quoted by Olmos, La Cooperacion Argentina-Brasil: Nucleo Impulsor de 
la Integracion Latinoamericana, p. 61, my translation.
13 S. Gaveglio, 'Estados Unidos en la Relation Argentina-Brasil,' in Iris Mabel Laredo (ed.), La 
Integracion Latinoamericana en el Actual Escenario Mundial: de la ALALC-ALADI al Mercosur 
(Rosario, Argentina: UNR Editora, 1992), p. 83.
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This history of bilateral relations was thus both reinforcing, and reinforced by, the 
construction of a certain vision of the other, a particular vision of themselves, and a 
specific relational logic. In this sense, mutual and self-perceptions were as much the 
outcome as the cause of this type of dyadic relationship. Mutual and self-perceptions 
were exogenous to the process (to interaction) only in the beginning, thus being part of 
the cause of the type of relationship that ensued. Yet immediately afterwards, they 
became a part of it, thus being themselves affected by the dynamics of the relationship. 
As Alexander Wendt points out following interactionist theory, “even when the ideas 
that constitute identities and interests are not changing, they are being continually 
reinforced in interaction.”14
Arie M. Kacowicz observes that the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry also had important 
reverberations in the domestic and international politics of the region, since it 
consistently involved ‘buffer states’ such as Uruguay, Bolivia, and Paraguay.15 Both 
Brazil and Argentina would compete to gain increasing influence on these states by 
signing bilateral agreements to build rail links between their major cities and Argentine 
or Brazilian ports (particularly in the case of Bolivia and Paraguay, which are 
landlocked), to open banks, to build bridges and roads, to co-operate on 
communications and trade, and to undertake joint developments of oil fields.16 They 
also competed for access to the buffer states’ arms market, given that both Brazil and 
Argentina possessed developed arms industries, and for providing military advisors and 
awarding scholarships to cadets from those states to attend military academies in 
Argentina and Brazil.17
As the following sections discuss, another two very important fields of bilateral 
rivalry were the competition for natural resources, such as Paraguayan hydroelectric 
energy, and for attaining nuclear capacity. Both these aspects of the rivalry would later 
become the key to rapprochement, and this is why they are considered to have a 
particular relevance. The next section discusses the dispute over the hydroelectric power 
resources of the upper River Parana. The following section, in turn, is devoted to the 
nuclear issue.
14 A. Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
p. 334, italics in the original.
15 A. M. Kacowicz, 'Stable Peace in South America: The ABC Triangle, 1979-1999,' in Arie M. 
Kacowicz, et al. (eds.), Stable Peace Among Nations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000).
16 Hilton, 'The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy,' pp. 44-48.
17 Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels among Neighbors, pp. 99-100 and p. 
106.
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3. Itaipu and the deterioration of peace
By the 1970s both Buenos Aires and Brasilia had long viewed their relationship in 
terms of a cold peace. Mutual trust had mostly been absent, except for brief interludes 
that did not last long enough as to let it solidify. On the contrary, what solidified was the 
perception of the other as a rival, a competitor always trying to take advantages at the 
other’s expense. In the decade of the 1970s, as the Argentine-Brazilian relationship 
became dominated by the dispute over the exploitation of resources of the River Plate 
Basin, negative images and distrust intensified, geopolitical visions gained prevalence 
over more conciliatory ones, and the quality of peace seemed to deteriorate.
The most delicate issue concerned the use of the hydroelectric power and water 
resources of the River Parana, which has its source in Brazilian territory, and goes on to 
mark the border between Brazil and Paraguay and later between Paraguay and 
Argentina, ultimately finishing in Argentina. Both Brazil and Argentina were planning 
the construction o f dams in association with Paraguay. However, as the Brazilian 
venture advanced, Argentine officials feared that its construction at Itaipu on the upper 
River Parana—which would become the world’s largest hydroelectric power plant— 
would considerably endanger the viability of their downstream projects at Corpus and 
Yacyreta-Apipe, as well as the navigability of the river. All these bilateral plans had a 
deep geopolitical significance, given their backdrop of a longstanding Argentine- 
Brazilian competition for development and regional influence.
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Map 6.1: River Parana area, including planned and actual locations o f hydroelectric dams 
a
Fe-jluring M ipPb in fJ 
Technology
G R A N 
A C 0
1 '  " ~ - V,, 3/iytj  & I
Puerto La \  D ourados
V icto r lj p e d r o J u a n  ,  M A H )  G R O S S O  V '  A S SiS B
P re s id e n te
P r u d e n te
M ar ilia .
Q
Caballero |  DOSUI 
\ 0
, Amambai
B au ru
Psranavai ' *' ‘ PAUL* -
Concepcion
S e n  P e d ro  d a  
V o u a m a n d ii
", Iguatemi
.Trdpio of Capricorn ,© Q L o n d rin a  
M arin g a
PARAGUAyE S ^ '
San fcsEariTsIac *
la t te  d e l d u e l r e P ARA
% t*tm
a Toledo
'> ....
Telemeco 24*
A a 0Qrba
Q
Candido
0 C a s c a v e l d e :Abreu
I Castro ......
FORMOSA Asuncion
m
CHACO
PROVINCE 
R esist e n c i a .
P a re  jru ari^
I
* Villarrica
Coronel \  ■ rfiLaniQOi
BOviedo y  „ . / ' uT  89 G u a ra p u a v a 0  B,
C iu d a d  '
del E s te ,,
oCaaiapa J
‘ Form osa San Juan 1 B autista
JPilar
<?
^Eldorado}-
i
j
F rancisco
^Beltrao U n iaoda 
VitiSria.
MISIOMIS
•• fflCagador
-P o n ta  G ross a
Prudent opolis
Curit iba
a
- S a o M a te u s ...J t? “ 
do Sul- O
Joinville
7 , [ Yacireta-Ap ip<| . JCorpusj
lturaimtfV ' /  Posad as
y . °
Erexim,
C h a p e c o Ita ja i,
..
Villa Angela ARGENTINA s'.Santa Rosa
s
BRAZIL
. L a je s
.Bella V ista /  ■ '  Santo AngeloE
H trgiaoSul
©
SANTA I t CORRMNTIS
Cararinho 
^C ruz Alta
0 0, SAk
Puerto 
Reconquisla :
0 -0
Goya
Mercedes rg' 
a  j  Itaqui
U ru g u a ia n a ^ ' A legrete^
Santiago
P a sso  Lagoa CATADsNA 
Fundo V ermelha Criclurna^
Bento
RJO GRANOE 0 0  SUI 
Santa  M a ria
O  a
Gon;aivesB 0
Caxiasu/ i d o !
. - ' i r  j
V rtl**s Sao Gabrw
$  A  ' v >
ihtri.. Rios JLIRUGUAY j .aRive,'a
0  2002 Morosoft Corp and/or rts suppliers’. ffcjgi \
Cachoeira 
do Sul
64°
Sarta 
Cruz 
do Sul
62"
30*
Porto
A legre  ATLANTIC  
O CEAN
60"
Note: Based on “Expidia.co.uk find a map”: http://www.expedia.co.uk/pub/agent.dll, entry: 
“Corpus, Misiones, Argentina.”
B razil’s rapid industrial expansion was highly dependent on oil. Even before the 
first oil crisis in 1973, it was clear that the country needed other large sources o f  energy 
in order to maintain its levels o f  economic growth. In this context, the exploitation o f
I O t
the River Parana had long been in Brazil’s plans. The concrete project o f  a joint dam 
with Paraguay, however, only started to take shape in June 1966 with the signing o f  the 
Yguazu Act. It originated partly as a strategy conceived by Am bassador Gibson 
Barboza to try  to “submerge in the river a Paraguayan territorial claim .” 19 The colossal 
project would be entirely funded by Brazil and only later paid back by Paraguay. Each 
country would own half o f  the produced energy, and Paraguay would sell to Brazil the
18 As will be seen in the next section, the pursuit of the nuclear fuel cycle can also be explained by 
development and industrialisation goals. Interview with Ambassador Marcos Henrique C. Cortes in Rio 
de Janeiro, 4 April 2001. Ambassador Cortes was Minister Counsellor at the Brazilian Embassy in 
Buenos Aires between 1974 and 1978, and is currently professor at the Brazilian War College (Escola 
Superior de Guerra).
19 Interview with Ambassador Mario Gibson Barboza in Rio de Janeiro, 5 April 2001. Ambassador 
Gibson Barboza was, among many other appointments, ambassador in Paraguay between 1966 and 1967, 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1969 and 1974.
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surplus energy that it did not consume. For Paraguay, one of the poorest nations in 
South America, the prospective income was a large boost to its economy.
After carrying out studies to determine the most suitable location for the binational 
hydroelectric power plant, in 1970 it was established that the originally planned site at 
Porto Mendes, some 50 km south of the Guaira Falls, was technically unsuitable. 
Instead, they “marked the optimum location to be near Foz do Igua9u [...] some 200 km 
down the river, very close to the border with Argentina.”21 (Indeed, it was only 17 km- 
10 miles away from the border. See map 6.1). The report caused great preoccupation 
among Argentine authorities and aroused suspicions among influential nationalist 
sectors.
The old discourse of ‘ideological borders’ of General Ongania, when during a visit 
to Brazil he argued openly for the establishment of bilateral military co-operation in 
order to counter communism,22 faded away as soon as Brazil announced the project of 
Itaipu. In fact, the ‘ideological borders’ rhetoric, which Castello Branco liked as much 
as Ongania, had only had a limited impact on the Argentine-Brazilian relationship 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Their interests repeatedly clashed, as reflected in their 
attitudes toward issues as varied as the U.S. proposal for the creation of an Inter- 
American Peace Force, the recognition of the left-wing regimes in Chile and Peru, and 
the limit of maritime sovereignty.23
When Brazil’s hydroelectric power plan became public, Argentina began an open 
campaign to gain international support with the clear goal of stopping the project. 
Buenos Aires claimed that although every state has the right to carry out construction 
works in its own territory, it has to assume responsibility for the consequences that 
those works may have beyond its own borders. In particular, Argentina campaigned for 
the recognition of the principle that downstream countries on international 
watercourses, like the River Parana, must be consulted before construction projects by 
which they may be affected are carried out. The thesis of ‘prior consultation’ was put 
forward at several international fora—such as the 1967 Meeting o f South American
20 As Gibson explained, the hydroelectric plant would have a capacity of 12.600.000 MW to be 
divided between Brasilia and Asuncion. But Paraguay only had an installed capacity o f240.000 MW. The 
difference between what Paraguay would consume and its half o f the total production of energy would be 
bought by Brazil at an agreed price. The negotiation of this price alone took three years.
21 Interview with Ambassador Mario Gibson Barboza.
22 See Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, 
Volume XIII, Chapter 65, http://www.argentina-rree.com/13/13-046.htm: and M. L. San Martino De 
Dromi, Argentina Contemporanea de Peron a Menem (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Ciudad Argentina, 
1996), p. 343.
23 See Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, 
Volume XIV, Chapter 66, http://www. argentina-rree.com/14/14-015 .htm.
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Foreign Affairs Ministers, the Fourth Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the River 
Plate Basin (1971), the U.N. Conference on Environment in Stockholm (1972), the 
1973 OAS Meeting in Lima, the Fourth Conference o f Non-Aligned Countries in 
Algiers (1973), and the U.N. General Assembly of November 1973—with different 
degrees of success, although mostly winning endorsement.24 Argentine President 
Alejandro Agustin Lanusse also campaigned openly against Brazil on his visits to 
several other Latin American countries.
The very creation of the Treaty of the River Plate Basin in 1969 as a multilateral 
regional forum has its origins in this dispute. It was established following an Argentine 
proposal aiming to force Brazil to discuss its initiatives within this context rather than to 
act unilaterally. Furthermore,
through the Treaty, Argentina sought to put pressure on Brazil and make it stop 
the construction of hydroelectric power projects, and otherwise to prevent 
Brazil from taking economic development initiatives that could affect 
Argentina’s own economic development. The Treaty was clearly framed by the 
geopolitical animosity between Argentina and Brazil, and the power 
connotations of the exploitation of hydroelectric resources.25
Paradoxically, many in Argentina—not only orthodox-nationalist, but also 
developmentalist groups—were very critical of the Treaty, since they understood that it 
would only serve Brazilian interests and would reaffirm its dominance in the region.26 
For nationalist-developmentalists, Argentina needed to bridge the gap between the 
development of its own hydroelectric projects and those of Brazil in order to be able to 
establish a new, balanced alliance between the two. They sought to promote a balanced 
rapprochement with Brasilia and, in this manner, break up its alliance with Washington,
onwhich would otherwise only bring dependency to the region.
Opinion in Brazil was also divided. Whilst nationalist sectors vigorously called in 
the pages o f the newspaper O Globo for decisive action against Argentina’s 
obstructionism regarding Brazil’s hydroelectric development, others took on a more
24 See J. H. Herrera Vega, 'Las Politicas Exteriores de la Argentina y del Brasil,' Documentos de 
Trabajo no. 10, (Buenos Aires: ISEN-Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Intemacional y 
Culto, September 1995); and Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la 
Republica Argentina, Volume XIV, Chapter 66, http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-015.htm.
25 Interview with Ambassador Eduardo dos Santos, who was Second Secretary (1979-1982) and First 
Secretary (1982-1984) at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires. See also Cisneros and Escude, Historia 
General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, Volume XIV, Chapter 66, 
http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-027.htm.
26 For instance, Admiral Isaac Rojas set up and presided a “Commission for the Defence of Argentine 
Interests in the River Plate Basin” (Comision Pro Defensa de los Intereses Argentinos en la Cuenca del 
Plata).
27 See J. E. Guglialmelli, 'Argentina-Brasil: Enfrentamiento o Alianza para la Liberation,' Estrategia 
vol. September-October, no. 36 (1975).
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conciliatory stance highlighting the potential o f co-operation. The latter channelled their 
positions mostly through newspapers such as Journal do Brasil and O Estado de Sao 
Paulo?%
A resolution of the dispute seemed close when in September 1972, just before the 
XXVII U.N. General Assembly, the Foreign Affairs Ministers Eduardo Me Loughlin 
(Argentina) and Mario Gibson Barboza (Brazil) personally and privately negotiated and 
signed the New York Act that was then unanimously approved by the Assembly. The 
New York Act, however, became the target of the criticism of Argentine nationalist 
sectors, and was soon denounced by the incoming Peronist administration o f Hector 
Campora in 1973, in an effort to distance itself from any initiative taken by the previous 
government.29 This decision infuriated Brazilian nationalists, who intensified their 
media campaign, writing heated leader columns referring to their neighbour as ‘hostile,’ 
‘provocative,’ ‘megalomaniac,’ ‘threatening,’ and ‘conflictive.’30
After 1973, discussions and negotiations adopted a mainly technical character, 
revolving around the height above the sea level allowed at the projected Corpus and the 
number of turbines that would be at work at the already-under-construction Itaipu. 
However, it was clear that the main issue preventing a resolution was political rather 
than anything else. Against this backdrop, Argentina was confronted with Brazil’s 
policy of ‘doing work,’—the ‘kilowatt diplomacy,’ as Argentines called it—and thus, 
despite protests and accusations, Brasilia not only refused to delay the project, but 
instead speeded up the construction.31
Probably driven by Brazil’s greater stability and executive capacity, Paraguay sided 
with the larger partner. In 1973 Asuncion accused the government of Buenos Aires of 
repetitively attempting to limit “every state’s sovereign right to use the natural resources 
located within its own territory.”32
In the face of such diplomatic failure, Argentina’s new military government of 1976 
decided that the only recourse left was to minimise losses through bilateral or trilateral 
negotiations. This attitude was encouraged by Martinez de Hoz, the new minister of 
economy and one of the strongest men in the government, who already suspected that
28 See also Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica 
Argentina, Volume XIV, Chapter 66, http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-015.htm.
29 Interview with Ambassador Mario Gibson Barboza.
30 See Cisneros and Escud6, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, 
Volume XIV, Chapter 67, http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-036.htm.
31 Interview with Eduardo dos Santos.
32 “Paraguay rechaza el reclamo argentino sobre Itaipu”, La Opinion, 20 de mayo de 1973, p. 11, 
quoted in Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, 
Volume XIV, Chapter 66, http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-017.htm.
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Corpus would never be built in the end, and regarded rapprochement with Brazil as a 
priority. He saw the resolution of the issue—an issue which would most probably not 
exist in the future—as a purely political scheme to achieve the much needed 
overcoming of the old rivalry.
Martinez de Hoz in fact admired Brazil’s economic performance, and was keen on 
establishing good relationships with Brazilian business circles. In his own words, from 
the Argentine side rapprochement with Brazil
sprang from a shif^  of political intention of the Ministry of Economy that was 
only later taken up by wider governmental sectors. The slogan under which the 
Ministry and the Secretary of Foreign Trade worked was ‘Argentina and Brazil 
are not rivals but partners.’34
In this, Martinez de Hoz counted on President Vide la’s full support, who in 1978 
appointed his brother-in-law, Carlos Washington Pastor, as Foreign Affairs minister. 
Pastor’s ‘pragmatic’ views came to replace the previous hardline stance of Ministers 
Guzzetti and Montes.35
In addition, the new government of 1976 offered the Embassy in Brasilia to Oscar 
Camilion, former member of the developmentalist administration o f Arturo Frondizi. 
All three members o f the junta—Emilio Eduardo Massera, Jorge Rafael Videla and 
Orlando Ramon Agosti—met with him and confirmed this offer separately, giving 
Camilion assurance that he would be given the green light to negotiate the resolution of 
the dispute with Brazil. This was meant to be as much a sign to him as to Brazil, since 
Camilion had held diplomatic responsibilities in the Argentine Embassy in Brazil during 
the government of Frondizi between 1959-1961, and was well known for his position on 
the need to advance a bilateral entente. Back then, Camilion’s and Ambassador Carlos 
Manuel Muniz’s mission in Brazil had been to achieve a rapprochement, and even 
more, a partnership between the two countries. Frondizi’s desarrollista profile was 
close to Kubitschek’s policy ideals, and shared important principles with the Quadros 
administration as well. Furthermore, Frondizi sought to conform a ‘loose Argentine-
33 O. Camilion, Memorias Politicos: De Frondizi a Menem (1956-1996) (Buenos Aires: Planeta-Todo 
es Historia, 1999), p. 194.
34 Telephone interview with Dr Josd Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, Minister of Economy of Argentina 
1976-1980. Buenos Aires, 17 April 2001.
35 See L. S. D. Aragao e Frota, Brasil - Argentina: Divergencias e Convergencias (Brasilia: Centro 
Grafico do Senado Federal, 1991), pp. 116-119; C. W. Pastor, 'Chile: La Guerra o la Paz. 1978-1981,' in 
Silvia Ruth Jalabe (ed.), La Politico Exterior Argentina y  sus Protagonistas. 1880-1995 (Buenos Aires: 
CARI-Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1996), pp. 281-289; and Cisneros and Escude, Historia General de 
las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Argentina, Volume XIV, Chapter 66, http://www.argentina- 
rree. com/14/14-056.htm.
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Brazilian axis,’ but with a firm pro-Western basis, which would focus on joint and 
complementary industrialisation.36
Against this background, Camilion’s appointment as ambassador hinted at Videla’s 
conciliatory inclinations towards Brazil. Camilion delineated a strategy for reaching an 
understanding with the Brazilian government on the basis that co-operation would be 
beneficial for both. The first step in this strategy consisted in establishing regular 
contacts and an open dialogue with the Brazilian press, thereby initiating and gradually 
achieving a shift in the way the Brazilian public opinion and government perceived 
Argentina.
On the side of Brazil, Augusto Varas resorts to the professionalism of Itamaraty to 
account for the fact that a policy of negotiation prevailed over one of imposition by 
force; an option favoured by the military:
This is most notable, since Brazil is the top military power in South America.
[...] Especially in the case of Argentina, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry has 
tried to achieve joint cooperation agreements in the hydroelectric and nuclear 
areas, as well as a considerable number of other negotiations and agreements.37
Ambassador dos Santos considers that a very important factor in the change of 
attitude was the realisation on the part of the Brazilian government that
the strategy of unilateral, autonomous development, according to which a state 
takes decisions irrespective of the interest, aspirations and goals of its 
neighbours, had been exhausted. By then the import substitution model was in 
serious decline. Thus, in the context of a rather hostile international scenario for 
Latin America, the possibility of uniting efforts in the interest of policy 
coordination and co-operation took shape.38
Other academics and former government officials also believe that the oil shocks, 
the exhaustion of model of industrialisation via import substitution, and the end of the 
‘economic miracle’ played an important role in Brazil’s new predisposition towards its 
neighbour.39 In addition, the change of government within the military regime and the 
personal attachment to Argentina of the new president, General Joao Figueiredo, were 
significant favourable conditions for the rapid resolution of the dispute, as seen in 
chapter three.
36 Interview with Ambassador Carlos Manuel Muniz, Argentine Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro 1959- 
1962 and Minister of Foreign Affairs 1962-1963, Buenos Aires, 16 April 2001. See also Camilion, 
Memorias Politicos: De Frondizi a Menem (1956-1996), pp. 59-78.
37 A. Varas, 'Controlling Conflict in South America: National Approaches,' in Michael Morris and 
Victor Millan (eds.), Controlling Latin American Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. 79.
38 Interview with Eduardo dos Santos, my translation.
39 This was put forward in several interviews, as for instance with Dr Juan Alemann, Secretary of the 
Treasury of Argentina 1976-1980, Buenos Aires, 27 March 2001; Prof Amado Luiz Cervo, History 
Department, University of Brasilia and Editor of the Revista Brasileira de Politica Intemacional, Brasilia, 
2 April 2001.
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The inauguration of the Figueiredo administration in Brazil in March 1979 was 
accompanied by the firm decision of deepening relations with Latin America and with 
Brazil’s neighbours in particular, partly due to the deterioration o f the global context.40 
The resolution of pending issues with Argentina thus became a priority; a fact that 
brought about a reshuffling of diplomats at Itamaraty and the Brazilian missions in 
Buenos Aires and Asuncion, definitely helping to clear the political air 41 Finally, on 19 
October 1979 Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay signed the Tripartite Agreement on 
Itaipu-Corpus that brought the dispute to an end. Although it met opposition in all three 
countries, it marked a watershed after which Buenos Aires and Brasilia were able to 
find a different way to relate to one another.
The dispute over the use of shared natural resources damaged relations between 
Argentina and Brazil for over a decade, turning into a political and geopolitical issue 
although at times presented as a merely technical one. In a sense, the dispute was the 
crystallisation of the controversial relationship that the countries had had throughout 
their history. The titles of some books and journal articles of the 1970s still reflect 
this.42 Yet the situation changed remarkably in the 1980s, and this, too, was reflected in 
the new optimistic literature, which is reviewed mainly in the next chapter. In line with 
most academics from both countries, who were strongly in favour of the mutual 
understanding, Juan Archibaldo Lanus writes,
The issue of the exploitation of the River Plate Basin took up the centrality of 
the bilateral relation between Argentina and Brazil. [...] Geopolitical fear only 
fosters reciprocal isolation, competition, and regional rivalry, all of which 
damage the full participation of both countries on the world stage. To keep the 
division is to increase the reign of the others.43
40 This deterioration was characterised by a declining understanding with the United States, the 
escalation of the East-West conflict, the rise of oil prices and international interest rates, among other 
factors.
41 Hilton, 'The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy,' pp. 47-48. 
See also M. Segre, 'La Cuestion Itaipu-Corpus. El Punto de Inflexion en las Relaciones Argentino- 
Brasilenas,' Serie de Documentos e Informes de Investigation no. 97, (Buenos Aires: Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales-FLACSO, September 1990).
42 See, for example, M. A. Scenna, Argentina-Brasil: Cuatro Siglos de Rivalidad (Buenos Aires: 
Ediciones La Bastilla, 1975); H. J. Rosenbaum, 'Argentina-Brazilian Relations: A Critical Juncture,' 
World Today vol. 29 (1973); A. Benavides Correa, Habra Guerra Proximamente en el Cono Sur? 
America Latina, Explosiva Caldera Geopotilica (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1974); J. E. Guglialmelli, 
'Argentina, Brasil y la Bomba Atomica,' Estrategia vol. September-October, no. 30 (1974); J. E. 
Guglialmelli, '^Y si Brasil Fabrica la Bomba Atomica? (A Proposito del Acuerdo Nuclear Brasilefio- 
Aleman),' Estrategia vol. May-June/July-August, no. 34-35 (1975); and N. Gall, 'Energia Atomica para el 
Brasil, Peligro para Todos,' Estrategia vol. September-October, no. 42 (1976).
43 J. A. Lanus, De Chapultepec al Beagle: Politico Exterior Argentina: 1945-1980 (Buenos Aires: 
Emece Editores, 1984), pp. 311-312, my translation.
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4. The nuclear issue
The nuclear race constitutes the second major issue in the Argentine-Brazilian 
relationship, and an important element in their rapprochement. Their complex relational 
logic can be seen reflected in their conflictive nuclear relationship, which allowed 
periods of limited policy co-ordination, despite being mostly dominated by mutual 
suspicions and jealousy. The same issue that aroused their strongest mutual distrust was 
the one that encouraged the ultimate rapprochement. Indeed, in the same way as 
Argentina felt the pressure of Brazil’s greater hydroelectric and industrial development, 
Brazil recognised with concern Argentina’s advantage in the nuclear field. It was partly 
Argentina’s nuclear superiority that induced Brazil to negotiate on hydroelectric 
matters.
The following pages analyse the centrality of nuclear development in both 
Argentine and Brazilian domestic politics, and the role it played in their bilateral 
relationship. The first subsection explores separately the nuclear development in both 
countries. Then, their nuclear progress is placed into the global context, and the refusal 
of Argentina and Brazil to adhere to international and regional non-proliferation 
regimes is discussed. The third subsection focuses again on the bilateral relation. It turns 
first to their nuclear competition and then to their nuclear co-operation, taking into 
account domestic and international pressures.
4.1. The search for autonomy
After the end of the Second World War the potential o f using nuclear energy for 
development and industrialisation became clear. This awakened the interest of many 
countries, among them the most developed ones in Latin America, Argentina and 
Brazil, which in the 1950s decided that they, too, would carry out nuclear programmes. 
At that time, developmentalist agendas with important nationalist components were in 
place both in Brazil and Argentina, and the role of the military in politics was 
prominent. Those were the years of Getulio Vargas’s second administration (1951- 
1954), Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), and statist-nationalists Janio Quadros and 
Joao Goulart (1961-1963) in Brazil; and, in Argentina, Juan Domingo Peron’s two 
governments (1946-1955), the military coup that put Pedro Aramburu in office (1955- 
1958), and the election of Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962).
Peron was determined to drive Argentina through the path o f nuclear grandeur to 
the forefront of industrial-technological development. To that end he hired the Austrian
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physicist Ronald Richter, a refugee from World War II, and put him in charge of the 
nuclear programme. Soon it became clear that Richter would not deliver what he had 
promised and Peron had announced to the world—namely, a controlled fusion reaction 
in the laboratory—and thus, in 1952, the whole project was cancelled and Richter 
dismissed. However, far from being discouraged by this failure, Peron decided to 
empower the recently created National Commission of Atomic Energy (CNEA, founded 
in 1950) by hiring the best technicians and placing it under the strong influence of the 
Navy in order to centralise and promote scientific and technological nuclear research.
Carlos Castro Madero and Esteban A. Takacs distinguish four periods in the 
Argentine nuclear development between 1950 and 1983, to which Julio Cesar Carasales 
adds another two that go from 1983 to the present.44 The first phase, between 1950 and 
1958, was characterised by the exploration of uranium deposits and the beginning of the 
formation of a professional body of nuclear specialists. The creation o f the Institute of 
Physics “Jose Antonio Balseiro” in the city of Bariloche was a part of this plan. This 
phase coincided with the lift of the secrecy surrounding nuclear technology as a 
consequence of the programme Atoms for Peace (1953) sponsored by U.S. President 
Eisenhower. Through this programme Argentine professionals gained access to 
scientific information and training in nuclear plants and laboratories abroad. Monica 
Serrano emphasises the character of Argentine nuclear development: “from the early 
stages Argentina began steadily to pursue an independent nuclear route by developing 
natural uranium methods which enabled it to limit international control over its nuclear 
programme.”45 This period concluded in 1958 when the first experimental reactor of 
American design, but entirely built by Argentine technicians, was put into operation.
The second period (1958-1967) witnessed the development of the applications of 
radioisotopes, internal sources of radiation, and experimental reactors, and the 
feasibility study for the construction of the first nuclear electricity-generating plant in 
Argentina. Between 1967 and 1976, the third phase, the first plants of nucleoelectric 
energy were established in Latin America. A heavy-water power reactor for the plant 
Atucha I was purchased from the West German company Siemens, and another one for
44 Carlos Castro Madero was president of the CNEA between 1976 and 1983, and Esteban A. Takacs 
was the Argentine ambassador in Canada (1976-1981) and then in the United States (1981-1982), and one 
of the main negotiators of Argentina’s nuclear deals. The phases of Argentine nuclear development are 
elaborated in C. Castro Madero and E. A. Takacs, Politica Nuclear Argentina: lAvance o Retroceso? 
(Buenos Aires: El Ateneo, 1991), pp. 51-144; and J. C. Carasales, De Rivales a Socios: El Proceso de 
Cooperacion Nuclear entre Argentina y  Brasil (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1997), pp. 
11-16.
45 M. Serrano, Common Security in Latin America: The 1967 Treaty ofTlatelolco (London: Institute 
of Latin American Studies, 1992), p. 13.
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the plant Embalse was purchased from Canada.46 The construction of the latter began in 
1974. However, the Indian nuclear explosion that same year made Canada harden its 
position regarding technology transfers and safeguards, a situation that resulted in a 
very long and difficult renegotiation of the contract. Finally, the reactor came on-line 
three years behind schedule, in March 1983, and at five times the initial cost47
The fourth period marked the height of Argentine nuclear development. Between 
1976 and 1983, the years of the last military dictatorship, Argentina started to build a 
third nuclear power plant, Atucha II in 1980, and a commercial heavy-water plant that 
would eliminate the need for overseas suppliers for the Atucha I and Embalse plants. 
For Atucha II, the reactor was purchased from West Germany, and the heavy-water 
production facility from a Swiss company. Since the beginning, Argentina opted for the 
utilisation of natural uranium as fuel, and heavy water as a moderator and coolant, given 
that the country already had large reserves of uranium in its territory, and therefore 
would not be dependent on foreign supply.
In the late 1970s Buenos Aires clandestinely built a gaseous diffusion uranium 
enrichment facility at Pilcaniyeu that was not subject to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Mitchell Reiss suggests that this enterprise was partly 
motivated by U.S. refusal, announced in 1974, to supply enriched uranium for 
Argentina’s research reactors, and partly by Brazil’s 1975 nuclear deal with West 
Germany, which is discussed below. Officially, its secrecy was later explained by the 
fact that its publicity would have made Canada cut off its assistance to the Embalse 
power plant, which was still under construction.
In 1983, the uranium enrichment technology had been finally fully developed at 
Pilcaniyeu. Argentina had thereby achieved a goal that it had long pursued—the 
mastery o f the complete nuclear fuel cycle—and so it was publicly announced exactly 
one month before President elect Raul Alfonsin took office after the seven-year military 
regime. This capacity, together with the reprocessing facility to extract plutonium 
achieved at a spent-fiiel reprocessing plant at Ezeiza some time earlier, meant that 
Argentina possessed, in theory, the capacity to extract enough plutonium for one or two
46 Construction of Atucha I started in 1968 and finished in 1974. The purchase of the heavy-water 
power reactor for Embalse was contracted in 1973.
47 M. Reiss, Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, 
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 46.
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nuclear weapons per year, and to enrich enough weapons-grade uranium for four to six 
nuclear bombs per year.48
After 1983, the nuclear activity came to a standstill. Carasales’s fifth period 
coincides with the first democratic administration (1983-1989). In this case, the change 
of regime accounts to a significant extent for the changes in the approach to nuclear 
issues.49 Upon taking office, Raul Alfonsin replaced Navy Captain Carlos Castro 
Madero, who had been the president of the CNEA since 1976, with civilian Alberto 
Constantini. He also made the CNEA accountable to a council o f ministers within the 
Foreign Ministry, limiting the high degree o f autonomy to define and implement policy 
that it had enjoyed since its beginnings.50 Finally, Alfonsin also reduced the CNEA’s 
budget by 40 percent during his first year in office.51 While the change of regime seems 
to partly explain the changes of nuclear policy—such as the effort to make it more 
accountable—the actual stagnation was largely due to the lack o f public resources to 
finance projects.
Lastly, Carasales distinguishes yet a sixth period between 1990 and the present. He 
laments that “nuclear energy does not arouse the enthusiasm it used to, and the 
economic situation prevents the State from assigning the CNEA the support it would 
need.” In this phase Argentina’s nuclear policy made a drastic shift. For instance, 
international and regional non-proliferation treaties, to which Argentina had refused to 
adhere for decades, were at last signed within a short period of time. Moreover, under 
Menem, Argentina also adhered to all other treaties on non-proliferation of arms of 
mass destruction, and abruptly dismantled the Condor II project, a ballistic missile that 
could have potentially carried a light nuclear load.
48 This capacity was achieved only in theory. The Pilcaniyeu plant could produce low-enriched 
uranium for Argentina’s research reactors, which is uranium that consists of less than 20 percent U-235, 
whereas weapons-grade uranium is uranium that consists of 90 percent or more U-235. See Reiss, Bridled 
Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities, pp. 46 and 47, and n.7 pp.74-75. See 
also J. R. Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson 
Center, 1995), p. 2.
49 Castro Madero and Takacs quote, with a hint of regret, the words of the new government’s 
appointed Secretary of Science and Technology, Dr Sadosky, on the announcement of the achievement at 
Pilcaniyeu: “Every research comes to an end.” Castro Madero and Takacs, Politico Nuclear Argentina: 
IAvance o Retroceso?, p. 88.
50 The CNEA was ultimately under the aegis of the Navy, although reporting solely to the President. 
This allowed a remarkable continuity of leadership and the vertical functional integration of the nuclear 
sector. All research, international bargaining, licensing, and financing functions were the CNEA’s 
responsibility. See E. Solingen, Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining: Designing 
Nuclear Industries in Argentina and Brazil (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996).
51 Reiss, Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities, p. 48.
52 Carasales, De Rivales a Socios: El Proceso de Cooperacion Nuclear entre Argentina y  Brasil, p. 15, 
my translation.
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Motivated, as Argentina, by the vast potentialities offered by the nuclear energy, 
Brazil created in 1951 the National Research Council. However, it was not until 1956— 
following the 1955 signing of the Atoms for Peace agreement with the United States— 
that Kubitschek founded the National Commission of Nuclear Energy (CNEN). Yet 
Brazil’s CNEN never enjoyed the autonomy, continuity, and centralisation of its 
Argentine counterpart.
Brazil had hoped to benefit from its special relationship with the United States as 
well as from its condition as a uranium exporter to that same country. There had been 
intense debates on whether to utilise natural uranium and heavy water, or enriched 
uranium and light water for the production of electric energy. The former—Argentina’s 
choice—had a higher cost but also involved greater independence, whereas the latter 
was a more widely available technology, but one that ensured dependency on U.S. 
exports of enriched uranium. Brazil opted for the second alternative, and in 1969 a 
turnkey nuclear power plant, Angra I, was acquired from the American company 
Westinghouse, which the government agreed to put under IAEA safeguards. In this 
way, the programme was, until 1975, entirely dependent on U.S. supply o f enriched 
uranium and controlled through U.S. assistance. Progress had thus far been very slow.
1975 stands out as a key year in Brazilian nuclear history. It was in 1975 that Brazil 
and West Germany closed a deal for an extensive transfer of sensitive technologies, by 
which the latter committed itself to provide Brazil with technology covering all aspects 
of the nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium exploration to nuclear waste storage. According 
to Reiss, it represented the largest transfer ever of nuclear technology to a developing 
country.53
Nonetheless, this impressive deal with West Germany had some drawbacks. For 
instance, the transferred method to enrich uranium was of an experimental kind. Indeed, 
the aerodynamic jet-nozzle technology was only then being developed by West 
Germany. Also, Brazil was pressured into accepting the strictest IAEA safeguards of the 
time, agreeing to rigorous international inspections. In addition, as Itamaraty conducted 
all negotiations of this agreement secretly, the Brazilian scientific community justifiably 
felt that it had been marginalized, and thus generally opposed it on the grounds that it 
was excessively ambitious for Brazil’s electric energy demand and for its economy, and 
that it was technologically challenging given the domestic scientific and engineering
53 Reiss, Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities, p. 49. Not everyone 
is of the same opinion, though. For instance, Redick calls the amount of advanced nuclear technology 
actually transferred through this agreement “unimpressive.” See Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and 
Brazil, pp. 6-14.
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resources available.54 Yet despite criticisms and difficulties, the government decided to 
carry on with the deal.
The Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 not only resulted in the Canadian government 
hardening its non-proliferation policy but so too did the Carter administration increase 
its opposition to the transfer of sensitive technology, and fiercely censured the West 
German-Brazilian agreement. For instance, one of Carter’s first measures towards Latin 
America was to send Warren Christopher to Brasilia and have him deliver a speech 
attacking Brazil’s nuclear policy and pressing it to denounce the agreement with West 
Germany. As Camilion notes, this came as a great shock to the Brazilian government, 
not used to finding itself in open conflict with the interests of Washington.55
Ironically, American hostility on this matter produced an effect opposite to that 
expected, eventually unifying domestic support for the nuclear deal with West 
Germany. Even Argentina, having real grounds for concern given their bilateral history, 
publicly manifested through its ambassador, Oscar Camilion, its opposition to U.S. 
obstructionism and its absolute confidence in the peaceful intentions of Brazil’s 
programme.56
After the controversial signature of the agreement with West Germany, all three 
branches of the armed forces started to develop their own, ‘autonomous’ nuclear 
projects. These constituted Brazil’s secret, later known as ‘parallel’ programme, and 
were ‘coordinated’ by the CNEN’s president, Rex Nazareth Alves, who was closely 
associated with President Figueiredo (1979-1985). The Navy, in particular, concentrated 
its efforts on the enrichment of uranium by orthodox methods—as opposed to 
Germany’s experimental one—at the ultracentrifuge enrichment plant Aramar in Ipero. 
It did this independently from the German deal and it was not subjected to international 
safeguards. It seems reasonable to believe, as Brazilians have, that the Germans would 
have cut off Brazil’s access to nuclear technology, had they known about this enterprise.
In any case, the more the implementation of the 1975 agreement slowed down, the 
more the execution of the parallel research programme intensified; especially after 
Argentina announced in 1983 the achievement of the complete development of the 
uranium enrichment technology. In 1986 the parallel programme was denounced for the 
first time by a Brazilian newspaper, but the armed forces profusely denied it and
54 See Carasales, De Rivales a Socios: El Proceso de Cooperation Nuclear entre Argentina y  Brasil, 
p. 24; Reiss, Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities, p. 50; Redick, 
Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil, pp. 7-9.
55 Camilion, Memorias Politicos: De Frondizi a Menem (1956-1996), p. 202.
56 Ibid, pp. 202-204.
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disavowed all knowledge of the matter. In 1987 a West German intelligence service 
published a report on the existence of this parallel programme, which served later as the 
basis for a second report by a German parliamentary group, which concluded that there 
had been significant leakage from the safeguarded to the unsafeguarded parallel 
programme.57 Additionally, in September of that same year, President Samey 
announced that Brazil had conducted the successful laboratory-scale enrichment of 
uranium. In other words, it recognised that the Navy’s clandestine programme had 
achieved its goal—outside of IAEA safeguards.58
4.2. Global context of nuclear regimes
Along with an international increase in the interest on atomic energy after the 
Second World War, so too was there an increase in the concern for the threat of nuclear 
proliferation. This was immediately reflected in the first resolution of the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1946, which called for the control of atomic energy to the 
extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes, and the elimination of 
nuclear weapons from national armaments under a system of effective safeguards.59
During the following decades various comprehensive plans were devised calling for 
general and complete disarmament, or alternatively proposing the establishment of an 
international authority to own, manage and control all atomic energy activities 
throughout the world, as put forward by the “Baruch Plan” o f the 1940s. Other 
proposals envisaged less ambitious measures of disarmament or arms regulation and 
control. Regarding the latter, Joseph E. Johnson notes that 1963 stands out as a banner 
year:
In June of that year, what is known as the “hot line” communications link was 
established between Moscow and Washington as an arms control or confidence- 
building measure which could help to avert war by miscalculation, accident, or 
breakdown in communications; in August, the partial test ban treaty prohibiting 
nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater was signed 
in Moscow (and subsequently signed or acceded to by more than 100 states); 
and in October the General Assembly of the United Nations called for a 
permanent ban on nuclear and mass destruction weapons in outer space, and 
welcomed the expressions of intention by the Soviet Union and the United 
States to that effect.60
57 Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil, p. 12.
58 Reiss, Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities, p. 51.
59 Joseph E. Johnson, “Preface” in A. Garcia Robles, The Denuclearization o f Latin America (New 
York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967), p. xi.
60 Ibid., p. xii.
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Furthermore, in April of 1963, the presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and 
Mexico signed a Joint Declaration on the denuclearisation of Latin America, and in 
November 1964 a Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearisation of Latin America 
was established. Within the context of those declarations and resolutions the term 
‘denuclearisation’ was used to refer “exclusively to military denuclearisation,” whereas 
“the peaceful use of atomic energy is not only permitted but encouraged,”61 since it “can 
be of incalculable benefit in accelerating the development of the Latin American 
countries.”62 In order to make clear that what was intended was not civil but only 
military denuclearisation, the Preparatory Commission changed the original name from 
‘Treaty for the Denuclearisation o f Latin America’ to ‘Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America’ at its last meeting.63 The Treaty would later be 
known as Treaty of Tlatelolco.
While Brazil was the one proposing the creation of a Latin American nuclear 
weapon-free zone in September 1962, Argentina supported the proposal rather 
reluctantly at the United Nations General Assembly. The background to Brazil’s 
initiative was Goulart’s ‘independent’ foreign policy—‘independent’ from the United 
States, which had naval bases in Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal zone. Yet Brazil’s 
enthusiasm did not last long. In 1964 General Castello Branco ousted President Goulart 
and moved away from the latter’s ‘independent’ foreign policy. In contrast, Castello 
Branco (1964-1967) hardened Brazil’s position with respect to the Tlatelolco 
negotiations, as it considered that “a position of non-alignment and support for the 
nuclear weapon-free zone would compromise Brazil’s ability to develop into a great 
world power.”64
The negotiations of the Treaty of Tlatelolco took place between 1964 and 1967.65 
They were preceded by Cuba announcing its alignment with the Soviet Union, and soon 
thereafter, Kennedy calling for the Alliance o f Progress (1961) and leaving Cuba in 
regional isolation. In October 1962, the Cuban missile crisis further complicated the 
relationship between the continent and the island, and made the U.S. reconsider its 
interest in Latin America’s denuclearisation initiative. The Chinese nuclear detonation 
of 1964, in turn, had two effects in the region. On the one hand, there is little doubt that
61 Ibid., p. xx.
62 Ibid., p. 13.
63 Tratado para la Proscripcion de las Armas Nucleares en la America Latina y  el Caribe (Tratado de 
Tlatelolco) con las Enmiendas Aprobadas por la Conferencia General, signed in Ciudad de Mexico, 14 
February 1967.
64 Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil, p. 17.
65 For the background to, and the negotiation of the Treaty, see Serrano, Common Security in Latin 
America: The 1967 Treaty o f Tlatelolco, pp. 27-42.
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Argentina and Brazil were rather impressed by it.66 On the other, it also provided new 
impetus for the goal of non-proliferation and the creation of nuclear free zones. The 
1974 Indian nuclear explosion, when both Argentina’s and Brazil’s programmes were 
well under way, once again caused similar reactions.
In 1967 the two nations signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco. However, Argentina failed 
to ratify it, and whilst Brazil did ratify it, it failed to waive the conditions specified in 
Article 28, which delays entry into force until all eligible countries have signed. Hence, 
the Agreement did not come into force either in Argentina or Brazil until 1994, when it 
was amended and they revised their positions, as will be seen below.
Although the Treaty’s rules apply to all countries equally, Argentina and Brazil felt 
particularly affected by them, since they were the only two in the region to have attained 
significant progress in the nuclear field. This fact had an important impact on 
Argentine-Brazilian relationships: it allowed them to identify, for the first time, an area 
of potential co-operation. As John Redick highlights, during the Tlatelolco negotiating 
process, “two suspicious rivals discussed fully and frankly the most sensitive issues of 
nuclear policy and reached common positions.”67
Argentina and Brazil were in disagreement with the rest of the Latin American 
nations mainly in four areas. Firstly, the issue of the prohibition of peaceful nuclear 
explosions (PNEs). Whilst Article 18 states, “Contracting Parties may carry out 
explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes,”68 it was interpreted that PNEs 
would only be permitted once the technology required for them could be distinguished 
from the technology necessary for the manufacture of atomic bombs. As that was not 
yet the case, the goals of any one nuclear explosion remained ambiguous. Yet neither 
Argentina nor Brazil were willing to renounce the right of PNEs.
Secondly, Argentina and Brazil argued for a complete prohibition on the 
transportation of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states through the zone covered 
by the Treaty, whereas the majority of the Latin American states interpreted it to be a 
question of free exercise of sovereignty on the part of each country, in tune with the 
U.S. and Britain. Thirdly, the Treaty ‘reservations’ also became a contentious issue. 
Both states opposed the proposal that the nuclear powers, whose adherence to Protocols
66 For instance, General Meira Mattos observes, “After China’s first explosion in 1964, also she was 
made member of the Atomic Club and of the U.N. Security Council [...].” C. Meira Matos, Brasil: 
Geopolitica e Destino (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Jos6 Olympio Editora, 1975), p. 92, my translation.
Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil, p. 19.
68 Tratado para la Proscripcion de las Armas Nucleares en la America Latina y  el Caribe (Tratado de 
Tlatelolco) con las Enmiendas Aprobadas por la Conferencia General, signed in Ciudad de Mexico, 14 
February 1967, Article 18.
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I and II was sought, could include ‘interpretative statements’ accompanying their 
protocol ratification. In spite of the existence of an article explicitly rejecting treaty 
reservations (Article 27 of the original treaty, 28 of the amended version), the 
Argentine-Brazilian claim did not prevail.69
A final shared objection was regarding Article 13, which requires members to sign 
“multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for 
the application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities.”70 While Argentina and Brazil 
opposed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA sought to get them to 
accept the same agreement on safeguards that it applied to NPT parties. The NPT was 
rejected on the grounds that it consisted of an unequal and discriminatory regime, which 
would force them to give up the possibility of developing their ‘young but ambitious’ 
nuclear programmes. It not only ensured that the number of nuclear states did not 
increase, but it also guaranteed that the number did not decrease.
The emphatic refUsal of Argentina and Brazil to sign the NPT, to fully adhere to the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco, and their insistence on the right to carry out peaceful nuclear 
explosions was defended until the 1990s, when eventually both states revised their 
nuclear policy, as is explored below.
4.3. Bilateral nuclear relationship
The bilateral nuclear relationship can be divided into three stages. The first stage 
covers the period from the 1960s up until the late 1970s, and mainly involves 
competition and isolation between the Argentine and the Brazilian programmes. The 
second phase is one of rapprochement and the beginning of co-operation. This 
comprises the first contacts in the late 1970s, the first nuclear agreements of 1980, when 
both countries were still under military rule, and stretches until the late 1980s, when 
nuclear co-operation and exchanges intensified under democratic governments. 
Although during the 1980s gestures and rhetoric dominated, rather than concrete co­
operation initiatives, some decisive first few steps towards transparency and confidence 
building were then taken. Finally, the third period takes place during the 1990s. It was 
then that the most significant changes in nuclear policy occurred, not only in the context 
of the bilateral nuclear relationship, but more strikingly, in their attitude vis-a-vis global
69 Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil, pp. 16-19.
70 Tratado para la Proscripcion de las Armas Nucleares en la America Latina y  el Caribe (Tratado de 
Tlatelolco) con las Enmiendas Aprobadas por la Conferencia General, signed in Ciudad de Mexico, 14 
February 1967.
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nuclear policies. This period is characterised by the final adherence of Argentina and 
Brazil to several non-proliferation regimes. In a sense, it constitutes the deepening and 
consolidation of the previous phase. These latter changes involving adherence to 
multilateral nuclear regimes could not have taken place were it not for the preceding 
stage of bilateral nuclear rapprochement.
a) The competition
Argentina’s and Brazil’s nuclear developments were marked by differences, as 
discussed earlier. Buenos Aires carried out a coherent and continuous nuclear policy, 
characterised by a single and centralised direction. Reiss observes that “the history of 
the Argentine nuclear energy program—the oldest and most sophisticated in Latin 
America—is one of slow but steady progress, marked largely by stability, 
professionalism, and the quest for energy independence.”71 Indeed, its programme had 
been generally insulated from the country’s political and economic turmoil. For 
instance, while Argentina had sixteen presidents between 1950 and 1983, its National
77Commission of Atomic Energy Commission had only four directors. And although 
presidents of the CNEA came mostly from the Navy, the Commission reported directly 
to the head of state. Moreover, the nuclear programme was generally backed by the 
Argentine scientific community and public opinion.
Conversely, in Brazil there was very little consensus with respect to nuclear 
development at the political and scientific levels as well as at the level of public 
opinion. Brazilian scientists remained largely estranged from, if not overtly opposed to, 
their country’s programme. The CNEN never enjoyed the autonomy of its counterpart 
in Buenos Aires, alternating its dependency between the Presidency and the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy. Further, as discussed earlier, the Commission of Nuclear Energy 
was not the only institution carrying out a nuclear project, but nuclear efforts were 
rather dispersed. The civilian-led programme under IAEA safeguards co-existed with 
indigenous—unsafeguarded—parallel programmes controlled by the different branches 
of the armed forces. In this context, the CNEN constituted at best the institution that 
presided a “federation of autonomous or semi-autonomous entities performing related
71 Reiss, Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities, p. 46.
72 G. F. Treverton, 'Interstate Conflict in Latin America,' in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico 
(eds.), The United States and Latin America in the 1980s (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1986), p. 581.
73 J. C. Carasales, 'The So-Called Proliferator that Wasn't: The Story of Argentina's Nuclear Policy,' 
The Nonproliferation Review vol. 6, no. 4 (1999), p. 53.
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activities.”74 All this made the development of nuclear technology in Brazil,
n c
unsurprisingly, slower than that which took place in Argentina.
However, this fact was not always seen this way in Argentina, particularly after the 
1975 West German-Brazilian deal. Thus, Osiris Villegas warned
the relative nuclear situation can become critical for Argentina in the 
geopolitical field as a consequence o f Brazil’s dynamism regarding nuclear 
policy, which is propped up by abundant financial resources and foreign 
technology. It becomes imperative that Argentina adopts as soon as possible 
measures ensuring the completion o f a plan that will end with the political lack 
o f definition, foreign dependency, and with the frustration that has led to the 
exodus o f  hundreds o f  prominent scientists since 1973.76
Both nuclear developments evolved in the context of a competition for the 
achievement of prestige, power and development. Aspiration for regional leadership, 
and sustainability of a technological and scientific lead over the rest of Latin America 
can be counted among the main reasons for this rivalry. In this sense, Juan Guglialmelli 
congratulated the Argentine policy of nuclear minerals prospecting and exploitation, 
given that it allowed Buenos Aires “to have a clear lead over the whole of Latin 
America and in particular over Brazil, as well as to share with only few other countries 
the status of being ‘close’ to the Nuclear Club.”77
It was crucial to be ready to ‘go nuclear’ as a hedge against the possibility of the 
neighbour’s nuclear bomb. Looking back, Carasales explains,
Although the Argentinean government always gave assurance that its nuclear 
program had exclusively peaceful objectives, it is probable that there was one 
exception: the possibility that a neighboring country, in particular Brazil, would 
manufacture a nuclear weapon or, at least, set o ff a peaceful nuclear explosion.
It was always assumed, without needing to be stated, that in such a case, for 
strategic and national security reasons, Argentina would have no option but to 
do the same.78
Despite the fact that it was constantly and profusely denied by the governments, 
both countries were suspected of wanting to acquire a nuclear bomb. Argentina’s 
selection of technologies for its nuclear programmes, which could potentially produce 
bomb-grade materials, reinforced these fears. Equally, the Brazilian Navy’s interest in
74 Carasales, De Rivales a Socios: El Proceso de Cooperacion Nuclear entre Argentina y  Brasil, P- 22, 
my translation.
75 See in particular Chapter 11 “The Quest for Nuclear Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil” of E. 
Adler, The Power o f Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1987).
76 O. G. Villegas, 'Puntos de Vista para una Politica Nuclear Nacional,' Geopolitica vol. July- 
December, no. 5/6 (1976), pp. 11-12, my translation.
77 J. E. Guglialmelli, 'Argentina: Plan Nuclear y Presiones Extemas (Proliferation, Salvaguardias y 
Seguridad Nacional),' Estrategia vol. September/October, no. 42 (1976), p. 6, my translation.
78 Carasales, 'The So-Called Proliferator that Wasn't: The Story of Argentina's Nuclear Policy,' p. 56.
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enriched uranium for submarine propulsion, the 1975 nuclear deal with West Germany, 
and certain declarations—“all the material of the future co-operation between Brazil and 
the Federal Republic of Germany will be subject to safeguards; but nothing of what 
Brazil does in the nuclear field outside that co-operation with Germany will be subject 
to them”79— aroused concern among external observers.
Both states judged technological autonomy as primordial to their national security 
and development. Military, strategists, nationalists, and developmentalists were 
increasingly convinced about this, especially after the 1973 oil shock, when the 
disadvantages of being dependent on imported oil as a source of energy became evident. 
As the effects of the oil crisis were threatening to derail the Brazilian economic boom, a 
significant investment in nuclear power could help ensure that the national energy 
demand would be met.80
Yet on the other hand, both states had strong incentives not to pursue the nuclear 
option. By the mid-1970s, a nuclear race appeared to be all too costly for both 
Argentina and Brazil, and the need for substantial investment in the nuclear field was 
becoming excessively heavy for their economies. Hence Guglialmelli’s advice not to 
“begin a race with Brazil of enormous financial costs, at a time when both nations need 
to apply the most of their resources to projects ensuring their socio-economic, spiritual 
and cultural progress.”81 Furthermore, their nuclear agendas were contributing to the 
negative image that not only international non-proliferation advocates had of them, but 
also international creditors, both groups led by the United States.
b) The detente o f the late 1970s and rapprochement of1980s
During the 1960s Argentina and Brazil shared several nuclear policy premises, 
particularly their opposition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, their belief in the advantages of, and the right to pursue, nuclear energy, and 
their search for an independent nuclear path. Within the context of the negotiations of 
the Tlatelolco Agreement, Brasilia and Buenos Aires managed to co-ordinate some 
policy positions, as was discussed earlier.
79 Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Azeredo da Silveira in Newspaper La Prensa, 22 
September 1975, quoted by J. M. Grondona, 'El Programa Nuclear Brasileflo,' Revista Argentina de 
Relaciones Intemacionales vol. 1, no. 3 (1975), p. 53, my translation.
80 See Meira Matos, Brasil: Geopolitica e Destino, in particular Chapter IX “No Limiar da Era da 
Energia Nuclear.”
81 Guglialmelli, '^Y si Brasil Fabrica la Bomba Atdmica? (A Proposito del Acuerdo Nuclear 
Brasileno-Aleman),' p. 14, my translation.
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The rationale for a co-ordinated strategy of negotiation was renewed by their 
resentment toward the nuclear suppliers’ decision to restrict nuclear exports; a policy 
reflected in the 1977 London Club agreement on export guidelines. In addition, the 
deterioration of the relationship between the U.S. and Brazil due to the latter’s nuclear 
contract with West Germany opened further spaces for joining forces.
An influential group of Argentine nationalist-developmentalist military—led by 
General Juan Enrique Guglialmelli, director of the War College and editor of the journal 
Estrategia, and partly inspired by the Dependency Theory—began to call for nuclear 
rapprochement with the larger neighbour. While they observed Brazil’s undeniable 
industrial and economic superiority, they also identified common problems shared by 
the two, which could be more easily overcome with co-operation. In this sense, Hugo 
Scarone observed,
The suspension o f  American military assistance has accelerated Brazil’s 
national development with regard to arms, aiming at self-sufficiency; and the 
confrontation with the United States regarding the socio-political problem o f  
human rights and, more fundamentally, the technological-political problem of  
nuclear development, could lead to Brasilia accelerating and hardening its 
atomic programme, and to its supremacy in this field in the Southern^ Cone. 
However, common problems with Argentina bring both countries o f  the River 
Plate Basin closer, and we are witnessing the signs o f  a new type o f  relationship 
between the neighbours.82
And he concluded that the saying of a Latin American diplomat,
‘if  Brazil sneezes, the OAS gets a cold, and if  Argentina sneezes, the OAS gets 
a cold. But if  both sneeze, the OAS catches a pneumonia’ should express the 
wish that a shared sneeze in the basin should call our attention, and bring, in the 
future, good health back to the continent.83
Less poetically, and also more cautiously, Guglialmelli warned, “it will be more 
prudent, before embarking ourselves on the construction o f our bomb, if we tried to 
obtain effective and real assurances, which, of course, should be reciprocal.”84 
Similarly, Jose Dion de Melo Teles, president of the Brazilian National Research 
Council, praised the public support given by Argentina to Brazil vis-a-vis U.S. pressure 
after the nuclear deal with Germany, and called for the establishment of a co-operation 
scheme between the two countries in the field of atomic energy.85
82 H. Scarone, 'Brasil: Production de Armas y Vectores,' Estrategia vol. May-June/July-August, no. 
46-47 (1977), p. 43, my translation.
83 Ibid., my translation.
84 Guglialmelli, '^Y si Brasil Fabrica la Bomba Atomica? (A Proposito del Acuerdo Nuclear 
Brasilefio-Aleman),' p. 14, my translation. Italics in the original.
85 J. E. Grefio Velasco, 'El Tratado Nuclear Brasil-Republica Federal Alemana,' Revista Argentina de 
Relaciones Intemacionales vol. Ill, no. 9 (1977), p. 53.
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Argentina’s pronouncement in favour o f Brazil’s sovereign right to make 
technological progress without foreign obstruction had not been entirely without self- 
interested motives. Buenos Aires feared the same potential problems arising with 
Canada, its principal nuclear supplier at that time, if the latter decided to back the U.S. 
non-proliferation policy. In any case, that circumstance contributed to a growing feeling 
of solidarity aimed at defying international pressure on nuclear issues; a pressure that 
indeed backfired for a long time. According to Oliveiros S. Ferreira, “were it not for the 
insistence of the U.S. government that Buenos Aires and Brasilia sign the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty, both countries would not have felt the need to coordinate policies 
in the face of pressures that affect them equally.”86
The United States’ role in the Argentine-Brazilian dyad had been a significant and 
longstanding one. Ferreira notices that Brazilian nationalist factions were better 
disposed than liberal ones to promote an entente with Argentina, because they “sought 
in Argentinean antagonism against the United States common points for supporting a 
foreign policy that was intended to be independent.”87 This could be observed in the 
brief rapprochement attempts of Vargas, Kubitschek and Quadros. Liberals, instead, 
were all the more concerned with Argentine nationalism, and tended to see in the U.S. 
an ally with whom to align in order to counterbalance Argentine regional ambitions.
In the second half of the 1970s a combination o f concrete common external 
challenges, coupled with Brazil’s incipient process of political abertura and the return 
of Latin America to a prominent place in its foreign policy during the administrations of 
Geisel (1974-1979) and Figueiredo (1979-1985) contribute to explain the embryonic 
entente with Argentina. Indeed, after 1974 the government started to reassess Brazil’s 
place in the international community, adopting an “ecumenical, pragmatic and 
responsible diplomacy.”88
Nuclear rapprochement—and thus political rapprochement—was made easier by an 
existing consensus among bargaining audiences in this field. In Argentina, CNEA had 
remained a non-partisan institution throughout time, relatively insulated “from political 
and economic ideological contests between right and left, Peronism and liberalism, the 
civilians and the military: the nuclear autonomy ideology and policy made some sense
86 O. S. Ferreira, 'Goals of Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation,' in Paul L. Leventhal and Sharon 
Tanzer (eds.), Averting a Latin American Nuclear Arms Race: New Prospects and Challenges for  
Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 64-65.
87 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
88 Ernesto Geisel, Mensagem ao Congresso de la Nacion, quoted in C. Men&idez and M. Kerz, 
Autocracia y  Democracia: Brasil, un Camino al Mercosur (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1993), 
p. 140.
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to everyone.”89 At CNEA, scientists retained a large degree of liberty of action to design 
their programme. A strong idea among them was that nuclear energy was linked to 
technological and industrial dependency, which led them to define their objectives as
the achievement o f nuclear technological and industrial autonomy; the 
development o f a science and technology infrastructure; and the creation o f a 
demonstration effect, showing that indigenous R&D is possible in a dependent 
(and politically and economically troubled) country before structural economic 
changes have taken place.90
A similar ideology was sustained by the aforementioned nationalist- 
developmentalist faction of the military. These two groups, the ones most interested in 
nuclear development and the ones who could have presented important opposition to co­
operation, did in fact favour it.
In Brazil, diplomatic and scientific-technological circles shared the preoccupation 
for the lack of concrete results of their nuclear programme. Both perceived that
the maintenance o f  a conflictive pattern in the relationship with Argentina, in a 
context in which this country had demonstrated its superiority in the nuclear 
field, could become an increasingly dangerous factor.91
The possibility of co-operation was seen by these two key actors as an opportunity 
to help to reactivate the Brazilian nuclear programme.
Although a proper rapprochement would not commence until the energy and water 
dispute was solved in 1979, it was as early as 1977 that Buenos Aires and Brasilia 
agreed on the initiation of technical exchanges between the CNEA and CNEN. John R. 
Redick points out that through these exchanges the “nuclear energy commission 
officials began to develop personal linkages and familiarity with their counterparts over
QOthe period of years,” a fact that would later facilitate the development of the joint 
Argentine-Brazilian Accounting and Control System (SCCC) and its administrative 
institution, the Argentine-Brazilian Agency of Control and Accountability (ABACC).
After the resolution of the hydroelectric dispute, 1980 stands out as a key year. 
Carasales sees here the turning point in the bilateral nuclear relationship, on which all 
later changes of Argentina’s international nuclear policy rested. One could equally 
assert that together with the 1979 agreement, the year 1980 marks the turning point on 
which all later changes in the Argentine-Brazilian relationship rested. In May that year,
89 Adler, The Power o f Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil, p. 
299.
90 Ibid., p. 295.
91 Segre, 'La Cuestion Itaipu-Corpus. El Punto de Inflexion en las Relaciones Argentino-Brasilenas,' p. 
34, my translation.
92 Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil, p. 20.
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during the first visit of a Brazilian president to Buenos Aires in 40 years, Figueiredo and 
Videla signed agreements establishing co-operation in eleven areas; among them, an 
agreement on nuclear fuel cycle co-operation, which—despite being rather symbolic— 
represented the end of competition and the beginning of collaboration on nuclear 
matters.93 It signalled, too, the possibility of economic and political co-operation in the 
years to come.
However, in 1979 and 1980 the basis for concurrence was convenience rather than a 
radical shift in mutual perceptions or a wider convergence of political interests. After 
the Falklands/Malvinas War, this seems to start changing. Although during the war 
Brazil’s backing was discrete and lukewarm—it supported Argentina’s sovereignty 
claim but not the military invasion—after the war Brazil took on the representation of 
its neighbour’s interests where Argentine diplomatic channels had been broken. This 
constituted an important backing that continued after the change o f regime in Argentina. 
Some authors read key significance into Brazil’s support, and regard it as the 
cornerstone “that made possible some sort of ‘non-written-alliance’ between Argentina 
and Brazil in regional security matters.”94
A more profound and substantial change would come about after 1985; one in 
which nuclear matters would still have an important place. Along with the new regime 
of 1985, Brazilian scientific groups and newly empowered politicians were able, for the 
first time, to lobby openly for a specific policy on nuclear activities. Many of these 
efforts helped to build a political environment more conducive to the implementation of 
bilateral and international safeguards. In 1985, Raul Alfonsin and Jose Sarney signed a 
Joint Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy in Foz do Iguasu,95 which was followed 
by state visits; mutual technical assistance; exchange of students, scientists and 
information; and joint action in the international arena. With the restoration of 
democracy in both states, the establishment of a climate of mutual trust and confidence 
advanced swiftly.
93 Acuerdo de Cooperation entre el Gobiemo de la Republica Argentina y  el Gobiemo de la 
Republica Federativa del Brasil para el Desarrollo y  la Aplicacion de los Usos Pacificos de la Energia 
Nuclear, signed by Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations and Cult Carlos W. Pastor and Brazilian State 
Minister of Foreign Relations Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, in Buenos Aires, 17 May 1980, in Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.
94 C. Brigagao and M. Valle Fonrouge, 'Argentina y Brasil: Modelo Regional de Confianza Mutua,' 
Estudios Internationales vol. Ano XXXII, no. 125 (1999), p. 9, my translation.
95 This Declaration was in fact part of a broader economic integration agreement, which is discussed 
in chapter seven. Foz do Igua9u is located on the Brazilian side of the border between Argentina and 
Brazil. That makes it a symbolic town and accounts for the fact that numerous bilateral treaties and 
declarations have been signed there.
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The 1985 Joint Declaration reiterated the commitment to develop nuclear energy 
exclusively with peaceful purposes, the goal of close co-operation in all fields of 
peaceful use of nuclear energy and of mutual complementation in those aspects deemed 
convenient, and the hope that this co-operation be extended to other Latin American 
countries with similar goals. Additionally, it averred that co-operation between both 
countries not only constituted a multiplying factor of the beneficial effect that the use of 
nuclear energy can provide to both countries, but also would allow them to better 
confront the increasing difficulties found in the international supply of equipment and 
materials.96
After the Declaration of Foz do Iguafu, the Declaration of Brasilia of 1986 defined 
several areas of nuclear co-operation and joint development. Also in 1986, the 
Integration Act of Buenos Aires was agreed, where—under numerous co-operation 
protocols—a protocol on immediate information and reciprocal assistance in case of 
nuclear accidents was signed. In 1987 President Samey visited the Argentine uranium 
enrichment plant in Pilcaniyeu, and both presidents signed the Declaration of Viedma 
reaffirming, among other things, the peaceful purpose of their nuclear programmes. In 
1988 President Alfonsin visited the Brazilian Aramar Experimental Centre in Ipero. 
Furthermore, also in 1988 Sarney visited the laboratory of radiochemical processes at 
the CNEA in Ezeiza, signing another two Joint Declarations in either visit.97
However promising these series of agreements and understandings were, none of 
them actually incorporated reciprocal control measures, bilateral safeguards, or 
inspections. “Each was expected to place its trust in the other’s good faith and in the 
possibility of checking up on suspicious activities by visits, exchanges, etc., none of
Q Q
which were enforceable,” as Carasales observes. Nor had they changed their policy
96 Declaration Conjunta sobre Politico Nuclear, signed by President Raul Ricardo Alfonsin and 
President Jose Samey, in Foz do Igua9u, 30 November 1985, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International 
Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.
97 Declaration Conjunta sobre Politico Nuclear, signed by President Raul Ricardo Alfonsin and 
President Jose Samey, in Brasilia, 10 December 1986, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade 
and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department; Acta para la Integration Argentino-Brasilena, 
signed by President Raul Ricardo Alfonsin and President Jos£ Samey, in Buenos Aires, 29 July 1986, in 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department; 
Declaration Conjunta sobre Politico Nuclear, signed by President Raul Ricardo Alfonsin and President 
Jos6 Samey, in Viedma, 17 July 1987, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the 
Argentine Republic, Treaties Department; Declaration de Ipero sobre Politico Nuclear, signed by 
President Raul Ricardo Alfonsin and President Jose Samey, in Ipero, 8 April 1988, in Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department; and Declaration de 
Ezeiza sobre Politico Nuclear, signed by President Raul Ricardo Alfonsin and President Jose Samey, in 
Buenos Aires, 29 November 1988, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the 
Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.
98 Carasales, 'The So-Called Proliferator that Wasn't: The Story of Argentina's Nuclear Policy,' p. 57.
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towards the NPT or the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Hence the persisting, although much 
diminished distrust of the international community.
As Isabella Alcaniz points out, the unobtrusive but steady progress in the bilateral 
nuclear realm shows that co-operation was not the sole result of democratic forces." 
Had this been the case, then the shift in nuclear policy would have been much more 
extraordinary than it was after 1985, or absolutely absent before that year. Instead, 
rapprochement started before the change of regime. After the restoration of the 
democratic rule, the policy chosen represented as much a common effort for 
consolidation of democracy as an attempt to send clear signals to the international 
community and, especially, to the core economies. As the demands of the international 
financial system became more pressing, the initiative of Foz do Iguagu to further 
bilateral transparency contained a message: “we meet you halfway. Brazil and 
Argentina would give in to international pressure without forfeiting control of their 
nuclear programs.”100
c) The multilateral 1990s
The 1990s heralded an era where both countries had new governments that were 
more receptive to the demands of the nuclear supplier nations. For the first time the 
pressure of the United States and West Germany led to a drastic change of policies. The 
United States had consistently linked better economic relations to the acceptance of full- 
scope safeguards and the renunciation of peaceful nuclear explosions. Bonn, on its side, 
had announced in September 1990 that it would authorise nuclear exports only if the 
recipient country were subject to full-scope safeguards. As both Argentina and Brazil 
were nuclear importers from Germany, and both were willing to improve their relations 
with the U.S. given, in part, their difficult economic situations, they eventually came to 
reconsider the possibility of accepting IAEA safeguards for all their nuclear facilities.
Yet there are further factors that help explain Argentina’s and Brazil’s decision to 
change their nuclear policy. With the end of the Cold War the importance of nuclear 
weapons in the global scene diminished. Simultaneously, the number of binding 
agreements aiming at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
increased significantly, as did the number of states ratifying them. Yet above all, the 
fact that Argentina and Brazil had already overcome their rivalry, and had even set up a
99 I. Alcaniz, 'Slipping into Something More Comfortable: Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Integration 
and the Origins of the Mercosur,' in Georgi M. Derluguian and Scott L. Greer (eds.), Questioning 
Geopolitics: Political Projects in a Changing World-System (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000).
100 Ibid., p. 166.
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programme of nuclear co-operation, greatly helped to facilitate the implementation of a 
new strategic foreign policy in both countries.
The 1990 Declaration on Nuclear Policy of Foz do Igua9u reflected these later 
bilateral changes. In it, the new presidents Carlos Menem and Fernando Collor 
expressed their firm determination to 1) deepen the commitment initiated by their 
predecessors by stipulating the creation of a Joint System of Accountability and Control 
(SCCC) that included reciprocal inspections to be applied to all nuclear activities; 2) 
consider acceptance of fiill-scope IAEA safeguards; and 3) adhere to an amended Treaty 
ofTlatelolco.
After only a few months, the Agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy of 
July 1991 made a reality the first of the planned measures, the SCCC, by establishing 
the Argentine-Brazilian Agency of Control and Accountability, ABACC, to administer 
and apply the SCCC. Also, the Treaty banned PNEs in their territories “given that 
presently the technical possibility does not exist to distinguish between peaceful and 
warlike nuclear explosive devices.”101 In this manner, after many decades of defending 
the right to conduct PNEs, both states renounced them.
In December 1991, Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the IAEA signed an 
agreement on fiill-scope safeguards, thus fulfilling the second measure envisaged in the 
1990 Declaration. By this arrangement, also known as the Quadripartite Agreement, 
both states consented to the application of IAEA safeguards on the totality of their 
present and future nuclear installations and activities, even on those indigenously 
developed; a possibility that had also been resisted for decades. The Quadripartite 
Agreement, which was ratified in 1992 by Argentina and in 1994 by Brazil, resembled 
the model applied to NPT parties.
The third measure envisaged in Foz do Igua9u, the amendment and adherence to 
Tlatelolco, materialised soon thereafter, when a set of amendments proposed by 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico were unanimously approved by the parties in 
1992. By May 1994, the three countries of the Southern Cone of South America had 
ratified the treaty.102 Finally, in 1995 Argentina became a party to the hitherto resisted
101 Acuerdo entre la Republica Argentina y  la Republica Federativa del Brasil para el Uso 
Exclusivamente Pacifico de la Energia Nuclear, signed by The Government of the Argentine Republic 
and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil, in Guadalajara (Estados Unidos Mexicanos), 18 
July 1991, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, 
Treaties Department. See also Declaracion sobre Politica Nuclear Comun Argentino-Brasilena, signed 
by President Carlos Saul Menem and President Fernando Collor, in Foz do Iguagu, 28 November 1990, in 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.
102 Acuerdo entre la Agenda Argentina-Brasilena para el Control de Materiales Nucleares y  el 
Organismo Intemacional de Energia Atomica -OIEA- para la Aplicacion de Salvaguardias - Protocolo,
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NPT, advocating for its indefinite and unconditional extension. In time, the NPT 
became nearly universal, and even Brazil revised its position, eventually ratifying its 
adherence to it in 1998.
5. Final remarks
As it has been discussed in this chapter, since their beginnings Argentina and Brazil 
constructed their relationship upon negative perceptions o f one another, which 
reinforced the dominant relational pattern defined in terms of rivalry. After World War 
II only a few governments made feeble attempts at improving bilateral dialogue, mostly 
when pursuing an ‘independent’ foreign policy that would put them in confrontation 
with the United States. That was the case of Peron and Vargas, for instance, and of 
Frondizi, and Kubitschek and Quadros.
However, both Peron’s and Vargas’s regimes were of nationalist-populist character 
with a very strong doctrinal content, which in general precluded the growth of positive 
mutual visions. The second period of coincidence, that of Frondizi in Argentina and 
Kubitschek and Quadros in Brazil, resulted too short to bear fruit. Frondizi, who based 
his administration on a developmentalist agenda, was willing to reach an understanding 
that would enable the two countries to work on a co-operative and complementary 
programme. In this case, institutional problems and rumours o f coup d’etat during the 
terms of Kubitschek and Quadros in Brazil, as well as the successful coup in Argentina 
frustrated this initiative.103
In the years that followed, the recurring intervention of the armed forces in politics 
served to intensify geopolitical distrust and competition for regional influence and 
power. The emergence of the dispute on water resources on the River Parana made both 
militaries update their ‘war hypotheses’ against one another,104 while they were 
embarked on a race to develop nuclear technology.
By then, the cold peace that had prevailed in the dyad began to deteriorate. If so far 
competition, display of military capacity, and zero-sum calculations had constituted the 
military’s and politicians’ frame of mind, during the 1970s, when the hydroelectric 
power dispute escalated, the relationship reverted to a situation of unstable peace.
signed in Vienna, 13 December 1991, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the 
Argentine Republic, Treaties Department; and Tratado para la Proscripcion de las Armas Nucleares en 
la America Latina y  el Caribe (Tratado de Tlatelolco) con las Enmiendas Aprobadas por la Conferencia 
General, signed in Ciudad de Mexico, 14 February 1967.
103 Interview with Ambassador Carlos Manuel Mufliz.
104 Interviews with Ambassador Gibson Barboza, and with Ambassador Cortes.
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Bilateral tension increased to the extent of making dialogue very difficult and the 
consideration of resorting to violence more credible.105 During this period, peace was 
just a precariously sustained situation.
However, it was also then that international and domestic circumstances concurred, 
generating a favourable environment that made it easier for co-operative postures to 
gain influence on domestic decision-making circles. Internationally, U.S. pressure on 
nuclear development matters clearly encouraged the identification of a common ground 
for policy coordination. Domestically, a combination o f several key factors made it 
more appealing to overcome old disputes. These were, in Brazil, the exhaustion of its 
economic boom and of its model of inward looking development, as well as the gradual 
abertura o f its political system and the recognition of Argentina’s nuclear superiority; 
and in Argentina, its convoluted political and economic scenario, coupled with pressure 
for an entente from sectors as different as Martinez de Hoz’s pragmatic liberals and 
Gugialmelli’s nationalist-developmentalists.
In the face of international and domestic adverse circumstances, decisive actors 
favoured a process that implied the abandonment of contending perceptions, and the 
adoption of more positive images of one another with the prospective goal of easing 
tensions and pursuing co-operation. Through this mechanism a slow process of 
desecuritization of the bilateral relation evolved. This task was eased by the absence of 
territorial disputes, and by the fact that, strictly speaking, the issue that confronted 
Argentina and Brazil was more hypothetical than actual.
There was yet another relevant factor constraining their perceived policy options. 
Neither Brazil nor Argentina had had a tradition of isolationism in foreign policy. Much 
to the contrary, both had pursued positions of regional hegemony, and were used to 
seeking allies and friends among their smaller neighbours. Therefore, the option of 
reverting hostility into co-operation eventually appeared as a stronger possibility than 
the one of persisting in the conflict, seeking independent solutions to common 
problems.
With the restoration of democracy in both countries in the mid-1980s, 
improvements in the bilateral relationship accelerated. The fall of the military rule in 
Argentina in 1983 led to the election of Raul Alfonsin, who launched major initiatives 
to defuse the traditional economic and military rivalry between Argentina and Brazil.
105 Camilion quotes Commodore Hughes, air force attache in the Argentine Embassy in Brazil, telling 
him that if negotiations on Itaipu Corpus did not prove successful, “we will have to bomb Itaipu.” 
Camilion, Memorias Politicos: De Frondizi a Menem (1956-1996), pp. 200-201.
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However, the process that formally started in 1986 with the Programme for Argentine- 
Brazilian Integration and Economic Co-operation (PICE) was actually the culmination 
of a process of rapprochement that had gained momentum since 1979, when the 
negotiations of the Itaipu-Corpus dispute came to a satisfactory end with the signature 
of the Tripartite Agreement. As pointed out by Monica Hirst and Eduardo Bocco, the 
“solution of the essentially strategic conflict over the use of the hydroelectric resources 
of the Parana River was decisive in settling old rivalries between the two countries.”106
The possibility of co-operation arose first in a particularly delicate area, namely the 
nuclear field. Their finding of common technological and military interests opened the 
door to the consolidation of nuclear co-operation, which after a modest beginning 
became the main political triumph in Argentine-Brazilian integration. In fact, the 
political impact of their nuclear rapprochement largely counterbalanced other 
difficulties.107
This chapter has shown that Argentina and Brazil engaged in a process o f entente in 
the late 1970s whilst under military governments. As soon as they resolved the Itaipu- 
Corpus dispute, a steady process of rapprochement and mutual confidence building 
began to develop, which resulted in the coordination o f common foreign policies on 
nuclear matters. Most importantly, however, it permitted the realisation that co­
operation could be a more advantageous strategy in other fields too, for instance, in the 
field relating to economic matters, where both countries were at that time suffering 
serious difficulties. Chapter seven discusses the successful Argentine-Brazilian co­
operation programme that followed the process just examined, and its larger impact on 
the Southern Cone.
106 M. Hirst and E. Bocco, 'Nuclear Cooperation in the Context of the Programme for Argentine- 
Brazilian Integration and Cooperation,' in Paul L. Leventhal and Sharon Tanzer (eds.), Averting a Latin 
American Nuclear Arms Race: New Prospects and Challenges for Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear 
Cooperation (London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd, 1992), p. 214.
'°7 Ibid., p. 216.
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PART IV
THE SOUTHERN CONE AND ITS PROSPECTS
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CHAPTER 7
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE SOUTHERN CONE
1. Introduction
So far, this study has discussed the beginning of the rapprochement processes in the 
Argentine-Brazilian and Argentine-Chilean dyads. Despite differences in speed and 
intensity, both dyadic transformations converged on one major development; the 
stabilisation of peace in the Southern Cone.
The more rapid and further reaching rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil 
resulted in the creation of Mercosur, the Southern Cone Common Market. The regional 
integration programme was initially led by Argentina and Brazil. Paraguay and Uruguay 
soon joined the project, and Chile and Bolivia became associated members. As will be 
seen next, Mercosur further contributed to reshape identities and interests in the 
Southern Cone.
Crucial to this regional renovation was the gradual change o f perception from 
‘neighbour as rival’ to ‘neighbour as partner.’ What started as a governmental 
programme advanced by the political elites has extended, in time and as relations 
intensified, to include wider segments of the societies. This latter development has been 
more apparent between Argentina and Brazil.
However, in the late 1990s, Mercosur took a more commercial profile. Trade 
disputes, and divergent political priorities and foreign policy orientations have slowed 
down progress in the Association. As this happened, optimism about the possibility of 
Mercosur moving beyond a customs union and developing into a proper common 
market seemed to dilute. Simultaneously, the political bases underpinning the project 
seemed to weaken.
This chapter concentrates on the period that followed the resolution of bilateral 
disputes and the initial phase of rapprochement. It covers the time between the early 
conception of the integration project and the first several years of Mercosur, 
highlighting how convergent political interests set out a profound transformation in the 
region. Whilst perceptions at the level o f political and economic elites were deeply 
reshaped, changes in the societies and the armed forces, however present, have proved 
more measured.
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The next section focuses on the political and economic aspects and objectives of the 
Southern Cone regional integration, identifying the cognitive changes that it brought 
about in governments and elites. Section three turns to the spillover of political and 
economic rapprochement into the societies, and enquires about the emergence of a 
shared identification between Brazilian and Argentine people.1 The fourth section deals 
with the debate that emerged around the possibility of integration extending to the 
military field. Finally, the last section of this chapter draws some conclusions from the 
previous discussion.
2. Political and economic transformations
Given Latin America’s past failed attempts at integration, such as LAFTA and 
LAIA, and the rivalry that had characterised relations between Argentina and Brazil 
until the late 1970s, when these two countries began the talk about a Southern Cone 
common market, the announcement aroused little optimism.2 Despite the initial lack of 
confidence in the project, there is now a shared consensus among academic, business 
and policy-making circles that Mercosur has constituted a fairly successful enterprise 
since its beginning. Between 1991 and 1997 intraregional exports rose at a rate that 
trebled the growth of exports to the rest of the world. In addition, there was greater co­
operation among firms establishing subsidiaries and joint ventures, as well as stepped-
1 The term ‘identification’ is preferred here over that of ‘identity,’ as the former suggests a looser 
conceptual understanding, implying a common perception of potential shared benefits and costs; mutual 
sympathies; recognition of areas of common interests that promote co-operation and coordination in 
different fields, both at the public and private levels; growing curiosity about and familiarisation with the 
other’s politics, culture, society, etc., that is in fact reflection of a growing interest in the other as such; 
and, in general, a positive image of the other that tends to advance co-operation rather than competition, 
and that does not see a negative impact on one’s own state in the other state’s gain, but appreciates that it 
can instead redound to one’s own benefit (absolute gains). In other words, I am not arguing that what has 
emerged between Argentina and Brazil is a common identity similar to the European one that, many say, 
is shared by many citizens in the European Union, but a much looser concept of positive perception of 
commonalities.
2 For an exhaustive chronology of agreements on Latin American integration, see P. R. D. Almeida, O 
MERCOSUL no Contexto Regional e Intemacional (Sao Paulo, Brazil: Edicoes Aduaneiras Ltda., 1993), 
pp. 167-171. See also D. Chudnovsky and F. Porta, 'On Argentine-Brazilian Economic Integration,' 
CEPAL Review vol. 39, no. December 1989 (1989), p. 115; E. Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's 
Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 
pp. 149-151; B. Garre Copello, El Tratado de Asuncion y  el Mercado Comun del Sur: Megabloques 
Economicos y  America Austral (Montevideo, Uruguay: Editorial Universidad, 1991), pp. 47-50; S. Abreu 
Bonilla, Mercosur e Integracion (Montevideo, Uruguay: Fundacion de Cultura Universitaria, 1991), pp. 
39-47; and L. V. Pereira, 'Toward the Common Market of the South: Mercosur's Origins, Evolution, and 
Challenges,' in Riordan Roett (ed.), Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets (Boulder, CO and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), pp. 8-16.
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up purchase of equity shares within the region. However, the actual goal of 
implementing the common market is still to be achieved.3
As Mercosur progressed, interest and enthusiasm rose; a fact reflected in an 
increasingly vast literature. Although it is not comparable with the literature on the 
European Union, studies on Mercosur have become great in number, albeit rather 
uneven in quality. Most of them have concentrated on economic and trade aspects of the 
agreement.4 Others have studied its political features and the foreign policy of the 
members with regards to Mercosur,5 and fewer have focused on cultural aspects.6
This section on Mercosur highlights the extent to which the project of regional 
integration was underpinned by political ideals, as strong as, if not stronger than, the 
economic ones. It is argued that its political content became a crucial element in the 
transformation of interests and identities, and in the development o f mutual trust, which 
is a defining factor of stable peace. In addition, economic integration has facilitated 
interaction and exchange between societies, thus contributing to develop social links 
beyond the competence of the governments.
The project of Mercosur sprang from the initiative o f Argentina and Brazil. 
Although it was created by the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991, it was conceived some years
3 See R. Bouzas, A Mercosur-European Union Free Trade Agreement. Issues and Prospects (Buenos 
Aires: FLACSO, 1999); and Pereira, Toward the Common Market of the South: Mercosur's Origins, 
Evolution, and Challenges.'
4 Among many others, see R. Bouzas, 'Promoting Trade and Investment in the Common Market of the 
South: Lessons for Development Cooperation,' Documentos de Trabajo no. 31, (Buenos Aires: ISEN- 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Intemacional y Culto, November 1999); R. Bouzas, 'The 
External Trade Relation of Mercosur: Dealing with a Congested Agenda,' Documentos de Trabajo no. 25, 
(Buenos Aires: ISEN-Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Intemacional y Culto, July 1998); 
M. Garriga, 'Politicas Exteriores: Hacia una Politica Comun,' in Mario Rapoport (ed.), Argentina y  Brasil 
en el Mercosur: Politicas Comunes y  Alianzas Regionales (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 
1995); P. R. Schilling, Mercosul: Integracao ou Dominacao? (S.Paulo: CEDI, 1992); and A. A. Guadani, 
La Argentinay el Regionalismo Abierto (Buenos Aires: Universidad Catolica Argentina, 1995).
5 See Bouzas, A Mercosur-European Union Free Trade Agreement. Issues and Prospects', K. L. 
Remmer, 'Does Democracy Promote Interstate Cooperation? Lessons from the Mercosur Region,' 
International Studies Quarterly vol. 42, no. 1 (1998); G. Mace, 'The Challenge of Assembling an Intricate 
Mosaic,' Forces: Economic, Social and Cultural Quarterly, no. 117 (1997); A. L. Cervo, 'Politicas 
Exteriores: Hacia una Politica Comun,' in Mario Rapoport (ed.), Argentina y  Brasil en el Mercosur: 
Politicas Comunes y  Alianzas Regionales (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1995); and A. 
C. Vaz, 'Las Alianzas Regionales: Mercosur, Nafta y la Union Latinoamericana,' in Mario Rapoport (ed.), 
Argentina y  Brasil en el Mercosur: Politicas Comunes y  Alianzas Regionales (Buenos Aires: Grupo 
Editor Latinoamericano, 1995).
6 For instance, see E. Jelin et al., 'Mercosur: A Space for Interaction, a Space for Integration. A 
Research and Network Project,' produced by UNESCO/MOST, (1996) accessed: June 2000, 
http://www.unesco.org/most/p80ext.htm; E. Jelin, T. Valdes, and L. Bareiro, Gender and Nationhood in 
Mercosur: Notes for Approaching the Subject, vol. Discussion Paper No. 24 (Paris: UNESCO/MOST,
1998); A. Ford, Una Navegacion Incierta: Mercosur en Internet (Paris: UNESCO/MOST, 1998); A. 
Grimson, Nationality at the Frontier as a Media Construct: A Case Study in Posadas (Argentina) - 
Encamacion (Paraguay) (Paris: UNESCO/MOST, 1998); F. Calderon and A. Szmukler, Aspectos 
Culturales de las Migraciones en el Mercosur (Paris: UNESCO/MOST, 1999); and M. Mena et al., 'Las 
Politicas Educativas y de Ciencia y Tecnica,' in Mario Rapoport (ed.), Argentina y  Brasil en el Mercosur: 
Politicas Comunesy Alianzas Regionales (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1995).
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earlier, when the democratically elected Argentine and Brazilian presidents, Raul 
Alfonsin and Jose Samey, met in Foz do Igua9u in November 1985. The fact that 
democracy had been restored in both countries played a key role in the establishment of 
a bilateral co-operative agenda, as will be discussed below. However, the ongoing 
rapprochement, which had started in 1979, had already paved the way for co-operation.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, two developments marked the turning point 
in the bilateral relationship. The first was the termination both of concrete controversies, 
such as the River Parana dispute, and of a more subtle rivalry for regional prestige, such 
as the one reflected in the competition for nuclear capacity. The second was a change at 
the level of public discourse and political attitudes. In this sense, the presidential 
summits in Buenos Aires and Brasilia, in May and August 1980, were of importance. 
They lasted several days, and the presidents travelled with large delegations of ministers 
and state secretaries. According to Carlos W. Pastor, Argentine Foreign minister at that 
time, the personal ties that developed between the presidents and the other members of 
the governments translated into authentic mutual understanding, which in turn was 
reflected in the signing of 22 documents.7 These put in motion joint infrastructure 
enterprises, such as the construction of a bridge over the River Iguazu linking Puerto 
Iguazu (Argentina) and Porto Meira (Brazil); the first of its kind since 1947. They also 
established nuclear and hydroelectric co-operation, the sale of Argentine gas to Brazil, 
and the interconnection of their electricity systems. Other important attitudes that eased 
rapprochement were Brazil’s agreement to represent Argentine interests in London 
during and after the Falklands/Malvinas war, as well as its support for Argentina’s 
sovereignty claim at the U.N. and OAS, and the decision of not authorising British 
airplanes flying to the South Atlantic to schedule a regular refuelling stop in Brazilian 
territory.
With the restoration of democracy in both countries, mutual gestures of goodwill 
multiplied. For instance, one of Samey’s first measures upon taking office was to 
increase the purchase of gas, oil and wheat from Argentina in order to revert a trade 
deficit that was at the centre of concerns of economy authorities in Buenos Aires.8 The 
1985 Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy, and the mutual visits of Presidents Alfonsin
7 C. W. Pastor, 'Chile: La Guerra o la Paz. 1978-1981,' in Silvia Ruth Jalabe (ed.), La Politico Exterior 
Argentina y  sus Protagonislas. 1880-1995 (Buenos Aires: CARI-Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1996), 
pp. 286-289. See also O. Camilion, Memorias Politicos: De Frondizi a Menem (1956-1996) (Buenos 
Aires: Planeta-Todo es Historia, 1999), p. 221.
8 J. H. Herrera Vega, 'Las Politicas Exteriores de la Argentina y del Brasil,' Documentos de Trabajo 
no. 10, (Buenos Aires: ISEN-Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Intemacional y Culto, 
September 1995).
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and Samey to nuclear facilities, carried out for the first time in Argentine-Brazilian 
relations in 1987 and 1988, were perhaps more significant, given both the bilateral 
history and the sensitive nature of the issues involved.
It is sometimes argued that these declarations and gestures did not go far beyond 
rhetoric, and that they failed to constitute any concrete co-operation scheme.9 While it is 
true that the rapprochement of the early 1980s did not translate into an immediate 
programme of action, this ‘mere rhetoric’ should be given greater credit: easing the 
relationship at the discursive level was a crucial step to strengthening political optimism 
and to later promoting more concrete projects. After four decades of nuclear 
competition and regional rivalry for prestige between Argentina and Brazil, the 
importance of the shift in the ‘discursive mood’ should not be underestimated.
Grand gestures backed by determined political decisions were crucial signs that the 
governments were sending to one another and to their domestic publics. Indeed, in 
addition to overcoming mutual distmst, the governments needed to persuade public 
opinion in both countries that the neighbour did not constitute a realistic threat any 
longer. To this end, the two factors—the signing of treaties and agreements, on the one 
hand, and rhetoric as the manifestation of political will, on the other—proved useful in 
helping to build up trust and confidence, and develop these into viable policies backed 
by the public.
Although in the past several years, economic integration has become Mercosur’s 
primary force, its original motivation was mainly political. This was reflected in the 
Declaration of Iguazu, where the two presidents highlighted their political agreement. 
They congratulated themselves for the inauguration of the bridge ‘Tancredo Neves’ 
over the river Iguazu, which had been projected five years earlier. Samey reiterated 
Brazil’s historic support for Argentina’s claim over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands; and 
both resolved to revive the project of Latin American co-operation and integration. To 
that end, the presidents decided to create a High Level Joint Commission that would 
advance a bilateral integration project.10 A few months later, it had resulted in the 
Programme for Economic Integration and Co-operation {Programa de Integration y  
Cooperation Economica, PICE), signed in Buenos Aires on 29 July 1986. Rather than
9 Solingen, Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy, 
p. 141.
10 Declaration de Iguazu, signed by President Raul Ricardo Alfonsin and President Jose Samey, in 
Foz do Iguafu, 30 November 1985, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult of the 
Argentine Republic, Treaties Department.
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being promoted by the Ministries of the Economy, PICE was originally proposed by the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs.11
The backdrop for these initiatives was a more general convergence of both 
governments’ foreign policy orientations, as well as of domestic and external 
challenges. Regarding the former, goals such as strengthening peace and discouraging 
regional arms races, keeping Latin America outside of the strategic conflict of the 
superpowers, consolidating continental representation instances, and advancing Latin 
American integration became central. Argentina and Brazil took common stances on the 
crisis in Central America, the Uruguay Round of negotiations on the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, nuclear proliferation regimes, and the South Atlantic 
peace zone.12 Regarding common domestic and external challenges, both governments 
shared concerns about issues such as high inflation, the democratic transition, the 
improvement of their international images, the external debt crisis, and developed 
countries’ trade protectionism. Hence, regional integration was conceived as a strategy 
with multiple purposes, as much economic as political, and domestic and regional as 
well as international.
The project was mainly driven by the governments and their agencies, rather than
by industrial and commercial groups. This can be seen in that a debate about integration
only started after the 1986 treaty had been signed, and not before. In fact, the PICE
1
agreement took many by surprise.
In 1988 a further Treaty on Integration, Co-operation and Development was signed, 
this time with the aim of consolidating the bilateral integration process, and establishing 
a first period of ten years to build up a common economic area by gradually dismantling 
reciprocal trade barriers. In July 1990, the newly elected presidents, Carlos Menem and 
Fernando Collor de Mello, signed the Buenos Aires Act accelerating the timetable for 
the establishment of the bilateral common market by the end o f 1994, and instituting 
automatic tariffs reductions and the elimination of non-tariff barriers across the board.
11 See A. Cisneros and C. Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica 
Argentina (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 2000), Volume XIV, Chapter 69, 
http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-081 .htm.
12 M. Hirst, 'Mercosur's Complex Political Agenda,' in Riordan Roett (ed.), Mercosur: Regional 
Integration, World Markets (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 36.
1 J. Cason, 'On the Road to Southern Cone Economic Integration,' Journal o f Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs vol. 42, no. 1 (2000). See also A. Hurrell, 'The Politics of Regional Integration in 
MERCOSUR,' in Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), Regional Integration in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: The Political Economy of Open Regionalism (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 
University of London, 2001).
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Shortly afterwards, on 26 March 1991, Paraguay and Uruguay joined the project, and 
the four countries signed the Treaty of Asuncion finally creating Mercosur.14
As Roberto Bouzas explains, “closer links between Argentina and Brazil acted as a 
magnet for Paraguay and Uruguay. [...] Enhanced co-operation between the two larger 
partners thus acted as a centripetal force in the sub-region.”15 Uruguay needed to be part 
of the agreement in order to avoid erosion of its relatively generous non-reciprocal 
preferential access to Argentine and Brazilian markets. In the case of Paraguay, 
Mercosur played a central political role. It was to contribute to its transition to 
democracy after decades of authoritarian rule.16
The earlier bilateral co-operation scheme between Argentina and Brazil, and the 
later foundation of Mercosur rested upon three general political purposes, besides the 
commercial advantages of the preferential trade agreement. First, it aimed to consolidate 
democracy at home and throughout the region. Second, it sought to improve the 
members’ external political and economic performance. And third, it hoped to help the 
states to overcome their serious domestic economic difficulties, by providing them with 
a more stable context. With respect to all three matters, there was consensus that a co­
operation agreement in the Southern Cone was a worthwhile strategy. Furthermore, the 
following subsections argue that these three areas, in which integration was expected to 
bring about improvements, were key to strengthening the vision of the neighbours as 
partners, and developing a shared sense of common destiny.
Some of the conditions that Karl Deutsch indicates as contributing to the formation 
a security community—and hence the growth of a common identification—have 
developed between Argentina and Brazil, and, to a more limited extent, among the other 
Mercosur partners as well.17 Deutsch’s essential conditions are three; mutual 
compatibility of major values, mutual responsiveness, and mutual predictability of 
behaviour. Helpful but not essential conditions, according to the author, are a distinctive 
way of life, superior economic growth, expectation of joint economic reward, wide 
range of mutual transactions, broadening of elites, links of social communication,
14 At the time of writing, the actual goal of a common market still remains to be achieved. What was 
created on 1 January 1995 was an imperfect customs union.
15 Bouzas, 'Promoting Trade and Investment in the Common Market of the South: Lessons for 
Development Cooperation,' p. 1.
16 Ibid.
17 Attention will mainly concentrate on Argentina and Brazil, and to a lesser degree on Chile, given 
that the former have been the force behind integration and where transformations has been more 
remarkable.
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greater mobility o f persons, reluctance to wage ‘fratricidal’ war, outside military threat, 
strong economic ties, and ethnic and linguistic assimilation.18
According to the definition of security community introduced in chapter two of this 
thesis, its main feature is a sense of ‘we-fee ling,’ of common belonging among elites 
and societies of the states involved. Not only is war unthinkable in a security 
community. In addition, the societies have developed links, mutual sympathies, and 
some sort of common identification that makes them perceive one another as members 
of the same community. The rapprochement and political co-operation that resulted in 
the process of creation and evolution of Mercosur in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
brought about the incipient emergence of such feelings.
2.1. Integration and democracy
The fragile nature of the Southern Cone democracies aroused a shared perception of 
vulnerability and mutualism.19 By the second half of the 1980s Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil and Uruguay had started their democratic transitions, but Chile and Paraguay 
were still ruled by authoritarian regimes (until 1990 and 1993 respectively). Among the 
former, ‘democracy’ had become a key value in structuring their foreign policies, and 
moulding, to an important extent, their vision of the world. Argentina was determined to 
promote democracy across the region, for instance by giving support to opposition 
parties in Chile and Uruguay before their democratisations. For Samey, “the first road 
to peace is freedom, and the political organisation of freedom is democracy. [...] The 
new humanism should be centred on solidarity and peace. Peace only exists with 
freedom, with democracy.”20
However, the democratic transitions in the region encountered several obstacles. In 
Argentina, the government of Alfonsin confronted three carapintadas ( ‘painted faces’) 
military uprisings in April 1987, and January and December 1988, and Carlos Menem 
one, in December 1990. In Brazil, President elect Trancredo Neves died shortly before 
taking office, leaving his running partner Vice President elect Jose Samey with the 
responsibility o f the democratic transition. Whereas Neves was a skilled politician, who 
had won the vote in the Electoral College with 480 votes out of 686, and who counted
18 See K. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization 
in the Light o f Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
19 The term ‘mutualism’ was coined by Hirst, 'Mercosur's Complex Political Agenda.'
20 Jos6 Samey at the U.N. General Assembly in 1985, quoted in C. Menendez and M. Kerz, 
Autocraciay Democracia: Brasil, un Camino al Mercosur (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1993), 
p. 152.
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on the approval of the armed forces—after assuring them that no military official would 
be prosecuted for human rights violations—, Samey was seen as traitor, who had left 
the regime-backed Party of Social Democracy (PDS), which had given him the post of 
senator, to unite forces with Tancredo Neves. Moreover, Samey belonged to the 
patrimonial order, thereby awakening little popular enthusiasm.21 Confronted with this 
domestic scenario, President Samey sought external allies to help him strengthen his 
government in particular, and Brazilian democracy more generally.
Yet another acute crisis of government occurred in 1992, when the last minute 
resignation o f President Fernando Collor de Mello averted his impeachment under the 
charges of being directly involved in major corruption scandals. In a democracy such as 
Brazil’s, where the armed forces had retained an important share of power, it was not 
guaranteed that a crisis of this type would be resolved without military intervention.
In Paraguay, the 1996 attempted coup d’etat generated immediate, strong and 
energetic responses by Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Brazil and Argentina not only 
gave public support to the Paraguayan democracy, but also flew their representatives 
into Asuncion to contain the crisis and assist President Wasmosy to preserve the 
constitutional rule. The Brazilian Ambassador declared that a military uprising would 
find no support in Mercosur, and the Argentine President said that Paraguay would be 
marginalized from the Agreement if there were an internal constitutional failure.22
These crises of government were eventually resolved reasonably quickly before 
they became ‘crises of regime,’23 that is, they were resolved within the rule o f law, and 
democracy survived in spite of the instability that the crises provoked. Although 
Mercosur may not have been the defining factor in the successful resolution of the 
events, it provided a stabilising framework, in which certain political behaviour was not 
to be acceptable.
Liberal democracy has been one of the ideals underpinning Mercosur’s creation and 
consolidation. It has become a major common value structuring the members’ priorities 
and expectations. Since its beginnings, leading actors on all sides of the Agreement 
have placed particular emphasis on democracy, by stressing the role that it has played in
21 R. Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger,
1999), pp. 134-136.
22 'Washington acalld los Rumores en Asuncion,' La Nacion Line, (Buenos Aires: 10 April 1998), 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/98/04/10/x04.htm.
23 J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, 
South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
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redefining their interests and reshaping their identities and sense of common purpose.24 
Democracy has been at the centre of the region’s new political identity, and this was 
eventually reflected in the Agreement. Whilst it had already been included in previous 
Mercosur Presidential Declarations, the 1998 Ushuaia Protocol, signed by Argentina, 
Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, and Bolivia and Chile, established the ‘democratic 
clause,’ whereby democracy became an essential and explicit condition for membership.
2.2. Integration and international political leverage
A second important goal of regional integration referred to enhancing the region’s 
external performance. Three related aspects can be identified as part of this broad 
objective. First, the improvement of the countries’ international image, of their 
credibility and prestige before the international community. Second, the increase of 
their international political and economic leverage. And third, their competitive 
insertion into the global economy, in an era when regional trade blocs were 
consolidating in the world. Particularly with regard to the latter, as the 1990s 
approached, there was
a powerful perception in Latin America that dynamic economies are 
internationalized economies, that growth depends on successful participation in 
the world economy, and that the accelerating rate o f technological change 
undermines projects aimed at autonomous, nationally based technological 
development.25
The decision of building Mercosur implied a shift of identities and interests, which 
was translated into the gradual development of the idea of bloc and of ‘regional
96habitat.’ To that end, increasing transparency and predictability between members, co­
ordinating common diplomatic positions in international negotiations, and setting up 
Mercosur’s external agenda helped to reinforce a feeling of common belonging. The 
audiences of such desecuritization initiatives were simultaneously each other’s 
government, their own publics, and the international community.
Brazil and Argentina’s early nuclear transparency measures allowing mutual 
inspection of nuclear facilities in the 1980s, and the establishment of their Agency for
24 A. Hurrell, 'Regionalism in the Americas,' in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), 
Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization and International Order (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995).
25 A. Hurrell, 'Latin America in the New World Order: A Regional Bloc of the Americas?,' 
International Affairs (Royal Institute o f International Affairs) vol. 68, no. 1 (1992), p. 126.
26 The term ‘regional habitat’ is used by F. Pena, 'Broadening and Deepening: Striking the Right 
Balance,' in Riordan Roett (ed.), Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets (Boulder, CO and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 54.
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Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material in the 1990s were initiatives pointing in 
this direction. They represented signals o f openness aimed at each other’s government 
and armed forces. They involved declarations, meetings and visits in order to transmit a 
feeling of mutual trust and confidence to their domestic publics. Finally, the measures 
were also showing the international community—and international creditors, as seen in 
chapter six—that Argentina and Brazil had become credible and trustable.
Again, trying to transform their international image, they sought to co-ordinate a 
‘diplomacy of prestige’ by jointly sponsoring Brazil’s proposal to create a ‘zone of 
peace’ and cooperation in the South Atlantic, the formation of the Cartagena Consensus, 
and the creation of the Contadora Support Group. As the ‘diplomacy o f prestige’ 
continued, and common norms and practices of confidence building and transparency 
became systematic, they made possible the development of new mutual visions that 
contributed to the further stabilisation of bilateral and regional peace. In this sense, 
identities and interests were affected by the process of interaction, while also the 
process of interaction was affected by them. In the medium term, this complex process 
of social learning allowed the passage from negative to positive peace; two situations 
involving radically different logics. Instead of viewing one another as rivals and guiding 
their behaviour according to Wendt’s Lockean culture, the emergence of trust rendered 
possible the development of a (loose) Kantian culture, which “is based on a role 
structure of friendship.”27
The political decision and determination which characterised the resolution of the 
pending border issues between Argentina and Chile, as well as the maturity that the 
Congresses and publics in both countries showed, can also be read in terms of their will 
to advance mutual confidence, and break with their old international images. Similarly, 
Chile’s eventual acceptance to become an associated member of Mercosur reaffirmed 
its policy o f strengthening ties with Latin America (and represented a good alternative 
to the frustrated incorporation into NAFTA).
In Argentina, the agreement with Chile was supported by an eager government, 
which based its enthusiasm on commercial, strategic and political grounds. Besides the 
economic calculation of access of Argentine (and Mercosur’s) products to Pacific ports 
and markets, the possibility of finally tightening bonds with a neighbour with which it 
had been on the verge of war was also appealing. On the side of Brazil, the prospect of 
the increased bargaining power of Mercosur plus Chile in the Free Trade Association of
27 A. Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
p. 298.
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the Americas (FTAA) negotiating process finally encouraged Brasilia to go along,
despite lack of enthusiasm for a free trade area with Chile among the smaller Mercosur
28partners.
The need to get a stronger voice in a globalised international system was a serious 
consideration not just by Brazil and Argentina, but also by Chile. During a visit to 
Brazil, Chile’s newly elected president, Ricardo Lagos, declared,
it is only by integrating that South America will have a say in the world o f  the 
next decade. Nothing will be achieved if  every country is on its own: we will 
get globalised, rather than being members o f a globalised world.29
The free trade agreement between Chile and Mercosur also had important economic 
motivations. Conversely, the free trade agreement with Bolivia did not involve large 
trade values from Mercosur’s perspective. Rather, it constituted a further step towards 
building up a network of consistent free trade agreements throughout the region, with 
the eventual goal of forming a South American Free Trade Area.
The adoption of common stands by the countries of the Southern Cone has 
contributed to strengthen a sense of mutual responsiveness as well as a common feeling 
of mutual support. This was reflected in the region’s reaction to the attempted coup in 
Paraguay. Yet other instances illustrate this too. For example, at the presidential summit 
in Potrero de Funes (June 1996), the heads of state of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Paraguay and Uruguay signed the so-called ‘Malvinas Declaration’ in support of 
Argentine rights over the islands. In addition, these countries repeated their support 
before international fora.31 This constituted an important gesture that symbolised 
changes in the internal logic of the region, not least on the part of Chile, a country with 
strong ties with Great Britain.
28 Bouzas, 'The External Trade Relation of Mercosur: Dealing with a Congested Agenda.' On the 
implications of the agreement between Chile and Mercosur, see also P. V. Milet, 'Posicionamiento de los 
Actores Chilenos ffente a la Integration,' in Francisco Rojas Aravena (ed.), Argentina, Brasil y  Chile: 
Integracion y  Seguridad (Caracas, Venezuela: FLACSO-Chile and Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1999); R. 
Lavagna, 'Las Alianzas Regionales: Mercosur, Nafta y la Union Latinoamericana,' in Mario Rapoport 
(ed.), Argentinay Brasil en el Mercosur: Politicos Comunesy Alianzas Regionales (Buenos Aires: Grupo 
Editor Latinoamericano, 1995); Jorge Castro’s intervention in a round table in M. Rapoport (ed.), 
Argentina y  Brasil en el Mercosur: Politicos Comunes y  Alianzas Regionales (Buenos Aires: Grupo 
Editor Latinoamericano, 1995), p. 110; and C. Stefoni and C. Fuentes, Chile and Mercosur: How Far Do 
We Want Integration to Go? (Paris: UNESCO/MOST, 1998).
29 See E. Gosman, 'Mercosur: Chile apura su Ingreso,' Clarin Digital, (Buenos Aires: 15 July 2000), 
http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2000-07-15/e-01701 .htm, my translation.
30 R. Bouzas, 'Mercosur's External Trade Negotiations: Dealing with a Congested Agenda,' in Riordan 
Roett (ed.), Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1999).
31 'Geopolitica del Mercosur,' Clarin Digital, (Buenos Aires: 1999), 
http://old.clarin.eom/diario/l 999/06/20/i-01401 d.htm.
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Playing as one single actor in international negotiations reinforced the feeling of 
community. Indeed, reaching consensus within Mercosur and then talking on its behalf 
with one single voice involved a qualitatively different commitment than that of acting 
individually in a co-ordinated manner. An opportunity to put the former into practice 
were the negotiations following the Miami Summit (December 1994), where the U.S. 
government announced its decision to guide the formation of a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) by 2005. According to declarations by Jorge Herrera Vegas, chief o f 
the Argentine delegation, “Mercosur is negotiating without fissures. [...] Within 
Mercosur, there is only one position.”32
Following Brazil’s proposal, which was backed by the Mercosur bloc, it was finally 
agreed that countries would carry out negotiations towards the agreement as members of 
the already existing subregional groups, as well as individually, as was advocated by the 
United States. According to Cason, “the partners have begun to forge a Mercosur 
‘identity’ with respect to the rest of the Americas, and the bloc appears quite strong as it 
faces the possibility of a hemisphere-wide free-trade area.”33 Looking at the FTAA 
negotiations, Bouzas concludes, “Mercosur’s main accomplishment has been to 
contribute to making that process a negotiating exercise rather than a framework for 
extending NAFTA to the rest of the hemisphere.”34
The Protocol of Ouro Preto (December 1994) gave Mercosur international juridical 
personality, enabling it to participate as a single entity in international negotiations. 
Following this, Mercosur reached an economic co-operation agreement with the 
European Union (EU), at least partly motivated by the drive to increase political 
leverage vis-a-vis the United States. The EU-Mercosur agreement created an 
institutional mechanism to conduct a regular policy dialogue between the two regions. 
The aim was to pursue co-operation in entrepreneurial matters and economic and social 
reforms, rather than the formation of a free trade area. In part, this was possible because 
of Mercosur’s success in improving the international image and leverage of its 
members, both individually and collectively. The EU saw in Mercosur a trade and 
investment partner; an image of partnership that the EU would not have had of the 
region before.35
32 'Discrepan el Mercosur y EE.UU.,' La Nation Line, (Buenos Aires: 14 May 1997), 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/97/05/14/e02.htm.
33 Cason, 'On the Road to Southern Cone Economic Integration,' p. 24.
34 Bouzas, 'Mercosur's External Trade Negotiations: Dealing with a Congested Agenda,' p. 91.
35 Ibid., p. 90.
209
2.3. Integration and domestic economy
Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s the gradual process of rapprochement, 
co-ordination, co-operation and integration initially promoted by Brazil and Argentina 
developed into a solid institution. During this period, Mercosur’s motivations were as 
much economic as political. In fact, while the latter gave it a more substantive support, 
the former tried to make it more attractive to domestic business circles, which were not 
used to regional interdependence.
Mercosur sought to improve its members’ productivity by taking advantage of 
economies of scale, and to become a more attractive region for international trade and 
investment. In this sense, it was not radically different from past attempts. However, 
Marcelo Stubrin asserts that this time regional integration was part of a ‘paradigm 
change’ taking place in the Southern Cone in the 1980s;
For centuries Latin Americans thought o f themselves in terms o f ‘stripped rich.’
This has happened since the times o f Pizarro, when the Spaniards stole the gold 
o f the Incas. [...] Instead, the new paradigm o f the 1980s understood that our 
poverty was absolute. It assumes that the fault o f  our poverty is ours, and, 
therefore, solutions have to come from us. Mercosur is an outcome o f  this 
paradigm change, carrying with it a change o f development strategy.36
However, integration was a challenging undertaking, given that co-operation was to 
take place among states that showed a low level of interdependence. Even once 
Mercosur had been formally founded in 1991, interdependence continued to be 
remarkably low, and pre-eminence was given to domestic programmes of stabilisation 
and reform. In addition, the countries had looked at one another as potential enemies for 
most of the century, rather than as potential partners. Brazilian Ambassador Sebastiao 
do Rego Barros summarises the effort made by Argentina and Brazil, putting later trade 
disputes into perspective:
The integration process between Brazil and Argentina began there, where it was 
most difficult: the nuclear, security, and defence areas. [. . .] Once absurd 
hypotheses o f mutual destruction fade away, it would be any country’s dream to 
have stingy discussions about chicken, textiles, pork meat, the shoe industry, 
milk, etc.37
A new impetus was felt when Collor and Menem established unilateral trade 
liberalisation programmes in their countries in the early 1990s, and gave a more
36 Interview with Representative Marcelo Stubrin, President of the Commission of Foreign Relations 
of the Chamber of Deputies of the Argentine Congress, in Buenos Aires on 17 August 2000. My 
translation.
37 S. D. R. Barros, 'Por un Mercosur sin Traumas,' Clarin Digital, (Buenos Aires: 27 April 2000), 
http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2000-04-27/i-01701d.htm, my translation.
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decisive push to the integration process as a fundamental part of the restructuring of 
their domestic economies. Between 1990 and 1993 intra-Mercosur trade flows and 
investment increased impressively, and economic interests began to consolidate. These 
were, undoubtedly, some of Mercosur’s early goals. Since the mid-1990s genuine 
dynamics of interdependence between the economies of the area have been evident. 
Whereas in 1990 Mercosur accounted for 4.2 percent of Brazilian exports and for 11.2 
percent of its imports, by 1996 these figures had risen to 15.5 and 15.6 percent 
respectively.38 If this is true for Brazil—Mercosur’s largest and strongest partner—the 
other three member countries have become yet more dependent on access to each 
other’s markets, especially Brazil’s.
The increasing level of trade and economic exchange put in evidence a growing 
interdependence, which, in turn, facilitated the uncovering of important grounds for 
joint profits, as well as for joint losses. With this, Deutsch’s condition of mutual 
responsiveness gained more importance in the relationship between Argentina and 
Brazil. As trade disputes became bitterer, the countries have mostly succeeded in 
resolving them co-operatively; most often, however, at the level of the Executives.
Additionally, increased exchange and interdependence brought the business 
communities of both countries closer together, which in turn resulted in increased 
communication and co-operative interaction amongst them. With exchange and fluid 
dialogue, the business circles came to realise that co-operation could bring about greater 
advantages; a fact that facilitated the identification o f shared interests. Economic 
calculations were finally seen as positive-sum game, where absolute gains became more 
important than relative gains.
In Argentina, there was increasing awareness that economic growth in Brazil would 
redound to Argentina’s benefit. Indeed, the growth of the Brazilian economy soon 
translated into higher imports from Argentina. As some sectors of the Brazilian industry 
reached the limit of their production capacity, demand to foreign suppliers increased, 
and Argentina was in a privileged position to cover that need. Similarly, when Brazil 
experienced a break or a fall in its growth, this was immediately felt by the smaller 
partner, which sent 30 percent of its exports to Brazil.
Although to a lesser degree, Brazil has also been affected by Argentina’s economic 
performance. While in 1990 Argentina ranked 10th on the list of Brazil’s most important
38 P. D. M. Veiga, 'Brazil in Mercosur: Reciprocal Influence,' in Riordan Roett (ed.), Mercosur: 
Regional Integration, World Markets (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 30.
39 E. Gosman, 'Un Salto del 6% en la Economia,' Clarin Digital, (Buenos Aires: 6 July 2000), 
http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2000-07-06/e-01901.htm.
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markets, accounting for just 2 percent of total exports, in 1994 Argentina had become 
Brazil’s second largest trading partner, taking up half of Brazil’s trade with South 
America, and making up 10 percent if its exports. On a more negative note, after the 
latest financial crisis of Argentina (2001/2002), the Brazilian Real lost 20 percent of its 
value in less than a year. The cause probably lay more on concerns about Argentina’s 
debt crisis spreading to Brazil than on inherent problems with the Brazilian economy. 
However, the shared sense of vulnerability arose again.
3. Identity transformation
If the integration process was state-led, as argued earlier, the same has been true for 
the gradual emergence of a common identification. It has indeed been a state-driven, 
politically engineered development, rather than a spontaneous mutual identification of 
the peoples involved. Yet this has not been a completely new experience in the Western 
Hemisphere. Nation-states in both North and South America have been the result o f 
conscious nation- and state-building enterprises in the years that followed colonial 
dependency, independence and civil wars.40 In the case o f the Southern Cone, the 
economic and political consolidation of Mercosur started to timidly arouse a shared 
identification among the peoples. Yet, this only happened after the project of integration 
was set in motion. In what follows, attention is paid to this development in the case of 
Argentina and Brazil.
The shift of mutual perception from opponent to partner has been a parallel and 
concomitant outcome—rather than a by-product—of the transformation of the Southern 
Cone into a zone of stable peace. The incipient emergence of a common identification 
and o f a security community are two sides of the same coin, insofar as they are mutually 
reinforcing aspects of a single process.
As discussed above, common political experiences contributed to the emergence of 
a shared, although still loose, identification between the peoples in Argentina and 
Brazil. Not only had both states undergone authoritarian dictatorships during the 1970s 
and faced difficult transitions,41 but they had experienced economic instability, the debt 
crisis of the 1980s, underdevelopment, and hyperinflationary peaks as well.
40 See chapter 4 “Creole Pioneers” in B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).
41 However, it must be noted that the democratic transitions and the evolution of civil-military 
relations in Argentina and Brazil were very different.
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In addition, as Karen Remmer observes, even though proximity punctuated their 
relationships with military tensions and rivalries, shared borders, riverine systems, and 
transportation linkages created an extended history of subregional links and co­
operation.42 Indeed, in some regions, where the countries share borders, the cultural 
assimilation and mixture has been remarkable. Ambassador Gibson Barboza emphasises 
that
in Argentina, Uruguay, and Southern Brazil there are all the same gauchos. That 
area is a discrete geographic unit, divided up by political borders. Even 
linguistically, the Portuguese o f the state o f Rio Grande do Sul, especially, has 
taken a lot from the Spanish o f the River Plate. It sounds very different from the 
rest o f the country.43
In recent years, there has been a rather active, although not explicit policy aimed at 
spreading this common identification to broader parts of society. This can be observed 
in the field of culture, which is the one that has more immediate impact on the identity 
of the peoples. Intensified links of social communication have contributed to thicken a 
mutual cultural familiarity. Increased tourism, as highlighted by Ambassador Botafogo 
Gonfalves, has played an important role in this sense, as it has engaged locals and 
visitors in interaction and exchange, and has allowed them to directly observe and get to 
know one another 44
Similarly, cultural events and festivals bringing artists from the other country have 
also contributed to closer contacts and friendliness. ‘Porto Alegre in Buenos Aires’ has 
been a repeated major festival involving music, theatre, dances, literature, tourism, 
films, education and plastic arts. A similar festival has taken place in Porto Alegre, with 
the participation of artists from Buenos Aires.
Also, at Brazil’s Diplomatic Academy candidates receive Spanish courses besides 
English and French. This may not seem that remarkable, given that Brazil is located, 
after all, in a Spanish-speaking region. Yet at the Argentine National Institute of 
Foreign Service, which depends on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, learning Portuguese 
has become mandatory. Moreover, demand for Portuguese language has not stopped at 
the diplomatic level. The multiplication o f Argentineans studying Portuguese led to the
42 Remmer, 'Does Democracy Promote Interstate Cooperation? Lessons from the Mercosur Region,' p.
32.
43 Interview with Ambassador Mario Gibson Barboza, in Rio de Janeiro on 5 April 2001.
44 Interview with Ambassador Jose Botafogo Gonfalves in Brasilia on 3 April 2001.
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need to open special courses to train local teachers, since the number of Brazilian 
teachers has become insufficient.45
A further example has been the emergence o f topics such as ‘Mercosur’ and 
‘Regional Integration’ as sub-disciplines at Argentine and Brazilian universities and 
research centres. In 1996 the University of Buenos Aires created a Masters programme 
in Regional Integration with emphasis on Mercosur, while the University of Brasilia has 
a Centre of Mercosul Studies. This has happened in response to increasing interest and 
demand by academic and political circles, and public and private enterprises for 
specialists capable o f efficiently understanding, advising and predicting the effects of 
the integration process.
The formal process of integrating Mercosur has very gradually awakened a 
perception of common or shared destiny not just among political and economic elites, 
but also in wider circles of society. The appearance of such a perception by the latter 
has taken much longer than in the case of the former. In fact, to an important extent, it 
has been the result of both policies to that end, and spillover from political and 
economic developments. Yet once this was in motion, societies have gradually and 
increasingly got involved in the process, and so have they started to share a partial but 
growing identification in terms of self-image and interests, and mutual sympathy and 
loyalties. The commonality of interests, and the more familiar and trustful mutual 
perceptions among societies have gone beyond economic and political agreements. As 
Pena argues, “public opinion now regards Mercosur as an appropriate way to face the 
challenges and opportunities of globalization and to forge a regional identity, 
strengthening the respective national identities.”46
4. Security in the Southern Cone
4.1. Mercosur’s security spillover and the debate on security integration
A last aspect to consider in this chapter is whether the cognitive changes that have 
taken place at the political and social levels have also affected the military field. Given 
that the processes of rapprochement involved the transformation of visions o f former 
rivals, who at times became almost enemies, the question about Mercosur’s effect on
45 A. Lanusse, 'Cada Vez Mas Argentinos Quieren Hablar Portugues,' La Nation Line, (Buenos Aires: 
5 November 2001), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/01/ll/05/dq_348822.asp.
46 Pena, 'Broadening and Deepening: Striking the Right Balance,' p. 55.
214
military security appears relevant. This section discusses the chances of more 
institutionalised integration, or co-operation, between the armed forces of the region.
Mercosur seems to have undergone the inverse path of the European Community. 
Whereas the latter sprang from the necessity for military security as a strategy to contain 
Germany and avoid another war in Europe, in the Southern Cone military 
rapprochement was advanced because of economic and political needs. Once Mercosur 
was founded, defence and security were absent from multilateral discussions, and were 
only dealt with on a bilateral basis.
The reason for such omission is understandable. During the late 1970s and early 
1980s, it was generally realised that what could endanger to a greater degree the 
survival capacity of the states in the region was not so much a strategic-military threat 
coming from their neighbours as in fact their own severe socio-economic and political 
difficulties. While in the late 1970s the perception that these crises could eventually 
result in ungovernability and unviability was still overshadowed by dominant 
geopolitical visions, later in the decade of the 1980s it was feared that they could result 
in the weakening and collapse of their newly acquired democracies. The source of these 
instabilities was domestic, rather than external to their borders. Druetta, Tibiletti and 
Donadio, for instance, talk about Latin America’s ‘risk of Libanization.’47
There is yet another reason for the absence of discussions about regional security in 
the early days of integration. The United States had maintained a Cold War security 
agenda in the continent, monitored through the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 
1947 and the Organisation of American States (OAS) of 1948, in addition to periodic 
unilateral interventions in the region. However, in the nineties the situation changed. As 
David Pion-Berlin argues,
With the countries less reliant on the United States for military hardware than in 
the past and more mindful than ever that they must assume responsibility for 
their own individual and collective security, the time would appear to be right 
for more localized defense alliances. Mercosur’s successes would seem to 
reinforce this view.48
47 G. Druetta, L. Tibiletti, and M. Donadio, 'Nuevos Conceptos en Materia de Seguridad Estratdgica 
Regional,' Revista Seguridad Estrategica Regional vol. 1 (1992).
48 D. Pion-Berlin, 'Will Soldiers Follow? Economic Integration and Regional Security in the Southern 
Cone,' Journal of Interamericcm Studies and World Affairs vol. 42, no. 1 (2000), pp. 58-59.
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In this context, an Argentine Defence minister asserts that Mercosur has become a 
formidable tool to foster confidence-building measures, with the potential to grow into a
49co-operative security system.
The optimistic state of military and security affairs in the region in the 1990s was 
the direct result of the dyadic processes of rapprochement studied in this thesis. Often, 
the transitions to democracy and the establishment of neoliberal economic programmes 
across the region have also been interpreted as having facilitated regional co-operation 
in the area of economics and, to a lesser extent, security.50 According to Pablo Cabrera, 
sub-secretary of the Chilean Navy, this is what has to be defended in the post-Cold War 
international context;
At present, now that the Cold War and the bilateral conflicts have been 
overcome, the only thing that we have to defend is the politico-democratic 
stability and the economic development. Therefore, we consider decisive that 
these issues be dealt with in the context o f Mercosur.51
The constitution of Mercosur and the inclusion of Chile in the regional project have 
deepened and strengthened the countries’ commitment to regional and international 
peace and stability. Only in the mid-1990s the specialised literature began to discuss 
whether common security institutions should be expected to develop as an outcome of 
the deepening of the Common Market association. As this happened, some authors 
started to explore the prospects of a formal security arrangement. The envisaged 
possibilities ranged from a co-operative security regime to a collective arrangement to a 
defence alliance.52 Alongside this academic discussion, there were enthusiastic 
proposals by Argentine government officials to link economic integration to regional 
security. For instance, Argentine academic, military, and diplomatic circles have 
insisted on the formation of a centre to collect strategic data, and to carry out military
49 J. H. Jaunarena, 'Cooperation Multilateral en Materia de Seguridad,' Revista Seguridad Estrategica 
Regional vol. 10 (1997), http://www.ser2000.org.ar/articulos-revista-ser/revista-10/hem-coop.htm.
50 See J. S. Tulchin and F. Rojas Aravena, 'Introduction,' in Joseph S. Tulchin, Francisco Rojas 
Aravena, and Ralph Espach (eds.), Strategic Balance and Confidence Building Measures in the Americas 
(Washington, D.C. and Stanford, Calif.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 
1998), p. 1.
51 Newspaper El Mercurio, 16 July 1998, quoted by R. Diamint, 'Integracion y Seguridad. La 
Dialectica de los Actores Argentinos,' in Francisco Rojas Aravena (ed.), Argentina, Brasil y  Chile: 
Integracion y  Seguridad (Caracas, Venezuela: FLACSO-Chile and Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1999), p. 
49, my translation.
52 See, among others, T. G. D. Costa, 'Condiciones para la Integracion de Politicas de Defensa en la 
Region del Mercosur,' Revista Seguridad Estrategica Regional vol. 7 (1995),
http://www.ser2000.org.ar/articulos-revista-ser/revista-7/costa.htm; J. Rial Roade, 'Actitud de las Fuerzas 
Armadas en el Mercosur,' Revista Seguridad Estrategica Regional vol. 7 (1995); and Comite De Estudios 
De Asuntos Latinoamericanos Y Del Caribe, El Rol de las Fuerzas Armadas en el Mercosur (Buenos 
Aires: Editorial Fratema and C.A.R.I., 1993).
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technical exchange, co-operation in the field of the arms industry, and co-operation for 
civil protection.53
Whereas Argentine circles were very keen on the possibility of setting up a 
common security arrangement, Brazilian accounts proved far more cautious, despite 
also acknowledging the existence of a crucial consensus among the Mercosur countries, 
for instance with regard to the maintenance and defence of democratic regimes, 
peaceful resolution of disputes, the relevance of regional integration, and even a gradual 
increase of military co-operation. According to Eliezer Rizzo, Brasilia defined the issue 
of regional security in terms of its disposition to co-operate and to expand military 
exchange with the countries of Mercosur and of South America. However, the 
government “does not envisage a project to constitute a regional security and/or defence 
institution.”54
In this same line, Brazil repeatedly highlighted that the mission o f the armed forces 
was to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of the state. Moreover, the government 
expressed concern about U.S. insistence on assigning the armed forces domestic and 
policing roles. The Brazilian Defence minister declared that
[t]he [Brazilian] Armed Forces do not have policing powers or rights. They do 
not deal with drugs trafficking issues, as other countries would like to see it 
done, even when those countries do not use their own military to deal with 
drugs related problems.55
In addition, Brazil has opposed the pressure of developed countries concerning the 
regulation of advances in military technology. Keeping an autonomist profile, it has 
called for a common strategy aiming to neutralise the obstacles put by industrialised 
states to the access of developing countries to sensitive technology. In this context, it 
was feared that Argentina’s announced ‘automatic alignment’ with the U.S could lead 
Buenos Aires to unconditionally back American security proposals. Thus, while
53 M. Hirst, 'Security Policies, Democratization, and Regional Integration in the Southern Cone,' in 
Jorge I. Dominguez (ed.), International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
Post-Cold War Era (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), pp. 113-114 and M. Donadio, 
'Integracion y Defensa Nacional en el Cono Sur,' Revista Seguridad Estrategica Regional vol. 8 (1995), 
http://www.ser2000.org.ar/articulos-revista-ser/revista-8/marce8.htm. For concrete proposals, see Druetta, 
Tibiletti, and Donadio, 'Nuevos Conceptos en Materia de Seguridad Estrategica Regional'; and the articles 
by former Argentine Defence Minister, Jaunarena, 'Cooperation Multilateral en Materia de Seguridad'; 
and by former Argentine Army Chief of Staff M. A. Balza, 'La Seguridad entre los Paises del Mercosur,' 
Revista Seguridad Estrategica Regional vol. 8 (1995).
54 E. R. D. Oliveira, 'El Caso Brasileno: la Politica de Defensa Nacional y la Seguridad Regional,' in 
Francisco Rojas Aravena (ed.), Argentina, Brasil y  Chile: Integracion y  Seguridad (Caracas, Venezuela: 
FLACSO-Chile and Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1999), p. 164, my translation.
55 G. M. D. C. Quintao, Minister of State for Defence of Brazil, 'Defence and Democracy: Brazil in 
the 21st Century,' presented at Brazil Talk, Canning House, London, 11 September 2000.
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supportive of a common strategy, Brazilians considered Argentine initiatives of defence 
integration ‘premature.’56
Yet, in the security field, along with the signing of treaties on nuclear matters, 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile signed the Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons in 1991, known as the Declaration of Mendoza. 
Later, also Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay adhered. In addition other joint 
developments have taken place. There has been a series o f yearly symposia on strategic 
studies attended by the Chiefs of Staff of all four Mercosur states. It started in 1987— 
that is, only two years after the Declaration of Iguazu—as a bilateral event where the 
Argentine and Brazilian Armed Forces’ Chiefs of Staff met with the aim of deepening 
the co-operative spirit of the Declaration. Later, Uruguay and Paraguay were also 
invited, and since 1992 Chile has joined the symposia as well.57
A positive outcome of these meetings was the 1998 Declaration of Ushuaia, by 
which the four Mercosur states together with Chile and Bolivia declared the Southern 
Cone a ‘zone of peace’; that is, a region free of weapons of mass destruction, and 
supporting international mechanisms aimed at the non-proliferation of those weapons. 
The declaration also announced the willingness to make the region a zone free of anti­
personnel mines, seeking to expand this condition to the whole continent; the 
commitment to expand and systematise the information provided to the U.N. Register of 
Conventional Weapons, and to establish a uniform methodology to report military 
spending; the reinforcement of co-operation in matters related to the peaceful and safe 
use of nuclear power and space science and technology; the strengthening of regional 
mechanisms of consultation and co-operation on security and defence issues, and the 
implementation of confidence building measures. Finally, through the Declaration of 
Ushuaia the signatory states committed their support to the OAS Commission on 
Hemispheric Security.58
56 See T. G. D. Costa, 'Mercosur, Seguridad Regional y Defensa Nacional en Brasil,' Revista 
Seguridad Estrategica Regional vol. 4 (1993). Although the author assumes responsibility for that paper, 
he attributes most of its content to a speech given by the Brazilian Ambassador Rubens Barbosa. See also, 
D. G. Vieira, 'La Variable Estrategica en el Proceso de Constitution del Mercosur,' Revista Seguridad 
Estrategica Regional vol. 5 (1994).
57 R. Diamint, 'Medidas de Confianza Mutua: Realizaciones y Propuestas para la Argentina,' Revista 
Seguridad Estrategica Regional vol. 2 (1992); and M. F. Sain, 'Seguridad Regional, Defensa Nacional y 
Relaciones Civico-Militares en Argentina,' in Francisco Rojas Aravena (ed.), Argentina, Brasil y  Chile: 
Integracion y  Seguridad (Caracas, Venezuela: FLACSO-Chile and Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1999).
58 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de la Republica Argentina, 'White Paper on National Defence,' 
produced by SER en el 2000 Data Base, (1998) accessed: 2000, http://www.ser2000.org.ar/protect/libro- 
argentina-eng/arg-indice.htm.
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During the years that followed the signing of the Treaty o f Asuncion, numerous 
military co-operation schemes were implemented. Co-operative activities involving the 
three branches of the armed forces have included joint exercises, periodic military 
visitations, exchange programmes for cadets, military observers attending their 
neighbours’ border exercises, and joint war game and peacekeeping operations.59
However, this co-operation in military affairs failed to translate into a programme 
involving military integration. The latter would imply “a defense system that unites 
states militarily to fend off potential aggressors, in which an attack against one is an 
attack against all,” and whose “nature, persistence, and depth of unity would vary 
depending on the exact arrangement.”60 Security integration could take the form of an 
alliance or a system of collective security, for instance.
While alliances function permanently, pool resources, intelligence and command 
systems, and focus on specific adversaries, collective security systems view security as 
indivisible and are organised according to a reactive mechanism by which an attack 
against any of its members is countered collectively. Both alliances and collective 
security agreements differ from a co-operative security arrangement in their internal 
organisation and aims. Co-operative security and its confidence and security building 
measures (CSBMs) work on the basis of prevention rather than reaction, and focus on 
the internal dynamics between members rather than on external enemies. Both alliances 
and collective security systems are defence systems, whereas a co-operative 
arrangement is a system of common security, but not o f common defence.
In the 1990s, co-operation and security in the Southern Cone were mostly about 
CSBMs. These have aimed to make information about one’s own capabilities and 
intentions available by increasing transparency, reliability, reciprocity, and 
communication between the armed forces. Although the benefits of moving beyond this 
type of co-operation to some kind of more committed military integration could be 
manifold, counterarguments have also been convincing.
First, military integration would have improved professionalism through exposure 
to other armed forces, exchange, joint exercises and action, and coordination of 
strategies. However, this has also been attainable through participation in U.N. 
peacekeeping operations, to which Argentina, Brazil and Chile contributed extensively 
during the 1990s. Second, it would have reflected in an actual institution the political
59 Pion-Berlin, 'Will Soldiers Follow? Economic Integration and Regional Security in the Southern 
Cone,' pp. 46-48.
60 Ibid., p. 47.
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will and commitment of the countries to maintain the Southern Cone as a ‘zone of 
peace.’ By doing so, they would have been giving clear signals to the international 
community and foreign investors about the long-term peaceful nature of the region. 
Nevertheless, this would not have differed very much from what security co-operation 
was already bringing about. Another advantage about setting up security integration that 
seemed not to be attainable through alternative arrangements involved the economic 
benefit of sharing the cost of access to hardware and technology purchased by other 
partners.
On the other hand, the purpose of military integration did not appear very clear, and 
obstacles seemed to outnumber potential benefits. The main reason for scepticism about 
possible military integration involved lack of support by the very armed forces in the 
region. According to Pion-Berlin, the military’s position was based on several 
considerations.61 First, the fiscal changes that neoliberalism and economic openness 
imposed on the region brought about a critical shrinkage o f defence budgets. Thus, the 
military tended to associate their own institutional losses—and possibly their 
organisational survival—with neoliberalism and processes of economic integration, 
opposing security integration as well.
Secondly, from a military point of view, the armed forces still perceived their 
primary mission to be the defence of the national territory, integrity, and sovereignty. 
The model of the European Union, where economic integration and defence alliance 
were giving way to political integration, was far from attractive. The sole idea of state 
borders fading away seemed too dangerous in the military’s eyes for them to support a 
project of military integration. Thirdly, a regional defence system would have inevitably 
involved a thorough reassessment of the overall strategic doctrine o f nations that until 
recently had defined each other as adversaries. This was something that many in the 
armed forces were not ready to do yet.
However, the main obstacle to a common defence system would have been its 
mission. It was suggested that a regional security force would have been most effective 
in handling transnational challenges, such as rising drugs trafficking, the persistence of 
terrorism, the emergence of non-ideological and drugs-linked insurgency movements, 
and environmental degradation.62 However, neither the military nor most of the political 
leaders in the region seemed to share this view, as it was explicitly stated by the
61 Ibid., pp. 58-62.
62 W. Perry and M. Primorac, 'The Inter-American Security Agenda,' Journal of Inter-American 
Studies and World Affairs vol. 36, no. 3 (1994) cited in Pion-Berlin, 'Will Soldiers Follow? Economic 
Integration and Regional Security in the Southern Cone,' p. 59.
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Brazilian minister of Defence in the passage quoted above. There were four reasons for 
this resistance. First, being these domestic—even if transnational—missions, it had to 
be the domestic security forces that dealt with such issues. Secondly, because of the 
nature of their training, the armed forces tended to define targets in terms of enemies, 
which may have easily resulted in abuses. And the fact that such policing 
responsibilities would have brought soldiers into direct contact with the civilian 
population may have revived old memories of human rights violations. Thirdly, it 
would have increased the chances of corruption, an evil that affected police forces but 
of which armed forces had managed to stay relatively clean. Fourthly, in strategic terms, 
states in the region had different threat perceptions. Security threats were heterogeneous 
throughout the area, and very often they combined in different forms in each country, 
thus leading to potentially critical situations. Even transnational issues could take a 
peculiar vernacular shape. This was the case, for example, o f narcoterrorism, the 
‘indigenous factor,’ poverty, and illegal immigration,63 affecting areas of Brazil, Bolivia 
and Paraguay.
If transnational/domestic missions were ruled out, an alternative justification for 
setting up a common defence system rested necessarily on an external, extra-regional 
enemy. However, there has not been such a regional or extra-regional adversary or 
threat during the 1990s (or at present) to validate such system. As Pion-Berlin rightly 
points out, “[u]ntil one can be found or manufactured, one that does not lead armies into 
ill-advised, unprofessional campaigns, then the raison d’etre of the regional alliance will 
be repeatedly questioned.”64
4.2. Security co-operation in the Southern Cone
Despite the apparent lack of mission of a formal military integration system, it can 
be argued that during the 1990s the Southern Cone became a zone of stable peace, and 
even a loose security community. The establishment of a concrete institution, such as an 
alliance or a common security pact, is not necessary for a region to become a security 
community. Furthermore, the existence of a security arrangement does not 
automatically ensure that the member states are part of a security community, as the 
case o f the Warsaw Pact shows. Soon after the Pact was dissolved, war in the Balkans 
broke out, proving that peace was only carefully kept by the communist authorities.
63 Balza, 'La Seguridad entre los Paises del Mercosur.'
64 Pion-Berlin, 'Will Soldiers Follow? Economic Integration and Regional Security in the Southern 
Cone,' pp. 61-62.
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Therefore, while military co-operation treaties do not always bring about community, 
pluralistic security communities can evolve despite the lack o f legal instruments 
backing them up.
Similarly, the existence of a pluralistic security community does not necessarily 
entail a process of security integration. Instead, it involves ruling out the mere 
consideration of the use of violent as a means to resolve interstate disputes among a 
group of states. Moreover, it involves the mutual confidence that no party to the 
community will consider to use force within it. To do so would be regarded as 
fratricidal violence, given that elites as well as societies have developed a sense of 
common belonging.
As has been extensively discussed already, this sense of community is given by the 
growth of a common identification, shared values, and common long-term interests. The 
perception of a common destiny worth preserving precludes the idea of resorting to 
force in the case of disputes. This shared identification of elites and societies sets apart a 
security community from a zone of stable peace. In line with this, the 1998 Argentine 
White Paper on National Defence declares that the old perception of the neighbour as a 
potential threat to one’s own security has been replaced by another one; that of their 
risks having also become one’s own.65
Thus, the road towards security community involves both a strong build-up of 
mutual military trust and a political effort aiming to develop a common identification in 
political, economic, and social circles at large. The set of confidence and security 
building measures, and regional symposia discussed earlier formed part of the armed 
forces’ contribution towards this goal. Not only have these activities increased the levels 
of confidence and trust in the region, but they have helped to develop personal ties 
between members of the forces of the different countries as well.66 In the case of Brazil 
and Argentina, where this process went the furthest, the armed forces stopped referring 
to ‘confidence building measures,’ since it was considered that these were no longer 
necessary. Instead, they started to call them ‘measures for co-operation and 
friendship.’67
In the same way as rapprochement took longer in the Argentine-Chilean dyad than 
in the Argentine-Brazilian one, also military co-operation proved to move at a slower
65 Ministerio De Defensa Nacional De La Republica Argentina, 'White Paper on National Defence.'
66 C. Castro, 'Comunalidades del Debate: Proyecciones de las Relaciones entre los Paises del ABC,' in 
Francisco Rojas Aravena (ed.), Argentina, Brasil y  Chile: Integracion y  Seguridad (Caracas, Venezuela: 
FLACSO-Chile and Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1999), p. 204.
67 P. L. De La Fuente, 'Confidence-Building Measures in the Southern Cone: A Model for Regional 
Stability,' Naval College War Review vol. Winter (1997).
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pace. Nevertheless, as it was seen, also in this case results were remarkable. 
Achievements were reinforced by the habit of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to 
collectively discuss decisions that may have a regional impact, and try to reach 
coordinated positions in regional and global regimes, such as the United Nations and the 
OAS, as well as at numerous ad hoc meetings, such as the Summit of the Americas, 
meetings of the Ministers of Defence, and conferences on security, as Rut Diamint 
highlights.68
In general, the combination of bilateral and multilateral schemes led by Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile regarding both economic and physical integration, as well as military 
co-operation have had a broader impact on the region. It has been pointed out that 
initiatives such as the Declaration of Mendoza banning chemical and biological 
weapons, the yearly Chiefs of Staff symposia, and the 1998 Declaration o f Ushuaia 
proclaiming the Southern Cone a ‘zone of peace’ free of weapons o f mass destruction, 
aimed at the inclusion of all the countries in the Southern Cone and as many in Latin 
America as possible. While to some extent the developments led by Argentina, Brazil, 
and Chile contributed towards Latin America’s pacification, they were certainly crucial 
in the stabilisation of peace in the Southern Cone.
5. Final remarks
As previous chapters showed, the desecuritization o f dyadic relations in the 
Southern Cone involved a complex process of cognitive change. As material contextual 
conditions changed, so too changed the perception of needs, interests, identities and 
visions of the others. In principle, this was enough to begin the process of stabilisation 
of peace. This sufficed to leave behind fragile and unstable situations, even when that 
only meant cold (or conditional) peaceful co-existence.
The return of democracies paved the way for the second stage of peace stabilisation, 
which implied the passage from negative to positive peace. With democratic 
governments in the region, the successful implementation of the integration project 
advanced. Political motivations encouraged not only new practices, but also new 
perspectives from which to look at the world and at one another. Regional integration 
deepened and intensified the development of mutual trust between states in the region, 
and eventually some o f its positive results spilt over into society. Under the lead of 
Argentina and Brazil, and fostered by the remarkable advances of Argentina and Chile,
68 Diamint, 'Integracion y Seguridad La Dialectica de los Actores Argentinos,' p. 53.
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the Southern Cone moved away from negative peace in the direction of positive, stable 
peace.
However, these processes of cognitive change and construction of mutual 
confidence, whereby former adversaries become true friends, take long to reach 
societies, and take even longer to consolidate within them When such a development 
was beginning to take place in the Southern Cone, Mercosur’s profile started to become 
increasingly commercial. Argentine and Brazilian foreign policies proved to be too 
divergent in the years of Menem and Cardoso for Mercosur to keep the pace of its 
political progress. In the late 1990s, Mercosur’s political content and base of support 
seemed to be thinning down, diluting the timid feeling of community that was only 
starting to arise.
Even in this case, it must be highlighted that relations between the states of the 
Southern Cone have improved to levels which were unthinkable only twenty or twenty- 
five years earlier. Although no peace process is ever irreversible, the development that 
began in the late 1970s with the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement has consolidated 
into a stable and strong regional peace in the 1980s and 1990s.
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION
The primary focus of this thesis has been the development of a zone of peace in the 
Southern Cone of Latin America. This transformation was far from an inevitable 
evolution o f the Southern Cone regional security complex. On the contrary, until the 
late 1970s the Southern Cone’s fate seemed inexorably marked by competition and 
distrust, and the resort to military force was not an unthinkable possibility. 
Nevertheless, after peaks of tension in the second half o f the 1970s, the political 
ambience in the region began to change. As the preceding chapters have argued, this 
transformation was the product of manifold changes in the countries’ perceptions, 
involving a reassessment of their self-perception and priorities, as well as their visions 
of neighbours and of the regional context. Since the 1980s, the relationships between 
Argentina and Brazil, and Chile and Argentina have stabilised the quality of their 
bilateral peace, moving away from negative towards positive peace. These shifts have 
resulted in the stabilisation of regional peace in the Southern Cone. However, this does 
not seem to be a generalised trend in Latin America, where many disputes and sources 
of mistrust have survived.
This concluding chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section briefly reviews the 
main arguments developed in the study, and draws some thoughts from the discussion. 
The second highlights the differences between the Southern Cone and the rest of Latin 
America. Finally, the third section ventures into the more contemporary scenario of the 
Southern Cone, which has been beyond the focus o f the study. It reconsiders the 
evolution of the Southern Cone in the late 1990s and early twenty-first century in terms 
of the main concepts used throughout the previous chapters; that is, the present 
condition of the Southern Cone regional security complex, its status as a zone of stable 
peace and, possibly, as a pluralistic security community.
1. Final thoughts on the study
This study was structured in four main parts, each covering different aspects of the 
research, and together gradually building up the argument that the Southern Cone 
evolved, since the 1950s, from a zone of negative into one of positive peace. In this 
process, the late 1970s and the 1980s stood out as a turning point in the quality of
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regional peace. It was shown how this transformation was the product of global, 
regional and domestic changes and that, whilst it may have sprung from material 
considerations, it also required, and indeed involved, a re-evaluation of perceptions and 
identities.
Part I served as general introduction and theoretical framework. In chapter one a 
few initial conceptual definitions and the principal subject of research were set out, as 
well as the main research questions and assumptions. The relevance o f the present study 
was also highlighted.
Chapter two, ‘Theories of Regional Security and Peace,” discussed the theoretical 
debate around the key concepts ‘security’ and ‘peace.’ After reviewing different 
theoretical perspectives, it was argued that within the context of this study security and 
peace were to be understood in rather broad terms, although still remaining closely 
associated to the consideration of use of violence or its avoidance, and with the 
possibility of developing trust. In this way, it was argued, the realists’ narrow focus on 
geopolitics and absence of war could be overcome, whilst retaining a defining element 
that would differentiate international/national security from other types of policy. The 
chapter expanded on notions that were then used throughout the dissertation, such as 
regional security complex, zones of peace, and security communities. These were 
defined as empirical developments embedded and rooted in the historical and 
geopolitical context of a certain region, rather than as necessarily constituting alliances 
or any other kind of formal political or military arrangement.
Three issues were highlighted in chapter two. Firstly, it was stressed that a focus on 
dyads and on regions induces a comprehensive study, including domestic, bilateral, 
regional, as well as extra-regional factors. Second, it drew attention to the advantages of 
taking a constructivist approach for explaining the changes in mutual and self­
perceptions, which in turn helped to explain the processes of desecuritization and 
rapprochement. A constructivist approach, it was argued, allows the incorporation of the 
element of rational calculations into the social learning process, thus acknowledging the 
presence of material factors in the construction of identities and perceptions. 
Accordingly, it was claimed that some element of calculation and self-interest must be 
present in the construction of any zone of peace and security community, and that this 
instance should be properly identified in the analysis. Finally, regional peace was 
understood as a relational concept, as well as a dynamic, although fragile and reversible, 
process. The type of peace that a region enjoys, it was argued, is marked by the level o f 
trust. When trust extends beyond the circles of the elites, and spills over bringing about
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mutual sympathies and, eventually, some kind of shared identity among the societies 
involved, then these can talk about the emergence of a security community.
Part II dealt with the ‘contexts’ surrounding the dyadic relationships. Chapter three 
discussed the domestic circumstances in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, while chapter four 
reviewed regional and hemispheric developments. Overall, both chapters shed light on 
the difficulties of the Southern Cone to promote stable peace, pointing to the role of 
domestic, regional and hemispheric factors in hindering the development of confidence 
and trust between states not only in the Southern Cone, but also within Latin America 
and between Latin American countries and the United States.
Chapter three, on “Domestic Conditions,” showed, through an enquiry of domestic 
developments in Argentina, Brazil and Chile between the 1950s and 1970s, that 
economic and political performance, as well as foreign policy traditions, significantly 
informed the vision the states had of themselves and the world surrounding them, of 
their own strengths and weaknesses, and of their policy options and opportunities. It 
demonstrated that the differences in the economic and political achievements in the 
three countries by the late 1970s had significantly shaped their outlook. The repressive 
regime of Argentina had not managed to bring the situation under control in political but 
above all in economic terms, whereas the authoritarian government in Chile appeared to 
be finding stability after the rather chaotic last years of Allende and first few years of 
Pinochet. This, in fact, did affect self-perceptions in each country. In Argentina, a 
faction of the junta felt the need for building more stable bases for external political and 
economic support, thus trying to avoid new fronts of conflicts. Nonetheless, internal 
opposition and contradictions inherent to the government prevented this from becoming 
a successful and sustained policy—which the case of the relationship with Chile in the 
1970s so clearly shows, as discussed in chapter five. In contrast, the Chilean situation 
gave the government a boost of confidence and sense of self-sufficiency that were 
reflected, for instance, in the country’s new foreign policy. In Brazil, the years of the 
‘economic miracle’ had gone, the special relationship with the United States had not 
only long finished, but the opposition of interests between the two was clear, and the 
decline of public support for the ‘military republic’ was stimulating the beginning of a 
slow process of abertura. The Brazilian self-perception of omnipotence of the previous 
years was also changing to a more vulnerable image, encouraging a re-assessment of its 
policy towards the region.
In addition to analysing the impact of domestic political and economic conditions, 
chapter three also examined how foreign policy traditions played a significant role in
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shaping regional relationships. Argentina and Brazil had traditionally maintained a high 
profile in regional affairs, which also continued during the military periods (not least as 
a consequence of their regional hegemony ambitions), whereas Pinochet’s Chile 
abruptly broke off with Santiago’s former foreign policy orientation of universal 
diplomatic relations. The key focus of the Pinochet administration in foreign affairs was 
the promotion of external trade and foreign investment. Beyond that, this government 
was not too concerned about international political isolationism
Thus it was shown how, especially in the case of Argentina, although also present in 
the case of Brazil, there were, potentially, significant material incentives to pursue 
rapprochement. In an unstable domestic and external scenario, the easing of tension 
between the two countries could solve a longstanding and expensive competition, 
prevent future conflicts, and advance coordination and co-operation in different areas, 
not least in nuclear and economic matters, in which they were being pressured and 
punished by developed countries and international creditors. In contrast, Chile had 
given priority to domestic economic and foreign trade policies that were showing signs 
of success, and as a consequence it saw no material incentives in solving its dispute with 
Argentina.
As was the focus of chapter four, the regional and hemispheric context have also to 
be taken into account as these importantly affected the countries’ perceived range of 
policy options, in addition to the role played by domestic performances and foreign 
policy traditions. After successive U.S. initiatives towards Latin America failed to bring 
the benefits that the latter expected, a sense of resentment and lack of reciprocity grew 
in the region. Furthermore, distrust and resentment were also the dominant patterns of 
bilateral relations between many Latin American countries. It was shown that Latin 
American history was full of regional and bilateral controversies, dormant conflicts, and 
unforgotten and unresolved claims. Almost every country had had a border dispute with 
a neighbour, or had intervened, more openly or more covertly, in its neighbours’ 
domestic affairs or international conflicts. A key feature of the region was the complex 
set of regional allegiances that resulted in its ‘checkerboard’ design.1
Another important regional feature was the apparent absence of war, despite a 
significant potential for war. In consequence, it was argued that Latin America as a 
whole was, during most of its history, a zone of negative peace, in which states were 
wary and cautious, and relationships were dominated by mistrust and suspicion. This
1 P. Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: the Geopolitics of South America (Austin, TX: University 
of Texas Press, 1997).
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was the case of the Southern Cone as well, given that its main two dyads, the Argentine- 
Chilean and the Argentine-Brazilian, did not develop trustful, transparent and co­
operative relationships until the 1990s and 1980s, respectively, as Parts III and IV 
showed.
Without repeating in full the arguments of the particular cases discussed in Part III 
(chapters five, “Bilateral Relations between Argentina and Chile,” and six, “Bilateral 
Relations between Argentina and Brazil”) a few brief points summarise the argument 
here. The comparison of the peaks of tension and subsequent processes of 
desecuritization in the two dyads further supported the claim that domestic factors and 
visions of self and other affected the range of perceived policy options, precluding or 
advancing—depending on the case—an early bilateral rapprochement. The presence of 
concrete territorial disputes between Chile and Argentina, meanwhile, added intense 
nationalistic sentiments to the controversy, involving wider circles of society—although 
just to a limited extent due to the nature of both regimes. The Chilean-Argentine 
relationship contrasted with the more implicit and covert competition for regional 
prestige, which dominated relations between Brazil and Argentina. As a consequence, 
the resolution of the former disputes proved to be more protracted and difficult than the 
Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement, remaining on hold for many years and then only 
advancing very gradually.
In fact, until the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the relationship between 
Argentina and Chile had been one of negative peace, oscillating between fragile and 
unstable peace for most of the time. The escalation of the dispute in 1977 and 1978 
moved the dyad definitely into a situation of fragile peace, seriously threatening to 
devolve into war by the end of that period. After the change of regime in Argentina in 
late 1983, the relationship moved from unstable to cold peace, hence starting a long 
process of stabilisation.
Argentina and Brazil initiated their process of rapprochement when neither state 
was under a democratic regime. Once the hydroelectric issue had been solved, the 
absence of territorial disputes facilitated the adoption of more positive images of one 
another with the prospective goal of easing tension and pursuing co-operation. The shift 
from unstable to cold peace, following the 1979 Treaty of Itaipu-Corpus, was quick and, 
to a certain extent, audacious, as co-operation began in one of the most sensitive fields 
and where competition had been most obstinate—the nuclear field.
The fact that both the Argentine-Brazilian and Argentine-Chilean processes of 
rapprochement were initiated when at least one of the governments was still
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authoritarian showed that the type of regime did not play such an important role in the 
initial stage of the process of peace stabilisation. It is not, however, a conclusion of this 
study that military dictatorships are (the most) appropriate actors to conduct 
rapprochement processes. In fact, the tensest peaks and the instances in which war 
seemed closest happened under such regimes, and not under democracies.
Nonetheless, the observation that the long and gradual processes of desecuritization 
started under at least one authoritarian government appeared at the beginning of this 
research as an empirical curiosity. The study of the cases showed that the military 
governments in the Southern Cone were able to move between different types of 
negative peace: that is, they were able to ease tension, achieving, at best, a relationship 
of cold or conditional peace. According to the typology presented in chapter two, cold 
or conditional peace is a type of negative peace, where the absence of trust, as well as of 
war, is the main feature. Nonetheless, as it became clear in chapter seven, for this 
process to continue towards the consolidation and stabilisation of peace, for it to 
become positive peace, and, eventually, for an incipient security community to emerge, 
the presence of democratic regimes was indeed a determining factor.
In the case of Chile and Argentina, the most striking changes took place once both 
countries were ruled by (neo)hberal democracies. Then, the Chilean government 
returned to its traditional foreign policy orientation towards the region after 17 years of 
political isolationism, and Argentina had an active interest in maintaining a high (and 
compromise-inclined) profile in international affairs, partly as a strategy to attract 
foreign investment. The last few border issues could be resolved, and interdependence 
grew between the two states. Even if only reaching limited circles of society, such as the 
political and business elites, the mutual image changed, and with it, the quality o f the 
bilateral peace, which in the 1990s finally became a positive, stable peace.
For Brazil and Argentina, the Itaipu-Corpus Treaty and the nuclear co-operation 
agreements brought about a change of mutual attitudes, which became a solid basis for 
the transformation of their cold peace into stable peace after the restoration of 
democracy in both countries in the mid-1980s. Thus, also in this case democratisation 
was key in accelerating the process of peace stabilisation and consolidation.
The period that followed the initial steps towards rapprochement and the restoration 
of democracy in the region was dealt with in chapter seven, in Part IV. This last Part 
turned to an exploration of the Southern Cone at the regional level, after the chapters in 
Parts II and III had focused on the domestic, hemispheric and dyadic levels.
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The creation of Mercosur in 1991 was the almost exclusive result of the Argentine- 
Brazilian partnership, which had been launched in 1985. Chapter seven claimed that, 
under the lead of Argentina and Brazil, and fostered by the remarkable advances of 
Argentina and Chile, the Southern Cone moved away from negative peace in the 
direction of positive, stable peace. Furthermore, it was argued that in the early 1990s 
Brazil and Argentina saw the incipient emergence of a security community between the 
two. This happened as not only political and business elites became aware of the 
importance of the partnership and the compatibilities and deep commitment between the 
two states, but also wider social circles converged on this view. With the enthusiasm of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, a feeble common identification begun to arise among 
some parts of both societies, as a result of shifts in their mutual perceptions and growing 
levels o f trust and confidence. Undoubtedly, this constituted an enormous political 
triumph.
The spillover effect of both the Brazilian-Argentine desecuritization process and the 
equally remarkable process of rapprochement between Chile and Argentina on the 
Southern Cone security complex entirely transformed the outlook o f the region. The 
shift from negative to positive peace is never an easy one, as demonstrated by the huge 
political will that was involved in these two cases. The result at the end of the period 
under study, in the early 1990s, was that violence had become unthinkable as a means to 
resolve dispute between states in the Southern Cone. However, this has not been the 
situation in many other areas of Latin America, which is discussed next. And even in 
the Southern Cone, although the positive outcome has not been overturned, in the last 
few years a number of crises in the region have slowed down impetus of the early 
1990s. This is the issue of the last section.
2. Peace and security in Latin America
Many differences have marked the evolution of peace in the Southern Cone vis-a- 
vis other areas in Latin America, where, like in the Southern Cone, the relative absence 
of open interstate violence has been a key feature throughout the twentieth century. 
However, in the last fifteen years a series of issues that either remained in the security 
agenda from the 1980s or before, or became securitized, thus making it onto the security 
agenda, threatened to destabilise and deteriorate the already negative regional peace.
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Monica Serrano identifies five areas of domestic or transnational problems in Latin 
American states that have had external repercussions.2 These are ethnic self- 
determination, environment, insurgency and civil violence, migrations, and weapons 
and drugs trafficking and organised crime in general. While the countries most affected 
by these have been Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Mexico, securitization of issues such 
as drugs trafficking has often been induced by the U.S.. Furthermore, the potential 
capacity of these ‘security threats’ to spill over across national borders has often led to 
increasing tensions with neighbouring countries.
The case of the Colombian guerrilla—a complex issue involving insurgent and 
paramilitary groups as well as narcotraffic activities—is paradigmatic. In the last few 
years regional tension has been rising, with paramilitary leaders threatening to 
internationalise the conflict. In addition, Venezuela, a country with which Colombia still 
has pending maritime issues, has been trying to establish dialogue with the guerrilla. 
Ecuador, instead, has accepted U.S. military presence in its territory, whereas Brazil has 
undertaken a unilateral military build-up on its border with Colombia. U.S.-sponsored 
Plan Colombia against drugs trafficking, far from making Colombia’s neighbours feel 
more secure, has led to a strengthening of control in border areas in Venezuela, Peru, 
Panama, Ecuador and Brazil.4
Alongside these ‘new’ security problems, some old-fashioned border issues have 
survived, further preventing the emergence of trust and the stabilisation of peace. In 
1995, Ecuador and Peru clashed over territory, and three years after the armed 
confrontation, government officials in both Quito and Lima were once again initiating a 
verbal escalation, showing that distrust and negative mutual visions had not been 
overcome.5
Finally, as Carlos Alberto Montaner highlights, the late 1990s also were a tense 
period in Central America. Tension grew between Belice and Guatemala after the
2 See M. Serrano, 'America Latina: La Nueva Agenda de Seguridad,' Foro International vol. XXXVI, 
no. 1 (1998), http://www.hemerodigital.unam.mx/ANUIES/colmex/foros/151/sec_8.htm.
3 Indeed, Carlos Castano, leader of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia is reported to have warned 
neighbouring Venezuela, “if guerrilla leaders are going to find refuge in Caracas, then the Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia [paramilitary group] will reach Caracas.” See 'Amenaza a Venezuela el Conflicto 
Colombiano,' La Nation Line, (Buenos Aires: 16 March 1999),
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/99/03/16/xll.htm. Ecuador agreed to U.S. military presence in Manta; and 
Brazil undertook a unilateral build-up on its border with Colombia, “including the inauguration [...] of its 
$1.4 billion Amazon-wide radar system, SIVAM (Sistema de Vigilancia da Amazonia).” G. Kourous, 
'Return of the National Security State?,' Americas Program (Silver City, MN: Interhemispheric Resource 
Center, 18 November 2002), p. 6.
4 See 'Los Paises Vecinos ya Toman Medidas para Impedir Acciones Guerrilleras,' La Nation Line, 
(Buenos Aires: 26 July 1999), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/00/08/26/x04.htm.
5 See 'Acusaciones Cruzadas entre Peru y Ecuador,' La Nation Line, (Buenos Aires: 1 August 1998), 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/98/08/01/x07.htm.
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murder of two farmers, a fact that served to awaken old territorial claims of Guatemala; 
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica for the incursion of the latter’s police into the 
former’s territory; and between Honduras and Nicaragua regarding maritime territory.6 
Although most of these Central American instances were successfully contained, they 
reflect the negative character of regional peace.
Does the survival of such issues prevent a change of perception of neighbours and 
of the region, or does the maintenance of hostile mutual visions prevent the resolution 
of disputes and the overcoming of distrust? This thesis has argued that the two shifts- 
tend to go hand in hand and are in fact two sides of the same coin. In any case, political 
will is a key factor to put in motion the mechanism for this transformation. In the 
absence o f it—that is, in the absence of a prevailing will to pursue a process of 
desecuritization—the enterprise becomes unattainable.
3. The present of the Southern Cone and its prospects
In the 1990s, with neoliberal administrations in Argentina and Brazil, Mercosur 
adopted a primarily economic and commercial profile, playing down the importance of 
its initial political spirit. This shift happened at a time of global financial crises that 
spread from Mexico, in 1994, to East Asia, in 1997. Not long afterwards, in 1998, the 
economies of Russia and Brazil also crashed, adding the ‘vodka’ and the ‘caipirinha’ (or 
‘samba’) effects to the ‘tequila’ and ‘dragon’ (or ‘saki’) effects, as the crises came to be 
known.
As Mercosur’s attention turned to trade, the parties failed to comply with several 
commercial agreements they had signed earlier, mainly by resorting to the imposition of 
different types of non-tariff barriers to intra-Mercosur trade. Not surprisingly, the result 
was the extension of the list of trade conflicts and a decline o f credibility o£ and 
confidence in, new negotiations. These drawbacks had been minimised in a context of 
trade expansion, such as the one that took place until 1998, but the Brazilian currency 
devaluation of 1999 and the simultaneous recessions in Brazil and Argentina aggravated 
the problem and halted the process of integration. What followed were bitter trade 
disputes between Mercosur’s two largest partners extending until mid-2000. The recent 
Argentine financial and economic crisis that resulted in the end of the convertibility 
plan (2001/2002) slowed down the development of the Common Market even more.
6 C. A. Montaner, 'Hay que Matar al Monstruo en la Cuna,' La Nation Line, (Buenos Aires: 5 March 
2000), http://www.lanacicxi.com.ar/suples/enfoques/0011/plO.htm.
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In the absence, or at best the thinning down, of the political basis that had 
underpinned the co-operation programme in the 1980s, these circumstances implied an 
important reversal of Argentine-Brazilian relations, given that the most solid grounds 
for shared benefits had come to be the now-declining commercial exchange. In other 
words, both the Brazilian and the Argentine crises have had important implications for 
regional trade, bilateral relations, and even for the viability o f Mercosur, and this, in 
turn, has undoubtedly had an effect on their mutual perceptions.
Indeed, the fact that the emergence of a security community between the two main 
partners in Mercosur has only developed slowly despite an early enthusiastic beginning 
can be partially explained by the trade disputes and the partners’ economic and political 
instabilities. Major crises provoked doubts in the responsiveness and predictability of 
the other party as a trustworthy partner. On the other hand, Mercosur has so far survived 
every crisis, and, repeatedly, crises have been followed by renewed enthusiasm to ‘re­
launch’ the programme. One could thus interpret that periods o f tension merely 
highlight the partners’ own vulnerabilities and the on-going need to co-ordinate long­
term action.
The relationship between Argentina and Chile, and Chile and the region, in turn, has 
advanced mainly in the field of the economy, although achievements in other areas, 
such as defence and security, have been remarkable, as examined in chapter seven. 
However, Chile’s economic success—in contrast with its neighbours’ problems and at 
times the apparent lack of a solid integration project—makes Santiago look for 
alternatives and partnerships beyond the region. This, o f course, also has an impact on 
mutual and self-perceptions.
One way or another, the present study hopes to have opened some spaces that can 
shape an interesting future research agenda. In this sense, the Southern Cone provides a 
rich ground on which to explore how economic and financial crises may affect mutual 
perceptions, and how these, in turn, may have an impact on the quality of peace and 
regional security. At the turn of the new century, the process of consolidation of peace 
that was beginning to develop into a Southern Cone security community had been to 
some extent reversed. Nevertheless, the absolute confidence of states in the region that 
no other fellow state will resort to violence to solve disagreements implies that stable 
peace remains on secure ground.
The most solid base, however, seems to be political rather than economic. The 
newly elected authorities in Buenos Aires and Brasilia have expressed their firm 
decision to work in this direction and to strengthen their political alliance. If the
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Southern Cone countries succeed in recreating a common political foundation on which 
to build a sincere commitment to shared interests and common perspectives, then the 
benefits of closer interaction and more familiarity with one another are likely to spill 
over into larger sections of society. This way, hopefully, social actors may become 
active participants in the process of the further consolidation of peace. If this occurs, it 
appears that a more sustained security community will evolve in the Southern Cone.
Appendix: Interviews
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1. Dr Juan Alemann
Interviewed in Buenos Aires on 27 March 2001.
Argentine Treasury Secretary, 1976-1981.
2. Ambassador Joao Hermes Pereira de Arauio
Interviewed in Rio de Janeiro on 6 April 2001.
Secretary and Counsellor at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, 1964-1971. 
Head of the River Plate Basin and Chile Division, Itamaraty, Brazilian Ministry of 
Foreign Relations, 1972.
Brazilian Ambassador in Buenos Aires, 1984-1987.
3. Ambassador Mario Gibson Barboza
Interviewed in Rio de Janeiro on 5 April 2001.
Minister-Counsellor at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, 1956-1959.
Brazilian Ambassador in Asuncion, 1967.
Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations, 1969-1973.
4. Minister Gustavo Cristian Bobrik
Interviewed on the telephone in Buenos Aires on 26 March 2001.
Held positions at the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and 
Cult in the following Departments:
Working Group on Special Issues: Papal Mediation (Beagle Channel), 1983-1984. 
Department of Borders, 1984-1987, and 1991.
Office for Arbitration (Oficina para el Arbitraje-O.P.E.A.), Arbitration on Milestone 
62-Monte Fitz Roy (Laguna del Desierto case), 1991-1995.
Consultive Council on the South Atlantic (CASUR), since 2000.
5. Prof Amado Luiz Cervo
Interviewed in Brasilia on 2 April 2001.
Editor o f ‘Revista Brasileira de Politica Intemacional. ’
History Department, University of Brasilia.
6. Ambassador Marcos Henrique C. Cortes
Interviewed in Rio de Janeiro on 4 April 2001.
Minister-Counsellor at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, 1974-1978.
7. Prof Rut Diamint
Interviewed in Buenos Aires on 17 August 2000.
Department of International Relations, University Torcuato Di Telia, Argentina.
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Specialist in civil-military relations and defence.
8. Prof Carlos Escud6
Interviewed in Buenos Aires on 18 April 2001.
9. Carlos da Fonseca
Interviewed in Brasilia on 2 April 2001.
Department of Mercosul, Itamaraty, Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations.
10. Minister Marcelo Giusto
Interviewed in Buenos Aires on 27 March 2001.
Argentine Embassy in Santiago de Chile, 1984-1989 and 1992-1998.
Chief of Cabinet of the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, since 2002.
11. Ambassador Jos6 Botafogo Goncalves 
Interviewed in Brasilia on 3 April 2001.
Special Representative of the Brazilian President on Mercosul Affairs, 2001-2002. 
Brazilian Ambassador in Buenos Aires, since 2002.
12. Ambassador Ramiro Elvsio Saraiva Guerreiro
Interviewed in Rio de Janeiro on 6 April 2001.
Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations, 1979-1985.
13. Dr Jose Horacio Jaunarena
Interviewed in Buenos Aires on 19 April 2001.
Argentine Undersecretary of Defence, 1983-1984.
Argentine Secretary of Defence, 1984-1986.
Argentine Minister of Defence, 1986-1989, and since 2001.
14. Dr Jorge Horacio Lavopa
Interviewed in Buenos Aires on 30 March 2001.
Chairman, Committee of Latin American Affairs, CARI, Argentine Council for 
International Relations.
15. Dr Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz
Interviewed on the telephone in Buenos Aires on 17 April 2001.
Argentine Minister of Economy, 1976-1981.
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16. Ambassador Carlos Manuel Muniz
Interviewed in Buenos Aires on 16 April 2001.
Argentine Ambassador in Brasilia, 1959-1962.
Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult, 1962-1963. 
Argentine Ambassador in the United States, 1971-1973.
President of CARI, Argentine Council for International Relations.
17. Prof Jose Paradiso
Interviewed in Buenos Aires on 30 March 2001.
Head of International Relations Department, University of El Salvador, Argentina.
18. Cel so de Tar so Pereira
Interviewed in Brasilia on 2 April 2001.
Department of Mercosul, Itamaraty, Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations.
19. Prof Mario Rapoport
Interviewed in Buenos Aires on 18 April 2001.
Director of the Economic and Social History Research Institute, Faculty of 
Economics, University of Buenos Aires.
20. Ambassador Eduardo dos Santos
Interviewed in Brasilia on 3rd April 2001.
Secretary at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, 1979-1984.
Special Consultant of the Brazilian President’s Cabinet, 1999-2002.
Brazilian Ambassador in Montevideo, since 2002.
21. Marcelo Stubrin
Interviewed in Buenos Aires on 17 August 2000.
Representative in the National Chamber of Deputies of Argentina, 1983-1985, 
1985-1989, 1995-1999 and 1999-2003.
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Chamber of Deputies of 
Argentina, 1999-2001.
Participant in the reserved meetings with Chilean representatives to find a solution 
to the dispute of Hielos Continentales/Campos de Hielo Sur, 1998.
22. Ambassador Juan Jose Uranga
Interviewed on the telephone in Brasilia on 3 April 2001.
Argentine Ambassador in Brasilia.
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